THE CRUSADES AND THE NEAR EAST

Edited by
Conor Kostick

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The crusades are often seen as epitomising a period when hostility between the Christian West and the Muslim Near East reached an all-time high. As this edited volume reveals, however, the era was one which saw both conflict and cohabitation.

Tackling such questions as whether medicinal and architectural innovations came to Europe as a direct result of the crusades, and why and how peace treaties and intermarriages were formed between the different cultures, a distinguished group of contributors reveals how the Holy Wars led on the one hand to a reinforcement of the beliefs and identities of each side, but on the other to a growing level of cultural exchange and interaction. This volume breaks new ground in exploring not only the conflict between the Christian and the Muslim worlds, but the impact of this conflict on the cultural evolution of European and Near Eastern thought and practices. Utilising the latest scholarship and original studies of the sources, this survey sheds new light on the cultural realities of East–West relations and marks a new departure for studies of the crusades.

Contributors include Léan Ní Chléirigh, Susan B. Edgington, John France, Yehoshua Frenkel, Yvonne Friedman, Bernard Hamilton, Natasha Hodgson, Sini Kangas, Jürgen Krüger, Alan V. Murray and Chris Wright.

Conor Kostick teaches on the crusades at Trinity College Dublin. A former winner of the Dublinia Medieval Essay Competition and holder of a Trinity College Gold Medal, his historical works include *The Social Structure of the First Crusade* (2008) and *The Siege of Jerusalem* (2009).

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CONTRIBUTORS

Léan Ní Chléirigh is currently researching the collective and ethnic terminology of the early Latin chronicles of the First Crusade. The Irish Research Council for Humanities and Social Sciences funds this doctoral research. She has recently published a chapter entitled 'Anti-Byzantine polemic in the *Dei Gesta per Francos* of Guibert, Abbot of Nogent-sous-Coucy' in Savvas Neocleous (ed.), *Sailing to Byzantium* (Newcastle: CSP, 2009).

Susan B. Edgington teaches Latin and medieval history at Queen Mary College, University of London, where she is an honorary research fellow. She has a BA and Ph.D. from the University of London, and recently added a postgraduate Diploma in the History of Medicine. Her *magnum opus*, an edition and translation of the crusade history of Albert of Aachen, was published in 2007 (Oxford: Clarendon Press), and she is also the co-author of *Walter the Chancellor's Antiochene Wars* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) and co-editor of *Gendering the Crusades* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2002), as well as the author of many articles and essays on aspects of the crusades and the history of medicine.

John France is Professor Emeritus, Swansea University and former director of the James Callaghan Institute for Conflict Studies. His main works are *The Crusades and the Expansion of Catholic Christendom 1000–1714* (London: Routledge, 2005); *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades 1000–1300* (London: UCL Press, 1999); and *Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Yehoshua Frenkel is Senior Lecturer at the University of Haifa, teaching medieval history of the Arab Middle East. His recent publications include: 'Piety and Charity in Late Medieval Egypt and Syria', in Miriam Frenkel and Yaacov Lev (eds), *Charity and Giving in Monotheistic Religions* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009); 'Dream Accounts in the Chronicles of the Mamluk Period', in Louise Marlow (ed.), *Dreaming across Boundaries: The Interpretation of Dreams in Islamic Land* (Cambridge, MA: Ilex Foundation/Harvard University Press, 2008); and 'Public Projection of Power in Mamluk Bilad al-Sham', *Mamluk Studies Review*, 11.1 (2007).

Yvonne Friedman of Bar-Ilan Unversity was recently Visiting Fellow, Lucy Cavendish College, Cambridge. Her many publications include the monograph *Encounter between Enemies: Captivity and Ransom in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Leiden: Brill, 2002); as co-editor, *Medieval Studies in Honour of Avrom Saltman* (Jerusalem: Bar-Ilan Press, 1995); 'Captivity and Ransom: The Experience of Women' in S.B. Edgington and S. Lambert (eds), *Gendering the Crusades*; and 'Gestures of Conciliation: Peacemaking Endeavours in the Latin East' in Iris Shagrir, Ronnie Ellenblum and Jonathan Riley-Smith (eds), *In Laudem Hierosolymitani* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).

Bernard Hamilton is Professor Emeritus of Crusading History, University of Nottingham. He is president of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East. His publications include *The Leper King and His Heirs: Baldwin IV and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); *Religion in the Medieval West* (London: Arnold, 2003 [1986]); and *The Latin Church in the Crusader States: The Secular Church* (London: Variorum, 1980). A collection of his articles is available in *Monastic Reform, Catharism, and the Crusades (900–1300)* (London: Variorum, 1979).

Natasha Hodgson is Senior Lecturer in Medieval History in the Department of History, Heritage and Geography at Nottingham Trent University. Her Ph.D. thesis considered the perception of women in the narratives of crusade and settlement, and led to the publication of a number of articles. Her monograph was published in 2007 as *Women, Crusading and the Holy Land in Historical Narrative* (Woodbridge: Boydell). Her current research focuses the relationship between crusading and ideals of masculinity and chivalry, and she is currently working on a book-length study entitled *Gender and the Crusades*.

Sini Kangas is a research fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki. Her present research project concerns the role of children within the crusading movement between the years 1100 and 1300. Her publications include the forthcoming monograph *The Concept of Crusader Violence* (Leiden: Brill 2011); and as co-editor: Sini Kangas, Marjatta Hietala and Heikki Ylikangas (eds), *Historia eilen ja tänään. Historiantutkimuksen ja arkeologian suunnat Suomessa 1908-2008* (Helsinki: Suomen Tiedeseura, 2009).

Conor Kostick teaches on the subject of the crusades at Trinity College Dublin. His publications include the monographs *The Siege of Jerusalem: Conquest and Crusade in 1099* (London: Hambledon, 2009) and *The Social Structure of the First Crusade* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), as well as the anthology, as editor, *Medieval Italy, Medieval and Early Modern Women: Essays in Honour of Christine Meek* (Dublin: Four Courts, 2010). His most recent crusade-related article is 'Social Unrest and the Failure of Conrad III's March through Anatolia', *German History* 28.2 (2010).

Jürgen Krüger is Professor of Art History at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology KIT. His publications include, as co-editor, *Transfer: Innovationen in der Zeit der Kreuzzüge* (Speyer: Pfälzischen Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften, 2006); *Die Dormitio-Basilika in Jerusalem: Dormitio Beatae Mariae Virginis, Benediktinerabtei* (Karlsruhe: Arte Factum, 2007); *Klosterlandschaft Maulbronn* (Karlsruhe: Arte Factum, 2008). His most recent article is 'The Crown Prince and His Ambassador: Two Individuals in the Service of Roman Archaeology', in Nathalie de Haan, Martijn Eickhoff and Marjan Schwegman (eds), *Archaeology and National Identity in Italy and Europe 1800–1950* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008).

Alan V. Murray studied History, German Language and Literature, and Folk Studies at the universities of St Andrews, Salzburg and Freiburg, and received his Ph.D. for a dissertation on the origins of the nobility of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. He is currently Senior Lecturer in Medieval Studies at the University of Leeds and editorial director of the *International Medieval Bibliography*. He has written numerous studies on the Latin states of Outremer, crusade and mission in the Baltic region, and the historiography and literature of the crusades. He is author of the monograph *The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem: A Dynastic History* (Oxford: Unit for Prosopographical Research, 2000) and editor of the four-volume reference work *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2006), as well as of several collections of essays on the crusades.

Chris Wright received his Ph.D. in History from the University of London in 2006, for a thesis on the history of the Genoese Gattilusio dynasty of Lesbos in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. A chapter of this dissertation, examining the Gattilusio lordships' interaction with the crusades, was awarded the Norman Hepburn Baynes Essay Prize for 2006. He is currently adapting his doctoral thesis for publication by Cambridge University Press, while teaching at Royal Holloway, University of London.

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Funding from the Centre also allowed me to invite Professor John France to Trinity College Dublin, where he delivered the talk which now forms Chapter 1 of this book to a packed audience. Trinity Long Room Hub also supported the visit of Professor France to Trinity College and in addition provided funding for me to obtain professionally drawn maps and diagrams. I am very appreciative of the award from Trinity Long Room Hub and – once more – of the efforts of the staff at Freeline Graphics for their compositions. Copyright to the maps and figures resides with the respective contributors.

ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana – History of the Journey to Jerusalem*, Susan B. Edgington (ed. and tr.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007
AC	Anna Comnena, *The Alexiad*, E.R.A. Sewter (tr.), Middlesex: Penguin, 2003 [1979]
BD	*Baldrici episcopi Dolensis Historia Jerosolimitana*, *RHC Occ.* IV.1–111
BEO	*Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales de l'Institut Français de Damas*
BnF	Bibliothèque nationale de France
BSOAS	*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*
CCCM	*Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis*
EA	Ekkehard of Aura, 'Chronica', *Frutolfs und Ekkehards Chroniken und die Anonyme Kaiserchronik*, Franz-Josef Schmale and Irene Schmale-Ott (eds), Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972
EHR	*English Historical Review*
Fath	Imad al-Din al-Isfahâni, *Kitāb al-Fath al-Qussi fi' l-Fath al-Qudsi*, H. Massé (tr.), as *Conquête de la Syrie et de la Palestine par Saladin*, Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1972
FC	Fulcher of Chartres, *Historia Hierosolymitana (1095–1127)*, H. Hagenmeyer (ed.), Heidelberg: Winter, 1913
GF	*Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum*, R. Hill (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962
GN	Guibert of Nogent, *Dei Gesta per Francos*, R.B.C. Huygens (ed.), *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis* 77a, Turnhout: Brepols, 1996
JK	John Kinnamos, *Epitome rerum ab Ioanne et Alexio Comnenis gestarum*, Augustus Meineke (ed.), *Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae* 28, Bonn, 1836
JSAI	*Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*

ME	Matthew of Edessa, 'Chronicle', in *Armenia and the Crusades: Tenth to Twelfth Centuries*, A.E. Dostourian (ed. and tr.), Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993
MGH SS	*Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores*, *Scriptores* in *Folio*, 32, Berlin: Weidmann, 1826–1934
NC	Niketas Choniates, *Nicetae Choniatae Historia*, Jan Louis van Dieten (ed.), *Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae*, 11, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1975
OD	Odo of Deuil, *The Journey of Louis VII to the East*, V.G. Berry (ed.), New York: W.W. Norton, 1948
OV	Orderic Vitalis, *The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis*, Marjorie Chibnall (ed.), 6, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968–80
PL	J.P. Migne (ed.), *Patrologiae cursus completus*: *Series Latina*, Paris: Migne, 1844–66
RA	Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem*, *RHC Oc.*, III.235–309
RC	Ralph of Caen, *Gesta Tancredi in expeditione Hierosolymitana auctore Radulfo Cadomensi*, *RHC Oc.*, IV.587–716
RCEA	*Repertoire Chronologique d'Epigraphie Arabe*
Regesta Regni	*Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani: 1097–1291*, Reinhold Röhricht (ed.), Innsbruck: Wagner, 1893
RH	Roger of Howden, *Chronica magistri Rogeri de Houedene*, William Stubbs (ed.), Rolls Series 51, 4, London: Longman, 1868–71
RHC Arm.	*Recueil des historiens des croisades: documents armeniens*, 2, Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1869–1906
RHC Lois	*Recueil des historiens des croisades: les Assises de Jérusalem*, 2, Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1841–3
RHC Oc.	*Recueil des historiens des croisades*, *Historiens occidentaux*, 5, Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1841–95
RHC Or.	*Recueil des historiens des croisades*, *Historiens orientuax*, 5, Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1872–1906
RM	Robert the Monk, *Historia Iherosolimitana*, *RHC Oc.*, III.717–882
WT	William of Tyre, *Chronique*, R.B.C. Huygens (ed.), *CCCM*, 63, Turnhout: Brepols, 1986

INTRODUCTION

Conor Kostick

Modern conflicts in the Middle East and the War on Terror have created enormous interest in the history of the region and in the origins of Christian–Muslim conflict. In particular, the phenomenon of crusading has come under intense scrutiny as increasing numbers of modern historians have turned their attention to the subject, producing a flurry of studies to meet the demands of readers and students wanting to understand the medieval origins of conflict between the West and the Near East. There has also been a huge increase in the numbers of researchers investigating narrower and narrower aspects of the crusades, as well as a noticeable increase in the availability of modern editions of source materials. The level of discussion around the subject, as reflected in the growing number of papers concerning the crusades read at history conferences, has also grown rapidly. And it is from this wave of scholarship that I have solicited the essays contained in this book on the grounds that they were original, that they enhanced our understanding of the Near East in the era of the crusades, and that they were investigations of previously unresolved assumptions concerning the practice of crusading in the Near East.

Broadly speaking, these are cultural studies, and the conscious assembly of a volume of cultural histories concerning the crusades is unusual for the discipline. But with so much work having been done on the political history of the crusades and also on the question of the motivation of the crusaders, it seemed to me that the priority for a new anthology was to look for areas of study that were relatively underdeveloped, but were also fertile in their possibilities. As a result, this book is a step towards a dialogue between crusading historians and practitioners of Cultural Studies in its narrow sense: that inchoate discipline which (deliberately) eludes succinct definition but which has taken a sharp turn from its origins in the work of historians such as E.P. Thompson and the *Annales* school, to embrace post-modernism, post-colonialism, gender studies and self-reflexivity. Cultural Studies is a discipline that above all mistrusts generalisations and perhaps for this reason has not particularly appealed to practitioners of medieval history, despite the importance of the writings of Marc Bloch to its origins. But it is also a discipline that has revolutionised the humanities, most obviously in the field of Literature, but even a subject like Archaeology – so much more rooted in the

materials rather than the ideas of society – has benefited from its interaction with proponents of Cultural Studies.

If this volume does represent a methodological step by crusade historians in the direction of Cultural Studies, it has to be said that the step is a very small one. The main difficulty in developing a strong dialogue between studies of the crusades and Cultural Studies is that the latter has evolved from its roots in history to be a discipline that today shares more with philosophy. While there is an overlap between the two disciplines, it is the same kind of overlap as that, say, between physics and botany, or mathematics and chemistry: that is, there is an overlap – and potentially a very interesting one – but the area where the disciplines can usefully communicate to one another is relatively small. Just as there would be limited scope for a specialist in botany to contribute to a conference on quantum physics, so it would be very hard for a follower of Foucault or Derrida to add value to a history conference wanting to understand the world of the crusader. If such a person were to study a classic crusading text, say the *Gesta Francorum*, there is no doubt their findings would be of interest to the historian. But what the proponent of Cultural Studies would find very difficult – and they would probably not desire to do so anyway – is to say something about the society and events that led to the production of the manuscript and which in turn are illuminated by the historian's analysis of the text.

This anthology is very much a collection of history essays; and insofar as it is a collection that is focused on culture in the broader sense, this is a result of my raising particular questions with those historians whom I believed had the expertise to answer them. I have no idea of the philosophical outlook of the contributors and the extent to which they have an interest in Cultural Studies. But they all, whether long-established professors or relatively early career researchers, are splendid historians, and as a result I hope the reader will find here crusading studies that are clear, erudite and fresh.

The anthology opens with something of a keynote essay, by John France, on warfare in the Mediterranean region in the age of the crusades. For all that the meeting of crusaders with Muslims in the Near East led to fascinating cultural exchanges, these need to be framed by a recognition that Muslim armies and Muslim citizens in the path of the crusaders first encountered one another in battle and that, despite periods of détente, major conflicts between the rulers of the rival states flared repeatedly in the period that the crusaders had a presence in the region (1098–1291). The evolution of the pattern of warfare over such a long period has its own dynamics worth understanding, especially when the conflicting forces differ not only in their religions, but in their fundamentally different approaches to the art of war. This essay is the work someone who has devoted decades of research to the subject and, moreover, has taken the trouble to explore the geography of the region, including areas where it is difficult for a Western scholar to travel today. As a result, it is rich in comparative assessments and lucid generalisations that a historian of less experience would hardly dare formulate.

Despite the rapid growth of research into the subject of the crusades, it is widely recognised that there exists a noticeable lacuna in the use of medieval Arabic

sources. Researchers with the appropriate language skills are in a small minority and a great number of important medieval Arabic texts lack modern editions and reliable translations. Discussion of topics such as the evolution of *jihad* in the era of the crusades has been hampered by this difficulty, and although since 1999 readers of the English language have been able to avail themselves of the seminal work by Carole Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, further advances in this area have been slow to emerge. The second essay in this volume was commissioned in recognition of this problem and I consider myself fortunate that a scholar so thoroughly conversant with medieval Arabic sources as Yehoshua Frenkel was willing to address the question of how the theory and practice of the counter-crusade developed in the Muslim Near East.

Through a thematic – rather than chronological – approach, Yehoshua Frenkel has been able to develop a number of insights here. Above all, the essay carries the argument that while Muslim jurists and theologians responded to the crusades with clear invocations of the duty of Muslims to declare *jihad* against the invaders, Muslim rulers found means to adopt more flexible and pragmatic policies that suited the complexities of their position: complexities that included a recognition of the dangers posed by the ambitions of fellow Muslim princes; the dissatisfaction of Muslim merchants if trade faltered; and, in some instances, the need for temporary military alliances with Christian neighbours.

The phenomenon of the crusades fundamentally altered the political map of the Near East and, ironically, given their adherence to Christianity, the most dramatic of these changes was the significant weakening of the Byzantine Empire and Armenian lordships in Cilicia. The process by which this happened is assessed here by Chris Wright with respect to the Byzantine Empire and Natasha Hodgson with respect to Cilician Armenia. The theme that runs through Chris Wright's analysis is that of marginalisation. The Byzantine state, he argues, lost its ability to act as a coherent authority for the affairs of its citizens partly for material reasons – the catastrophic Fourth Crusade and sack of Constantinople severely disrupted the mechanisms of imperial rule – but also for ideological reasons: the whole crusading project had a tendency to marginalise the empire with regard to Mediterranean affairs despite the fact that a call from Constantinople for military aid against the Turks was one of the factors that triggered the appearance of crusading armies in the Near East.

Natasha Hodgson's focus is on the marriages that took place between crusading Latin Christian princes and the Armenian lords of Cilicia. Intermarriages between these two cultures took place throughout the period that the crusaders had a presence in the region and by paying careful attention to the patterns of marriage alliances Natasha Hodgson is able to piece together the dynamics of the ambitions of both groups as well as to assess the respective effectiveness of these alliances. One of many conclusions that can be drawn from this chapter is that while at times such marriage alliances assisted both Latin Christian and Armenian rulers to maintain their autonomy from the Byzantine Empire and strengthened their ability to resist attacks from neighbouring Muslim powers, these intermarriages

also created cross-cultural dynastic ambitions that led to conflicts that drained the resources of both sides.

The subject of the origins of modern European national identity is a large one and one to which a study of the crusades can make an important contribution. For the crusades took place at a time when national structures were beginning to coalesce in Europe, typically around royal authority. More importantly, crusading was a phenomenon that was almost unique in the Middle Ages in bringing together large numbers of people of all social classes in bands that formed up into even greater amalgamations of people from all the regions of Europe. The question of national identity in these crusading armies very much came to the fore, as rival princes manoeuvred for hegemony at the same time as a sense of common purpose and religion cut across regional interests.

In an important essay for those interested in the wider topic of national identity as well as crusading history, Alan V. Murray focuses on the crusades to the Near East between 1096 and 1192, to reveal the expressions of nationality within the crusading armies. Additionally, he makes the notable point that near-contemporary medieval historians attempted to appropriate successful crusaders to their own emerging nations and thus crusade-related sources provide us with good evidence for the development of a nationalistic spirit from the twelfth century onwards, one that was to develop more powerfully in the early modern period.

The following essay by Sini Kangas also concerns the history of ideas. Her investigation is into the important and very sensitive topic of medieval Latin Christian writings on Islam. Again, crusading expertise is valuable in opening up a line of investigation for this much wider topic, for four crusade-related texts form the basis for this study. What they reveal is a great interest in the Muslim religion, not so much – in the eyes of these authors – as a theology worthy of serious intellectual engagement, but as a 'heresy' that could be caricatured and polemicised against in order to provide warning examples for the Christian population. The crude and insulting language that the Christian polemicists directed against Muhammad and his followers served to send a message about the superiority and correctness of the Christian Church. A secondary, but notable, observation made by Sini Kangas is that despite the hostility of these authors towards Islam, they did not entirely fabricate the material from which they fashioned their attacks. It may well have been that as a consequence of the crusades and Latin Christian settlement in the Near East, there was a flow of information about Islam arriving in Europe that did communicate the basic history and tenets of the religion.

In a third essay concerned with mentalities, Léan Ní Chléirigh undertakes a close reading of two very early Latin crusading histories: those of Fulcher of Chartres and Guibert of Nogent. The point of her investigation is to assess whether the growth of hostility in the Latin Christian world towards the Byzantines was necessarily accelerated as a result of the experience of crusades to the Near East. While Guibert's *Dei Gesta Per Francos* is an early example of a crusading history that vigorously pursues an anti-Byzantine theme, Fulcher

provides a stark contrast and it is this contrast that leads Léan Ní Chléirigh to talk of a polarisation of Western opinion, rather than a one-sided development of anti-Byzantine feeling. As with some of the earlier chapters, this is an essay with a very important secondary observation. For nearly a century, modern historians have considered Fulcher of Chartres to have been an eyewitness to the launching of the First Crusade at the Council of Clermont on 27 November 1095, but Léan Ní Chléirigh's examination of Fulcher's language in his account of the council leads her to a different conclusion. Fulcher was indeed close to the thinking of Pope Urban, whom he met during the course of his journey east. But this familiarity with the papal message is more likely to have arisen from his having access to written sources, such as the decrees of the council, rather than from his presence at Clermont.

In raising the issue of inter-cultural exchanges between Christian and Muslim society in the Near East in the era of the crusades, one distinct topic worthy of proper investigation is that of medicine. When I learned that Susan B. Edgington was carrying out research in this area I immediately sought an essay from her for this book, thinking that such a chapter would provide a case study of how Christian medical practices benefited from the more advanced Muslim traditions and that as these new practices were incorporated more generally into Latin Christian culture they came westwards from the crusader states. In her extremely thorough analysis of the sources and of recent scholarship, however, Susan B. Edgington gives us a much more sophisticated view of the subject.

Crusading armies brought with them very competent battle surgeons; and insofar as the wider body of crusading medics learned from Oriental practices, they seem to have done so from native Christians rather than directly from Muslim society. The development of the theory and practice of medicine in Western society benefited from Oriental knowledge, but the flow of ideas and treatments was not one way, nor can these developments be crudely attributed to the crusades, as in the same era important Arabic medical texts were independently being translated in centres of Christian intellectual activity, such as the great monastery of Monte Cassino.

Another discipline whose evolution was shaped by cultural exchange between the Christian West and the Muslim Near East in the era of the crusades is architecture. Again, a lot of assumptions are often made about the flow of influences: in particular, in the 1990s it was stated that Gothic architecture in the West derived from innovations begun in the crusader states and this style – crudely, pointed arches – subsequently found its way to Europe. By taking as a case study the church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, Jürgen Krüger addresses these assumptions, because the history of the building and its many reconstructions allow us to identify a succession of distinct architectural influences. This chapter presents a great deal of new and original material, the result of Jürgen Krüger's research at the church. He is able to draw a number of conclusions, two of which stand out as highly significant: first, that Western traditions influenced construction at the church until the middle of the twelfth century, when more local

influences came to dominate; and second, the exchange of architectural culture, such as the Gothic style, took place in both directions.

If the cross-cultural exchanges between Christian and Muslim neighbouring societies tended to be mediated through Arab-speaking Christian residents of the Near East, so that the direct contact between them proves hard to establish in fields such as medicine and architecture, there was one area of activity where direct encounters were a necessity: establishing peace treaties. The final essay in this volume comes from Yvonne Friedman, who has long devoted her expertise in crusading history to the issue of peace treaties. For this book, she analyses the 120 or so treaties mentioned in the sources between Christian and Muslim lords (1096–1291), to demonstrate the evolution of a mutual understanding of the stages of peacemaking out of an initial lack of comprehension – in both mentality and practice – of their respective views on how to conduct and conclude peace agreements.

Framing the book in this way, between John France's discussion of warfare between crusading and Muslim armies and Yvonne Friedman's focus on peace between the rival lords, serves to emphasise the curious dialectic of the phenomenon of the crusades. The huge Christian army of the First Crusade set out to defeat Muslim forces in the Near East and establish new states, in particular at Jerusalem. But having done so, in order to survive, crusading settlers found themselves adjusting to a necessary engagement with the politics and culture of the region. Never stable, always prone to renewed outbreaks of warfare and the arrival of new waves of crusading armies, the consequences of this engagement were simultaneously a strengthening of the ideology of Holy War on both sides and a growing level of cultural interaction between the religious rivals.

This was an era of profound changes in the political formations of the region as well as in the ideas that were circulating in both societies. A growing cry for *jihad* to counter the Christian armies by the Islamic clergy was a factor in the emergence of Muslim princes capable of ruling much larger territories than their predecessors. In the West, crusading led – among other developments and not in a linear fashion – to a growth in the alienation of the Latin world from the Byzantine Empire; a furtherance of the concept of national identity; and an increase in the circulation of polemical texts belittling Islam. More positively, although less definitively, the period in which Christian states existed in the Near East was one where a sharing of knowledge could take place, to the mutual advantage of practitioners in fields such as medicine and architecture.

It was an era of both conflict and cohabitation.



Map 1.1 The political boundaries of the Eastern Mediterranean c.1090, shortly before the arrival of the First Crusade



Map 1.2 The political boundaries of Christian territories in the era of the crusades

1

WARFARE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION IN THE AGE OF THE CRUSADES, 1095–1291

A clash of contrasts

John France

Crusading warfare in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was marked by a fascinating clash between the Turks, who employed a highly mobile and fluid fighting pattern, and westerners, whose methods revolved around a relatively slow-moving style based on mass and solid formation.

Medieval warfare in Western Europe in the age of the crusades is often symbolised by the castle and the knight, and this does express a certain reality. The economy of the west was overwhelmingly based on land, which does not produce much liquidity – cash. This meant that the medieval state could not easily collect taxes to pay for bureaucrats and standing armies. The soldiers had to have their own resources, land, to enable them to equip themselves and their followers.[1] As medieval society was not an equal but a deeply unequal society, great men with great estates played the leading role in politics and warfare, and they were very difficult to control. They enjoyed *de facto* governmental power because kings without articulated administrations had to delegate power. In turn, great men could not be everywhere, and they had to delegate to others. In effect, society was dominated by the patronage-spheres of great men, their *mouvances*, within which those wealthy enough to serve as fully equipped soldiers were especially privileged and enjoyed a position of negotiation with, rather than full subordination to, their masters.[2] Moreover, it is not sufficiently appreciated that their estates were not great blocks, but packets scattered across the countryside interpenetrating with the lands of others. An English example is Aubrey II de Vere (1108–41), who inherited the lands acquired by his father in the Norman Conquest in Essex, Suffolk, Cambridge, Huntingdon and Middlesex. His son, Aubrey III, was made Earl of Oxford, and in celebration he built the magnificent Hedingham Castle on the Suffolk–Essex border, where the family estates were densely concentrated.[3]

The dispersal of properties inevitably created property disputes, adding to the political and personal tensions among relatively small groups of great families who dominated the countryside in the various 'states' of medieval Europe. Moreover, families had to commute between their possessions because they needed to collect and eat up the right and dues they collected from the peasants which were largely paid in kind. This created the need for comfortable houses which, in a dangerous society, had to be protected. From this situation was born the castle, which is essentially a fortified private house. But the castle needed a garrison. This was provided by the armed men whom we call knights. In the age of the First Crusade their social status was enormously variable. Some, especially those who could claim some family relationship with the great lord, were granted landholdings in return for service in administering and protecting the lord's land. Others were simply paid as 'table knights' who earned bread and board by protecting their master, but could be paid off at his pleasure. Since resources were short, lords employed relatively few knights, but they were superbly equipped and provided with the leisure to train for war. In effect, they and their masters formed a military elite who could fight on foot or, for preference, on horseback. European agriculture was dominated by the production of grain so there were few open plains capable of raising grass-fed light horses cheaply. In any case, this small minority needed armour and fine weapons if it were to dominate the masses, so heavy grain-fed horses were essential to carry such weight. Warhorses could be produced only by selective breeding and they then had to be trained for combat. They were, therefore, very expensive and knights preserved them by riding lesser animals until they were needed for combat. Even then, heavily burdened by man, weapons and armour, warhorses were capable of only short bursts of fast movement, after which they were exhausted. But the momentum of their charge was terrifying. As a Greek princess, Anna Comnena, remarked: 'A mounted Kelt [Frank] is irresistible: he would bore his way through the walls of Babylon; but when he dismounts he becomes anyone's plaything.'[4]

These men were highly effective soldiers, well used to small-scale warfare in which they sallied out of their lands to ravage the territory of their neighbours in pursuit of the disputes which divided great aristocrats or the petty quarrels which they picked. When some greater quarrel arose, the lord could augment numbers by bringing together several of the scattered groups of soldiers who served him. Further reinforcement could be found by hiring mercenary knights who would be paid off as soon as the military situation allowed. However, substantial actions demanded larger forces, not least because enemy fortresses, usually of earth and timber, would have to be attacked and new castles created. This demanded large forces of infantry. Sergeants were very petty landholders who could equip themselves reasonably well for war and perhaps even come mounted, but most footsoldiers seem to have been recruited from the more adventurous but barely trained peasantry. Their equipment would usually be very limited: a spear or bow and arrows, a padded jacket and perhaps a metal or leather helmet would be the norm.

They were not just needed for what might be called 'military labouring', because the broken and seamed countryside of the west, deeply imprinted by arable farming with its many barriers, sometimes favoured footsoldiers. At Hastings in 1066 the English formed up on foot at the top of a hill, annulling much of the advantage of the Norman horsemen in height, reach and weight. In addition, bad weather could hinder horses. The infantry could also be strengthened by employing professionals, mercenary foot, usually drawn from areas of frequent warfare like Flanders and Spain, some of whom might bring the accurate and hard-hitting crossbow to war. Infantry are clearly inferior man for man to cavalry, but their advantage lies in the fact that they are cheaper and so can be hired in mass. But to be effective, above all to manoeuvre, mass needs to be trained, and medieval armies had very short lives, simply because of cost. Hence, in general, infantry were at a great qualitative disadvantage. This lack of training was compounded when a king or very important lord called together a very large army. It was usual to divide such a force between *milites et pedites*, knights and foot, but locally raised footmen were not used to working with those from other localities, and an army would only rarely be kept in being for sufficient time to enable them to train together. This problem also affected cavalry, who would be trained well as individuals but would be used to working only in small groups with their immediate neighbours and, occasionally, with more distant groups from within their own lord's retinue. Such kin and neighbour groups were the effective components of the cavalry and fought together under a banner in a unit of variable size called the *conroi* in the twelfth century. A great royal army was a gathering of retinues of the great, and each retinue was in turn made up of these local groups. Medieval armies, in short, lacked cohesion. William the Conqueror's army of 1066 was therefore unusual: because it was delayed by unfavourable winds, it had the opportunity to exercise together at Dives for a month.[5]

This, in part, explains why commanders were relatively reluctant to commit to battle. This was always, at best, a chancy affair, 'where fortune tends to have more influence than bravery'.[6] At Conquereuil, on 27 June 992, Duke Conan of Brittany lured Fulk Nerra of Anjou's army into charging into a concealed trench. Conan then pursued the Angevins, but paused to strip off his armour in the heat of the day, and was killed by some enemies hidden in nearby bushes![7] But the incoherence of medieval armies amplified the dangers. Great lords might desert their commander or untrained soldiers could panic and flee. Knights made a cult of bravery, but the minor skirmishes, which were the staple of the medieval war of raiding, promoted a highly individualistic ethos of war which, in the absence of any real command structure, could result in actions quite contrary to a commander's intentions. Sensible commanders, therefore, approached battle with caution and always had a real sense of its dangers. At Gisors in 1198, Richard I of England (1189–99) routed the forces of Phillip II of France (1180–1223), but in a letter to England Richard admitted that the whole affair had been highly dangerous: 'In doing this we risked not only our own life but the kingdom itself, against the advice of all our counselors.'[8]

For much the same reasons even sustained sieges against alerted fortresses were not common. They demanded a very high degree of organisation and sustained effort which was very expensive. Most obviously, besiegers had to provide their own shelter and food. And sieges were also open to chance. In 1078 Robert Curthose rebelled against his father, William the Conqueror, who gathered a strong army and besieged his troublesome son in the castle of Gerberoi. But Robert made a sudden sally, unhorsed his father and put the besiegers to flight.[9] As a result, armies, even large armies, preferred ravaging the land to undermine the economic base of the enemy, deprive his army of food and provide it for your own. A poet here portrays Philip, Count of Flanders, in 1173 advising how to attack an enemy: 'Lay waste the land; let it all be consumed in fire and flames. Let him not leave them, outside their castles, in wood or meadow as much as will furnish them a meal on the morrow.'[10]

Destruction of this kind was the staple of war in medieval Europe. It had enormous advantages. In the main it involved bullying peasants, which might not be glamorous, but was certainly safer than fighting well-armed enemies. It offered a solution to an attacking army's worst problem – logistics – because they could consume and carry off as well as destroy. It also drew a defender's forces, precipitating skirmishes in which knights could demonstrate their bravery, while informing the commanders on both sides of their enemy's strengths and dispositions.

There were battles, but a soldier as famous as Henry II of England (1154–89) could have a distinguished military career without ever fighting in one. At Bouvines in 1214 the victory of Philip II of France decided the fate of the French kingdom, the English realm and the German Empire, even though there were less than 20,000 troops on the field. In the thirteenth century armies became more professional and better organised, but at Tagliacozzo on 23 August 1268 the forces of Conradin defeated those of Charles of Anjou only to throw away their victory by scattering to plunder the enemy dead, enabling the Angevins to rally and crush them. Battles were fought at very close quarters, and indeed at Bouvines, Eustache of Malenghin was grasped from behind by a French knight who tore off his helmet while another stuck a dagger in his heart. In 1265 at the Battle of Benevento, Charles of Anjou's army was almost defeated by a group of German cavalry heavily armed and fighting in very close order, but Charles made his French knights close right up with the enemy, even thrusting with daggers. Overall, westerners had a slow-moving style of war which turned on siege and its attendant destruction. When battle had to be fought it was a matter of a very direct confrontation in which the key arm was the heavy cavalry which fought in close order. While archery was used, it was rarely decisive, and victory went to the side which fought the most ferociously in the dreadful hacking-match of battle.[11]

The First Crusade was an assembly of armies, each of which gathered around one of the major leaders, such as the Count of Toulouse or Bohemond of Otranto. But there were groups among them who owed little to the great leaders, like Gaston of Béan, who seems to have drifted out of the *mouvance* of Raymond

of Toulouse and become associated with the Count's great enemy, Tancred.[12] This loose structure was always characteristic of crusading armies. In the case of the First Crusade they survived the initial contact with the enemy in Anatolia largely by luck and sheer numbers, and the experience welded them into an experienced and coherent fighting force. But the forces of the Second Crusade were defeated in Asia Minor largely because they lacked discipline. The presence of the charismatic Richard of England and the long struggle to capture Acre from 1189 to 1191 made the army of the Third Crusade formidable. By contrast, the Fifth Crusade (1217–21) lacked an overall leader, and the contingents which fought on it came and went, apparently taking the view that one year's service was enough for anybody. The French crusade of Louis IX of France (1226–70) was a different case, in that it enjoyed a unified command. But at the Battle of Mansourah, Louis' brother, Robert of Artois, charged rashly into the town after a local success, and he and his forces were cut off and annihilated. In many ways this exemplified the problems of command and discipline in medieval armies, and it certainly compromised Louis' chances of a decisive success.[13]

The Middle East about 1100 was a radically different kind of society. It was also ultimately agricultural, but trade was far more important, a cash economy existed and it was ruled by great courts with elaborate bureaucracies set in important trading cities. At the head of society was the Caliph, but political power rested with the Sultan of Baghdad, who ruled through a bureaucracy organised around ministries (*diwan*) and delegated authority to governors and office-holders. No authority could afford huge standing forces, but all these personages had substantial personal followings (*askars*) which they augmented at need by other forces – paid or conscripted for a short period.

The Middle East has a radically different landscape from Europe. It is an area of open plains, which make for easy raising of small horses, and there is open space in which they can move, unlike the seamed and closed countryside of Europe. Even now this is classic tank country in which mobility is vital. In medieval conditions this meant the dominance of cavalry, and the best troops among them were alien to the Middle East. Since the ninth century the Caliphs had regularly employed elite units of Turks, a steppe people whose special expertise was as horse-archers. As the Baghdad Caliphate declined, these expert troops became highly influential at the Baghdad court and became diffused across the whole area, finding employment in the *askars* of governors and even in the rival Fatimid Caliphate of Cairo. In 1055 Turks, led by the Seljuk family, invaded the Caliphate and seized power there in alliance with countrymen already in Baghdad. (Indeed, from this time until 1919, Turks would rule the Middle East.) The Seljuk sultans recreated the old empire of Baghdad, and in the process drove the Fatimids back into Egypt, seizing Jerusalem in 1073. Turks were an alien minority and it is a sign of this that they built citadels in the great cities of the Muslim world, notably at Damascus. The purpose of these mighty structures was to shelter the new and alien rulers and overawe the mass of the population.[14] Turkish horse-archers, always recruited directly from the steppe, were never great in number but

increasingly formed the cutting edge of armies. They were backed up by hordes of native light horse, especially Bedouin, some of whom were also archers, though most wielded lances and swords. Less often, these were backed up by heavy cavalry of Persian origin, called *Agulani* by the Franks: 'The *Agulani* numbered 3000; they fear neither spears nor arrows nor any other weapon, for they and their horses are covered all over with plates of iron.'[15]

One result of the crusader wars seems to have been an increase in this heavy element in the Islamic forces. Horse-archers and other light cavalry had strings of spare mounts and this gave a capacity for rapid movement and, on the battlefield, swift manoeuvre to Middle Eastern armies. In the end, unless their enemies were terrorised by the rain of arrows from fast-moving horsemen who sought to surround and harass, they would have to fight at close quarters, but fire and movement enabled them to unsettle their enemies and break up their formations. The great change in Muslim armies came with the Mamluk regime which seized power in Egypt in 1250. The Turkish soldiers took over the state. They formed a standing army which was a kind of militarised republic drawn generation by generation from steppe Turks, whose chief officers chose a sultan from their own ranks. This remarkable army crushed the crusaders and repelled the Mongol attempt to conquer the Middle East.[16]

The Seljuk Empire at its greatest extended from Syria in the west across Iraq and Iran into what is now Pakistan, and from the Caucusus to the frontier with Egypt. But it dissolved into sustained civil war after the death of Malik Shah (1072–92). The consequent chaos provided the Byzantine Emperor Alexios I (1081–1118) with the opportunity to intervene with a view to regaining the lands of Anatolia lost to the Turks since 1071. His appeal for mercenaries to assist in this process reached Pope Urban II (1088–99) at the Council of Piacenza in March 1095. This triggered Urban's thinking which led to the summoning of the First Crusade at Clermont in November of the same year.

The first crusaders entered a very divided world. The dominant power in Turkish Anatolia was the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum, but they were challenged by Danishmends, Menguchekids and Saltukids to the east and defied by the Emirate of Smyrna to the west. Berkyaruk made good his claim to the Sultanate at Baghdad, but he was deeply preoccupied by asserting his power in the eastward dominions. Syria was disputed between his young cousins, Duqaq of Damascus and Ridwan of Aleppo, and this enabled the rulers of cities like Antioch and Homs to play one off against another. Jerusalem was held by the Artukids and they were effectively independent. Fatimid Egypt to the south saw these divisions as an opportunity to regain her lost power in Syria. It was undoubtedly this high degree of fragmentation that underlay the success of the First Crusade, but it should be noted that many of these 'fragments' were actually rich and powerful and could raise big armies.

On 1 July 1097 a Turkish army ambushed the vanguard of the army of the First Crusade. It is hardly surprising that a priest, Fulcher of Chartres, found this a novel but harrowing experience:

> Altogether they numbered 360,000 fighters, all on horses and armed with bows, as was their custom. We, on the other hand, had both foot-soldiers and knights . . . The Turks crept up, howling loudly and shooting a shower of arrows. Stunned, and almost dead, and with many wounded, we immediately fled. And it was no wonder, for such warfare was new to us all.[17]

What is more surprising is that a knight in the contingent of Bohemond of Otranto was equally surprised:

> Our men wondered exceedingly whence had arisen so great a multitude of Turks, Arabs, Saracens and others, for almost all the mountains and hills and valleys and all the level places, within and without, were on all sides covered with that excommunicate race.[18]

This is strange, because the anonymous knight was from southern Italy, whose ruler, Robert Guiscard, had tried to conquer Byzantium through the Balkans in the years 1081–5. His son, Bohemond, one of the leaders of the ambushed vanguard, had served in Robert's army and had encountered Turks fighting for the Emperor. Moreover, Anna Comnena says that her father had told the leaders what to expect from the Turks.[19] But armies learn by experience, and most of the knights in the vanguard would have been totally surprised by the Turkish tactics.

As the enemy army approached, the leaders of the vanguard ordered the infantry to set camp while the cavalry advanced to meet them. But the Turks divided and surged around the western cavalry, threatening to surround them. As a result, the knights bolted, only to be rallied by Bohemond and Robert, Duke of Normandy. This was generalship of a very high order by medieval standards, and it resulted in a chaotic situation with the knights driven back on the camp in a confused mass of men, animals and tents. This compacted mass drew the Turks into a close-quarter scrum which suited the heavy weaponry of the westerners, and eventually the main body of their army came up and drove off the enemy. The First Crusade was lucky to survive at Dorylaeum, but the crusaders recognised the need for discipline and close order as a response to the encircling tactics of the Turks. Early in 1098 the Franks, then besieging Antioch, sent a foraging expedition into Syria, and ran into a relief army despatched to Antioch by Duqaq of Damascus. Their battle formation took account of the tactics of the Turks because while the Count of Flanders went forward with the vanguard, Bohemond held back in a rearguard:

> For the Turks have this custom in fighting: even though they are fewer in number, they always strive to encircle their enemy. This they attempted to do in this battle also, but by the foresight of Bohemund the wiles of the enemy were prevented.[20]

By the end of the crusade the westerners had adopted a new tactical device – throwing their infantry forward to keep horse-archers out of range of the horses.

Thus a whole battery of tactical devices, essentially dependent upon tight discipline and close order, were devised to counter Turkish tactics. But each new crusading army came fresh to the task of learning new methods of fighting, and all found it difficult to accept the discipline demanded. The 'Crusade of 1101' went down to total disaster in Anatolia.[21] On the Second Crusade the German army's discipline seems to have collapsed, leading to its destruction. The French army fought its way through Anatolia in column headed by a strong vanguard, but on Mount Cadmus this powerful force went off on its own to camp with disastrous results because the Turks broke into the column: 'The Turks thrust and slashed, and the defenceless crowds fled or fell like sheep . . . exposed the king and his companions to death.'[22]

Even on St Louis' crusade, when the French King was the undisputed commander, subordinates took matters into their own hands. At the highest level we have already noted the rashness of Robert of Artois, but lower down the scale Joinville, the king's biographer, reports that at the Battle of Mansourah in February 1250: 'In the meantime, I and my knights had decided to go and attack some Turks who were loading their baggage in their camp on our left; so we fell upon them.'[23] In the event he and his men had to be rescued when they were ambushed. Western armies with their weak chains of command were always prone to this kind of indiscipline, which meant that although leaders knew that close formation and tight control were essential, these were very difficult to implement.

Siege warfare, on the other hand, was something with which westerners were familiar. The cities of the east, with their Roman fortifications, were bigger and better fortified than anything they had encountered in Europe, but the siege of Nicaea, with its elaborate deployment of catapults, siege towers, cats and mining, demonstrated western mastery of technique as well as sheer determination. Antioch was so great a city that assault proved impossible and a close blockade was implemented, and this was extended with great skill so that eventually the city fell by betrayal. At Jerusalem the double wall to the north of the city was breached by a ram, and a great siege-tower pushed in to carry the main curtain. But it was a skilful switch of the *schwerpunkt* from the north-west to the north-east corner which made life difficult for the defenders, who were also having to divide their forces to face the Count of Toulouse's attack on Zion Gate to the south.[24] This skill in siege warfare then enabled the western settlers to seize the cities of the coast in alliance with the Italian city-states who were seeking trading bases in the Levant. The culmination of this process was the long siege of Tyre which, having resisted successfully in 1112, fell in 1124.[25] After the collapse of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1187 the Third Crusade focused its efforts on a great siege of Acre from 1189 to 1191, whose successful conclusion provided a capital for the new kingdom which would last until 1291. During the Fifth Crusade the attack on Damietta occupied the army from May 1218 to November 1219. The Muslims proved just as adept at siege warfare. The Mamluks captured mighty Crac des

Chevaliers in a siege which lasted from 3 March to 8 April 1271, and Marqab, besieged on 17 April 1285, surrendered on 24 May. The final assault on Acre began on 6 April 1291 and ended with a terrible sack on 18 May though the Templar fortress held out until 28 May 1291. It is said that on this occasion the Mamluks deployed ninety machines in their assault on the city. Siege warfare involved the use of relatively sophisticated machinery, but neither side enjoyed any technological advantage.[26] In the end storming a fortification was enormously costly in lives lost, and once an army broke in with its blood up a massacre was pretty well inevitable. This is what happened at Jerusalem in 1099 and Acre in 1291. Such horrors explain why most sieges ended with negotiated surrenders from which both attacker and defender profited.[27]

The First Crusade established Latin Christian bridgeheads in Syria and Palestine which the settlers in these areas then had to be make into viable entities. They were never united and, as we shall see, often pursued radically different and even contradictory policies. But one simple condition underwrote their existence. This was western naval supremacy. It is remarkable that there is no naval history of the crusades,[28] for the First Crusade received very substantial naval assistance and could hardly have succeeded without it.[29] Subsequently the capture of the cities of the Palestinian littoral was heavily dependent upon the fleets of the Italian city-states who quickly established a maritime supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean which would end only with the Ottomans in the sixteenth century. How and why this came about has never been fully explored, though J.H. Pryor has made some interesting suggestions.[30] Previous to the First Crusade, Egypt had had a powerful fleet, but this was so eclipsed that when Saladin tried to revive it in the 1180s he simply could not find enough sailors to sustain the effort.[31] The Fifth Crusade landed in Egypt in 1218 and continued until 1221. In that time there was never any attempt to interfere with its sea-borne communications. This is an astonishing fact and underlines the extent to which crusading depended upon command of the sea for its very being.

The states of the Latin east enjoyed very different possibilities for expansion and therefore were forced to consider different strategies.[32] Antioch held the Jabal Ansariyah. Before them was the Orontes Valley and its eastern bank, the much lower Belus Massif and beyond that a great plain in the north of which stood Aleppo, only 100 kilometres from Antioch along a good Byzantine road which went via Artah and a gap in the Belus Massif, past Sarmada and al-Atharib. But Antioch had been created in spite of the agreement with the Byzantine Emperor to hand back former imperial lands. As a result it was threatened by Byzantine attack, usually directed through Cilicia, where the Armenians later established a powerful kingdom. Moreover, the expansion of Antioch would have been greatly facilitated by cooperation with the crusader principality of Edessa, but in practice relations were not always good. Despite these diversions, by 1119 Antioch threatened an encirclement of Aleppo which was only prevented when Prince Roger of Antioch was defeated and killed at the 'Field of Blood'. Within a few years the Antiochenes had recovered most of what they had lost. It was the

outbreak of internal conflict and the dominance of Byzantine power from the mid-twelfth century which weakened them, coupled with the rise, after 1126, of a strong Islamic power in Aleppo under Zengi, but even so they continued to be ready to be aggressive.[33]

The Kingdom of Jerusalem had different choices. At Tripoli the First Crusade had resolved not to go to Jerusalem inland via Damascus, but at Ramla the leaders considered an attack on Egypt as an alternative to the siege of Jerusalem.[34] These two possible axes of attack set the strategic dilemma for the kingdom. Both were tempting. Damascus was easily accessible from the Galilee across the bare landscape of the Hauran, which posed no significant barrier, though it is fairly dry. Baldwin II was especially active against Damascus between 1126 and 1129 when a crusade came from the west to his assistance, but suffered defeat at Marj as-Suffur. It has also been suggested that in the 1120s Jerusalem was consciously seeking a policy of 'natural frontiers', and that this underlay the expansion of Oultrejourdain down to the Red Sea and the search for a desert frontier based on Damascus. Whether there was ever such a doctrine is debatable, not least because the new lordship there was quickly granted out to vassal lords.[35] Egypt was also close and constituted a real threat to the kingdom until the 1120s, but it suffered from internal divisions and the balance was clearly changing when Baldwin I died during an expedition there in 1118. The weakness of its Fatimid regime ultimately tempted Amalric I (1163–74) into major expeditions which ended in defeat by Nur ad-Din, who united Egypt and Syria.

The westerners who settled in the east therefore found themselves in a very hostile environment in which fighting was frequent and essential.[36] The kingdom was not as weak as its small size might indicate. It was anchored by powerfully fortified cities like Tyre, Acre and Jerusalem. In addition the crusaders very soon built numerous castles. These were products of the structure of lordship which they brought with them to the east, but they served as refuges and supply bases in times of trouble. Most of them were rather small. It was only in exposed areas like Oultrejourdain that mightier structures, like Kerak and Shawbak, were erected. As the threat from Muslim attack became more marked, the crusaders developed stronger castles, most notably Belvoir (built in 1168–70), which was a superbly designed concentric fortress of a kind which did not appear in Europe until nearly a century later. In the thirteenth century such amazing structures as Crac des Chevaliers and Marqab appeared. But the strength of the kingdom in the twelfth century essentially rested on the combination of strong cities and a powerful field army. To conquer the kingdom, an enemy needed to seize the cities and castles, but this invited attack from the field army, which could count on assistance from the many castles.[37]

Moreover, recent research has shown that although westerners were relatively few in the kingdom, they seem to have enjoyed the support of the native Christians, whom they treated very generously. This probably explains why, in the emergency of 1187, the kingdom could raise nearly 20,000 troops.[38] The Latins essentially retained their western style of war. It was successful, and they were

constantly receiving reinforcements and immigrants from Europe. However, they recognised the need to adapt their military methods to the radically different environment in which they found themselves and did so to a degree which historians have been slow to appreciate.[39]

The settlers employed 'Turcopoles', mounted archers, like the Turks, whom they used for reconnaissance and raiding. They were quite numerous, perhaps 1,500 in the campaign of 1183 and, apparently, many more at Hattin in 1187. On 20 June 1192 they spotted an Egyptian convoy bringing supplies to Saladin's army in Jerusalem, enabling Richard of England to seize it.[40] But they were simply not numerous enough for the Latins to change their tactics radically, and on occasion they seem to have been incorporated into the mass of knights who formed the key element in their host.

The knights were the key military asset of the Latins, and the concerted mass charge their primary tactic. This was essentially an innovation of the Franks of the east. Western armies were, as we have noted, incoherent and lacked the discipline to manage such a tactic. At Hastings, William committed his cavalry only in sections and elements within them chose to make their attacks in whatever ways suited them best. The cavalry combat in 1214 at the Battle of Bouvines consisted of charges by retinues numbering fewer than 200 knights. Only at Muret in 1213 was there an all-out charge of massed cavalry. [41] But the armies of the Latins were called together frequently, so they grew used to working together, and this enabled them to form and to take the enormous risk of a mass charge. But this in turn led to further tactical changes. There could be only a single opportunity for a mass charge, because if it did not strike its enemy a fatal blow the horses would be blown and dispersed. Turkish light horse were skilled at the rapid retreat, even the feigned retreat, turning to fall on their exhausted enemies:

> If they [the Turks] are hotly pursued a long way they flee on very fast horses. There are none nimbler in the world, with the swiftest gallop – like a flight of swallows. It is the Turks' habit, when they realise that their pursuit has stopped following them, to stop running away themselves – like an infuriating fire which flies away if you drive it off and returns when you stop.[42]

But in awaiting the crucial moment Latin cavalry would be exposed to harassment, and in any case battle was a dynamic environment. And the Latins were usually outnumbered by their enemies, so the basic formation of infantry and cavalry evolved into the fighting march, as Smail was the first to understand.[43] In 1147 the Latins under Baldwin III (1143–63) had marched on Bosra but found Nur ad-Din in great strength, so they were forced to retreat in the presence of an enemy army which outnumbered them. Their response was:

> General orders had been given that the bodies of all the dead in the Christian ranks were to be placed upon camels and other pack animals,

> that the knowledge of the massacre of our forces might not tend to strengthen the enemy. The weak and wounded were also to be placed on beasts of burden so as to give the impression that not a single Christian had been killed or wounded. It was a source of amazement, therefore, to the wiser heads among the enemy that, after such a volley of arrow, such repeated conflicts, such torture of thirst, dust and unbearable heat, not a single dead Christian could be found. This people must, indeed, be made of iron, they thought.[44]

In such a formation the infantry surrounded the cavalry and the pack animals in a moving fortress and held off the enemy, enabling the knights to choose when, or indeed if, to unloose their famous charge. Again in 1170, near Gaza:

> Terrified by the vast numbers, they began to crowd together more than usual, with the result that the very density of their ranks almost prevented any further advance. The infidels at once charged and tried to force them apart, but the Christians, by divine help, massed themselves even more closely together and withstood the enemy's attack. Then at quickened pace they marched on to their destination where the entire army [250 knights and 2,000 foot] halted and set up tents.[45]

In July 1187 Saladin, with a huge army 30,000 strong, besieged Tiberias as the army of Jerusalem concentrated at Safforiyah, twenty-six kilometres to the west. Guy of Lusignan, King of Jerusalem, decided to march to its relief, presumably trusting in the solidity of his formation to enable him to choose battle at will. At the heart of his army were three divisions of cavalry, something like 1,200 knights, each surrounded by infantry, in all nearly 20,000 men. But a march of twenty-six kilometres against a numerous and determined enemy was unprecedented, and there was no water along the route. They became exhausted and were encircled and destroyed at Hattin, and the kingdom fell.

But on the Third Crusade, Richard of England made the system work. After the fall of Acre to the crusader host, Richard set out southwards down the coast to seize the port of Jaffa, with his cavalry in three sections surrounded by infantry. This time, water was plentiful because the road ran close to the sea, where the western fleet acted as a source of supply. The infantry, who bore the weight of the enemy attacks, were rotated so that they could rest between the army and the coast. Saladin's mounted archers attacked the infantry screen but to little effect. One of his advisers commented:

> The enemy army was already in formation with the infantry surrounding it like a wall, wearing solid iron corselets and full-length well-made chain-mail, so that arrows were falling on them with no effect . . . I saw various individuals amongst the Franks with ten arrows fixed in their backs, pressing on in this fashion quite unconcerned.[46]

On 7 September 1191 Saladin deployed his army for battle close to Arsuf. Richard broke his cavalry into five divisions to facilitate control, and was anxious to hold his force together until he could, with a single charge, destroy his enemy totally. In the event his rearguard, sorely provoked, charged prematurely, obliging him to commit his whole cavalry force. Even so, the damage to Saladin's army was considerable:

> The enemy's situation worsened still more and the Muslims thought they had them in their power. Eventually the first detachments of their infantry reached the plantations of Arsuf. Then their cavalry massed together and agreed on a charge, as they feared for their people and thought that only a charge would save them. I saw them grouped together in the middle of the foot-soldiers. They took their lances and gave a shout as one man. The infantry opened gaps for them and they charged in unison. One group charged our right wing, another our left, and the third our centre. It happened that I was in the centre which took to wholesale flight. My intention was to join the left wing, since it was nearer to me. I reached it after it had been broken utterly, so I thought to join the right wing, but then I saw that it had fled more calamitously than all the rest.[47]

But the most spectacular innovation of the Latins was the foundation of the military religious orders, of which the most important were the Hospital and the Temple. The latter was founded by a group of pious knights under the authority of the Patriarch of Jerusalem and their first task was to protect the pilgrim roads. Once the order was recognised in 1128 it attracted recruits and generous donations, making it an enormously rich landowning institution. The Hospital was an older charitable institution caring for pilgrims which gradually evolved into a fighting order.[48] The bulk of the wealth of both orders lay in the west, so that they could replace losses in the east. The importance of these orders was that they formed what were, in effect, small but well-disciplined standing armies, each numbering about 300 knights. They accounted, therefore, for about half the 1,200 knights raised for the army which fought at Hattin. The Temple evolved very strict military discipline which was embodied in their *Rule*.[49] The armies of the orders therefore formed the backbone of the army of Jerusalem, so it is hardly surprising that after Hattin, Saladin ordered that the 300 of their knights who had fallen into his hands should be massacred.[50] However, the orders recovered, and during the Third Crusade they were joined by the new Teutonic Order.[51] In the thirteenth century, when the Jerusalem monarchy was weak, the armies of the orders constituted the primary military forces in the kingdom, especially as more and more castles were handed over to them by a nobility that could hardly afford them. The orders became increasingly enmeshed in the politics of the kingdom, yet they still offered the strongest hope of recovery, and visiting rulers and pilgrims put much-deserved faith in their fighting qualities.[52]

The crusades precipitated a period of ideological warfare in the Middle East. At the Council of Clermont in 1095, Urban II preached salvation through slaughter, a notion that inspired men to go east to fight for many centuries. In the Middle East most warfare had long been between Muslims, and in these circumstances holy war, *jihad*, had simply faded away. Al-Sulami of Damascus was one of the few people at the time of the First Crusade to think in these terms.[53] But as the challenge of the Latin settlers became clearer, the Turkish soldiers who ruled Islamic society increasingly presented themselves as champions of Islam. Zengi of Aleppo seized Edessa in 1144 and his son, Nur ad-Din, was a subtle diplomat who patronised and capitalised on the prestige of Muslim *madrassas* (Islamic schools) to promulgate a suitable image of himself. Saladin did likewise. These leaders at the same time proclaimed themselves champions of Sunni (orthodox) Islam and directed their *jihad* against all dissidents, especially Shi'ites. The alien ruling group in this way used *jihad* to build bridges with the broad mass of the city populations on whom they depended for taxation and the running of the machinery of government. Thus the temper of warfare in the Middle East was something special and different from that experienced elsewhere. William of Tyre, who was born in Jerusalem, rightly observed:

> War is waged differently and less vigorously between men who hold the same law and faith. For even if no other cause for hatred exists, the fact that the combatants do not share the same articles of faith is sufficient reason for constant quarrelling and enmity.[54]

There were terrible events. In 1099 Jerusalem fell and many of its inhabitants were massacred, but it should be noted that this was the normal fate of any city which resisted until it was stormed, at which point nobody really could control the attackers. When Zengi captured Edessa in 1144 he ordered a terrible massacre of its Latin population, while sparing the eastern Christians. Saladin killed all the captured members of the orders after Hattin in 1187. Richard of England promised to respect the lives of the garrison of Acre when it capitulated in 1191, on condition that Saladin pay a ransom. When this was not forthcoming, he killed them all, some 2,600 men, women and children. In response Saladin ordered that prisoners captured as Richard's army moved south should be executed. But this was not the *Ostfront* in the Second World War, and while war was savage it was never total.

We have some of our most vivid portrayals of battle from the crusades, like Joinville's recollections of the Battle of Mansourah in 1250:

> A blow from one of the enemy's swords landed in the middle of Erard de Siverey's face, cutting through his nose so that it was left dangling over his lips. At that moment the thought of St James [of Compostella] came into my mind and I prayed to him: 'Good Saint James, come to my help, and save us in our great need.'[55]

But all medieval battles were like this. On 9 August 1160 Frederick Barbarossa was defeated at the Battle of Carcano and two days later some knights of Lodi and Cremona, rushing to his aid, were ambushed by the victorious Milanese in a marshy valley. But Carnevalo de Cuzego, a knight of Lodi who had taken refuge in the bushes, pulled a Milanese knight, Roger of S. Sceptiro, off his horse and suffocated him in the earth before he could call for help from his followers.[56]

Despite the excesses, in principle, both sides obeyed the general rules concerning the surrender of cities.[57] In the aftermath of battle footsoldiers were massacred or enslaved, but this was the general rule everywhere. On the other hand, it was in the interests of the leaders on all sides to honour the custom of ransoming notables, so this was done.[58] In the wake of St Louis' surrender in 1250 his whole army was captured, but a significant proportion was ransomed. But such civilities were much more difficult to maintain in the heat of religious warfare, and the sheer distance between ransomers and those who held their nearest and dearest imposed great problems. In 1227 Pierre de Queivilliers, a Picard crusader, was captured and held at the castle of Sayhun. He died before his ransom could be arranged. Pierre may well have been held in a little cell halfway up the great rock-cut ditch of the castle, for carved into its wall is a Latin cross: a pathetic and rather personal reminder of the sacrifice of the Holy War.[59]

Notes

1 N.J.G. Pounds, *An Economic History of Medieval Europe*, London: Longman, 1974, esp. pp. 41–89.
2 John France, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades 1000–1300*, London: UCL Press, 1999, pp. 55–7. It was common to describe this social and political situation as 'feudal', but this has been contested by the highly influential Susan Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
3 'Aubrey II de Vere' in H.C.G. Matthew (ed.), *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004–8.
4 AC XIII.8, p. 416.
5 France, *Western Warfare*, pp. 53–76; R.A. Brown, *The Normans and the Norman Conquest*, London: Constable, 1969.
6 Vegetius, *Epitome of Military Science*, N.P. Milne (tr.), Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1993, p. 108.
7 John France, 'La guerre dans la France féodale', *Revue belge d'histoire militaire* 23, 1979, 190–1.
8 RH IV.58–9.
9 'John of Worcester', *Chronicon*, R.R. Darlington and P. McGurk (eds), 3, Oxford: Clarendon 1995, III.31–3.
10 Jordan Fantosme, *Chronicle*, R.C. Johnston (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon, 1981, p. 41, lines 34–5.
11 J.F. Verbruggen, *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages*, Woodbridge: Boydell, 1997, pp. 239–59; France, *Western Warfare*, pp. 181–4, 178–80.
12 John France, *Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 331.
13 OD, pp. 115–27; John Gillingham, *Richard I*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999; J.M. Powell, *Anatomy of Crusade 1213–21*, Philadelphia: University of

Pennsylvania, 1986; Jean Richard, *St Louis, Crusader King of France*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Jean Joinville, *The Life of St Louis*, in M.R.B. Shaw (ed. and tr.), *Chronicles of the Crusades*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963, pp. 218–19.

14 On the role of Turks in the Caliphate of Baghdad see Hugh Kennedy, *The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State*, New York: Routledge, 2001, pp. 118–67; on the entry of the Seljuks see P.M. Holt, *The Age of the Crusades: The Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1517*, London: Longman, 1986, pp. 9–30; Sophie Berthier, 'La citadelle de Damas: les apports d'une etude archéologique', in Hugh Kennedy (ed.), *Muslim Military Architecture in Greater Syria*, Leiden: Brill, 2006, pp. 151–64.

15 *GF* 49.

16 Reuven Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk–Īlkhānid War, 1260-1281*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

17 FC 193–5: 'erant deputati numero CCCLX milia pugnatorum, scilicet sagittariorum mos enim eorum est talibus uti armis equites omnes. Nos autem utrinque pedites et equites . . . nos ilico stupefacti mortique proximi, etiam multi laesi, mox dorsa fugae dedimus. Nec hoc mirandum, quia nobis omnibus tale bellum erat incognitum.' Translation from A.C. Krey, *The First Crusade*, Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1958, p. 117.

18 *GF* 19: 'Mirabantur ergo nostri ualde unde esset exorta tanta multitudo Turcorum, et Arabum et Saracenorum, et aliorum quos enumerare ignoro; quia pene omnes montes et colles et ualles et omnia plana loca intus et extra undique erant cooperta de illa excommunicata generatione.'

19 G.A. Loud, *The Age of Robert Guiscard: Southern Italy and the Norman Conquest*, Harlow: Longman, 2000; R.B. Yewdale, *Bohemond I Prince of Antioch*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1924; J. Flori, *Bohémond d'Antioch, chevalier d'aventure*, Paris: Payot, 2007; AC 326.

20 RA 244: 'Etenim id moris pugnandi apud Turcos est, ut, licet pauciores sint, tamen semper nitantur hostes cingere suos: quot etiam in hoc bello facere conati sunt; sed prudentia Boamundi hostium insidiae praeventae sunt.' Translation in Krey, *The First Crusade*, p. 135.

21 J.L. Cate, 'The Crusade of 1101', in K.M. Setton and M.W. Baldwin (eds), *History of the Crusades*, 6, Philadelphia and Madison: University of Pennsylvania Press and University of Wisconsin Press, 1955–86, I.343–68. For a more substantial treatment see A.C. Mulinder, *The Crusading Expeditions of 1101–02*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Swansea University, 1996.

22 Jonathan Phillips, *The Second Crusade*, New Haven: Yale, 2007, pp. 178–9; OD 117–18.

23 Jean de Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis, credo et lettre a Louis X*, Natalis de Wailly (ed. and tr.), Paris: Renouard, 1868, p. 98: 'Moi et mes chevaliers nous décidâmes que nous irions courir sus à main guache dans leur camp, et nous leur courûmes sus.' Translation from Joinville, *Life of St Louis*, p. 220.

24 France, *Victory in the East*, pp. 325–56.

25 FC 559, 735.

26 The best discussion of western methods is Randall Rogers, *Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth Century*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1992.

27 John France, 'Siege Conventions in Western Europe and the Latin East', in P. de Souza and J. France (eds), *War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 159–72.

28 There is an unpublished thesis on the subject: S.M. Foster, S*ome Aspects of Maritime Activity and the Use of Sea-power in Relation to the Crusading States*, D.Phil., University of Oxford, 1978.

29 France, *Victory in the East*, pp. 209–20; and John France, 'The First Crusade as a Naval Enterprise', *Mariner's Mirror* 4, 1997, 389–97.

30 J.H. Pryor, *Geography,Technology and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean 649–1571*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, and '"Water, Water Everywhere, nor Any Drop to Drink": Water Supplies for the Fleets of the First Crusade', in Michel Balard (ed.), *Dei gesta per Francos: Études sur les croisades dédiées à Jean Richard*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, pp. 21–8.
31 A.S. Ehrenkreutz, 'The Place of Saladin in the Naval History of the Mediterranean Sea in the Middle Ages', *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 74, 1955, 100–16.
32 John France, 'Thinking about Crusader Strategy', in Naill Christie and Maya Yazigi (eds), *Noble Ideals and Bloody Realities*, Leiden: Brill, 2006, pp. 75–96.
33 Thomas Asbridge, 'The Significance and Causes of the Battle of the Field of Blood', *Journal of Medieval History* 23, 1997, 301–16; and Thomas Asbridge, *The Creation of the Principality of Antioch, 1098–1130*, Woodbridge: Boydell, 2000.
34 RA 292.
35 Joshua Prawer, *Crusader Institutions*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1980, pp. 471–83.
36 The study of crusading warfare focuses substantially upon the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, about which we are better informed. The greatest work on the subject is R.C. Smail, *Crusading Warfare 1097–1193*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, second edition, C. Marshall (ed.), 1995 [1956], which remains the foremost authority. For the thirteenth century see Christopher Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East 1192–1291*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
37 For an introduction to crusader castles see Hugh Kennedy, *Crusader Castles*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, while Ronnie Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles and Modern Histories*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, indicates how castle-building changed to meet the Muslim threat.
38 These ideas about the native Christians have considerably changed our view of the kingdom, and arise from the combination of historical source material and recent archaeology to be found in Ronnie Ellenblum, *Frankish Rural Settlement in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 and Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles*.
39 What follows is drawn from John France, 'Crusading Warfare and its Adaptation to Eastern Conditions in the Twelfth Century', *Mediterranean Historical Review* 15, 2000, 49–66, which is the only attempt so far to consider this subject.
40 Yuval Harari, 'The Military Role of the Frankish Turcopoles', *Mediterranean Historical Review* 12, 1997, 79–86 provides a fine treatment of this subject, though his suggestion that Turcopoles were Franks is controversial. I suspect they were largely recruited from among the native Christians and the Bedouin, many of whom became able allies of the Latins. For the capture of the caravan, Ambroise, *Estoire le la Guerre Sainte*, Marianne Ailes and Malcolm Barber (eds), 2, Woodbridge: Boydell, 2003, II.10285–510.
41 France, *Western Warfare*, pp. 158–61, 235–41.
42 *Itinerarium peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, in *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I*, William Stubbs (ed.), 2, Rolls Series 38, London: Longman, 1864, I.247: 'Et quando forte vehementius procul effugantur, equis avolant rapidissimis, quibus in mundo non sunt agiliores, volatibus hirundinum cursu comparandi velocissimo. Turcorum etiam moris est, ut quando persenserint se fugantes a persequendo cessare, tunc et ipsi fugere cessabunt, more muscae fastidiosae, quam si abegeris avolabit, cum cessaveris redibit, quamdiu fugaveris fugiet, cum desieris praesto est.' Translation from *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, Helen Nicholson (tr.), Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997, p. 234.
43 Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, pp. 156–65.
44 WT 730: 'Erat autem hostris indictum publice ut defunctorum corpora camelis et aliis animalibus ad sarcinas deputatis imponerent, ne nostrorum considerata strage redderentur fortiores inimici, debiles quoque et saucios iumentis imponi mandatur, ne omnino nostrorum aliquis aut mortuus aut debilis crederetur. His etiam datum erat in

mandatis, ut gladios educentes saltem speciem validorum exprimerent. Mirabantur itaque que hostium prudentiores quod de tanta immissione sagittarum, de crebris conflictibus, de tanta sitis, pulveris, estus inmoderati molestia nullus unquam mortuus aut deficiens inveniretur, populum iudicant ferreum qui tot tamque continua possint tam perseveranter sustinere dispendia.' Translation from *William of Tyre, A History of Deeds Done beyond the Sea*, E.A. Babcock and A.C. Krey (trs), 2, New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, II.153–4.

45 WT 937–8: 'Et prenimia multitudine territi ceperunt se solito artius comprimere, ita ut pre turbe densitate vix possent incedere. Illi statim in nostros irruentes temptabant si unquam possent eos abinvicem separare, sed nostri, proicia divinitate, solidius inter se conglobati et hostium sustinebant impetus et iter maturatis gressibus conficiebant. Tandem ventum est ad locum destinatum ibique defixis tentoriis stetit exercitus universus.' Translation from *William of Tyre*, II.373–4.

46 Baha al-Din Ibn Shaddad, *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, D.S. Richards (tr.), Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002, p. 170.

47 Baha al-Din, *History of Saladin*, p. 175.

48 Malcolm Barber, *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St John in Jerusalem and Cyprus, c.1050–1310*, London: Macmillan, 1967; A.J. Forey, *The Military Orders: From the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992; Helen Nicholson, *Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights: Images of the Military Orders, 1128–1291*, London: Leicester University Press, 1993.

49 *Rule of the Templars: The French Text of the Rule of the Order of the Knights Templar*, H. de Curzon (ed.), J.M. Upton-Ward (tr.), Woodbridge: Boydell, 1992.

50 Imad ad-Din, *Lightning of Syria*, F. Gabrieli (tr.), *Arab Historians of the Crusades*, New York: Dorset, 1957, pp. 138–9.

51 William Urban, *The Teutonic Knights: A Military History*, London: Greenhill, 2003.

52 Silvia Schein, 'The Templars: The Regular Army of the Holy Land and Spearhead of the Army of its Reconquest', in Giovanni Minucci and Franca Sardi (eds), *I Templari: Mito e Storia*, Siena: A.G. Viti-Riccucci, 1989, pp. 15–25.

53 Al-Sulami's *Kitab al-Jihad* can be found with a French translation in Emmanuel Sivan, 'Un traité Damasquin du début du XIIe siècle', *Journal Asiatique* 254, 1966, 206–22. Niall Christie is in the process of making an English translation, and see his study, 'Religious Campaign or War of Conquest? Muslim Views of the Motives of the First Crusade', in Christie and Yazigi (eds), *Noble Ideals and Bloody Realities*, pp. 57–74.

54 WT 606: 'Aliter enim et remissius solet inter consortes eiusdem legis et fidei pugna committi, aliter inter discolos et contradictorias habentes traditiones: hic enim sufficit ad materiam iugis scandali et perpetuorum iurgiorum quod in eisdem fidei articulis non communicant, et si nulla alia sit odiorum materia.' Translation from *William of Tyre*, II.24–5.

55 Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, p. 100: 'Monseigneur Érard de Siverey fut frappé d'un coup d'épée au visage, tellement, que le nez lui tombait sur la lèvre. Et alors il me souvint de monseigneur saint Jacques: "Beau sire saint Jacques, que j'ai invoqué, aidez-moi et me secourez dans ce besoin".' Translation from Joinville, *Life of St Louis*, p. 221.

56 Otto and Acerbus Morena, *De Rebus Laudensibus*, *MGH SS* XVIII.627.

57 France, 'Siege Conventions in Western Europe and the Latin East', pp. 159–72.

58 Yvonne Friedman, 'Captivity and Ransom: The Experience of Women', in S.B. Edgington and S. Lambert (eds), *Gendering the Crusades*, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2001, pp. 121–39, and, *Encounter between Enemies: Captivity and Ransom in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, Leiden: Brill, 2002.

59 France, *Western Warfare*, p. 229.

2

MUSLIM RESPONSES TO THE FRANKISH DOMINION IN THE NEAR EAST, 1098–1291

Yehoshua Frenkel

The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem has been the subject of innumerable studies over the years, resulting in a vast body of scholarship that covers a wide variety of subjects, including pilgrimage, military clashes, sieges, economics, political relations and contracts. For this reason, new contributions to the scholarship are only warranted if, instead of being concerned with details, names and episodes, they provide us with new insight. This chapter, therefore, neither narrates the history of events or fighting nor engages in the historical reconstruction of the diplomacy, commerce or ideology of the period. Instead, it explores several aspects of the Muslims' complex reaction to the Frankish dominion in the Near East as it evolved over time, between the conquest of Jerusalem in 1099[1] and the fall of Acre in 1291,[2] in an effort to shed new light on the subject.

In recent years, *jihadist* discourse has succeeded in planting a simplified popular visualization of the crusades within the mass media, as well as in some scientific quarters. According to this discourse, the crusades were simply a conflict between European intruders and Muslim freedom fighters: nothing more and nothing less. Medieval Arab sources do not support this depiction of an assault on Islamic territory or an indigenous population fighting energetically to rebuff the Westerners.[3] Modern authors often consult these writings in their research, selectively choosing from already selective data and thereby painting an imagined picture of the past: one of complete unrest and total *jihad* against the crusaders.[4] Medieval Muslims, however, were not familiar with this concept. In fact, the relationship between the Franks and the Muslims of the Near East was far more complicated.

A careful reading of the medieval sources reveals that contemporary Muslims competed with Frankish challenges through both war and ceasefire. The history of these turbulent years is not a story of a comprehensive total conflict between two colliding religions, but rather one of changing, multifaceted circumstances and a shift from cooperation and détente to hostilities and killing. It is a saga of war and peace, fighting and commerce, and antagonism and cohabitation that lasted for two centuries. Moreover, local rulers employed *jihad* not as a slogan of

total war but as a political instrument vis-à-vis rivals and enemies whom they accommodated.

I do not argue that Muslim rulers and governors refrained from declaring *jihad* or cynically pretended to participate in military efforts. Rather, my thesis is that these local rulers understood the extreme complexity of the conditions in the Near East and adopted an ad hoc reaction to evolving circumstances. Fighting was viewed as the arena of professional soldiers and as such it did not constitute a total war. This helps us understand how military encounters could be temporarily halted for agreed periods of armistice. During such periods, commerce was not conceived of as an obstacle to inevitable Islamic victory, just as merchants' caravans were not regarded as an obstruction to knights' sorties.

If we were to draw a map of the political realities of Western Asia in 1098, it would certainly require more than two colours. The lands of the Caliphate were disputed by the Sunni caliphs of Baghdad and the Fatimids of Egypt. Ethnicity separated Turks from Arabs. In Syria, local warlords seized towns and districts that were officially controlled by the Saljuq sultans. Moreover, long and complex religious polemics divided the Eastern Christian communities into a mosaic of denominations. These socio-political realities help us better understand not only the Latin conquests, but the slow local reaction and the complex relations that resulted between the Western Christians, the indigenous population and the Muslim commanding officers.

During the twelve years between 1098 and 1110, the Franks advanced southward, seizing the Syrian coast and Palestine. There is no indication, however, that during these formative years local Muslim rulers and subjects developed a comprehensive ideology of religious war (*jihad*). Rather, the institutionalization of *jihad* against the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and the organization of Muslim society to combat the Christian enemy was a slow process. The construction of a political and social discourse expressing a vision of total war against the Franks as the enemy and the ultimate other proceeded hand in hand with the development of territorial and social concepts. Organized propaganda enhanced the concept of Palestine as an Islamic 'Holy Land' (*al-ard al-muqaddasa*) – a land that should be reacquired from the hands of the infidels through a military onslaught on a par with the early Islamic conquests. The reconquered lands would then be purified and its Muslim inhabitants would adhere to the 'true and unspoiled' religion disseminated by the Prophet.

This message was shaped by a long list of authors who, supported politically and financially by the leading military commanders, composed poems, chronicles, biographies, stories and literary works in other genres highlighting the virtues of geographical locations and individual rulers. This literary production served as a powerful tool in depicting an idealistic and unreliable representation of the past and the fighting against the Franks. As we possess no contemporary Arabic language chronicles, the historical reconstruction of the initial Islamic reaction to the First Crusade is based upon later sources.[5] These sources focus primarily on a narration of the fighting, the victories and the defeats, and create the impression

that war was the major story of the day. Some authors, including some who wrote under the patronage of sultans who regarded themselves as commanders of *jihad*, however, offer a more realistic picture. Their writings shed light on the actuality on the ground, which was one of fighting side by side with commerce and negotiations. In this way, these sources establish that the crusaders operated in a divided arena and were met by multiple reactions.

While the Franks advanced southward from Constantinople to the Holy Land, local Muslim rulers continued to quarrrel among themselves, perhaps indicating underestimation of the danger of the Frankish assault. In fact, it is evident that the confusion shocked the local population.[6] Although it is difficult to reconstruct Islamic public opinion during this period, it is abundantly clear that a declaration of religious war against the intruders was not the immediate reaction of the Muslims. Some local warlords even negotiated deals with the advancing Franks (in 491/1098). For example, 'Umar, the governor of 'Azaz, handed his son, [Mahumeth], over to Godfrey of Bouillon as a hostage.[7]

Nonetheless, it is plain that the Franks' southward advance and the defeats (*nakba*) they inflicted on the Muslims soon instigated panic among civilians in northern Syria. As a result, a delegation from Aleppo was sent out to Baghdad to call for an Islamic response to the Frankish threat.[8] However, the alarm of the civil population failed to convince their lord, Ridwan b. Tutush, to take effective action and the Muslim relief mission frightened him even more than the advancing crusaders did. As a result, he ordered that the gates of Aleppo be closed, thus preventing the fighters dispatched by the Saljuq sultan from entering the city.[9]

Fatimid rulers of Egypt not only refrained from any rapprochement with the Turkish officers that governed the cities and towns of Syria but launched an attack on Jerusalem at the same time as the Frankish assault on Antioch. Moreover, having long before established commercial relations with southern Europe, they did not hesitate to dispatch diplomatic emissaries to the Frankish camp.[10] Indeed, commercial relations between Italian towns and Cairo began approximately one century before the First Crusade,[11] and political accord between the Franks and the Fatimids of Egypt should therefore not be ruled out.

In his work on the vast area between the Atlantic and the Euphrates, the Arab-Muslim historian Ibn al-Athir depicted a coordinated Christian onslaught on the Abode of Islam. Contemplating the relations between Western Europe and the lands of Islam, the well-known historian argued that the Christians endeavoured to uproot Islam by advancing in two prongs simultaneously: one in Spain and one in Sicily.[12] Roger the Frank, who had conquered the island, prevented them from attacking Tunisia and advised Baldwin, their ruler, to conquer Jerusalem. Ibn al-Athir offered an additional explanation for the Frankish conquests: one of regional conspiracy and betrayal. He claimed that the Fatimid rulers of Egypt were terrified by the advancing Saljuqs and in response invited the Franks to conquer Syria.[13] While it is possible to some degree to attribute this interpretation to anti-Shi'ite misinformation, it should also be emphasized that the Franks were no strangers to the Fatimids. Moreover, until the very final years of the Latin Kingdom, as

I will discuss in more detail later in this chapter, fighting and military expeditions went hand in hand with communication, agreements and trade.[14]

Muslim chroniclers have suggested still other explanations for the First Crusade. Al-'Azimi (483–532/1090–1138), who was a child at the time, held that the Franks attacked out of revenge. He did not portray them as anti-Muslim but rather as pilgrims who had been prevented by Muslims from travelling to the Holy Land and who had reacted by launching a religious war (*ghaziya* i.e. razzia).[15] Moreover, al-'Azimi did not hesitate to employ objective technical terms to denote the Christians, referring to the Pope as 'the caliph of the Christians'; to the crusades as *jihad*;[16] and to the Christian warriors who conquered the Holy Land as *hujjaj* (pilgrims).[17]

Baha al-Din Ibn Shaddad (539–632/1145–1239) was an eyewitness reporter who served Saladin. Keen to portray his master as a great statesman and commander, he composed a panegyric biography of the Sultan.[18] Yet his eulogy narrated not only the military and political achievements of the 'great religious reformer' (Salah al-Din) but daily affairs, including joint Frankish–Muslim games and the exchange of marriage proposals between the populations. These accounts undermine an imagined picture of unbridled hostility and incessant religious strife. With regard to the fighting around Acre (Sha'ban 585/September 1189), Ibn Shaddad recounted the following examples that demonstrate a certain amount of fraternization between the rival armies:

> The evening of that day a major battle took place between the enemy and our people in the city, in which a great number were killed on both sides. Similar conflicts went on for a long time and not a day passed without wounding, killing, capturing and plundering. They got to know one another, in that both sides would converse and leave off fighting. At times some people would sing and others dance, so familiar had they become over time, and then after a while they would revert to fighting.

During these encounters, he noted the following interesting occurrence:

> One day the men on both sides were tired of fighting and said: How much longer will the older men go on fighting, while the young have no share? We want two young men to contend, one of ours and one of yours. Two youth were brought out of the city [Acre] to meet two from the Franks. They fought fiercely together and one of the Muslim youths leapt on one of the infidel youths, clasped him in his arms and threw him on the ground and took him prisoner, tying him fast to take him away. A Frankish man ransomed him for two *dinars*. They said he really is your prisoner, so took the two *dinars* and released him. This is a strange incident of war.[19]

During the Third Crusade, Baha al-Din Ibn Shaddad served Saladin and his brother al-'Adil. Recounting the skirmishes between the Third Crusade and

Saladin's army, the Sultan's loyal secretary and his semi-official biographer begins with popular curses against the Latin enemy. This did not, however, prevent Ibn Shaddad from incorporating into his story what seems upon first reading to be a work of literary fiction.[20] After conveying to his reader how the bitter foes negotiated a ceasefire in the midst of military operations in central Palestine (1191),[21] Ibn Shaddad offers a tale combining romance and deep animosity: a medieval soap opera.[22] The cornerstone of the agreement (*qa'ida*) was Richard, Coeur de Lion's proposal that Saladin's brother al-'Adil marry his widowed sister Joanna, whom the English King had brought from Sicily to the Holy Land. The seat of their joint realm would be in Noble Jerusalem.[23] Several later Muslim authors repeated this story.[24] For example, Ibn al-Athir recounted that:

> Saladin moved his position to Latrun on Ramadan 587 (4 October 1191) and made camp there. The king of England sent to him, seeking peace. A series of envoys came to al-Adil Abu Bakr the son of Ayyub, Saladin's brother, and it was settled that the [English] king should marry his sister to al-Adil, that Jerusalem and the coastal land that the Muslims held should be al-Adil's and Acre and what was in Frankish hands should be for the king's sister, in addition to a kingdom she already had over the sea, which she had inherited from her husband, and that the Templars would accept whatever was agreed upon. Al-Adil submitted it to Saladin who agreed to it. When this became public knowledge, the priests, bishops and monks assembled before the king of England's sister and expressed their disapproval, so she refused to comply. Some other obstacle was spoken of, but God knows best.[25]

Here, we are not concerned with the historical validity of this account.[26] For our purposes, it is sufficient to point out that contemporary Muslim authors were not troubled by what their readers might have considered to be a dual attitude toward the abhorrent enemy. The popularity of this episode in later Muslim chronicles of the crusades attests to the fact that the Muslim reading public was even willing to accept the option of inter-communal marriage as a valid strategy to end hostilities.

In a later chapter, Ibn Shaddad recounted the negotiations and the arrangements that were agreed (587/1191). In this context, he cited the text of a letter attributed to King Richard, who was said to argue that Jerusalem was the centre of Christianity and claimed the return of the Holy Cross. A positive reply by Saladin, he suggested, would make peace possible. The Sultan replied as follows: 'Jerusalem is ours just as much as it is yours. Indeed, for us it is greater than it is for you, for it is where our Prophet came on his Night Journey and the gathering place of the angels. Let the king imagine that we shall give it up.'[27] Ibn Shaddad continued his account of the event by reporting that, following the conclusion of peace,

> The two armies fraternised and a good many Muslims went to [Frankish] Jaffa in search of trade. A large host of the enemy came to Jerusalem to

> perform their pilgrimage (*hajj*). The sultan gave them every assistance and sent escorts with them to protect them until they were taken back to Jaffa. Many Franks did this. The sultan's aim in this was that they should fulfil their pilgrim (*ziyara*) duty and return to their own lands, leaving the Muslims safe from their wickedness . . . Every day large numbers of them were arriving, officers, men of middling sort and princes concealing their rank. The sultan set about receiving honourably those who came. He offered food, met them with an easy manner and conversed with them . . . [and] allowed them to perform their pilgrimage (*hajj*).[28]

Although some of these accounts may very well have been created for propaganda purposes, they also appear to convey the realities of the twelfth century effectively. Even though they depict the Frank as the ultimate other and the personification of evil, they do not deny his religious faith and practice.

The Frankish conquest of the Syrian coastal plain, Jerusalem and the Galilee resulted in armed clashes and chronicles offer frequent reports of the fighting between the invaders and the 'Turk' rulers of Damascus, which provides the best case study for the fact that the reaction by Muslim rulers to the new developments precipitated by the arrival of the crusaders was not labelled 'Holy War' for several generations. Moreover, the rulers of Damascus did not go to great lengths to mobilize men, animals and material goods for the sake of the struggle. Pressing demands, the burden of fighting, and tension on other fronts drove both parties to seek temporary ceasefire arrangements, including *muwada'a* (reconciliation), *muhadana* (armistice) and *munasafa* (equal division).[29]

In his chronicle, the Damascene historian Ibn al-Qalanisi (470–555/1077–1160) conveyed the terms of such armistice accords.[30] The first pact (*shart*) reached by Baldwin and Zahir al-Din Tughtekin (Toghtekin, 1104–28) divided control over the Golan Heights (al-Sawad) and the mountains of Ajlun (Jabal al-'Awf) between the parties. In addition, one-third of the harvest was to be given to the Latin King of Jerusalem, one-third was to be given to the Turk (al-atrak) rulers of Damascus and the remaining third was to be left in the hands of the cultivators (502/1109).[31]

One year later, Tughtekin and Tripoli concluded a second 'amicable settlement . . . regarding their respective territories and to establish peaceful relations (*musalama*)'. According to this agreement, the Franks were to receive one-third of the agricultural produce of the Lebanese Plain (*al-Biqa'*). They were also to be ceded two castles in northern Lebanon, the inhabitants of which would pay them an agreed annual sum.[32] This truce broke down after a short period but was subsequently renewed (in Safar 504/September 1110), this time by the ruler of Damascus and King Baldwin, Lord of Jerusalem. The terms of this truce greatly resembled the earlier agreement between the parties regarding the Golan Heights: one-third of the agricultural produce went to the Franks, while the remaining two-thirds were to be divided equally between the Muslims (i.e., the ruler of Damascus) and the cultivators.

A few months later (Jumada the latter 504/December 1110–January 1111), this truce was followed by an agreement between Tancred, the regent of Antioch, and Ridwan, King of Aleppo, by which the latter consented to pay an annual tribute.[33] In the summer, the truce collapsed and a crusader column advanced into the Hauran. The raid, however, stopped at Sanamiain and the parties negotiated a peace agreement and amicable relations (504/1111). Tughtekin agreed that Baldwin would collect half of the annual agricultural yield of al-Sawad, the Jabal al-'Awf mountains and al-Jabaniya, and take control of meadows which were in the hands of the Banu al-Jarrah Bedouin. This, it should be emphasized, was in addition to the share of the harvest he was already slated to collect.[34]

The limited success of Mawdud of Mosul (murdered in Damascus, 1113) in northern and southern Syria (1110–13)[35] and the considerable damages to the rural districts drove Tughtekin of Damascus and Baldwin, King of the Franks, to conclude a new armistice (507/1114). Both parties aimed to restore agricultural cultivation and secure the roads, and they swore to uphold the terms of the pact faithfully and to maintain a sincere friendship. As a result, people travelled with increased safety on the roads and the crops were harvested more efficiently.[36]

The following summer witnessed yet another rapprochement between the Franks and a number of Syrian warlords. Alarmed by the advance of an expeditionary force dispatched by the Saljuq Sultan, the Muslim rulers of Damascus, Aleppo and Diyarbakir allied themselves with King Baldwin of Jerusalem, Prince Roger of Antioch and other Frankish 'devils'.[37] The military operation organized by the Sultan (509/1115) came to an end with the defeat of the army of Bursuqi of Hamadhan.[38]

Amicable relations between Damascus and the Latin King continued until the death of Baldwin, who was succeeded in Jerusalem by Baldwin of Bourcq. The new ruler sent representatives to Damascus to negotiate the extension of the temporary truce accord (512/1118). Although Tughtekin was ready to sign a new ceasefire, he first demanded the annulment of the crop-sharing agreement (*munasafa*) with the Latins.[39] Shams al-Muluk Isma'il's (r. 1132–5) account of the attack against Banyas (527/December 1132)[40] teaches us that the tradition of mutually agreed reconciliation treaties (*muwada'a*) between the Franks and the rulers of Damascus continued, despite recurring violations of the terms of the armistice (*hudna*) and friendly relations.[41] The restoration of past treaties between the old enemies stopped raids and reprisal raids.[42]

The close cooperation between the Latin Kingdom and the ruler of Damascus resumed as 'Imad al-Din Zangi advanced on the city. Facing this challenge, Mu'in al-Din Unur (who ruled Damascus between 1140 and 1149) agreed to take joint action with the Franks against the intruders, and a formal treaty (*ittifaq*; *mu'ahada*) including solemn oaths (*ayman*) and mutual guarantees was signed in 534/1139.[43] Although the Second Crusade (1148) and subsequent Frankish raids were regarded in Damascus as a reflection of ill faith and disregard for the *hudna*, Unur nonetheless endorsed a second truce agreement (*muhadana*). Muslim historians have depicted this as a positive step taken by the Damascene

ruler in response to a Frankish request to resume amicable relations (*musamaha*). It was agreed that the truce would last for two years and the parties took oaths to observe the treaty faithfully (544/1149). As a result, 'the strife ceased and the population on both sides of the border was eased in mind, satisfied with this solution and rejoiced at its provisions'.[44]

The emergence of the Latin Kingdom did not precipitate a large-scale migration of Muslims from the territory conquered by the Franks,[45] though it was accompanied by the mass murder of Muslims and a large wave of refugees.[46] Muslims remained in their villages, although they abandoned cities during the period of conquest.[47] Most Muslim peasants and Frankish seigneurs established a modus vivendi, and we have reports of only a handful of cases of immigrants from the Frankish Kingdom. The best-known case of emigration (*hijra*) is that of a Hanbalite community that deserted its villages in the mountain of Nablus (Palestine) and resettled in the Salahiyya quarter (Damascus).[48] These refugees stand out for their active participation in the *jihad* propaganda of the time. At the same time, as noted above, there is sufficient evidence to establish that most of the Muslim villagers did not migrate.[49]

The Reaction of the *'Ulama*

The limited truces discussed above were not the only Muslim response to the establishment of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. A military response followed the early defeats, and Muslim rulers' willingness to use force can be detected in a variety of contemporary sources.[50] That is not to say that inscription of military titles on stone and other materials began with the Latin conquest of the Holy land; indeed, two years prior to the conquest, the Fatimid commander al-Afdal designated himself 'the edged sword of the Leader of the Faithful (*sayf al-imam*)'.[51]

Yet with the stirring up of the fighting between Muslims and Franks it became increasingly evident that Muslim officers were keen to demonstrate their commitment to *jihad*. To this end, they used various titles, such as 'the illustrious lord, the commander of the armies, and the sword of Islam'.[52] These titles were inscribed on walls, sewed into fabric, and engraved in wood.[53] In al-Aqmar's (the Moonlight) mosque, no visitor could fail to notice the lines beginning with the supplication: 'Oh Allah, give victory to the armies of the Commander of the Believers over the Polytheists . . . The illustrious lord, the commander of the armies, the sword of Islam [ordered the construction of this building].'[54]

The practice of including military titles in inscriptions was not limited to the Fatimids of Egypt.[55] Another example of this self-adornment is an inscription discovered in the mosque of Busra (Syria), which reads as follows: 'The repair of this mosque was ordered by the commandant, marshal (*isfah-salar*), the great illustrious lord, the chosen commander . . . during the days of our master the sovereign Zahir al-Din Tughtekin, the *atabek*, the sword of the Commander of the Faithful.'[56]

We can also trace a belligerent reaction to the Frankish challenge among Muslim scholars as early as the first quarter of the twelfth century. Indeed, 'Ali ibn Tahir al-Sulami (1039–1106) wrote a tractate in support of religious war against the Latins as early as the turn of the century (in Damascus 498/1105).[57] Al-Sulami was a Sunni Muslim scholar from Damascus,[58] and his *kitab al-jihad* was the first treatise on the Holy War written after the arrival of the Franks in Syria.[59] Recognizing that the Franks were fighting a *jihad* against the Muslims of Syria, he understood their movement within the broader context of the struggle between Islam and Christianity and presented their triumph as a symptom of the moral and political decay of Islam.[60]

Al-Sulami also offered his audience the certainty of Islam's future victory and called on his fellow believers to unite and rise up against the Franks:

> I say: 'What I have mentioned illustrates that if there is a need to carry out a collective action, it is the duty of all the community (*fardan wajiban*)[61] to partake in the fighting. That is the situation in which we now find ourselves with the group that is currently attacking the Abode of Islam . . . If the enemy surrounds a town, the obligation of *jihad* is incumbent on all who are there, on whoever resides in the location. None are exempted from these obligations except those with reasonable excuses and impeding physical disabilities.'[62]

The Conquest of Syria, a pseudo-Waqidi historical text and popular tale that circulated among Arab readers after the emergence of the *jihad* movement in twelfth-century Syria, presented an approach opposing friendly relations with the Franks. One chapter of this fictional work recounts the tale of the wife of Aban ibn Sa'id, who was killed by a poison arrow during the siege of Damascus (in 634).[63] The widow, Umm Aban bint 'Utba b. Rabi'a, participated in the conquest of Syria with her brother, joining the fighting after her husband was killed immediately following their wedding ('her hand was still painted with the nuptial's colour'). Armed with her late husband's weapon, Umm Aban fought, 'hoping to join him, and praying that it will soon be'.[64]

Early manifestations of *jihad*

As we have seen, Islamic reactions to the Frankish conquests varied and at times were contradictory, and there is no evidence to indicate that the concept of an 'Islamic Holy War' to repel the enemy enjoyed popular support in the years before Nur al-Din.[65] Moreover, contemporary Muslim sources do not suggest that the local Muslim population viewed the conflict with the Franks as a total *jihad* obligating the mandatory participation of all members of society. Gradually, however, a different approach gained currency, reflected in early manifestations of public protest that corresponded to the negotiations and truce agreements concluded by the Syrian rulers and the Franks.

A decade after the Franks' arrival in northern Syria, a delegation consisting of a sharif (a descendant of the clan of the Prophet Muhammad) and a group of Sufis, merchants and jurists made its way to Baghdad to call on the Muslim leadership to respond (504/Febuary 1111). Appealing for assistance, they demonstrated loudly and disrupted the Friday prayer service at the Sultan's mosque. The following Friday, they went to the Caliph's mosque and repeated their performance, this time destroying the furniture in order to ensure that their message was conveyed. This prompted the action of the Saljuq Sultan, who ordered preparation for *jihad* against the infidels, the enemies of Allah.[66] This public outcry, and particularly the Muslim governors' use of *jihad* slogans, reflects the redeployment of traditional Islamic terminology in the political discourse of the early twelfth century.[67]

Although, as we have noted, Zahir al-Din Tughtekin signed amicable treaties with the Franks, he never renounced the option of military action against them. Indeed, he was engaged in military manoeuvres simultaneous to his diplomatic and political activities (which included military cooperation with the Latins). It appears that he was interested in portraying himself as the successor of Mawdud of Mosul, who achieved limited success in northern and southern Syria.[68] In line with this policy, Tughtekin dispatched letters to Muslim commanders, governors, officials and chieftains, urging their cooperation in repelling the 'malice of the accursed ones'. Similarly, Najm al-Din Il-Ghazi of Mardin and Aleppo[69] sent envoys to the Turkmen tribes, calling on them to fulfil the obligatory duty (*faridat*) of *jihad*. Both commanders undertook (in 512/December 1118) to devote all their resources to fight 'the infidel enemy' (*mujahadat al-kafara*), and to unite for the succour of faith and for the rooting out of the 'rebellious heretics'. During the same period, Abu al-Fadl Ibn al-Khashshab ('the wood merchant', d. 1125), the Shi'ite judge (*qadi*) of Aleppo, became active in anti-crusade propaganda. He joined the voices calling for the unity of Islam and for *jihad* against the 'misbelievers'.

It is difficult to assess the popular influence of these slogans, but the Muslim urban public appears to have reacted constructively. Furthermore, Muslim rulers were unable to turn a deaf ear to these voices. This conclusion is supported by the biography of Ibn al-Khashshab, who became a major political actor in Aleppo following the death of the Saljuq Prince Ridwan (507/1113). Facing the pressure of the Franks of Antioch, who had inflicted heavy losses on neighbouring Muslim forces,[70] Ibn al-Khashshab moved from words to political and military activity: he turned out in the battlefield in the Battle of Ager Sanguinis (the Battle of Balat, 513/June 1119).[71] Although his contribution to the victory that halted the Frankish advance was meagre,[72] later Muslim accounts depicted him as a leader who played a significant role in this encounter. He gained fame and was portrayed as the ideal Muslim cleric, serving as a model for his coreligionists to emulate.[73] The renewal of Frankish attacks drove Ibn al-Khashshab to put pressure on Aleppo's Christian population.[74] His conceptualization of the struggle against the Franks as a religious war between Islam (the Unitrans) and Christianity (the

Trinities or Polytheists) was adopted over the following years by a growing number of Muslim leaders. In this context, measures such as the seizure of churches became a common practice.[75]

A few years later, a new round of fighting engulfed northern Syria. In one of the battles, the Amir Balak, who emerged as a leading military commander in the anti-Frankish war, was killed (Manbij 518/May 1124). The lapidary on his tomb in Aleppo illuminates the ideological developments among Muslims in this realm.[76] The inscription opens with a Qur'anic verse:[77] 'Their Lord gives them good tidings of mercy from Him and good pleasure; for them gardens wherein is lasting bliss.'[78] The second line begins with another Qur'anic verse: 'Count not those who were slain in Allah's way as dead, but rather living with their Lord, by Him provided,'[79] and continues with: 'the martyr,[80] the commandant, the deprived who needs his Lord's mercy Nur al-Dawla (the Light of the Caliphate), Balak the son of Bahram b. Artuq has been taken by Allah unto Him.' In the lines that follow, Balak is referred to as 'the pride of the religion (i.e. Islam), the brilliant sun of the army commanders, the sword of the warriors *mujahidun*, the marshal of the Muslim armies, the defender of the Leader of the Faithful, the arrow of the kings, the tamer of the infidels and polytheists'.

The assumption that Muslim public opinion only gradually became receptive to the idea of *jihad* is supported by additional texts that were inscribed in various districts of Syria and adjacent regions during the second quarter of the twelfth century.[81] These texts include military titles such as: 'the defender of religion' (i.e., Islam) and 'the tamer of the infidels and polytheists'.[82] An inscription on the wall of a mosque in the Saruja market in Damascus reads:

> Built during the days of our master, the most illustrious marshal, the grand seigneur, the supporter of religion (Zahir al-Din; although an epithet), the vigour of Islam, the upholder of the Caliphate, the noble of the (Muslim) community, the pride of the people, the firmness of the kings, the foundation of the officers, the commander of the armies, the defender of warriors.[83]

According to an inscription on the wall of a religious school in Damascus, it was constructed by 'Mu'in al-Din Unur, the majestic officer, the marshal of the armies, and the manumitted slave of Tughtegin, the champion of *jihad*, the combatant and warrior'.[84] Similarly, a dedication at the entrance to the Bel Temple in Palmyra reads: 'This building was ordered by the chamberlain, the grand seigneur, the one helped by Allah, the defender of religion (Nasir al-Din), the resource of Islam, the sword of the caliphate, the prop of the kingship, the auxiliary of the champions of *jihad*, the honour of the commanders, the glory of the armies.'[85] An inscription at the al-Khidr Mosque in Busra (528/July 1134) conveys a similar message, stating that the renovation of the site was ordered by Gumushtakin (Gümüstekin, 'silver auspicious'), 'the spring of Islam, the trustworthy of the caliphate, the arm of the community, the sword of the people, the crown of the

commanders, the glory of the armies, the auxiliary of the *jihad* fighters'.[86] Gumushtakin also used similar titles and designations in an inscription above the window of a religious school he built in Busra.[87]

Expressions that illustrate the importance of a military role in the service of the Muslims and the Caliphate are visible on other public buildings as well. A religious school located on a street near the Great Mosque of Damascus was endowed by an officer who boasted that he had done so during the days of the courageous and fortunate (*alp qutlugh*) 'sword of Islam, the warrior for the cause of religion (*mujahid al-din*)'.[88] An inscription on the minaret of the Great Mosque in Hama states that the work was commissioned by the chamberlain Abu Ja'far Muhammad, who with excessive pride declared himself 'the defender of Islam, the director of armies'.[89]

These inscriptions and lapidaries reflect the thoughts and feelings of Muslims at the time and reflect the popularity that *jihad* had achieved. The Syrian Muslim elite regarded the act of leading an army against the Franks as a commendable deed that endowed one with high standing, both among the masses and within the religious establishment. At the same time, *jihad* ideology also eased agony and facilitated the endurance of lamentation and death.[90] Examination of the chronology of these inscriptions reflects that the use of *jihad* slogans spread in southern Syria concurrently with the advance of the *atabek* al-Malik al-Mansur 'Imad al-Din Zangi in northern Syria.[91] Political developments encouraged him to interfere in Syria and seize Aleppo in 1128,[92] and soon afterward he started to exert pressure on the rulers of Damascus.[93]

Muslim reactions at their zenith

Although the history of 'Imad al-Din Zangi in Syria falls outside the realm of this chapter, it is nonetheless important to note that he made use of *jihad* slogans as he tried to expand his realm. Setting out from northern Iraq in spring 524/1130, Zangi invaded the territory of Antioch, routed the Franks, killed many of their knights, and captured the fortress of Atharib.[94] The historian Ibn al-Athir, who was a great admirer of the Zangids, praised the decisiveness of his hero ('the Martyr'), arguing that Zangi acted after he had witnessed the extreme hardship of the people of Aleppo and noting that he ordered his troops to be ruthless. Ibn al-Athir concluded his account by saying: 'I passed over this terrain at night in the year 584/1188 and I was told: Until the present time many bones still remain here.'[95]

Yet, despite his image as an anti-Frankish *mujahid*, Zangi still signed a ceasefire agreement with the enemy. From the demolished fortress of Atharib, he travelled to the citadel of Harim. The prospects of a military conflict with the Artuqids of Mardin and Hisn Kayfa induced him to stop the anti-Frankish initiative and to conclude a *hudna* with the inhabitants of the town of Harim.[96] Zangi had a similar reaction in the summer of the following year after returning to and besieging the castle of Ba'rin (Barin).[97] Initially, he refused the Franks' offer to surrender on the

condition that he grant them safe passage and permit them to return to their lands. Upon learning of the advance of a sizeable Frankish army, however, 'circumstances forced him to grant the besieged their liberty[98] and he contracted an alliance (*'ahd*) with them upon the condition that they acknowledge his suzerainty (531/1137)'.[99] Several years passed before Zangi was able to achieve a major strategic victory in the long struggle with the Franks and their allies in northern Syria. The conquest of Edessa (538/1144) was a laudable compensation for past disappointments, shocking both the Franks and the local Christian communities.[100]

Governing Aleppo and endeavouring to seize central and southern Syria, Zangi toiled hard to construct his image as an upstanding Muslim ruler motivated by a strong desire to establish justice and fight the Franks.[101] He ordered inscriptions reflecting his self-image on several buildings. The earliest inscription in Damascus that mentions his name reads as follows: 'it was constructed during the days of the champion of *jihad*, the fighter, combatant, defender of the community, subduer of polytheists, and the exterminator of the heretics'.[102] In a tour inside the town of Baalbek, he is referred to as 'the pillar of Islam, the commander of the warriors in the cause of Allah, the vanquisher of infidels and polytheists, the aid of the armies'.[103] Similar *jihadist* titles were also employed by other officers in and around Damascus[104] and were included in several inscriptions on buildings in Aleppo.[105]

These inscriptions serve as lucid indicators of the evolution of a new political discourse in Syria. However, it should also be noted that, in addition to such Islamic designations, the rulers of Syria used ancient Iranian and Turkish titles, such as *pahlawan-i jihan* (the paragon of the world), *khusro-i iran* (the Caesar of Iran), *alp* (the courageous warrior), *inanj* (the trustworthy), *qutlugh* (the auspicious) and *tughril* (falcon).[106] This should not be interpreted as reflecting a weakened commitment to *jihad* or the cause of Islam, but rather as evidence of an emerging Islamic community that did not cut its ties with its pre-Islamic past.

In 1146, Zangi was murdered and his realm was divided among his sons, with Nur al-Din Mahmud inheriting Aleppo and northern Syria. He took to the battlefield soon after. His first goal was to force the Franks to withdraw from the territories they governed east of the Orontes River (al-'Assi). Eager to report Nur al-Din's achievements, Ibn al-Athir recounts a Frankish defeat at Yaghra.[107] In this context, he quotes verses by Ibn al-Qaysarani (d. Damascus 548/1153):

> How should we not celebrate our praiseworthy (Mahmud) life, when the sultan is the praiseworthy (Mahmud [Nur al-Din]) / and the sword of Islam is only turned aside when the carcass of the Unbelief [Franks] is cut in slices / Virtuous deeds are only found where the Light of Religion (Nur al-Din) is present / How many a battle has he, whose day is marked well by the infidel princes.[108]

Military achievements on the battlefield consolidated Nur al-Din's position in Syria,[109] and Muslim detachments from neighbouring districts joined him.[110]

Following the Frankish fiasco at the gates of Damascus (1148),[111] Nur al-Din was able to seize the city (549/1154), thus achieving one of his major goals in southern Syria.[112] With a firm grip on the reins of government in Islamic Syria, Nur al-Din invested considerable resources in building a standing army and spent additional capital on religious buildings and socio-cultural networks.[113] Pious foundations financed the religious establishment, which in turn expressed its vociferous support for Nur al-Din's *jihad* policy and plans.

Literary sources, particularly those written by his admirers, describe Nur al-Din as a strict Muslim who fought tirelessly against the Franks and firmly established justice and Islamic norms. Archaeological findings from this period also support this image of the leader.[114] Nur al-Din portrayed himself as the leader of the *jihad* and directed a well-orchestrated propaganda campaign against the Franks, with an idyllic image of Jerusalem presented as the goal and reward.[115] Inquiry into the three public fields of building, internal political measures and propaganda shed important light on Nur al-Din's policies and objectives. For example, inscriptions on the buildings constructed under his orders (a total of forty-two) served to spread his propaganda, his titles[116] and his self-representation. In these inscriptions, Nur al-Din is described as the champion of *jihad* (*mujahid*), the defender of Islam (*murabit*), the knowledgeable (*'alim*), the just (*'adil*), the foundation (*rukn*) of Islam, the partner (*qasim*) of the Caliphate, the crown of the (Muslim) congregation (*taj al-milla*), and additional glorifying titles.

Nur al-Din reinforced his army by recruiting Kurds to join his Turkish soldiers.[117] Investing considerable sums in religious institutions staffed by Iranians, he encouraged the migration of scholars and Sufis to his domain.[118] In addition to the Islamic titles and warrior ranks, he held Persian and Turkish titles. The inscriptions also refer to him as the subduer of the heretics, the potentate (*shariyar*) of Syria, the marshal of the armies (*isfah-salar*), and a host of similar titles that stress his commitment to fighting the Franks and establishing an 'Islamic' order.[119]

Based on the details presented here, we can firmly conclude that Nur al-Din conceived of *jihad* not only as an anti-Frankish measure but as an instrument to fortify Sunni Islam. For Nur al-Din, *jihad* was an all-encompassing social, religious and military policy directed toward internal and external enemies alike.[120] 'Imad al-Din al-Isfahanai (1125–1200) praised Nur al-Din as a leader who did not dwell in cities during spring and summer but rather took to the fields to guard the frontiers and to protect against 'evil'.[121] Nonetheless, Nur al-Din's policies were pragmatic. Despite his clear awareness of the importance of building up his self-image as a *mujahid*, his victories on the battlefield did not prevent him from signing an armistice and an accord of reconciliation (*muwada'a*) with the Franks.[122] Truces with the Franks were envisioned as a conclusion of military manoeuvres.

Although with the death of Nur al-Din in Damascus in 569 (14 May 1174) his young son al-Malik al-Salih Isma'il inherited the throne, the regent Shams al-Din Muhammad b. Abd al-Malik ibn al-Muqaddam served as the de facto ruler. One

of the first external threats he faced was the Frankish siege of Banyas, and his solution was simple: he informed the enemy that Saladin would attack the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and managed to conclude a ceasefire agreement, followed by a *hudna*.[123] In this way, 'Imad al-Din al-Isfahani explains, 'the sincere intention to fight was replaced by shaking hands (*musafaha*, or concord)'.[124]

Ibn al-Athir, who was not particularly fond of Saladin,[125] recounted that the ruler of Egypt wrote to al-Malik al-Salih Isma'il as follows:

> The Syrian emirs only made peace with the Franks out of fear of him [Saladin] and of Sayf al-Din Ghazi, the lord of Mosul for the latter had already taken the Jazira lands and they feared that he would cross into Syria. They considered making peace (*sulh*) with the Franks better than having the one [Saladin] come from the west and the other [Sayf al-Din] from the east, leaving them [Nur al-Nin's officers] too busy to repel the Franks (569/1174).[126]

The history of Saladin is one of the most popular topics in any crusades bibliography,[127] and for this reason we avoid dwelling on it excessively here. Instead, we present only a handful of accounts that clearly illuminate the complex policy of the Sultan, who alternated between temporary armistices and *jihad*.[128] Saladin was determined to build his public image as a moralist (*Salah al-Dunya wal-Din* means Righteousness of the World and of Faith) and as the victorious combatant who rescued Jerusalem from the hands of polytheists. He often represented himself as the unifier of belief and the subduer of worshippers of the Cross.[129]

In letters to the Caliph's court in Baghdad (577/1181), Saladin presented himself as the true Muslim champion engaged on three fronts: against the infidel Franks in Jerusalem, against the heretical Assassins (*al-Hashashiya*), and against the rulers of northern Iraq (Mosul). In these letters, Saladin claimed that the Franks were planning to attack northern Arabia,[130] that the ruler of Mosul was intriguing with the Franks and with the Assassins, and that he himself detested the idea of concluding a *hudna* with them.[131]

Yet, practically, Saladin conducted a policy similar to that of Nur al-Din. In order to focus on his internal challenges and subdue his opponents, he also concluded several truces with the Franks[132] and agreed to sign peace (*musalaha*)[133] and friendship contracts with them. In fact, until the second half of the 1180s, Saladin hardly fought the Franks at all.[134] Even on the eve of Hattin, he signed two truces: the first with Raymond (1185) and the second with Guy de Lusignan (1186).[135]

Despite his awareness of the importance of propaganda and the construction of his image, Saladin never changed his policy of alternating fighting with truces, even after the conquest of Jerusalem. He appears not to have been puzzled by the fact that his inscriptions and the writings of his courtiers and admirers depicted him as an enthusiastic warrior for the cause of Islam. Similarly, the fact that he never fulfilled the obligation of pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*) did not tarnish his image as a devout Muslim.

Commerce and collaboration

In the preceding sections, I have shown that the Zangid and Ayyubid concept of *jihad* did not indicate an endless struggle between Islam and the Franks, but rather referred to an ongoing political rivalry for hegemony against an enemy who was envisioned by the Muslims not as an invader but rather as a competitor, with whom a limited truce could be signed but no permanent peace established.[136] The commercial relations between the Latin Kingdom, the trading nations of southern Europe and the forces that ruled over the Islamic Near East between the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries shed important light on this uneasy reality in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Franks' arrival in the Levant brought warfare to Anatolia, Syria and Egypt, but the emergence of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem also encouraged an increased presence of Western European merchants.[137] Foreign merchants carried out business transactions in ports and cities in Muslim-ruled Egypt and Syria.[138] Amalfians,[139] Venetians, Pisans, Genoese and other nationalities resided in inns (*fondaco/fondaci*) built in Muslim ports.[140] Moreover, the Muslim authorities granted special privileges to these institutions and the merchants who occupied them. An early example of this dynamic is the history of the Pisan merchants in Egypt, who possessed an inn in Alexandria and obtained a permission to establish a second in Cairo.[141] In response to the Latin Kingdom's siege and conquest of Ashkelon ('Asqalan) in 1153, the Fatimids arrested them,[142] only to release them one year later.[143] An 1173 treaty between Saladin and Pisa reconfirmed the presence of the Pisan merchants in Egypt. In a letter to Baghdad written in 1182 on Saladin's behalf, al-Qadi al-Fadil informed the caliphal court that the Venetian, Pisan and Genoese armies raided the Muslims from time to time, seizing them and the merchandise they carried, but that 'nowadays they bring to our land weapons for the *jihad* and materials much needed for war'.[144] Two years later, Venice obtained an inn in Alexandria. Western inns were also established in Syrian cities.

Such commercial relations between Muslims and Europeans illuminate the complex reality in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East during this period. Travel and trade continued side by side with Muslim–Frank ideological division and confrontation. Armistice agreements ended bloody fighting, and pragmatism was often favoured by the opponents.[145] In successive accounts, Ibn al-Qalanisi recounts two early examples of these conditions:

> In this year news arrived that a company of travelling merchants, chafing at their prolonged inaction, lost patience and set out from Tinnis, Damietta and Old Cairo with a great quantity of merchandise and moneys. The Fatimid–Egyptian fleet was unable to go to sea, but they took upon themselves the risk and set sail. They fell in with some Frankish vessels and were captured, and merchandise and capital to the value of more than a hundred thousand dinars were seized by their captors, who held them as prisoners and tormented them, until they

> ransomed themselves by all that remained of their deposits at Damascus and elsewhere.
>
> On returning from Sidon, Baldwin marched to Ascalon, and made an attack upon it. Its governor Shams al-Khilafa opened negotiation with him, and a settlement was reached between them, the terms of which were that on receipt of a sum of money from the governor, Baldwin would retire and refrain from molesting Ascalon. Now Shams al-Khilafa was more desirous of trading than of fighting, and inclined to peaceful and friendly relations and securing the safety of travelers, and he levied from the people of Tyre seven thousand dinars, to be paid to him in the space of a year and three months. When the news of this reached al-Afdal, the ruler of Egypt disapproved the governor's action and bore him a secret grudge [in Shawwal 504/April–May 1111].[146]

The Maghribi (Spanish) traveller Ibn Jubayr,[147] who visited Egypt and Syria in the days of Saladin, provided his reader with several eyewitness accounts that shed light on the complex realities in the medieval Near East. In Tyre he saw a Frankish wedding. Muslims were among the spectators who watched the bride's procession crossing the streets from the cathedral to the home of her husband.[148] The remarkable (*'ajiba*) scene of Frankish caravans coming to trade in Damascus was another picture that amazed him. In a well-known observation, Ibn Jubayr reported:

> One of the astonishing things that is talked of is that though the fires of discord burn between the two parties, Muslim and Christian, their two armies may meet and dispose themselves in battle array, and yet Muslim and Christian travellers will come and go between them without interference.[149]

He added that even during the period when Saladin was attacking Frankish strongholds:

> The caravans still passed successively from Egypt to Damascus, going through the land of the Franks without impediment from them [Franks]. In the same way the Muslims continuously journeyed from Damascus to Acre [through the Frankish territory], and likewise not one of the Christian merchants was stopped or hindered [in the Muslim territories]. The Christians impose a tax on the Muslims [merchants who cross their lands] which give them [the Muslims] full security; and likewise the Christian merchants pay a tax on their goods in Muslim lands. Agreement (*ittifaq*) exists between them, and there is equal treatment (*i'tidal*) in all cases. The soldiers (*ahl al-harb = les gens de guerre*) engage themselves in their war, while the civilians are at peace and most [of the goods][150] goes to him who conquers.[151]

We learn more about the complex relations between the Franks and the Muslims in the medieval Near East from data on medical cooperation between indigenous and foreign patients and healers.[152] Abu Sulayman Dawud was an Eastern Christian who travelled from Latin Jerusalem to Fatimid Cairo. One of his sons worked for both King Amalric and Saladin.[153] The physician Muwaffaq al-Din Ya'qub worked in both Frankish Jerusalem and Muslim Damascus. While working in Frankish lands he would wear the medical dress of the Franks, and when in Muslim-controlled areas he would replace this attire with more typical Damascene dress.[154] Similarly, Theodore of Antioch was a Jacobite Christian who studied medicine in Iraq and practised in the Latin territory.[155]

Conclusion

The Zangids, Ayyubids and later the Mamluks claimed to be the leading commanders of the Muslims, and the jurists who served them were certainly familiar with the regulations on *jihad* that are stated clearly in the legal manuals. Early 'Abbasid period jurists concluded that Muslims should declare defensive war (*jihad*) in case their land is invaded[156] and that they should reject truces offered by polytheists.[157] The *jihad* against invaders who have penetrated the Abode of Islam and who threaten the life and property of Muslims is a duty that each individual Muslim (*fard 'ayn*) must carry out.[158] Participation in *jihad* was understood as the privilege of every free and mature Muslim man.[159]

The data presented in this chapter, however, paints a picture that is less unequivocal. As we have seen, the Muslim leadership found ways to accommodate their interests with the directives of Islamic canonical law and the realities in the medieval Near East. The *jihad* against the 'polytheists'/'infidels' Franks was carried out primarily by professional soldiers (some of whom were slaves, or mamluks).[160] Participation in the military offensives on the part of civilian volunteers (*mutatawwi'a*) was extremely limited,[161] and Muslim peasants hardly resisted their Frankish masters. And while a lasting peace with the enemy who had arrived from lands beyond the sea was inconceivable, temporary truces with the Franks were common.

At Clermont (1095), Pope Urban sought to mobilize the Franks of Europe.[162] In Cairo, however, the Mamluk Sultan Qalawun (678–89/1280–90) opted to employ political rather than military tactics,[163] and the truces he signed with a handful of Frankish strongholds and European trading nations created nearly normal relations between the parties.[164] Al-Ashraf Khalil, Qalawun's heir, was engaged in securing his authority against his courtiers, military commanders and governors, as well as in consolidating his rule over Syria. These internal political challenges drove him to attack Acre in 1291,[165] and his victory marked the end of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem.

The historical narrative presented in this chapter shifted, in accordance with context and circumstance, between these two seemingly contradictory Muslim approaches to the Frankish dominion in the Near East: the ultimate goal of war

that is explicitly commanded in the Qur'an[166] and the pragmatic needs of politics and everyday life, which led Muslim warlords to conclude truces with the infidel Franks.[167]

Notes

1 B.Z. Kedar, 'The Jerusalem Massacre of July 1099 in the Western Historiography of the Crusades', *Crusades* 3, 2004, 15–75.
2 D.P. Little, 'The Fall of Akka in 690/1291: The Muslim Version', in Moshe Sharon (ed.), *Studies in Islamic History and Civilization: In Honour of Professor David Ayalon*, Jerusalem: Cana, 1986, pp. 159–81.
3 On this myth, see S.R. Humphreys, 'Ayyubid, Mamluks and the Latin East', *Mamluk Studies Review* 2, 1998, 1–17.
4 P.E. Chevedden, 'The Islamic View and the Christian View of the Crusades: A New Synthesis', *History, The Journal of the Historical Association* 93, 2008, 181–200 and his article mentioned in note 58, below.
5 Carole Hillenbrand, 'The First Crusade: The Muslim Perspective', in Jonathan Phillips (ed.), *The First Crusade: Origins and Impact*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997, pp. 130–41.
6 Niall Christie, 'Religious Campaign or War of Conquest? Muslim Views of the Motives of the First Crusade', in Niall Christie and Maya Yazigi (eds), *Noble Ideals and Bloody Realities: Warfare in the Middle Ages*, Leiden: Brill, 2006, History of Warfare 37, pp. 57–72.
7 Ibn al-'Adim, in Suhayl Zakkar (ed.), *al-Mawsu'a al-shamiyya fi ta'rikh al-hurub al-salibiyya*, Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1995, XVI.7117; AA 348; Mahumet presumably being a spoonerism of the Arabic Muhammad.
8 On a similar delegation from Damascus, see Abu al-Mahasin Jamal al-Din Yusuf Ibn Taghri Birdi (813–74/1411–70), *al-Nujum al-Zahirah fi Muluk Misr wa-al-Qahirah*, 12, Cairo: al-Mu'assasah al-Misriyah al-'Ammah, 1963–72, V.150 (AH 488/summer 1099).
9 Ibn al-'Adim, *Bughya*, A. Sevim (ed.), Ankara: TKK, 1976, VII.xx (the biography of Ridwan b. Tutush).
10 Hadia Dajani-Shakeel, 'Diplomatic relations between Muslim and Frankish rulers (1097-1153)', in M. Shatzmiller (ed.), *Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth-Century Syria*, Leiden: Brill, 1993, pp. 193–6.
11 Claude Cahen, 'Un texte peu connu relatif au commerce oriental d'Amalfi au Xe siècle', *Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane* 34, Napoli: Società Romana di Storia Patria, 1953–4, pp. 3–8 [reprinted in his *Turcobyzantina et Orioens Christianus*, London: Variorum reprints, 1974, article A]; Claude Cahen, 'Le commerce d'Amalfi dans le Proche-Orient musulman avant et après la Croisade', *Comptes-rendus des séances de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres* 121, 1977, 291–301; Samuel Miklos Stern, 'An Original Document from the Fatimid Chancery Concerning Italian Merchants', in G.L.D. Vida (ed.), *Studi orientalistici in onore di Giorgio Levi Della Vida*, 2, Rome: Istituto per l'Oriente, 1956, II.529–38; A.O. Citarella, 'The Relations of Amalfi with the Arab World before the Crusades', *Speculum* 42, 1967, 299–312 and 'Patterns in Medieval Trade: The Commerce of Amalfi before the Crusades', *The Journal of Economic History* 28, 1968, 531–55.
12 'The increasing strength and importance of the Franks was first reflected in their invasion of the Lands of Islam and their conquest of part of this region in the year 478 (1085–6)', 'Izz al-Din 'Ali b. Abi al-Karm Muhammad Ibn al-Athir al-Jaziri (555–630/1160–1233), *al-Kamil fi al-ta'rikh*, 'Umar al-Tadmuri (ed.), Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi, 1422/2001, VIII.415–16 (AH 491) [D.S. Richards (tr.), *The*

Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir for the Crusading Period from al-Kamil fi'l-ta'rikh, 3, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, I.13]. Ibn al-Athir may have been echoing earlier voices. See also al-Sulami ff.174a–b in Emmanuel Sivan, 'La Genese de la contre-Croisade: un traite damasquin du debut du XIIe siecle', *Journal Asiatique* 254, 1966, 197–224 at 207; Muhammad ibn 'Ali al-'Azimi (483/1090), *Azimi tarihi Selçuklular dönemiyle ilgili bölümler, H. 430–538*, Ali Sevim (ed.), Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988, p. 20.

13 Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, VIII.416 [Richards, *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir*, I.13–14].

14 Claude Cahen, *Orient et Occident au temps des Croisades*, Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1983, p. 109.

15 al-'Azimi, *Azimi tarihi Selçuklular*, p. 23.

16 This terminology is evident in later writings as well: for example, Ibn Zunbul, *Sirat al-Zahir Baybars*, Jamal al-Ghitani (ed.), Cairo: al-Hay'a al-misriyya al-'amma lil-kitab, 1996–7, IV.2090. This Egyptian version of the saga is based on the edition of Hijazi, Cairo, 1341/1923, and Muhammad, Cairo, 1344/1926.

17 al-'Azimi, *Azimi tarihi Selçuklular*, p. 23; Ibn al-'Adim, *al-Mawsu'a*, XI.147. See also al-Sulami f.174b in Sivan, *Journal Asiatique* 254, 1966, at 207.

18 H.A.R. Gibb, 'The Arabic Sources for the Life of Saladin', *Speculum* 25, 1950, 58–72.

19 Baha al-Din Abu al-Mahasin Yusuf b. Rafi' Ibn Shaddad (539–632/1145–1239), *al-Nawadir alsultaniyya wal-mahasin al-yusufiyya* [*Sirat Salah al-Din*], Jamal al-Din al-Shayyal (ed.), Cairo: Turathuna, 1964, pp. 169–70 [English translation by D.S. Richards, *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin or al-Nawadir al-Sultaniyya wa'l-Mahasin al-Yusufiyya by Baha' al-Din Ibn Shaddad*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, pp. 100–1]. M.E. Bertsch, *Counter-Crusade, a Study of Twelfth Century Jihad in Syria and Palestine*, unpublished Ph.D., University of Michigan, 1950, p. 160.

20 Hayden White, 'The Historical Text as Literary Artifact', *Clio* 3, 1974, 277.

21 M.C. Lyons and D.E.P. Jackson, *Saladin: The Politics of Holy War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 342–3; Amin Malouf, *The Crusades through Arab Eyes*, New York: Shocken Books, 1984, p. 212.

22 We should also not rule out marriages between Muslims and Christians. The *hajib* Ibn Abi Amir al-Mansur (fl. 976–1002) married a Christian princess, the daughter of Sancho Garces II of Pamplona (Navara). The marriage between this young Basque women and the Muslim commander took place when Cordova signed a truce with her father (382/992). Évariste Levi-Provencal, *Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane: la Califat Umaiyade de Cordoue*, 3, Paris: Maisonneuve, 1950, II.241–2.

23 Baha al-Din, *al-Nawadir al-sultaniyya*, p. 292 [Richards, *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, p. 187].

24 Abu Shama, *al-Rawdatayn*, in Zakkar (ed.), *al-Mawsu'a*, XIX.8822.

25 Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, X.101 [Richards, *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir*, II.392].

26 For an Arabic inscription from Sicily that tells the story of a Christian woman who had been buried in a mosque before her son removed her corpse to a church, see: *RCEA* 8, 249–50, ##3140.

27 Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, X.290 [Richards, *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir*, II.186].

28 Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, X.349 [Richards, *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir*, II.232]. See also Emmanuel Sivan, 'Islam and Crusades: Antagonism, Polemics, Dialogue', in Bernard Lewis and Freidrich Niewöhner (eds), *Religionsgespräche im Mittelalter*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1992, pp. 210–11.

29 Jonathan Riley-Smith, 'Peace Never Established: The Case of the Kingdom of Jerusalem', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Fifth Series, 28, 1978, 99–101.

30 Abu Ya'la Hamza Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Dhayl ta'rikh dimashq*, H.F. Amedroz (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 1908. Partial English translation by H.A.R. Gibb (tr.), *The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades*, London: Luzac, 1932; partial French translation by Roger Le Tourneau (tr.), *Damas de 1075 à 1154*, Damascus: Institut Francais de Damas, 1952.

31 Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Dhayl ta'rikh dimashq*, p. 164 [Gibb, p. 92; Le Tourneau, p. 88].
32 Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Dhayl ta'rikh dimashq*, p. 165 [Gibb, p. 93; Le Tourneau, p. 89].
33 Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Dhayl ta'rikh dimashq*, p. 171 [Gibb, p. 106; Le Tourneau, p. 99].
34 Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Dhayl ta'rikh dimashq*, p. 174 [Gibb, p. 113; Le Tourneau, p. 105]. On nomads in the eastern frontier of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, see Ronnie Ellenblum, *Frankish Rural Settlement in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 219–21.
35 W.B. Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East: A Brief History of the Wars of Islam with the Latins in Syria during the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907, pp. 62–3, 94–6.
36 Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Dhayl ta'rikh dimashq*, p. 190 [Gibb, p. 147; Le Tourneau, p. 132].
37 Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East*, p. 98.
38 Ibn al-Furat in Claude Cahen, *Orient et Occident au temps des Croisades*, Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1983, pp. 226–7; Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, X.510 [Richards, *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir*, I.172–3]. Bursuqi's statement: 'I rather preferred to be slain on the path of Allah and be a sacrifice for the Muslims' may be a later addendum by the chronicle.
39 Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, X.543 [Richards, *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir*, I.196]; Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Dhayl ta'rikh dimashq*, p. 199 [Gibb, pp. 158–9; Le Tourneau, pp. 147–8] opens his description of this year by voicing critical remarks about 'the neglect of Islam to make raids upon the Franks and to prosecute the Holy War (*jihad*)'. His annals continue with an account of Tughtekin's call to the Turkeman tribes to wage war against the enemies of Islam and to root out the misbelievers.
40 The city was surrounded by the Franks in 1129. Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East*, pp. 132, 133; K.M. Setton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, 6, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1955–89, I.430, 433.
41 Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Dhayl ta'rikh dimashq*, p. 236 [Gibb, p. 216] claims that such actions were taken to avenge the mistreatment of Damascene merchants by the Frankish Lord of Beirut. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, X.684 [Richards, *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir*, I.299] alleges that the Franks decided to break their truce (*hudna*) with Shams al-Muluk because they considered him to be weak.
42 One case in point is the armistice agreement between Damascus and the Franks signed in 528/August 1134. Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Dhayl ta'rikh dimashq*, pp. 242–3 [Gibb, pp. 226–7; Le Tourneau pp. 213–14] refers to it as peace (*sulh*); while Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil*, XI.12 [Richards, *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir*, I.305] calls it truce (*hudna*).
43 Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Dhayl ta'rikh dimashq*, p. 272 [Gibb, p. 259; Le Tourneau, p. 256].
44 Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Dhayl ta'rikh dimashq*, p. 304 [Gibb, p. 290; Le Tourneau, p. 304].
45 On conflicting opinion concerning the duty to emigrate from/remain in lands conquered by Christians, see Devin Stewart, 'The Identity of the Mufti of Oran, Abu L-'Abbas Ahmad b. Abu Jum'ah al-Maghrawi al-Wahrani (d. 917/1511)', *al-Qantara* 27, 2006, 265–8; A.E. Arsuaga, 'Los mudejares de los reinos de Castilla y Portugal', in Manuel Ruzafa (coordinator), *Los mudejares valencianos y peninsulares*, *Revista d'Historia Medieval* 12, Valencia: Universitat de Valencia, 2001–2, pp. 40–1; K.A. Miller, 'Muslim Minorities and the Obligation to Emigrate to Islamic Territory', *Islamic Law and Society* 7, 2000, 256–88; Khaled Abou El Fadl, 'Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities', *Islamic Law and Society* 1, 1994, 160–3; Muhamed Mufaku al-Arnaut, 'Islam and Muslims in Bosnia 1878–1918: Two Hijras and Two Fatwas', *Journal of Islamic Studies* 5, 1994, 242–53 at 248.
46 Hadia Dajani-Shakeel, 'Displacement of the Palestinians during the Crusades', *The Muslim World* 68, 1978, 157–75.
47 Setton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, V.62.
48 Emmanuel Sivan, 'Refugies Syro-Palestiniens au temps des Croisades', *Revue des Etudes Islamiques* 35, 1967, 133–48; Daniella Talmon-Heller, 'The Shaykh and the

Community: Popular Hanbalite Islam in Twelfth–Thirteenth Centuries Jabal Nablus and Jabal Qasyun', *Studia Islamica* 79, 1994, 103–20 at 105; Toru Miura, 'The Salihiyya Quarter in the Suburbs of Damascus: Its Formation, Structure, and Transformation in the Ayyubid and Mamluk periods', *Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales* 47, 1995, 129–81; Daniella Talmon-Heller and B.Z. Kedar, 'Did Muslim Survivors of the 1099 Massacre of Jerusalem Settle in Damascus? The True Origins of the al-Salihiyya Suburb', *Al-Masaq* 17, 2005, 165–9.

49 B.Z. Kedar, 'The Subjected Muslims of the Frankish Levant', in J.M. Powell (ed.), *Muslims under Latin Rule 1100–1300*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, pp. 149, 151. For a Muslim traveller's account of the return of Muslims to Tyre, see Muhammad ibn Ahmad Ibn Jubayr (1145–1217), *al-Rihla*, Beirut: Dar Sadir, 1384/1964, pp. 279–81.

50 Emmanuel Sivan, 'Islam and Crusades: Antagonism, Polemics, Dialogue', in Lewis and Niewöhner (eds), *Religionsgespräche im Mittelalter*, p. 207 argues that, at first, there was very little religious animosity towards the Franks and that the initial reaction lacked an Islamic dimension.

51 H.A. Elsberg and Rhuvon Guest, 'The Veil of Saint Anne', *The Burlington Magazine for Connoisseurs* 68.396, 1936, 140–7 at 145; *RCEA*, VIII.36 (## 2864, veil Eglise Saint Anne d'Apt 490/1097; originally a *tiraz* from Damietta).

52 *RCEA*, VIII.49 (## 2882, flax fibres fabric from Egypt 495/1102; now at the Abbaye de Cadouin), 128–9 (## 2985, al-Ghamri Mosque, Mahalla al-Kubra, 515/1121), 129 (## 2986, Masjid Musa, Nile Valley, Egypt, 515/1121).

53 Bernard Moritz, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Sinai-Klosters im Mittelalter nach Arabischen Quellen*, Berlin: Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1918, pp. 50–1 (the door of a sermon pulpit in the Mosque of St Catherina Monastery, Sinai, 500/November 1106); republished in *RCEA*, VIII.69 (## 2912).

54 *RCEA*, VIII.146–7 (## 3011); Caroline Williams, 'The Cult of 'Alid Saints in the Fatimid Monuments of Cairo – part 1: The Mosque of al-Aqmar', *Muqarnas* 1, 1983, 39–60 at 43; Caroline Williams, *Islamic Monuments in Cairo: A Practical Guide*, Cairo: AUC, 1993, p. 198; I.A. Bierman, *Writing Signs: The Fatimid Public Text*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, p. 110.

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61 Kevin Reinhart, 'Like the Difference between Heaven and Earth: Hanafi and Shafi'i Discussions of Fard and Wajib in Theology and Usul', in B.G. Weiss (ed.), *Studies in Islamic Legal Theory*, Leiden: Brill, 2002, p. 226.
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65 Bertsch, *Counter-Crusade*, pp. 156–9.
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69 Carole Hillenbrand, 'The Career of Najm al-Din Il-Ghazi', *Der Islam* 58, 1981, 250–91.
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73 Ibn al-'Adim, *Zubdat al-halab fi ta'rikh Halab*, 3, Sami Dahhan (ed.), Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1951–68, II.185, 188–9; Zakkar (ed.), *al-Mawsu'a*, XVI.7144.
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77 The Muslim environment read the verses of the Qur'an not in segments but rather in Qur'anic context.
78 Qur'an, al-Tawba (Repentance), IX.21 (translation from A.J. Arberry (tr.), *The Koran*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1963). The implications of this verse are better understood when reading it together with the preceding and following verses: 'Those who believe, and have emigrated, and have struggled in the way of Allah with their possessions and their selves are mightier in rank with Allah; and those they are the triumphant'; 'Therein they will dwell forever and ever; surely with Allah is a mighty wage.'
79 Qur'an, Al Imran, III.169 (tr. Arberry). The next few verses provide a description of the martyrs' circumstances: 'Rejoicing in the bounty that Allah has given them, and

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83 *RCEA*, VIII.159–60 (## 3025, Damascus 521/1128).

84 *RCEA*, VIII.165 (## 3033, Damascus, Bab al-Barid 524/1130).

85 Jean Sauvaget, 'Inscriptions arabes du Temple de Bel à Palmyre', *Syria* 12, 1931, 143–8; *RCEA*, VIII.182 (## 3056, Bel Temple in Palmyra 527/1133).

86 *RCEA*, VIII.188 (## 3063, Busra, al-Khidr Mosque 528/1134).

87 *RCEA*, VIII.199–200 (## 3077, Busra, madrasa 540/1136).

88 *RCEA*, VIII.194–5 (## 3072, Damascus, waqf 529/1135).

89 *RCEA*, VIII.195–6 (## 3073, Hama, mosque 529/1135).

90 Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Dhayl ta'rikh dimashq*, p. 245 (AH 529/1134–5): 'It was said that [Shams al-Muluk Isma'il] went to every excess in indulgence of immorality . . . and his character transformed to eagerness to prosecute the jihad against the heretical foe' [Gibb, p. 228; Le Tourneau, p. 217].

91 His biography in Ibn al-'Adim, *Bughya*, pp. 251–72.

92 The great Saljuq Sultan affirmed his position as governor of Mosul and Aleppo (523/May 1129). Ibn al-'Adim, *Bughya*, p. 254 (quoting al-Azimi).

93 Tughtekin, who ruled Damascus for a quarter of a century, died in 522/1128.

94 Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East*, p. 129.

95 Ibn al-Athir, *Kamil*, IX.22–3 [Richards, *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir*, I.282].

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100 W.R. Taylor, 'A New Syriac Fragment Dealing with Incidents in the Second Crusade', *The Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research* 11, 1929–30, 122–3.

101 Ibn al-'Adim, *Bughya*, pp. 262–63 (quoting Ibn al-Harrani, Ta'rikh Harran). Compare this with a challenging tradition by Ibn al-'Adim, who transmitted accounts of forced labour and unpaid corvee.

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103 *RCEA*, VIII.228 (## 3111 Baalbek, interior tour 537/1143).

104 *RCEA*, VIII.232–3 (## 3117, Damascus, madrasat al-sadat 538/1144); 254–5 (## 3146, Busra, Mosque Dayr al-Muslimin 544/1149).

105 *RCEA*, VIII.229–30 (## 3112, the mausoleum of Sheik Muhassin, Aleppo 537/August 1142).

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107 Matti Moosa, 'The Crusades: An Eastern Perspective, with Emphasis on Syriac Sources', *The Muslim World* 93, 2003, 265.

108 Ibn al-Athir, *Kamil*, IX.162–3 [Richards, *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir*, II.25].
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167 The Qur'an instructs unambiguously: 'O believers, take not my enemy and your enemy for friends, offering them your love, even though they have disbelieved and rejected the truth that has come to you. O Believers, take not for friends a people whom Allah is wrathful.' Al-Mumtahanah, LX.1, 13 and compare LX.9 and IX.23.

3

ON THE MARGINS OF CHRISTENDOM

The impact of the crusades on Byzantium

Chris Wright

This chapter examines the role played by Byzantium in the crusading movement and the effects of the crusade on Byzantine thought, arguing that the prevailing theme uniting the variety of ways in which the crusades affected Byzantium was the empire's marginalisation. Central to the origins of the crusade, imperial concerns were soon relegated to the periphery of crusading thought, while the Byzantine reaction to crusading encouraged western Christians to regard the empire as occupying an ambiguous position on the margins of the Christian community. The crusades embodied a profound challenge to the imperial state's own notion of its special status in the world, and worked to undermine the centrality of that state to its inhabitants' conception of their own society and identity.

As a force lending enhanced unity and definition to the peoples of western Christendom as a group, and doing so through a common military enterprise on behalf of Christianity to which the empire's concerns were peripheral, from the outset the crusades disrupted the Byzantine idea of the world by implicitly supplanting the empire from its claimed position as leader and protector of the faith. This challenge to ideology and identity was vastly intensified by the shattering impact of the Fourth Crusade. By ousting the empire from its capital and dividing its scattered inheritors, and by installing Latin regimes and a Latin Church hierarchy across much of the Byzantine heartland, it undercut the potency and credibility of the imperial state as a unifying and defining force shaping the identity of its subjects and erstwhile subjects. Such effects were deepened by the final permutation of the empire's relationship with crusading, as the pressure for Church Union on Latin terms in return for military aid further complicated loyalties.

This tendency to push the empire from centre to periphery was in large part a product of the role it played in the crusading movement itself, being perennially entangled in crusading affairs, but usually remaining on the margins of crusading

endeavour, not being full participant, prime beneficiary, or principal enemy. As the foremost Christian state of the eastern Mediterranean, Byzantium could never be irrelevant to the crusading movement. This was particularly true while major crusading armies continued to travel by land, crossing the breadth of the empire's territories and passing through its very heart, where the choke-point of the straits brought all such expeditions into close proximity to Constantinople. Yet, though the notion of bringing aid to eastern Christians molested by Muslims and to a beleaguered Byzantium in particular played a formative part in the origins of the crusading movement, the early emergence of the liberation of Jerusalem as that movement's principal goal pushed the empire to the margins. Rather than being a central preoccupation of the crusades, Byzantine interests could thus only be benefited by them in passing. Conversely, from the early days of crusading, Byzantium was considered by some crusaders to be a suitable target for the movement's aggressive attentions, but this sort of central role also proved the exception rather than the rule, despite the catastrophic impact of that exception as manifested in the outcome of the Fourth Crusade. The oblique, peripheral quality of the empire's involvement with crusading accounts for much of the complexity, ambiguity and volatility of the relationship that developed.

The tone of unfulfilled potential for a central role was set in the prehistory of the crusade. In response to reports of the Turkish advance into Anatolia, Pope Gregory VII in 1074 proposed to lead an army himself to drive back the Turks, and to resolve religious controversies by securing agreement with a grateful emperor and his Church en route.[1] Such an expedition might have been better tailored to Byzantine interests in Anatolia than the movement which actually emerged two decades later, one focused on the defeat of the empire's Turkish enemies rather than the retrieval and defence of Jerusalem. It is, however, very far from certain that the focus of the early proposals on assisting the empire against the Turks would have been carried through into an actual campaign, had the pope succeeded in raising an army and leading it to the East: already in Gregory's later letters on the subject the prospect of continuing as far as Jerusalem had raised its head.[2] Nevertheless, in their emphasis on opposing the Anatolian Turks for the sake of Byzantium, and in the role of Church unity as an implicit *quid pro quo* for such assistance, Gregory's schemes represent the first appearance of a possible alternative version of crusading which would flicker from time to time in the shadow of the actual movement, but would not become reality until the eve of the empire's dissolution. The quietly menacing potential of a Latin army arriving at the gates of Constantinople expecting a favourable ecclesiastical settlement hinted at darker possibilities for Byzantium which would also be long in coming to fruition.

In the event it was left to another pope to realise something resembling Gregory's schemes. The appeal for troops presented by Alexios I's emissaries at the Council of Piacenza was the spark for Urban II's call for volunteers for a holy war at the Council of Clermont, but it is also likely that the nature of the western military response that was actually orchestrated by the pope took the emperor by

surprise, in its scale, its character as a penitential pilgrimage and its adoption of the conquest of Jerusalem as its principal goal. It has been argued on the basis of the late thirteenth-century testimony of Theodore Skoutariotes that Alexios in fact proposed in his appeal that the liberation of Jerusalem should be the expedition's goal, deliberately calculating on Latin solicitude for the Holy City to maximise recruitment.[3] However, this may well be an interpretation based on hindsight, and it seems more likely that it was only after the appeal had been made that Jerusalem emerged as a prominent component of the scheme. Probably Urban himself was responsible for this crucial modification, although the earliest surviving account of his speech at Clermont, that of Fulcher of Chartres, contains no mention of the Holy City.[4] It remains unclear whether the defence of eastern Christians against Turkish aggression and the possibility of ecclesiastical accord played a larger part in Urban's original intentions and preaching than in the thinking of those who responded to his call.[5]

Whatever its source, the establishment of the liberation of Jerusalem at the heart of the movement that emerged ensured that its original trigger, the contest between Byzantium and the Anatolian Turks, was swiftly and enduringly relegated to the margins. Only the First Crusade had a major impact on the empire's conflict with its Muslim neighbours, and this was largely indirect. The crusaders' haste to reach the Holy Land effectively precluded lingering in Anatolia. Their victories in battle and their help in capturing the Anatolian Seljuk capital at Nicaea weakened the opposition met by the ensuing imperial offensive which reconquered the western coastal plains of Anatolia, adding them to the northern littoral which was probably already largely under Byzantine control.[6] Crusader conquests also facilitated the intermittent extension of imperial control over Cilicia, although this was initially accomplished only by forcibly ousting the Latins themselves and continued to be contested by them.[7] However, the direct gains brought by the crusade beyond Nicaea proved transitory, with isolated garrisons installed on the central plateau but not heard of again and presumably soon regained by the Turks.[8] Thus the momentary successes of a crusading army in transit created a window of opportunity for more durable imperial gains, but its swift departure along the road to Jerusalem precluded the kind of direct and lasting conquests later accomplished in Syria and Palestine. The capacity of such pilgrim armies to transform the empire's military fortunes was by nature limited, and subsequent expeditions had a negligible effect in Anatolia.

Since the imperial concerns that had triggered it were largely incidental to the crusading movement that emerged, the direct and concerted promotion of Byzantine interests could only have been brought about by positive initiatives on the part of the imperial government which would enable it to assume a leadership role. Any such role could not realistically be secured without the personal participation of the emperor in an expedition. During the First Crusade Alexios I enjoyed opportunities in this regard which would not be available to his successors. The empire's reputation in the West had not yet been compromised by the ructions arising in the course of that expedition and its aftermath. Imperial

guidance and support were also of greater value to crusaders feeling their way through an unprecedented venture far from home than to those who would follow in the first expedition's footsteps decades later. The role of such considerations is reflected in the view of the historian Fulcher of Chartres, a participant in the crusade: 'It was necessary for all to confirm friendship with the emperor, without whose counsel and aid we could not have completed our journey, nor could those who were to follow us on that same road.'[9]

The importance attached to Byzantine involvement was such that, despite early scuffles and disputes, at Constantinople the leaders of the crusade invited Alexios to assume command of their forces: 'They reported that Bohemond, the Duke of Lorraine, the Count of Flanders, and other princes besought Raymond to make a pact concerning the crusade with Alexius, who might take the Cross and become leader of God's army.'[10]

Even after his failure to relieve the crusaders at Antioch, with its severe implications for relations between the emperor and the crusade leaders, they invited Alexios to come in person to take possession of Antioch and to join their continuing advance, albeit largely so as to absolve themselves of their obligations to him should he decline.[11] His failure to take up these proposals, while very understandable, set the seal on the swift relegation of imperial concerns to the margins of the crusading agenda and contributed to Latin suspicions regarding the empire's commitment to Christian solidarity.

Whereas Alexios declined the opportunity to put himself at the heart of the crusade, his grandson Manuel I strove at some length to achieve that end, but without any lasting result. His response to the Second Crusade, early in his reign, was considerably chillier than Alexios's cautious collaboration.[12] Later years, however, saw a sharp change of direction as Manuel sought to cultivate a relationship with the crusading movement that would secure a prestigious and advantageous central role for the empire. Adapting the policies of his father John II, he enforced renewed acknowledgement of imperial sovereignty over the Principality of Antioch and perhaps extended this recognition of his overlordship to the Kingdom of Jerusalem, through a combination of threat and military aid against the Muslims of Syria and Egypt.[13] Manuel apparently sought to extend this line of policy through a fresh crusade summoned by Pope Alexander III to establish firm Christian control of the land route to Jerusalem, clearing the way for pilgrims and future crusading armies.[14] That is to say, this time the targets of the expedition were not to be the Muslim states of Syria and Egypt but the Anatolian Turks, and its goal the extension of imperial territory. Without compromising the ostensible focus on pilgrimage and Jerusalem, Manuel would be able to redress in part the empire's consignment to the periphery and exploit the crusade as an instrument of imperial interests. If successful, this endeavour would also have enabled him to place himself at the head of a crusading army, in the hope of helping to counteract jaundiced views of the empire's role in previous crusades. In the event, the defeat of his solo offensive against Ikonion by the Seljuks at Myriokephalon stifled the enterprise at birth.[15] The potential to put Byzantine

interests at the centre of crusading activity, in practice if not in theory, remained unfulfilled.

Manuel's efforts also formed part of a wider effort to rehabilitate the empire's reputation in the Latin world, which had suffered from the experience of the first two crusades. Judging by surviving Latin assessments of him, Manuel seems to have achieved some success in enhancing his own reputation, but not in negating more general animosities. He attracted laudatory assessments from Latin writers, but these tended to present him as a kind of honorary Latin, a ruler who favoured westerners above his own subjects because he shared the Latin view of his people's vices.[16] William of Tyre, a Latin prelate and historian from the Kingdom of Jerusalem who had visited Manuel's court, could move seamlessly from praise for the emperor into a diatribe against his subjects:

> During the reign of Manuel, beloved of God, the Latins had found great favour with him – a reward well-deserved because of their loyalty and valour. The emperor, a great-souled man of incomparable energy, relied so implicitly on their fidelity and ability that he passed over the Greeks as soft and effeminate and entrusted important affairs to the Latins alone. Since he held them in such high esteem and showed toward them such lavish generosity, men of Latin race from all over the world, nobles and men of lesser degree as well, regarded him as their great benefactor and eagerly flocked to his court. As the result of this eager deference, his affection toward the Latins increased more and more, and he was constantly improving their status.
>
> The Greek nobles, especially the near kindred of the emperor, and the rest of the people as well, naturally conceived an insatiable hatred toward us, and this was increased by the difference between our sacraments and those of their church, which furnished an additional incentive to their jealousy. For they, having separated insolently from the church of Rome, in their boundless arrogance looked upon every one who did not follow their foolish traditions as a heretic.[17]

Thus high regard for Manuel in particular could readily be assimilated within, and even employed to reinforce, disdain for Byzantium and its people in general.

Manuel's concern with his image in Latin eyes reflects his awareness of the potential for the empire to take centre stage in the drama of the crusade in a much less welcome role than the one he sought to fill. Although present from the early years of the crusading movement, this potential also largely eluded fulfilment for some decades. The passage of large crusading armies through imperial territory was invariably marked by sporadic outbreaks of violence. Even during the first two major crusading expeditions, long before the deepening of antagonism that marked the late twelfth century, the possibility of capturing Constantinople was discussed among their leaders.[18] Within only a few years of the First Crusade the Latin case against Byzantium and its rulers as negligent and even actively

treacherous in their response to the common Christian cause, a critique with a long history ahead of it, had already been set out in its essentials.[19] As early as 1107 Bohemond of Taranto was able to invade the empire at the head of a crusading army raised by papal mandate and through a recruitment campaign which had emphasised Alexios I's alleged misdeeds against crusaders and espoused the explicit aim of overthrowing him.[20] This bears witness to the scope for diverting crusading energies against the empire which already existed only a dozen years after Alexios's appeal to the pope and almost a century before the Fourth Crusade.[21]

The detachment of the goals of crusading from the empire's concerns contributed greatly to the scope for hostility. The lack of compatibility between the crusade and Byzantine ideology ensured there was never any prospect of the empire or its people becoming committed to crusading on the basis of the religious enthusiasm which fuelled the movement in the West.[22] Policy towards the crusades was therefore dependent on calculations of self-interest and imperial prestige, and since Latin control of Jerusalem did not figure as a high priority in this regard, the adoption of a detached and ambivalent stance was liable to be commonplace. Had the empire become largely irrelevant to crusading it might safely have stood aloof, but its geographical situation ensured that it remained inextricably engaged. The conduct of successive emperors and their people was under searching scrutiny on each expedition and the empire was expected to pull its weight in supporting them. Hard-headed considerations such as safeguarding the imperial capital and its Balkan provinces, the assertion of the empire's right to retrieve former territories, the wish to avoid exposing the emperor and his armies to excessive risks far from home and the pursuit of diplomatic advantage in relations with Muslim powers contributed to policies that attracted the resentment and suspicion of crusaders.[23] What might have seemed unremarkable behaviour in the normal dealings between rulers was potentially dangerous in the context of a movement whose proponents felt that such considerations should be set aside for the benefit of a divinely appointed mission.

Perceptions of inadequate commitment to the crusade were likely to do much deeper and more lasting damage to the empire's reputation than they would to any Latin power because Byzantium could much more readily be cast as a society whose full membership of the Christian community was subject to doubt. The cultural and religious divide between Byzantium and the Latin peoples, more marked than those separating different western groups from one another, meant that the empire was susceptible to being seen not as one more individual Christian power alongside a range of other individual powers, but as a partially alien outsider alongside a single Latin community. The emerging ecclesiastical schism lent formal definition to this divide, while the friction arising from the crusades entrenched the schism, hitherto a liturgical and diplomatic technicality. The crusaders' installation of a Latin Church hierarchy in conquered lands, expelling eastern incumbents, and the maintenance in defiance of this of titular patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem by Byzantium, began the rupture's growth into a

concrete reality.[24] The sense of difference arising from religious controversy made the empire the obvious choice of scapegoat when crusading expeditions went awry, fuelling stories of treacherous Byzantine guides leading crusading armies to disaster and emperors encouraging Muslim rulers to attack them.[25] Such allegations were both encouraged by and reinforced perceptions that the empire occupied a position outside the mainstream of Christendom. They reached a climax in the late twelfth century with the charge that the agreements between Isaac II and Saladin amounted to an alliance to conquer the crusader states and thwart the Third Crusade, bringing about Isaac's efforts to bar the passage of Frederick I's army through Byzantine territory. The question of whether the allegations against Isaac were well founded remains a matter of considerable disagreement, but they were clearly consonant with the existing Latin critique of Byzantium.[26]

From a Byzantine perspective, the perception among Latins that the crusade constituted the common cause of Christendom implied the empire's displacement from the unique and central role it claimed in the Christian world. According to traditional imperial ideology, the emperor held a unique divine mandate as the pre-eminent worldly authority and the protector of the Church.[27] A common military enterprise on behalf of Christian society as a whole could be ordered and directed only by the emperor. Besides the unpalatability of crusade theology, with its violation of the taboo against clerical involvement in bloodshed, for the papacy to issue a call to war on behalf of the entire Christian world amounted to a usurpation of the emperor's prerogatives.[28] The emergence of the religious schism, itself stimulated in large part by the grandiose claims made for papal authority from the eleventh century onwards, may have rendered this challenge to the empire's idea of its own central place in the Christian world still harder to accept. The fact that the crusades tended to marginalise the empire in the leadership and defence of the Christian world was accidental but probably far from fortuitous, considering the movement's origins in the midst of the ideological and material struggle for supremacy between the papacy and the western empire.

This was a troubling challenge in itself and also increased the likelihood of conflict. Byzantine writers in the twelfth century insisted that the expedition to Jerusalem was a cloak for the true aim of seizing Constantinople and overthrowing of the empire. Thus Anna Komnene said of the First Crusade:

> Peter [the Hermit] had in the beginning undertaken his great journey to worship at the Holy Sepulchre, but the others (and in particular Bohemond) cherished their old grudge against Alexius and sought a good opportunity to avenge the glorious victory which the emperor had won at Larissa. They were all of one mind and in order to fulfil their dream of taking Constantinople they adopted a common policy. I have often referred to that already: to all appearances they were on pilgrimage to Jerusalem; in reality they planned to dethrone Alexius and seize the capital.[29]

The Second Crusade drew a like response from the historian John Kinnamos:

> Normans and French and the nation of Gauls and whoever lived around old Rome, and British and Bretons and simply the whole western array had been set in motion, on the handy excuse that they were going to cross from Europe to Asia and fight the Turks en route and recover the church in Palestine and seek the holy places, but truly to gain possession of the Romans' land by assault and trample down everything in front of them.[30]

The court oratory of 'Manganeios Prodromos' conveyed similar sentiments.[31] This conspiracy theory of crusading may reasonably be interpreted as being in part a way of avoiding the implications of this challenge to imperial preconceptions. If the crusaders' supposed aims could be dismissed as merely a pretext for aggression against Byzantium, the prospect of the empire being left on the sidelines of a common Christian enterprise could be obscured and events construed instead in the reassuringly familiar terms of barbarian conspiracy. The suspicions thus encouraged were reinforced by an apocalyptic tradition of prophecies predicting the downfall of Constantinople at the hands of western barbarians, which seems to have had a particular influence on Emperor Isaac II through the influence of the Patriarch Dositheos.[32] If such thinking shaped imperial policy, some of the more blatantly provocative Byzantine actions become more comprehensible, notably the attempt by Isaac II to block the advance of Frederick I's army through the Balkans during the Third Crusade.[33] This directly confrontational approach pushed the German emperor into laying serious plans for the capture of Constantinople.[34] Isaac's willingness to risk provoking such a response can more readily be understood if he believed that Frederick's intentions were malign in any case. The unwillingness of the empire's rulers to accept the sincerity of an ideology and a movement whose existence brought their own vocation and status into question may thus have contributed to actions that threatened to turn the conspiracy theory into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The empire's relegation to the periphery of the crusading movement thus had considerable potential to do it harm. Yet the precedent set by Bohemond in 1107 was not followed for decades, and this too was in part a product of Byzantium's marginal place in the movement. On each major land expedition some toyed with the idea of attempting the conquest of Constantinople, but none ultimately went ahead with a serious attempt. This was in large part due to the persistence in the twelfth century of reluctance to turn the crusade against Christians, and the widespread persistence of the belief that, whatever its faults, Byzantium remained entitled to the protection of Christian solidarity. Though widely espoused from an early stage, the case against Byzantium never secured universal approval in the West, and suspicions and grievances arising from crusading never eradicated more positive perceptions.[35] However, the avoidance of outright hostility also owed much to the compensations of the empire's early displacement from the heart of

the movement. One of the most powerful restraints on those interested in turning crusading expeditions against the empire was the eagerness of participants to complete their journey to the Holy Land and their preoccupation with aiding the Latin position there.[36] When Bohemond approached Godfrey of Bouillon in 1096 with a proposal to attack Constantinople, his urgings were rejected on the basis both of revulsion at the idea of turning the crusade against Christians and of the overriding priority of the expedition to Jerusalem:

> When he had heard this legation from Bohemond the duke put off making any reply to it until the next sunrise when, after taking counsel with his men, he replied that he had not left his homeland and family for the sake of profit or for the destruction of Christians, but had embarked on the journey to Jerusalem in the name of Christ, and he wished to complete the journey and to fulfil the intentions of the emperor, if he could recover and keep his favour and goodwill.[37]

The Bishop of Langre's similar suggestions to Louis VII during the Second Crusade were opposed on similar grounds, as reported by the crusade's historian Odo of Deuil:

> He [Louis VII] knows, and we know, that we are to visit the Holy Sepulchre and, by the command of the supreme pontiff, to wipe out our sins with the blood or the conversion of the infidels. At this time we can attack the richest of the Christian cities and enrich ourselves, but in so doing we must kill and be killed. And so, if slaughtering Christians wipes out our sins, let us fight. Again, if harbouring ambition does not sully our death, if on this journey it is as important to die for the sake of gaining money as it is to maintain our vow and our obedience to the supreme pontiff, then wealth is welcome; let us expose ourselves to danger without fear of death.[38]

Frederick I's swift abandonment of his preparations to seize Constantinople once Isaac II agreed to let him cross to Asia, despite the extent of the provocation offered by Isaac's previous actions, can be explained only by the centrality of Jerusalem and the insignificance of Byzantium to the aims of Frederick's expedition.[39] The pilgrimage model of crusading diminished not only the movement's potential benefits to Byzantium but its potential threat.

While the conquest of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade displays the eventual failure of such considerations to save the empire, the earlier course of the expedition shows that they had not ceased to apply. In his vain efforts to convince the crusaders not to turn aside to Constantinople, Innocent III insisted that, despite the chance of bringing an end to the schism, the defence of the Holy Land was a higher priority.[40] The diversion was brought about only in the teeth of sustained opposition from large numbers of participants, many of whom left, or

never joined, the army travelling on the Venetian fleet.[41] Many others argued against going to Constantinople and secured a guarantee that they would be transported on demand to the Holy Land after the installation of Alexios IV Angelos on the imperial throne, a pledge whose fulfilment they later unsuccessfully demanded.[42] These crusaders' objections to the plans of the army's leadership were once again based on a combination of opposition to targeting Christians and opposition to diverting the campaign away from the Holy Land, a tendency which had led even the original plan to direct the crusade to Egypt rather than Palestine and Syria to be kept secret.[43] The leaders argued for the crusade's redirection on the grounds that only by this means would the expedition have any chance of going on to achieve its original aims, supported by the longer-term benefits for the Holy Land which would accrue from a Byzantine regime dedicated to the crusade.[44] Just as Manuel I's schemes to focus crusading energies on helping the empire had necessarily been couched in terms of aiding the struggle for Jerusalem, so the same argument was key to making the case for aggressive interference in the empire.

The pact between the crusaders and Alexios Angelos presented another unfulfilled potential model for the intimate involvement of Byzantium in crusading, one that subordinated the empire to the Latin agenda through formal and enduring obligations to assist. This deal envisaged the empire not only contributing vast sums of money and joining their expedition with ten thousand men, but maintaining a permanent force of five hundred knights in the Holy Land.[45] Thus the empire was to be permanently integrated into the crusading movement as a source of funds. Such a model had been foreshadowed by the German Emperor Henry VI's attempt in 1196–7 to blackmail Byzantium into paying for his own crusade under threat of invasion.[46] These ideas may be seen as part of a wider trend towards a more strategic approach to crusading, manifested also in the emergence of Egypt as the prime target for expeditions. This shift undermined the traditional centrality of pilgrimage as a model for the conduct of crusades and broadened the geographical and methodological scope of what might be done in the course of a crusade for the sake of Jerusalem, within the parameters of the indulgence.[47] It may in part explain why the arguments which had hitherto led crusaders to reject the temptations of Constantinople failed to avert the diversion of the Fourth Crusade, by reducing the emphasis on the journey to the Holy Land and by encouraging a more pragmatic and calculating attitude to what might be justified in the service of the cause.

The conquest of Constantinople and much of the rest of the empire by the forces of the Fourth Crusade was not the product of a fundamental shift in the nature of the dealings between Byzantium and the crusade from the long-standing pattern of ambivalence to one of habitual enmity. It did however bring about such a transformation, for a time. Innocent III had repeatedly expressed his opposition to the diversion of the crusade from its proposed destination to attacks on Christian targets.[48] Yet the apparent opportunities for fulfilling the ambitions of the papacy opened by the capture of Constantinople were such that he

exuberantly welcomed it as an act of divine providence for the purpose of subjecting Byzantium to papal supremacy:

> Moreover, in our age we see this in the kingdom of the Greeks, and we rejoice in its accomplishment because He, who has dominion in the kingdom of humanity and who will give it to whom He might wish, has transferred the empire of Constantinople from the proud to the humble, from the disobedient to the obedient, from schismatics to Catholics, namely from the Greeks to the Latins. Surely, this was done by the Lord and is wondrous in our eyes. This is truly a change done by the right hand of the Most High, in which the right hand of the Lord manifested power so that He might exalt the most holy Roman Church while He returns the daughter to the mother, the part to the whole, and the member to the head.[49]

The establishment of a Latin hierarchy in the core of the empire, existing in parallel with a Byzantine hierarchy in exile headed by the patriarch at Nicaea, fully consummated the schism between East and West, completing the process which had begun with the installation of a Latin hierarchy in Syria and Palestine.[50] However, the papacy maintained hopes that it would bring that rupture to an end, through the exertion of authority by the new Latin masters of erstwhile imperial territories and churches on the population under their control. Such hopes led the papacy to take up the cause of the Latin Empire, promoting a series of crusading projects to defend it against the counter-attacks of the Byzantine successor states and, after its dissolution, to attempt to re-establish it.[51] These intermittent efforts were interspersed with attempts to bring about Byzantine submission to papal authority by diplomacy; the main incentive for imperial involvement in such negotiations was the prospect of an end to crusading hostility as a reward for imperial compliance.[52] This pattern reached its climax with the Union of Lyon of 1274, by which Michael VIII conceded all papal demands so as to forestall the crusading plans of Charles of Anjou, but which was rendered a dead letter by his failure to convince his subjects to accept the terms of the settlement.[53] By raising up a Latin alternative to supplant Byzantium, the Fourth Crusade for the time being largely resolved the ambiguity of the empire's position from the perspective of crusading, casting it clearly in the role of a defiant renegade which must be induced to submit or destroyed. Thus crusades finally appeared which placed Byzantium centre-stage, but with the aim of crushing rather than supporting it.

Yet, despite this transformation, the empire still did not assume a central place in the crusading movement in the eastern Mediterranean as a whole, in large part due to the abandonment of the land route for armies travelling to the Holy Land. Ironically, the geographical situation which had kept the empire inextricably entangled with the crusade even while it remained peripheral to the crusading agenda, and which had therefore been responsible for much of the resulting friction, lost most of its force just before the Fourth Crusade turned that friction

into open antagonism and made Byzantium a direct target of crusading. Had such sustained conflict broken out in the twelfth century, Latin states contending for the Byzantine inheritance would have been able to draw on subsequent crusading expeditions for support, as armies going to the Holy Land would have passed through the heart of the combat zone. In the event they bypassed it entirely. Thus, rather than being a source of strength for the Latin Empire, the cause of regaining or retaining Jerusalem became a competitor with the struggle to hold or retake Constantinople, and one whose capacity to attract attention and resources was unsurprisingly more powerful. The Latin emperors and the popes on their behalf, like Manuel I before them, sought to channel the crusading energies focused on Jerusalem into serving their own aims by arguing for the benefits of clearing the land route to Syria, but this argument had little impact now that that route had fallen into disuse.[54]

The fourteenth century saw a reversion from hostility between Byzantium and the crusade to a new form of the old uneasy and conditional cooperation, in which for the first time crusading goals coincided closely with the empire's own concerns. As a result of the installation of Latin regimes in what had been the empire's territorial core by the Fourth Crusade, and of the collapse of the empire's defences against the Turkish advance which the Latin onslaught facilitated, Byzantium and the Latins came for the first time to share a common front against a common Muslim foe, the Anatolian Turks. The threat from that enemy steadily escalated in the course of the fourteenth century, while the extinction of the Latin states in the Holy Land in 1291 had dramatically reduced that region's competing draw on crusading energies. The resultant realignment of the crusading movement in the eastern Mediterranean was not the product of major shifts in thinking. As the writings of contemporary crusade theorists show, the recovery of Jerusalem remained central to the crusading imagination, but it became steadily clearer that such an undertaking could not be seriously contemplated without first overcoming the Turkish threat.[55] Similarly, the crusade against Byzantium was not so much ideologically discredited as pragmatically recognised as being a frivolous irrelevance, as the empire withered and Turkish power blossomed ever more brightly in its stead. Theorists continued for a time to present plans for the conquest of Constantinople and the subjection of the eastern Christians to the Church of Rome by force, but the priority of opposing the Turks consigned such notions to the same realm of abstraction as the recovery of Jerusalem.[56] Serious planning for a restoration of the Latin Empire came to an end with the abortive projects of Charles of Valois, which were effectively abandoned around 1309.[57]

The empire's quiet transformation from enemy to ally was signalled in 1332 by the formation under papal auspices of a Christian league against the Anatolian Turks which included Byzantium.[58] In the wake of the final revival of thirteenth-century-style crusading – King Peter of Cyprus's 1365 invasion of Egypt – Pope Urban V urged Count Amadeo of Savoy, who was too late to join the campaign against the Mamluks, to redeem his vow by assisting his cousin Emperor John V against the Turks.[59] More than two and a half centuries after Alexios I's appeal for

help, for the first time crusaders set out with the defence of Byzantium as their primary goal and as a task considered sufficient in itself for participants to receive a crusade indulgence.

Even so, the potential scope for crusading for the empire's sake remained largely unfulfilled. Amadeo's modest enterprise brought more direct benefit to the empire than any other crusading expedition since the First Crusade, retrieving the key strategic position of Gallipoli from the Ottomans and Sozopolis, Anchialos and Mesembria from the Bulgarians.[60] Nevertheless, its small scale precluded any lasting transformation of the empire's dire situation, and it was to have no successors for thirty years. The intractable obstacle of the schism impeded prospects for crusading in the empire's defence, with the papacy insisting on religious submission as a *quid pro quo* for serious military aid.[61] In prompting Amadeo to assist John V, Urban had been encouraged by John's diplomatic approaches regarding Church Union, and he made clear to John the connection between such help and progress towards Union.[62] The help Amadeo brought enabled the count to negotiate an agreement from John to travel to Rome and make a personal submission to the pope, a pledge he fulfilled in 1369, with an undertaking to work for the reconciliation of his people to the papal position.[63] For decades, however, this remained the furthest that any emperor was willing to go in the face of the baleful precedent of the Union of Lyon.

Byzantium received the support of another limited crusading expedition under Marshal Boucicault in 1399.[64] Yet, despite the strategic importance and imperilled condition of Constantinople, no sizeable crusade was dispatched to save it from the Turks. The disastrous crusade of Nikopolis in 1396 was an enterprise on a large scale which definitively confirmed the establishment of opposition to the Ottomans at the heart of the declining crusading movement, in practice though not in theory taking the place of the conquest of the Holy Land.[65] Through the following three centuries, as long as the embers of the crusade continued to glow, turning back the advance of 'the Turk' would be the movement's main preoccupation.[66] However, the expedition was prompted largely by the arrival of Ottoman armies at the frontiers of Catholic Hungary, rather than by any acceptance of Byzantium's full entitlement to Christian solidarity on the part of the Latin West.[67] Only when John VIII and his prelates finally submitted to papal demands at the Council of Ferrara-Florence in 1438–9 did the papacy preach, for the first and last time, a full-scale crusade whose central goal was the defence of the state whose appeal to the papacy for military support had initiated the crusades.[68] Less than a decade after the failure of the ensuing crusade of Varna in 1443–4 the prospect of any further cooperation between Byzantium and the crusade was curtailed by the empire's extinction.

By its very existence the crusade constituted a challenge to the traditional view of the world promoted by the Byzantine state, the early effects of which were already discernible in the twelfth century. It is at times difficult to distinguish clearly the contribution of the crusades to these changes from that of other causes, particularly of other aspects of the growing importance of Latin civilisation.

However, the emergence in Byzantium of the very idea that such a civilisation existed, and hence the impact of thinking about it, was probably strongly influenced by the early crusades. The late eleventh and twelfth centuries saw a striking transformation of the ethnic categorisation used by Byzantine writers. For the first time it became common to refer to 'Latins', a group embracing all western Christians, rather than speaking only of particular peoples, on the one hand, or of undifferentiated barbarians, on the other. Alternative terms used interchangeably for this western Christian bloc by individual writers included 'Franks', 'Italians' and 'Celts', the first two of which also continued to be used in their more specific senses.[69] While this shift had begun before the First Crusade, it is reasonable to suppose that the spread of this new perception was closely connected with the unprecedented passage through the empire of huge hosts of people from a range of different western peoples all in cooperative pursuit of a common goal, at the instigation of a single authority. Thus, if thinking and policy in the empire's later centuries were increasingly dominated by a 'Latin question', it was probably the crusades, in combination with the ecclesiastical schism, which first led the elite of Byzantium to ask it.

The idea of the Latins as a coherent bloc represented in itself a significant complication of the Byzantine view of the world. Since imperial ideology associated adherence to Christianity with civilisation and with acknowledgement of the empire as the one legitimate temporal authority established by God, the existence of independent Christian rulers beyond the reach of imperial direct rule or even indirect hegemony would always be problematic. However, as long as they could be looked on and dealt with as individual peoples, their presence did not greatly unsettle the imperial outlook. The empire could still be seen without too much difficulty as the centre of the temporal world, with a profusion of barbarian peoples ranged around it, some more deferential to imperial authority than others. The recognition of the Latins as a large and assertive group of self-governing Christian societies united by cultural and religious affinities, which separated them from the empire and its people, made it possible to regard the Christian world as being split down the middle. The scale of the western Christian world, the status of its religious hierarchy, its growing wealth and sophistication and its increasingly pervasive presence in the eastern Mediterranean meant that it could not simply be dismissed or ignored. It would come to be seen as a contrasting counterpart to Byzantium, comparison with which increasingly defined the empire's rulers' and subjects' idea of themselves. Such thinking differed markedly from traditional ideas of the empire which defined it against generic barbarians and heathens. This implicitly compromised its leaders' conviction of their own central place in the world.

While the mere existence of the crusade exerted a disquieting effect on the comforting assumptions of conventional Byzantine thought, the disaster inflicted on the empire by the Fourth Crusade exponentially increased this disturbance. The conquest of Constantinople deprived the empire for more than half a century of the capital which had enjoyed an exceptionally preponderant place in the

politics, government, economy, culture and ideology of the state over which it presided. In the regions where Latin rule was not established, it led to the fragmentation of authority between a number of successor states laying claim to the Byzantine inheritance. This stark transformation of material circumstances naturally had its impact on ideas, which is reflected both in the writings of members of the imperial elite and in such evidence as is available for the thinking of the wider population, both in the territories retained or regained by the successor states and those held by the Latins. The Roman state had hitherto played a central part in the identity of its people. Loyalty to the emperor and recognition of his unique status as the earthly reflection of divine monarchy, recognition of the New Rome as the political centre of the world, adherence to Roman law and a sense of superiority over 'barbarian' outsiders on account of citizenship of the state which defined civilisation were all qualities associated with the state which played a part in defining the ways in which its people, and the educated elite in particular, saw themselves.[70] The credibility of the imperial state and of a sense of identity derived from it was severely impaired by the results of the Fourth Crusade.[71] The existence of multiple durable regimes laying claim to the imperial title, none of which possessed the capital, severely undermined the notion of a unique and indivisible empire. The rulers in Nicaea were able in time to induce their rivals at Thessalonike to renounce the imperial title and then to retake Constantinople from the Latins, while convincing the rulers at Trebizond, although still calling themselves emperors, to abstain from claiming the Roman *imperium*, as such.[72] Yet, even after this, the picture continued to be complicated by the enduring presence of independent states which were just as clearly part of the Roman tradition as the restored Byzantine Empire. The resilience of the successor state in Epiros in the face of the onslaughts of Nicaean and Byzantine emperors bears witness to its rulers' ability to make a more convincing appeal to the loyalty of those in their own area than the 'legitimate' emperor in Constantinople.[73]

Even in the highest circles of imperial government, the disaster of the fall of Constantinople severely undermined confidence in the conventional ideological scheme, while the empire's reduced strength placed increased practical constraints on its ability to assert the grandiose claims of former centuries. This tendency was particularly pronounced during the decades when Constantinople was in the hands of the Latins. The Nicaean emperors gave up elements of the grandiose symbolism of imperial diplomatic, replacing chrysobulls – with their golden seals and ideological preambles – with more modest documents. Such changes were often confined to the period of exile, being reversed by Michael VIII after retaking the capital.[74] In some regards, however, the quiet adoption of a more modest approach to customary imperial pretensions endured. For instance, after 1204 the documents granting privileges to Latin commercial communities were no longer presented as unilateral and magnanimous acts of beneficence by the emperor but as reciprocal treaties between independent powers.[75] By the fourteenth century imperial writers such as Theodore Metochites had come to doubt the traditional view that the empire had a special place in sacred history and would endure until

the Last Days, considering instead that it was subject to the same mundane processes of rise and decline as other polities.[76]

A loss of confidence and revision of preconceptions are also reflected in Byzantine perceptions of the crusade itself. This transition is reflected in the work of Niketas Choniates, the principal Byzantine historian of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, which represents a considerable departure from the approach taken by his predecessors, and particularly so in its treatment of the crusades themselves. Earlier historians had presented the leading crusaders as engaged in a duplicitous enterprise whose real purpose was the conquest of the empire, a goal for which their ostensible aim was merely a disguise. Whether or not these writers actually believed in this portrayal of events, it satisfied the requirements of imperial ideology and self-regard. It placed the empire at the heart of affairs, diverting attention from the marginalisation of the empire and its role as defender of the Christian world which was implicit in the nature of the crusade, with its papal authorisation, largely Latin participation and focus on the Holy Land. It enabled the cautious and calculating response of Alexios and Manuel to the expeditions to be presented as a masterful and successful deflection of Latin intrigues which had preserved the empire from barbarian scheming.[77] Thus it directed the reader away from the kind of interpretation which commended itself all too readily to Latin observers, in which the empire was seen as at best a negligent ally and at worst a traitor to the Christian cause.[78] The late twelfth century saw open warfare against the crusading army of Frederick I, the conquest of Cyprus by Richard I of England and the extortionate ultimatum of Henry VI. Finally came the crowning catastrophe of the Fourth Crusade. These events might reasonably have been interpreted by Byzantine observers as definitive confirmation of this conspiracy theory of crusading. However, this is not the impression which emerges from Choniates, who wrote his history during the reign of Alexios III (1195–1203) and extensively revised it in the years after 1204.[79] In his case the bruising experience of these years would seem rather to have had the countervailing effect of shattering complacency and initiating a more jaundiced assessment of the flattering illusions that had underpinned earlier accounts. Choniates readily attributed the outcome of the Fourth Crusade to a premeditated plot, though he did indicate that the crusaders were actually on their way to Palestine before being recruited into a scheme hatched by the Doge of Venice, Enrico Dandolo.[80] When dealing with previous crusading expeditions, however, Choniates diverged sharply from the interpretations of earlier imperial writers. The sincerity of the crusaders' avowed intentions and the religious character of their motivations was frankly acknowledged in his treatment of the expedition during the Second Crusade of Louis VII, to whom he gave a stirring speech suggesting a sympathetic grasp of crusading ideology.[81] He went still further in the case of Frederick I, whose integrity Choniates passionately affirmed:

> He was a man who deserved to enjoy a blessed and perpetual memory and justly to be deemed fortunate in his end by prudent men, not only

> because he was wellborn and ruled over many nations as an heir of the third generation but also because his burning passion for Christ was greater than that of any other Christian monarch of his time. Setting aside fatherland, royal luxury and repose, the worldly happiness of enjoying the company of his loved ones at home, and his sumptuous way of life, he chose instead to suffer affliction with the Christians of Palestine for the name of Christ and due regard for his life-giving tomb.[82]

Writing later in the thirteenth century, George Akropolites took this shift in perspective a step further. He did not even ascribe premeditated ill-intent to the leaders of the Fourth Crusade, instead presenting the coming of the expedition to Constantinople not as its intended course but as a diversion brought about by the blandishments of the young Alexios Angelos. He attributed the subsequent breakdown of relations between the crusaders and Alexios to the latter's failure to fulfil the commitments he had made, and blamed the final escalation of conflict that brought about the fall of the city on the crusaders' rage at the murder of their estranged protégé by Alexios Doukas Mourtzouphlos, exacerbated by the ill-judged expulsion of the Latin population of Constantinople by the Byzantines.[83] There is no assertion here of the kind of nefarious intent diagnosed by twelfth-century Byzantine historians in their assessment of earlier crusades, despite the seemingly far stronger foundation for such suspicions in the overall course of events. Thus, the evidence of historiography suggests that far from conventional distrust of proclaimed crusading motives being entrenched by the Fourth Crusade, the blow to imperial confidence and conceit inflicted by the disaster encouraged the open espousal of interpretations which took the crusaders at their word, acknowledging the possibility that Byzantium might have only a tangential importance in Latin thinking. The demise of the insistence that such a grand military undertaking among the 'barbarians' must be directed at seizing the empire of the Romans, the supreme earthly prize, is expressive of a marked retreat from traditional convictions about the empire's centrality in the affairs of the world.

The work of Byzantine writers from the period after the Fourth Crusade also reveals wider adjustments in the way in which outsiders were perceived, and thus in ideas of the empire and its people themselves in contradistinction to foreigners. From the thirteenth century the characterisation of outsiders as barbarians, hitherto a commonplace in Byzantine writing, became rarer. This terminology and the rehearsal of the associated stereotypes remained in frequent use only to denote the Turks and other non-Christian peoples. Strikingly, in so far as it was still used to describe Christian peoples, it was usually the Bulgarians and other Orthodox Slavic neighbours of the empire who were so labelled, not the Latins.[84] The bitterness generated by the sack of Constantinople might reasonably have been expected to deepen the association of the Latins with the wanton destructiveness of the barbarian. Yet the Fourth Crusade seems to have been followed by a widespread shift in perceptions removing the Latins from the barbarian category.

This was presumably a further ramification of the shattering of reassuring assumptions. The category of barbarian ceased to be a generalised designation for foreign peoples, whose disorderly and brutish life was set in contrast to the steadiness and refinement of a civilisation definitively linked to the imperial state, perhaps because Byzantine writers could no longer sustain the complacent conviction of superiority, sincere or affected, that had allowed the perpetuation of this traditional image. Barbarism became a largely religious category, while non-Roman Christian peoples were implicitly allowed within the civilised pale, although reservations remained with regard to the empire's long-standing northern neighbours, on whom Byzantine writers had piled a thick layering of scorn in more confident times. Thus the process of undermining the image of a unique, civilised empire surrounded by a scatter of barbarian peoples which had begun with the identification of the Latins as one group was extended.

As the efficacy and credibility of the state and of conventional perceptions of it were undermined, other sources of authority and bases for identity became increasingly important. The status of the Church hierarchy, and of the Patriarch of Constantinople in particular, as an object of loyalty and a source of authority was increased. Unlike the empire, the patriarchate did not see its adherents lastingly divided among rival lines of claimants to the throne. As the strength and status of the empire dwindled, the reach of Church and patriarchate remained relatively intact, so that emperors increasingly leaned on the authority of the clergy to bolster their own legitimacy and standing. This is found, for example, in the ceremonial of imperial accession. The imperial acclamation of Theodore Komnenos Doukas in Thessalonike in 1224–5 substituted the clergy for the people as acclaiming the emperor alongside the senate and army, while his rivals in Nicaea were anointed by the patriarch, an apparent novelty in Byzantine ceremonial.[85] By the fourteenth century clerics were taking part in the ceremony of raising the new emperor on a shield for acclamation, traditionally performed by soldiers.[86] The famous letter of Patriarch Antonios IV to the Grand Duke of Moscow, in which he condemned the latter's decision to cease ceremonial acknowledgement of the emperor and restated the traditional ideology of imperial authority, eloquently symbolises the role of the Church in bolstering the battered credibility of the empire.[87] While the Church willingly provided its support in this regard, the need for such help shows the diminished efficacy of the empire's ideological arsenal, and its increased dependence on clerical endorsement reflects the extent to which the Church had filled the void opened by the empire's fading lustre. This shift in the balance of power gave rise to more assertive and grandiose expressions of the standing of the ecclesiastical establishment in relation to imperial authority.[88]

The period after the Fourth Crusade also saw an increased emphasis being placed, at least among the educated elite, on the cultural inheritance of ancient Greece as a focus of self-identification. In a trend that had its beginnings in the eleventh century but was greatly intensified from the thirteenth, Byzantine writers began to identify themselves and their people as 'Hellenes' and to develop notions

of a Hellenic identity derived from the ancient world.[89] This in part reflected a decline in the adequacy of Roman identity to express the self-image and self-esteem of the imperial elite. As a source of definition and pride, an ancient cultural and intellectual tradition was less susceptible to the political vicissitudes of the present than a beleaguered state. This shift may also reflect the scope for terminological confusion between the Roman state and people, on one hand, and the Church of Rome, on the other. With the adherents of the papacy now a pervasive presence in the Byzantine world and in places a politically dominant one, and with the increased bitterness surrounding the schism following the Fourth Crusade and the intrusion of a Latin hierarchy, this ambiguity was more problematic than in former periods.[90]

A more marked realignment of identity appears to have taken place in some of the lands under Latin rule. Allegiance to the empire and adherence to the imperial ideal seem to have faded from the thinking of a significant number of its former subjects who had passed under the sway of Latin regimes as a result of the Fourth Crusade. In their stead, regional loyalties which could embrace the new rulers as well as the native population rose to prominence. This pattern is discernible particularly in the Peloponnese, where members of the indigenous landowning classes retained some of their wealth and power and joined the lower echelons of an ethnically mixed aristocracy together with the conquerors. Many of these indigenous leaders were willing to serve Latin rulers loyally in the face of efforts to restore Byzantine control.[91] This shifting political loyalty is manifested in the Greek versions of the Chronicle of the Morea, presumably produced for a native audience, in which the empire appears as a hostile and decried outside force while solidarity between the native inhabitants of the peninsula and their Latin rulers is espoused.[92] In marked contrast to the process under way in Turkish Anatolia, such populations were not simply being assimilated by the conquerors. They retained the linguistic, religious and cultural elements which had characterised their identity, and continued to regard themselves as Romans, but this was an identity in which the Roman state ceased to be a defining reference point.[93]

The final challenge which the crusade posed to the empire's sense of self was the pressure that it exerted on successive imperial governments to accept the claims of papal monarchy, giving up its traditional notions of the government of the Church and the emperor's position in the Christian world. This pressure was exerted in negative terms in the thirteenth century and in positive ones in the fourteenth and fifteenth, encapsulating the ambivalence of the empire's relationship with crusading. The Union of Lyon arose out of the central role of the schism in promoting crusading hostility to Byzantium, that of Florence out of the obstacle the schism posed to crusading assistance against the Turks. Yet, while the crusades were the driving force behind imperial promotion of Church Union, they also helped to ensure that that policy would remain a futile undertaking. The bitterness they had instilled against the Latins had entrenched the schism, while their reduction of imperial power and prestige and the corresponding increase in ecclesiastical authority undermined the capacity of emperors to cajole or coerce

their Church and people to comply with their wishes. The controversy also represents the fullest expression of the process by which the crusades diminished the centrality of the Byzantine state in its own society. It repeatedly set that state directly at odds with a very widely supported view of the Orthodox religious adherence which was central to its subjects' sense of identity. This complicated feelings to the extent that Loukas Notaras, the most influential official of the Emperor Constantine XI, could make his famous assertion that the empire's impending subjection to infidel rule was preferable to the subjection to the Latin religious order which recent imperial policy had promoted.[94]

The shifts in self-perception that characterised the last centuries of Byzantium cannot be seen as purely a product of the crusades. In so far as they arose from the acute decline of the empire's power and prestige, they were a product of all the forces contributing to that deterioration, including internal conflicts and structural changes, the secession and subsequent military pressure of the peoples of the northern Balkans and the expansion of the Turks, as well as the Latin challenge. Even in so far as the more forceful presence and pressure of the Latins contributed to them, developments separate from the crusading movement, such as the commercial expansion of the Italian republics and the growing intellectual prestige of the West, were also at work. Nevertheless, the crusades were of decisive importance in driving such changes forward. The First Crusade had opened a new era for Latin enterprise in the eastern Mediterranean, notably in its effect on the activities of Latin maritime communities into the region. The harm done by the Fourth Crusade was probably the most important single contributing factor to the empire's subsequent decline, while the passage of crusading armies in the twelfth century and the establishment of Latin territories around the Aegean in the thirteenth were fundamental to the growth and transformation of the Latin role in the Byzantine world. Thus, besides their direct contribution to these changes, the crusades catalysed other forces working in the same direction.

The changes in Byzantine thought brought about by the crusades represented incremental shifts in emphasis rather than a revolutionary transformation. While some of the shifts in symbolism that emerged in the empire of Nicaea proved lasting, the reversion to former practice in other respects after 1261 reflects the persistent quality of traditional perceptions of the empire's special status. The vast majority both of the empire's remaining subjects and of its former subjects under Latin rule continued to see themselves as Romans. Even among those educated sections of the population where the notion of Hellenic identity became influential, it was an adjunct rather than a replacement for Roman identity.[95] Nor did this identity become generally divorced from its connection with the Roman state. The refusal of George Akropolites to acknowledge the Epirot rivals of the empire of Nicaea as being Roman reflects the continuing assertion of a tight equation between Roman identity and allegiance to the state ruled by the legitimate Roman emperor.[96] It was only after the empire's destruction that the Athenian historian Laonikos Chalkokondyles would go so far as to apply the term 'Roman' not to Byzantium and its people but to the Latins, while describing the Byzantines

exclusively as 'Hellenes'.[97] Thus the impact of the crusades significantly weakened but did not fundamentally overturn Byzantine views of the empire's place in the world and in the loyalties and identity of its people.

This limited marginalisation of Byzantium by the crusade had begun as a trend in ideas about the empire's place within the goals of a military enterprise, shifting from being the focal point of the early schemes of Gregory VII and the Latin intervention sought by Alexios I to being a peripheral consideration in the movement called forth by Urban II, but remaining firmly entangled with the movement and the thinking of its participants throughout the remainder of Byzantine history. Soon this development grew into an alteration of more general Latin thinking about Byzantium's position in the world, with the spread of perceptions of the empire as negligent or treacherous with regard to a common Christian cause, although this never entirely displaced the notion that it should still be extended Christian solidarity. Finally the repercussions of the movement culminated in a shift in the ideological perceptions and sense of identity of the empire's own rulers and people, who leaned increasingly on other sources of self-definition and espoused less confidently the uniqueness and superiority of the Roman state.

Notes

1 E. Caspar (ed.), *Das Register Gregors VII*, 2, Berlin: Weidman, 1920–3, I.69–71, 75–6, 126–8, 165–8, 172–3, 188–9 (nos. I 46, 49, II 3, 31, 37, 49); H.E.J. Cowdrey, 'Pope Gregory VII's "crusading" plans of 1074', *Outremer: Studies in the History of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem Presented to Joshua Prawer*, B.Z. Kedar, H.E. Mayer and R.C. Smail (eds), Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, 1982, pp. 27–40; H.E.J. Cowdrey, 'The Gregorian papacy, Byzantium and the First Crusade', *Byzantium and the West, c850–c1200: Proceedings of the XVIII Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Oxford 30 March–1 April 1984*, James Howard-Johnston (ed.), Amsterdam: Adolf Hakkert, 1988, pp. 145–69 at pp. 154–5; Carl Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, pp. 164–9.

2 Caspar, *Register*, pp. 165–8 (no. II 31); Cowdrey, 'Gregory', pp. 34–5.

3 Peter Charanis, 'A Greek source on the origins of the First Crusade', *Speculum* 24, 1949, 93–4; Peter Charanis, 'Byzantium, the West and the origin of the First Crusade', *Byzantion* 9, 1949, 17–36 at 30–6; Jonathan Shepard, 'Aspects of Byzantine attitudes and policy towards the West in the tenth and eleventh centuries', *Byzantinische Forschungen* 13, 1988, 67–118 at 111–12.

4 FC 130–8. For a discussion of whether Fulcher was present at Clermont, see pp. 177–8.

5 Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading*, London: Athlone, 1986, pp. 13–25; Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, pp. 319–34, 365–71; Norman Housley, 'Jerusalem and the development of the crusade idea, 1099–1128', in B.Z. Kedar (ed.), *The Horns of Hattin: Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East*, Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1992, pp. 27–40, reprinted in Norman Housley, *Crusading and Warfare in Medieval and Renaissance Europe*, Aldershot: Ashgate 2001, pp. 28–36.

6 Anna Komnene, *Alexias (règne de l'empereur Alexis I Comnène, 1081–1118)*, Bernard Leib (ed. and tr.), 4 (Paris 1943–76), I.136–8; 2, 63, 67–74, 79–81, 109–10, 151, 205–6; 3, 7–19, 23–7; Jonathan Shepard, '"Father" or "scorpion"? Style and substance

in Alexios's diplomacy', *Alexios I Komnenos*, Margaret Mullett and Dion Smythe (eds), Belfast: Belfast Byzantine Enterprises, 1996, pp. 68–132 at 86–9.

7 Anna Komnene, *Alexias*, III.40–1, 49, 57–9; NC 52; JK 133–4; WT 662–3; Ralph-Johannes Lilie, *Byzantium and the Crusader States, 1096–1204*, J.C. Morris and J.E. Ridings (trs), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 64, 70–2, 83–4, 105–10, 176–80.

8 *GF* 25–6; AA 596–7.

9 FC 178–9: 'Erat enim omnibus hoc necesse, ut sic cum imperatore amicitiam consolidarent, sine cuius consilio et auxilio nostrum iter nequivimus expedire, neque illi qui nos erant subsecuturi eodem tramite.' Translation from *The First Crusade: The Chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres and Other Source Materials*, Edward Peters (tr.), Philadelphia: University of Pennysylvania Press, 1998 [1971], p. 62.

10 RA 40–1: 'Boamundus et dux Lotaringie, et Flandrensis comes, et alii principes hoc precabantur ut properaret comes convenire imperatorem de itinere Iherosolimitano, ut assumpta cruce dux et imperator in exercitu Dei fieret.' Translation from Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem*, J.H. Hill and L.L. Hill (trs), Philadelpia: The American Philosophical Society, 1968, p. 22.

11 *GF* 72; RA 105–6; WT I.343; Lilie, *Crusader States*, pp. 39–43.

12 JK 67–83; NC 60–8; OD 66–99; Lilie, *Crusader States*, pp. 145–63; Paul Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos, 1143–1180*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 46–53.

13 JK 16–24, 33–4, 178–90, 278–80, 300; NC 27–31, 39, 108–10, 159–68; WT 662–3, 670–1, 674–81, 700–4, 781–5, 844–8, 915–17, 926–34, 940–6, 981–6; Lilie, *Crusader States*, pp. 109–41, 176–83, 198–202, 204–9, 215–19; Magdalino, *Manuel*, pp. 66–76; J.L. La Monte, 'To what extent was the Byzantine empire the suzerain of the crusader states?', *Byzantion* 7, 1932, 253–64.

14 *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France*, 24 (1738–1904), 15, Michel-Jean-Joseph Brial (ed.), pp. 952–3 (no. 385); Lilie, *Crusader States*, pp. 211–14; Magdalino, *Manuel*, pp. 95–7.

15 NC 176–91; Magdalino, *Manuel*, p. 98; Lilie, *Crusader States*, pp. 211–15.

16 Robert of Clari, *La conquête de Constantinople*, Peter Noble (ed. and tr.), Edinburgh: Société Rencevals British Branch, 2005, p. 203; see also Magdalino, *Manuel*, pp. 105–6.

17 WT 1020–1: 'Regnante enim Deo amabili predicto imperatore, merito fidei et strenuitatis sue tantum Latinus populus apud eum reppererat gratiam, ut neglectis Greculis suis tanquam viris mollibus et effeminatis, ipse tanquam vir magnanimus et strenuitate incomparabilis solis Latinis grandia committeret negocia, de eorum fide merito presumens et viribus. Et quoniam apud eum optime habebantur et erga eos profusa liberalitate habundabat, ex omni orbe ad eum quasi ad benefactorem precipuum tam nobiles quam ignobiles concurrebant certatim, quorum exigentibus obsequiis magis et magis in nostrorum accen debatur amorem et eos amplius in statum promovebat meliorem. Unde Grecorum nobiles et maxime eius consanguinei, sed et reliquus populus odium insaciabile adversus nostros conceperant, accedente etiam ad indignationis cumulum et odiorum fomitem et incentivum ministrante sacramentorum inter nos et eos differentia. Arrogantes enim supra modum et a Romana ecclesia per insolentiam separati, hereticum omnem eum reputant qui eorum frivolas non sequitur traditiones.' Translation from William of Tyre, *A History of Deeds Done beyond the Sea*, E.A. Babcock and A.C. Krey (trs), 2, New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, II.461–2.

18 AA 82–3; OD 69–71.

19 *GF* 9–11, 16–17, 34–5; RA 38–42, 44–5, 54; GN 104–6, 128, 138–43, 182–4, 229–32, 313–14.

20 Anna Komnene, *Alexias*, III.53–6, 79–80; OV III.182–3, V.70–3; J.G. Rowe, 'Paschal II, Bohemund of Antioch and the Byzantines', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 49, 1966–7, 165–202.

21 A.E. Laiou, 'Byzantium and the crusades in the twelfth century: why was the Fourth Crusade late in coming?', in A.E. Laiou (ed.), *Urbs Capta: The Fourth Crusade and Its Consequences*, Paris: Lethielleux, 2005, pp. 17–40 at 18–28.

22 D.M. Nicol, 'Defenders of the Christian people: holy war in Byzantium', in A.E. Laiou and R.P Mottahedeh (eds), *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World*, Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 2001, pp. 31–9; John Haldon, *Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World 565–1204*, London: University College Press, 1999, pp. 13–33; T.M. Kolbaba, 'Fighting for Christianity: holy war in the Byzantine Empire', *Byzantion* 68, 1998, 194–221; Hélène Ahrweiler, *L'idéologie politique de l'Empire Byzantin*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1975, pp. 78–9. In the wake of the Fourth Crusade there was a momentary lapse in this tradition, as Patriarch Michael IV proclaimed absolution for imperial troops going into combat in a manner resembling the crusade indulgence, but this innovation was not repeated. Dimiter Angelov, 'Byzantine ideological reactions to the Latin conquest of Constantinople', in Laiou (ed.), *Urbs Capta*, pp. 293–310 at 298.

23 Jonathan Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, London: Continuum, 2002, pp. 60–71, 93–101, 132–41; Lilie, *Crusader States*, pp. 5–7, 38–51, 146–63, 230–42, 247–51; see also Shepard, '"Father" or "scorpion"?', pp. 122–9.

24 Bernard Hamilton, *The Latin Church in the Crusader States*, London: Variorum, 1980, pp. 161–3, 172–81, 315–22; Cowdrey, 'Gregorian papacy', pp. 167–9.

25 AA 634–7; GN 313–14; WT 743–6; OD 82–3, 90–3, 98–9; Lilie, *Crusader States*, pp. 57–9.

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τρέφοντες καὶ εὐκαιρίαν ζητοῦντες ἀντίποινα τοῦτῳ παρεσχεῖν τῆς λαμρᾶς ἐκείνης νίκης, ἣν ἥρατο κατ'αὐτοῦ ὁπότε κατὰ τὴν Λάρισσαν τὸν μετ'αὐτοῦ συνῆψε πόλεμον ὁμογνωμονήσαντες καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν μεγαλόπολιν κατασχεῖν ὀνειρράττοντες εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν ἐληλύθεισαν γνώμην (καὶ τούτου πολλάκις ἐμνημονεύσαμεν ἄνωθεν), τῷ μὲν φαινομένῳ τὴν πρὸς τὰ Ἱεροσόλυμα ὁδοιπορίαν ποιούμενοι, τῇ δ'ἀληθείᾳ τὸν αὐτοκράτορα τῆς ἀρχῆς παραλῦσαι καὶ τὴν μεγαλόπολιν κατασχεῖν ἔλθοντες.' Translation from AC 319; see also Anna Komnene, *Alexias*, II.209.

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38 OD 69–71: 'Visitare sepulcrum Domini cognovimus nos et ipse et nostra crimina, praecepto summi pontificis, paganorum sanguine vel conversione delere. Nunc autem urben Christianorum ditissimam expugnare possumus et ditari, sed caedendum est et cadendum. Si ergo caedes Christianorum peccata diluit, dimicemus. Item si nostris mortuis non nocet ambitio, si tantum valet in itinere pro adquirenda pecunia interire quantum summi pontificis oboedentiae et voto nostro intendere, placent divitiae; sine timore mortis discrimina subeamus.' See also Daly, 'Christian fraternity', 61–9.

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49 *Register Innocenz III*, VII.264 (no. 154): 'Hoc autem in regno Grecorum temporibus nostris videmus et gaudemus impleri, quoniam is, qui dominatur in regno hominum et, cui voluerit, dabit illud, Constantinopolitanum imperium a superbis ad humilis, ab inobedientibus ad devotos, a scismaticis ad catholicos, a Grecis videlicet transtulit ad Latinos. Sane a Domino factus est istud et est mirabile in oculis nostris. Hec est profecto dextere Excelsi mutatio, in qua dextera Domini fecit virtutem, ut sacrosanctam Romanum ecclesiam exaltaret, dum filium reducit ad matrem, partem ad totum et Membrum ad caput.' Translation from Andrea, *Contemporary Sources*, pp. 116–17; see also *Register Innocenz III*, VII.262–70, 354–9 (nos. 153–4, 203).

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4

CONFLICT AND COHABITATION

Marriage and diplomacy between Latins and Cilician Armenians, c.1097–1253

Natasha Hodgson

In recent years, historians have increasingly emphasised the importance of marriage and family ties between early crusaders and established Christian groups in northern Syria during the process of settlement in the Latin East. As the First Crusaders travelled through strategic areas en route to the Holy Land such as Cilicia, the Taurus Mountains and northern Syria, they came into contact with a range of existing Christian communities, predominantly comprised of Greeks, Armenians and Jacobites.[1] Some were governed by Armenian lords displaced from their ancestral homelands by the expansion of the Byzantine Empire in the early eleventh century, or by later advances of the Seljuk Turks. These nobles occupied frontier cities on the edge of Byzantine territories, administering rule on behalf of the Greeks, or striving to establish their own independent lordships.

Most historians agree that when the First Crusaders began to settle in the East, a special relationship grew up between the Latin newcomers and the Armenian Christians. Key leaders of the crusade married into Armenian noble families in order to establish themselves, gaining lands, military support and much-needed cash in order to pursue their campaigns. The important influence of Armenian intermarriage on the throne of Jerusalem has attracted considerable attention.[2] However, the legacy of these matches and new relationships in the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries between Armenian nobility and Latin settlers in northern Syria have yet to be fully explored. This chapter will address the issue of cohabitation and identity in a rather literal sense, focusing on the role played by marriage in what has been christened the 'brilliant diplomacy' of Cilician Armenia during the period in which the kingdom developed to its height.[3] As Mutafian and other modern historians have emphasised, the Armenians created a range of political ties with Latins, Greeks, Muslims and Mongols in their attempts to preserve a degree of independence, often in recognisably distinct phases, but dynastic links were usually confined to the Christian groups.[4] This chapter will focus on the period in

which the Rupenids and later Hethoumids built and consolidated the kingdom of Cilicia before Hethoum I officially placed it under Mongol overlordship during his visit to Qaracorum in 1253. Particular emphasis will be placed on dynastic ties between northern Syria and Cilicia, and their impact on the survival of an independent Christian presence in the Near East.

In western historiography the crusades have perhaps played an exaggerated role in the study of Armenian history and culture.[5] 'Greater' Armenia, located in the region between the Pontus and Taurus mountain ranges has a unique position in the context of 'East–West' conflict and contact. In the first millennium of the Christian period, the geographical situation of the Armenian plateau made it a 'buffer state':[6] a strategically desirable prize for the Romans and Byzantines in opposition to the rival empires of the Persians, Arabs, Seljuks, Mongols and Mamluks. Throughout their history, the Armenians have fought to preserve their political, cultural and religious independence from dominion by foreign powers. They have survived as an ethnic and religious minority while their homeland was under Byzantine, Arab, Mongol, Turkish, Russian and Soviet rule. Even during the medieval period, influential expatriate populations flourished in Macedonia, Thrace, Cappadocia, Bithynia, Anatolia, Georgia, Cilicia and Cyprus.

Armenia lays claim to the title of oldest Christian state, derived from the establishment of Christianity as the official religion in 301. Non-Chalcedonian doctrine and an alphabet specially designed to enable Christian teaching in the Armenian language have helped to preserve this distinctive culture. With the re-emergence of Armenia as a new republic in the post-Soviet era, scholars have identified a need to provide historical continuity to the existence of a people who suffered greatly to keep their identity under foreign rule. The idea of a shared heritage helps to create and maintain links with the present-day Armenian Diaspora.[7] There is a palpable desire to 'rewrite' the history books in order to reflect the contribution of Armenian subjects to wider historical events and underline their importance in political, economic, cultural and social terms. In undertaking such work, however, the historian must tread carefully to avoid associating modern and politically sensitive issues with the medieval past.

This trend has been reflected in recent crusade historiography, where scholars have increasingly emphasised the central role played by Armenians in supporting and facilitating the early crusaders' settlement of the Eastern Mediterranean region. The sense of the First Crusade as a western 'achievement' has rightly given way to a more subtle understanding of the existing political, military and social undercurrents in the Near East, all of which made possible the capture of Jerusalem by a loose coalition of European warriors and pilgrims in 1099. Some modern textbooks on the crusades now have a section specifically devoted to the role of the Armenians, while others incorporate them under the wider context of native Christians and settlement.[8] In a study specifically devoted to Armenians and crusading, J.H. Forse was keen to maximise the beneficial aspects of relationships with Armenians for the First Crusaders, suggesting that closer social, cultural and religious ties existed between the two than other Christian groups in the East. The

presence of common enemies in the form of Turks and Byzantines bound them closely together, despite occasional land disputes between individuals.[9]

The Armenians of the ancestral homelands beyond the immediate vicinity of Cilicia, however, seem to have attached less significance to the arrival of the crusaders. R.W. Thomson, in his examination of how the crusaders impacted on the broader Armenian world view, suggests that 'a general lack of interest in the West' persisted until the late twelfth century.[10] He emphasised the comparative insignificance of crusader activity to the Armenian people and culture, exposing the flaws in a western historiographical approach that has focused on interaction with Europe rather than the Armenian experience as a whole. This is partly because the Armenian language, so crucial to the preservation of Armenian culture, is still a very specialised area of study for most historical academics.[11] However, in a collection based on conflict and cohabitation during the era of the crusades, it is not the place of this chapter to challenge such limitations by focusing solely on an Armenian perspective. Instead, intermarriage will provide a focal point for interaction between the two cultures.

It is to Cilicia and its immediate vicinity that we must turn in order to look for the impact of the Latins' arrival on existing social and cultural circles, and where the closest ties developed between Frankish and Armenian aristocracies. Its geographical situation made it a highly strategic area, with defensible positions in the mountains guarding trade routes between Anatolia and Syria, and controlling access to the Mediterranean and Cyprus.[12] A collection of essays edited by Boase gave a brief overview of historical events in this region at the time of the crusades, but focused predominantly on its surviving fortifications and the influence of the military orders.[13] Mutafian has also published extensively on this area, emphasising the central role of Cilicia between empires and charting the development of the kingdom to its fourteenth-century demise.[14] Ghazarian's study runs from the ancient and medieval roots of Cilicia into the fifteenth century, but gives only a cursory overview of this period and is aimed at a more popular audience.[15]

One of the latest and most exhaustive contributions to the early period of crusader settlement is Dédéyan's account of interrelations between Armenians, Muslims, Greeks and Latins up to 1150. He discusses how Armenian nobles, ecclesiastics and society as a whole adapted not only to the arrival of the crusaders, but to the changing role of the Byzantine Empire and the political shifts in the Muslim world. He concurs that, despite their occasional disagreements, the Armenians found the Latins more tolerable neighbours than the Byzantines, and finds examples of cross-cultural convergence from both perspectives among aristocratic and ecclesiastical circles.[16] Finally, a recent collection of essays entitled *Armenian Cilicia* addresses political, cultural and social issues relating to the area from the medieval to modern periods.[17]

To date, historians of the Latin East have emphasised Armenian involvement in the early period of crusader settlement, especially in northern Syria, but the later twelfth and early thirteenth centuries have received comparatively little attention since Claude Cahen's 1940 study, *La Syrie du Nord*.[18] During the last quartile of

the twelfth century, Byzantine imperial power in northern Syria began to wane; growing Muslim unity all but forced the Latin Christians out of the kingdom of Jerusalem, and Armenian lords made a bid for supremacy over Antioch. Cilicia emerged as a kingdom in its own right, with dedicated support and approval from the West, and the Armenian Church was recognised by the papacy.[19] Growing Armenian interest in Cyprus with the establishment of the first Armenian archbishop, Tateos, in 1179 also became apparent. By the mid-thirteenth century, however, a new threat was encroaching from the East: the Mongol Empire. The Christians in the Latin East were caught in a vice as the Mamluks also rose to power in the south. By the 1250s, Bohemond VI of Antioch-Tripoli was prepared to swear allegiance to the Mongols in order to support his Cilician father-in-law, King Hethoum. This suggests that the alliance had become critical to securing Latin survival in the north.[20]

The relationship between ruling families in northern Syria was consolidated at least in part through dynastic alliances. Marriage is, of course, only one aspect of medieval diplomatic practice. As MacEvitt asserts, while it is tempting to view relations between the Franks and indigenous peoples solely in terms of religiously oriented conflict, the 'network of families, civic relationships, professional ties, and associations with churches, shrines and holy places' often crossed those boundaries, and were sometimes more important for establishing both group and individual identities.[21] Dynastic alliances between ruling families, however, were the linchpin of political stability. They included transactions of land and cash, created networks for military support, and forged ties of kinship and obligation.

When considering the role of marriage in any medieval context, the source material is primarily concerned with three key issues: the legitimacy of a marriage; the fulfilment of its agreed terms; and succession. Even within the confines of medieval Latin Christianity, these issues and the practices associated with them varied widely and were often hotly debated. When intermarriage between cultures and religious denominations occurs, a further set of problems may be presented to the historian. Armenians, as non-Chalcedonians, were technically viewed as heretics, but it seems that from the start marriage between Latin newcomers and established Christian populations was deemed acceptable. Rüdt-Collenberg suggests that Armenian practices remained reasonably similar to western and Orthodox patterns in terms of age of marriage, divorce and remarriage, although the murky politics that characterised the nascent kingdom of Armenian Cilicia seems to have led to a rather high proportion of noble marriages ending in violent deaths. Despite adhering to different degrees of separation, the Armenian Church also appears to have become increasingly tolerant of marriage between near relatives before the thirteenth century.[22] MacEvitt believes it unlikely that either Frankish or Armenian partners saw conversion as a necessary prerequisite to such a match during this early period.[23] Of course, any exact details of Latin legal rulings on the subject may have been lost when Saladin burned the laws of the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1187.[24]

Aside from the canons of the Council of Nablus in 1120, the only detailed legal information about marriage in the Levant largely stems from later thirteenth-

century works of Philip of Novara and John of Ibelin.[25] Interestingly, the *Assises of Antioch* which outline laws of succession in the principality survive today only because a copy was translated into Armenian c.1250, potentially with a view to using Latin customs as a legal model. The rise of the Mongol Empire at this time, however, hampered the attempts of the Hethoumid dynasty to create a more solid legal infrastructure for the kingdom of Cilicia.

Before going on to look at the later twelfth century, consideration must be given to the role of marriage in some of the more celebrated early diplomatic relations with noble Armenian families, and how these set precedents for later interaction between the two groups.

After the First Crusade, certain high-profile Latins who married Armenian women in order to secure new claims to property and cement alliances, but evidence for those lower down the social scale is limited: such matches may have been possible only for 'a select few'.[26] Marital relationships were just as fluid as other types of alliance in the early period of settlement, as the case of Baldwin of Boulogne (I of Jerusalem) underlines. On his arrival in the East, he was 'adopted'



Figure 4.1 Marital alliances between Rupenids and Frankish settlers

Note: This diagram shows select, high-profile relationships only. For further detail, see W.H. Rüdt-Collenberg, *The Rupenides, Hethumides and Lusignans: The Structure of the Armeno Cilician Dynasties* (Paris: Libraire C. Klincksieck, 1963).

by the ruler of Edessa, and later married an Armenian princess often referred to as 'Arda'.[27] According to Albert of Aachen, she was the daughter of Taphnuz, brother of the Rupenid prince Konstandin.[28] The match was not a success and Arda was put aside after a few scant years, only to be reinstated briefly after Baldwin's subsequent bigamous marriage to Adelaide of Sicily turned sour. Contemporary historians gave a number of reasons for the divorce, although Fulcher of Chartres, Baldwin's apologist, said little.[29] Guibert of Nogent spun a tale about Arda's capture by pirates while travelling with her household from Edessa to Jerusalem c.1100. Concerned about her potential infidelity, Baldwin reputedly put her aside in order to live a celibate life.[30] Guibert's account is somewhat discredited by the fact that Arda was not immediately dismissed on her arrival in the Holy Land: she was still queen in 1102. Baldwin's remarriage to Adelaide of Sicily in 1113 also demonstrated his lack of commitment to a supposed celibate ideal.

Albert of Aachen justified Baldwin's actions on the grounds that Taphnuz had failed to provide the agreed dowry: having promised 60,000 bezants he produced only 7,000.[31] The divorce, however, seems to have taken place long after Taphnuz feared retribution for non-payment during Baldwin's purge of rebellious nobles in Edessa and fled to his mountain strongholds.[32] In 1102, Arda was present at Jaffa where she, along with other nobles, was fooled by a Muslim ruse that the head and legs of Gerbod of Winndeke in fact belonged to her husband Baldwin. Albert records her distress at these events, and Fulcher of Chartres further mentions how she and her counsellors sent to Tancred, Baldwin's old enemy, for aid.[33] Much later, William of Tyre's account detailed how Arda was forcibly deposited with the convent of St Anne in Jerusalem.[34] He accused her of infidelity after she had been put aside by her husband. In William's view, Baldwin's motives were pecuniary, but if a need for ready cash was the true reason for the divorce, it seems surprising that the king waited so long to remarry.[35] The marriage to Arda had also failed in another key area, the succession; but his new wife Adelaide was probably in her late thirties and also unlikely to produce an heir.[36] It seems likely, therefore, that the divorce resulted from another cause: the gradual devaluation of the Armenian connection once Baldwin had left northern Syria and become King of Jerusalem.

Other significant early matches were those of Baldwin of Bourcq and Joscelin of Courtenay, who, like Baldwin of Boulogne, were both counts of Edessa.[37] Baldwin of Bourcq married Morfia, daughter of Gabriel of Melitene, an Armenian prince of the Greek Orthodox faith.[38] According to an anonymous thirteenth-century Edessan chronicler, this event occurred within a year of his assumption of the title. Gabriel had apparently offered Morfia to Bohemond in the first instance, but the match went awry after Bohemond was captured by the Danishmend Malik-Ghazi in 1100 while on his way to the defence of Melitene.[39] Matthew of Edessa, Fulcher of Chartres and Michael the Syrian support the notion that Gabriel was intending to turn Melitene over to Bohemond in return for his help. Although they do not specifically mention a marriage, Fulcher alludes to 'pledges

of mutual friendship'.[40] Asbridge suggests that Gabriel may not have intended to give the city to Bohemond in its entirety and was hoping to hold it as a fief from him, but if a marriage agreement was on the cards, this might indicate that the arrangement was intended to be a little more permanent.[41] As it stood, Baldwin of Bourcq came to Gabriel's rescue, and it was he who received Morfia's hand. Their four daughters subsequently infused the dynasties of three out of the four 'crusader states' with Armenian blood. Melisende, the eldest, became Baldwin II's heir, and after her marriage to Fulk V of Anjou in 1129 produced two sons, Baldwin and Amalric, who went on to rule the kingdom successively. Alice married Bohemond II of Antioch, and her daughter Constance made a dynastic alliance with the West to produce four children, including Bohemond III of Antioch (who later had to fend off Armenian attempts to interfere with the succession to his principality) and Maria (who became Empress of Constantinople). Morfia's daughter Hodierna married the Count of Tripoli, Raymond II. Although this dynastic branch was to end with their son, Raymond III, the relationship through the maternal line was sufficient to allow the son of Bohemond III of Antioch (also called Bohemond) to inherit the county, despite opposition from his nephew Raymond-Rupen.[42]

The success of Baldwin's match was not just measured in dynastic terms, however. Morfia's father provided a ready source of cash and military support during his time as Count of Edessa and King of Jerusalem. The dowry was 50,000 gold bezants, at the time 'a very large and very much needed sum of money',[43] and according to William of Tyre, Baldwin was able to extort yet more money from his father-in-law when stricken with poverty after his ransom from captivity. Deliberately playing on cultural differences, he reputedly claimed that he had pledged to shave off his beard if he could not pay his debts. William explained that all eastern Christians nurtured the beard and saw it as shameful and an insult if even one hair was plucked from it.[44] Shocked that Baldwin had been reduced to making such a pledge, and described as 'a simple man, and ignorant of their collusion', Gabriel decided to pay up rather than let a man he regarded as a son suffer dishonour.[45] William lauded the cunning of Baldwin's strategy and ridiculed eastern cultural practices, but the story emphasised how the ties created by marriage provided continuous support beyond a dowry alone; in this case at least until Gabriel was killed.[46]

The relationship between Baldwin II and Morfia appears to have been relatively stable until her death c.1126. There is no hint of mooted divorce for a wealthier or better-connected bride, despite Baldwin's move to Jerusalem and the lack of a male heir. She retained her position as queen and was present at her husband's coronation. In an episode which suggests a genuine attachment as well as signifying the queen's political agency, the Anonymous Syriac Chronicle specifically credited Morfia with masterminding a brave rescue attempt with Godfrey Almuin when her husband and Joscelin of Courtenay were in captivity at the hands of Balak. Several Armenians went in disguise to the castle, and once they had control of the gates killed the inhabitants and gained control of the fortress. As the news

spread, we are told, all the other Armenians in the town joined with them. Joscelin managed to break through the ring of Muslim defenders, but the king remained in the castle and on Balak's return was forced to hand it back. The Armenian ringleaders were tortured and flayed alive.[47]

These early marriages between crusaders and Armenians set a precedent for further links with established families who were respected by the crusaders as independent Christian aristocrats, rather than Syrian Jacobites, whom Jotischky asserts were seen as weak and corrupt after their years of subjection to the Muslims, or the Greeks, who, although fabulously wealthy, had ambitions of overlordship and were not to be trusted.[48] MacEvitt agrees that 'the Franks of Edessa perceived Armenian families as an avenue to bolster their own political standing, perhaps to a greater extent than their peers in Antioch, Jerusalem, or Tripoli did'.[49] Edessa, in Armenian lordship when the crusaders arrived, was secured by the Franks through a combination of warfare and dynastic alliance. Following the example of Baldwin of Bourcq, a number of his retinue entered into marriage with local Armenians. One of his cousins, Galeran of Le Puiset, married the daughter of Ablgharib, Lord of Bira, and was given the fief of Saruj.[50] Baldwin's cousin and successor Joscelin I of Edessa married Beatrice, a daughter of the Rupenid Konstandin (1093–1100). The date of this marriage is not certain, but it presumably took place before 1113, when her son Joscelin II was born, and when her husband lost Baldwin's favour and decamped for Jerusalem.[51] Joscelin had become ruler of Marash in 1104, and after returning to grace in 1118 became the third Count of Edessa. On the whole, he seems to have been a popular ruler with the Armenians, and had a great reputation as a skilled warrior.[52] On Joscelin's journey back to Edessa after his escape from imprisonment in 1123, Fulcher of Chartres recorded how an Armenian peasant and his family led the count to safety.[53] It seems that Joscelin may have taken a second Latin wife at some point after his capture, as the Anonymous Syriac Chronicle records him marrying the daughter (probably, in fact, the sister) of Roger of Salerno, Prince of Antioch, receiving with her the fortress of Azaz.[54]

Joscelin's wife Beatrice was sister to a powerful Rupenid prince, Leon I (Lord of the Mountains, 1129–39) and there is evidence to suggest he may have married a sister of Baldwin of Bourcq, securing dynastic alliances on both sides.[55] Rüdt-Collenberg refers to her as Beatrice/Cecilia of Rethel, and there seems to be some confusion over her exact identity. Contemporary sources confirm that Baldwin had a sister, usually named Cecilia, who married Roger of Salerno in 1109–10. According to Fulcher of Chartres, the marriage was not a good match, as he accused Roger of 'adultery with many others while married to his wife'.[56] Orderic Vitalis described how, as a widow following the Battle of the Field of Blood in 1119, Cecilia took on the trappings of lordship, knighting squires at Antioch in order to protect the city. However, he appears to have confused her with Cecilia of France, Tancred's widow, who subsequently married Pons of Tripoli.[57] Interestingly, the latter, too, had Armenian contacts. On the death of the great Armenian prince Kogh Vasil, among the gifts distributed to princes (including

Tancred), Cecilia of France was the recipient of his wife's diadem.[58] In any event, Asbridge suggests that Cecilia of Bourcq may have remarried after Roger's death, as a woman bearing the name is styled as 'Lady of Tarsus and sister of the king of Jerusalem' and described as holding lands in Cilicia in a charter of 1126.[59] He proposed that these lands may have been held in dower, or given to her by Baldwin II on a remarriage as part of the redistribution of land undertaken in the aftermath of the Field of Blood in 1119, but admits there is no direct evidence for this.[60]

If Cecilia of Bourcq was holding lands in Cilicia at this time, it is possible she was the aforementioned wife of Leon, although his own lordship was largely confined to eastern Cilicia during the rule of his brother Thoros I (Lord of the Mountains, 1102–29).[61] The wife taken into captivity along with Leon and their two sons by John Comnenus in 1137 is unlikely to have been Cecilia.[62] Three other sons, Stephane, Konstandin and Mleh, were reputedly sent to Joscelin of Edessa for protection because he was their maternal uncle. This suggests that they were progeny from a previous marriage: but the sources may have interpreted the relationship incorrectly, as they were also cousins to Joscelin.[63] Either Baldwin had one sister who married twice, whom he used in marriage policies in the Levant, or the sources are simply in error: unfortunately, the evidence is too slim to know for certain.

Joscelin II of Edessa was the first count of the region not to continue the trend of Armenian intermarriage. He married Beatrice, widow of William of Saône, possibly receiving Zardana as a result.[64] The marriage must have taken place after William's death in 1132 or 1133,[65] and it is possible that the previous alliance was not renewed as a result of recent conflict with Leon of Armenia. He was partly to blame for the death of Bohemond II of Antioch at Mamistra in 1130: Leon's raiding had enticed the prince out on campaign, although Turks struck the decisive blow. John Kinnamos suggests that directly after Bohemond's death the Antiochenes turned to Byzantium for a marriage alliance between the minor heiress, Constance, and the emperor's son, Manuel, but reneged on the deal and entered into an alliance with Leon instead.[66] By 1133 Leon had already captured Tarsus, Mamistra and Adana from the Franks although he did not hold them for long.[67] When Raymond of Poitiers arrived and married Constance in 1136, he coordinated an attack on Cilicia with Baldwin of Marash and troops lent by King Fulk of Jerusalem. Joscelin II, a supporter of Constance's mother Alice, sided with Leon against them but the union was short-lived. Leon was captured and took an oath of fealty to Raymond, promising to restore his Cilician conquests along with a ransom, although Lilie could ascertain no concrete evidence of him returning lands.[68] The situation took a further twist when Leon was removed from power and imprisoned by John Comnenus in 1137, dying in 1139. At that point Cilicia was almost under the complete control of the Byzantine Empire.[69]

The diplomacy of the Rupenid dynasty in this early twelfth-century period was therefore characterised by alternate attempts to support, pacify or pre-empt the aggression of encroaching Latins, with the aim of gaining independence from

Greek overlordship and crushing potential opposition from other ambitious nobles. After the fall of Edessa to Zengi in 1144, however, the power balance in the area was in flux, and with the escape of Thoros II (Lord of the Mountains, 1145–68) from Byzantine custody, the Rupenids set about building a more secure lordship. Thoros was keen to re-establish links with the Latins, marrying Isabelle of Courtenay in 1149.[70] Such a match was essential to the survival of the remaining Franks, especially when Joscelin II was taken captive in 1150. Beatrice of Edessa sold the majority of vestigial fortresses to the Byzantine Empire, but gave Hromkla to the Armenian Katholikos Grigor in 1150, which became the power-base of the katholikosate until 1292.[71] Both William of Tyre and Sempad praised her character as well as her ability as a ruler.[72]

Thoros was ambitious, and sought to extend his influence beyond northern Syria in Cyprus and Byzantium. He took part in Reynald of Châtillon's raid on the island in 1156 and after submitting himself to Manuel in 1157 fared rather better than his erstwhile ally, becoming governor of Cilicia.[73] Thoros came into contact with western Europeans when he joined the unsuccessful 1157 campaign against Shaizar alongside the crusader Thierry of Flanders.[74] He also influenced Antiochene affairs. Thoros' rebellious activities reputedly encouraged Emperor Manuel Comnenus to contemplate a marriage between Caesar John Roger and the widow, Constance of Antioch, in 1152.[75] Later, the Armenian baron helped the young Bohemond III to oust Constance from power and negotiated the prince's release after the Battle of Harim in 1164.[76] Thoros also married his daughter to Isaac Doukas Comnenus (d.1195), a Byzantine governor of Cilicia who later rebelled against the emperor and established himself as ruler of Cyprus.[77] It was later rumoured that Isaac murdered his Armenian wife for her pro-Latin sensibilities, although this was probably circulated in an attempt to justify the Lionheart's conquest of the island.[78] The Colbert-Fontainebleau Eracles asserts that Isaac's wife and daughter were taken captive by Richard and placed in the care of the Hospitallers, but this was probably a new wife from a marriage made c.1190, rather than his Armenian spouse.[79] Western sources for the Third Crusade portray Isaac as fond of his half-Armenian daughter,[80] but as his only heir, she was also an important pawn in Richard's hands after the conquest of Cyprus. She joined him on the crusade under the tutelage of Berengaria, with whom she was sent back to France. She married Raymond VI of Toulouse in 1199.[81] Isaac's daughter later returned to the Mediterranean, and was perhaps the first person of Armenian blood to press a dynastic claim to Cyprus in Syria at the court of Aimery of Lusignan, taking part in the Fourth Crusade with a new husband Thierry, probably an illegitimate son of Count Philip of Flanders.[82] She was, however, unsuccessful in her bid for power.

The Rupenid dynasty were not exclusively keen on intermarriage with the Latins, they seem to have followed a more entrepreneurial dynastic policy than some of the other ruling Armenian families in Cilicia, such as the Hethoumids. The latter entered into some Latin marriages but preferred links with other Armenian families. Interestingly, even though the Hethoumids of Lampron retained their ties with

Byzantium during this early period, they made no dynastic matches with the empire, whereas the Rupenids did.[83] Of the Rupenid barons and rulers, only Mleh (Lord of the Mountains, 1170–5), who usurped power from the minor Rupen II (Lord of the Mountains, 1168–70) on the death of Thoros II, did not marry at least once into a Latin settler family. He became infamous for his Muslim alliance with Nureddin, to the extent that certain Armenian sources suggest that he turned apostate and converted to Islam.[84] However, as Mutafian suggests, if that was the case, Armenian Katholikos Nerses Shnorhali would have been very unlikely to agree to a marriage between Mleh and his own niece.[85] It is also significant that while there seems to be a high proportion of marriages to Latins, the Rupenid rulers often married more than once, and made other alliances with Byzantines or Armenian Christians when it was politically expedient.

The later twelfth and early thirteenth centuries were a time of turmoil for the kingdom of Jerusalem and the 'crusader states', as they were increasingly caught in a vice between Egypt and Syria. For a brief period in the 1160s and 1170s, important nobles in the Levant looked to Byzantium for marriage alliances to help ensure their increasingly precarious position,[86] but with the Battle of Myriocephalum in 1176 and the death of Emperor Manuel in 1180, such links were no longer as efficacious as they had once been.[87] At that time, Bohemond III of Antioch reputedly incurred the wrath of both king and Church by putting aside his legitimate wife to marry an Armenian, 'a certain Sibyl . . . who, it is said, practised evil magics'. [88] Sybil was Bohemond's third wife, but there is some disagreement as to the order in which he married his first and second wives, Theodora Comnena and Orgueilleuse of Harim. Michael the Syrian, like William of Tyre, seems to date the repudiation of Theodora to 1180–1.[89] Lilie argued that Bohemond married Theodora after 1175, as Orgueilleuse appears in five documents between 1170 and 1175.[90] Most versions of *Lignages d'Outremer*, however, assert that he married Theodora first, putting her aside at the death of Manuel, and that his second wife was Orgueilleuse, followed by Sybil and finally Isabelle, cousin of Beatrice of Diaspre.[91] Rüdt-Collenberg concurs that the match with Theodora was more likely to have been entered into around the same time as Manuel married Maria of Antioch in 1160, and that Orgueilleuse, mother of princes Bohemond and Raymond, was his second marriage partner.[92] This idea is further supported by evidence from the Lyon Eracles, which asserted that Bohemond had married Sybil illegally as he already had another wife whom he had put aside, because she was poor and in debt: hardly a fitting description for a relative of the Byzantine emperor.[93]

Rüdt-Collenberg has given considerable attention to the background of Sybil based on evidence from a recension of the *Lignages d'Outremer* in two parts, the first covering the years up to 1398 by Pierre de Flory.[94] The Flory account is by no means definitive, but Rüdt-Collenberg argues convincingly that Sybil and a potential fourth wife, Isabelle (of Farabel), were in fact one and the same.[95] Sybil was a widow before marrying Bohemond and already had a son, a constable of Antioch.[96] She appears in nine documents between 1181 and 1199 as the wife or

princess of Bohemond; her sister was the wife of the Lord of Burzey.[97] As a result of this adulterous union, Bohemond was excommunicated. He took out his wrath on the patriarch and clergy, plundering church buildings and property, and an interdict was placed upon the whole principality. William of Tyre blamed Sibyl, his mistress, for leading the prince onto this path of greater evil, and a council at Latakia decreed that he must put aside his concubine and take back his legal wife to obtain absolution.[98]

Many of the Antiochene nobility were undoubtedly unhappy with Bohemond's actions but it cannot have been the Armenian character of the match that fuelled their resentment, nor potentially even Bohemond's treatment of the Church. It was only after matters had been nominally settled at the Council of Latakia that some of his most valued lords, including Giscard de L'Isle, Bertrand son of Count Gislebert and Garinus Gainart, were exiled because they disapproved of the prince's conduct. Interestingly, they took their service to Mleh's successor, the Armenian prince Rupen III (Lord of the Mountains, 1175–87), who provided generously for their support.[99] Perhaps William, outraged at the indignities suffered by the Church and writing about events in the recent past, was keen to find a simple explanation (or scapegoat) in order to gloss over more complex internal issues: potentially those caused by Bohemond putting aside a legitimate wife from the local baronage, Orgueilleuse. Rupen was a natural choice for these disgruntled vassals to approach: he had demonstrated his cordial attitude to the Latins by his visit to Jerusalem and marriage to Isabelle, daughter of Humphrey III of Toron, in 1181.[100] Relations with Kilij Arslan, the Turkish sultan, were very poor at this time, and Saladin had been persuaded to move into Cilicia, therefore Rupen needed the extra support. In 1183, however, Bohemond III lured Rupen to Antioch under false pretences and imprisoned him on behalf of the Byzantine emperor. Sempad asserted that Rupen had been tempted by sexual desire and had gone to Antioch to frequent with prostitutes, blaming the Armenian ruler's sins for his capture, but also indicating his opinion of Frankish corruption under Bohemond.[101]

The Lyon Eracles followed William of Tyre's lead: the fault lay with Sibyl, 'who was an evil woman'. She later betrayed Bohemond to Leon (Lord of the Mountains, 1187–98; I of Armenian Cilicia, 1198–1219), arranging his capture in order to gain Antioch for her own son William.[102] The continuator asserted that her expected reward was marriage to Leon, but Leon was already married at the time.[103] Sempad records that Leon had married Sybil's niece (Isabelle) in 1188, with the specific intention of protecting himself from any evil-doing by Bohemond.[104] Eracles thought Sybil was instrumental in persuading Bohemond to enjoy Leon's hospitality at the Springs of Baghras, where he was taken captive, allowing Leon to carry out an unsuccessful attempt to take control of Antioch.[105] Muslim sources asserted that Sybil was a spy for Saladin and corresponded with him, but Bohemond himself had fostered connections between the two by using her brother as an envoy.[106] Sempad took a rather more sympathetic approach, claiming that Bohemond, on his return from a visit to Saladin, had tried to enrol

Sybil in a plot to capture Leon. She was unwilling to comply and advised against the plan, pointing out the loyalty her son-in-law had shown to Bohemond, and the military aid he had provided. Rather than betraying her husband outright, she informed Leon of the plot, and the king used Bohemond's own stratagem against him, later imprisoning him at Sis.[107] Whatever Sybil's role in events, Bohemond did not put her aside after his release from capture, as she was still his wife in 1199.[108]

Bohemond's captivity resulted in further Armeno-Latin marriage alliances; potentially some of the most significant yet. When the new King of Jerusalem, Henry of Champagne, intervened on Bohemond's behalf, he established a pact of friendship with Leon, who arranged a marriage between one of his nieces, Alice (daughter of Rupen), and Raymond, the son of Bohemond III and Orgueilleuse of Harim. If the marriage produced a son, it was agreed that he would be Leon's heir, and after the death of Raymond he would rule Antioch itself. Thus, in one ambitious move, Leon was able to establish his vision of a united Cilician and Antiochene territory. Raymond remained in Leon's company, but as it turned out, he died not long after Alice fell pregnant, and the young Raymond-Rupen was nurtured as the heir to Leon's patrimony. [109]

Leon's attitude to dynastic politics was undoubtedly as aggressive as his expansionist activities elsewhere. Alice and her sister Philippa had previously been married to two brothers, Hethoum and Shahinshah, nephews of Katholikos Grigor. Both died in mysterious circumstances, and even Sempad recorded the rumours that Leon had poisoned them. Grigor had already fallen from favour, dying during a botched escape from a prison window, and the value of these marriage alliances had plummeted accordingly.[110] Leon was similarly ruthless in his own marital affairs. His wife, Isabelle of Antiochia, was accused of adultery with a cousin, Konstandin, son of Vasak, on the word of Katholikos Yohannes. Sempad suggests that Leon's reaction showed genuine emotion: he took revenge on her whole family, and reputedly struck her personally, wishing to kill her himself.[111] Kirakos de Ganjak, however, assigned a more pragmatic motive to the king: described as a man with a passion for women, Leon desired another bride and wanted a new match with the Cypriot Lusignans.[112] Isabelle died soon afterwards and was buried at Vahgka, potentially poisoned.[113] Leon then married Sybil, the daughter of Aimery of Lusignan, in 1210,[114] cementing relationships with the remnant of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem and Cyprus in one fell swoop. At the same time he arranged a marriage between Raymond-Rupen and Sybil's half-sister, Helvis of Ibelin.[115]

Leon's ambition to establish himself as a king may have come to fruition by 1198, but his designs on Antioch were, as yet, unfulfilled. On Bohemond III's death in 1201, the barons who had promised allegiance to Raymond-Rupen turned instead to Bohemond, son of Raymond III of Tripoli and soon to be Bohemond IV of Antioch. The ensuing civil war lasted well into the first half of the thirteenth century, fuelled by external as well as internal disputes.[116] The Templars had been aggrieved by the Armenian capture of Baghras after the Third

Crusade and were only too ready to support Bohemond's claim, while the Armenians had been patronising the Hospitallers and Teutonic knights in Cilicia to garner their support, fanning the flames of conflict between the orders.[117] The growing bond between Armenia and the Holy Roman Empire, evidenced by the latter's role in Leon's coronation of 1198, widened these political divisions. Traditions of succession were also at the heart of the dispute. Succession in Cilician Armenia was not clearly defined and could follow Latin patterns allowing inheritance through the female line, Arab customs of brothers before sons, ancient Armenian tradition based on the code of Mekhitar, or Greek customs which discounted rights of primogeniture or co-regency. It was, more often than not, a case of survival of the fittest as potential heirs were eliminated through natural or unnatural means, and it was not clear whether the crown itself was hereditary or elective.[118]

Raymond-Rupen's claim to Antioch was essentially a case of primogeniture and was supported by the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire, both of which had given credence to Leon's kingship. In contrast, Bohemond IV's claim to Tripoli came from the maternal line (through the relationship between Alice of Antioch and Hodierna of Tripoli), and because he was the younger brother of the deceased Raymond. The Armenians attempted to take Antioch several times, and finally Raymond-Rupen established himself there with the help of his father in 1216. Having provided thus for his grandson, Sempad asserts that Leon decided to make his daughter Zabel, who was probably not even five, his heir.[119] This suggests that despite his ambitions for Antiochene overlordship, Leon did not intend to join the titles to Antioch and Armenia: they were governed separately. Raymond-Rupen's success was short-lived, however, as the people of Antioch refused to accept him as a ruler. By 1219 he was expelled from the city, and he was assassinated in 1222. Alice, Raymond-Rupen's mother, had contested Zabel's inheritance of the Armenian title with her son, but after his death made a claim to the title of Toron through her mother, Isabelle, and later appeared in charters as Princess of Antioch and Dame of Toron.[120]

In the meantime, Leon extended his influence to the Latins in Jerusalem by arranging a match between his daughter Stephanie (Rita) and the newly widowed king-consort, John of Brienne.[121] The master of the Hospitallers helped to broker the marriage, which took place at Acre in 1214, according to Rüdt-Collenberg.[122] The second in a series of high-powered marriages made by John,[123] it attracted some criticism from contemporaries. He was accused of deserting the Fifth Crusade in order to pursue a claim to the Armenian crown when Leon died in 1219.[124] John certainly retired from Egypt to Acre around that time, but his claim foundered with the death of his wife and son shortly afterwards.[125] Ernoul described how John sent a group of knights to pursue his claim without success,[126] and how the ill-fated Raymond-Rupen also chanced his arm at the title,[127] but in the end it was Leon's daughter, Zabel, who inherited. Leon's marriage to Sybil, John's marriage to Stephanie, and earlier a proposed marriage between Leon's daughter Zabel and the son of King Andrew II of Hungary underlined the

newfound importance and heightened reputation of the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia in western eyes, now that Leon's regime had been bolstered by the support of the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire.[128]

Leon met Andrew as he returned home from the Fifth Crusade through Cilicia, and the marriage agreement he negotiated included an offer of the throne to Andrew's son. On his deathbed, Leon made his barons swear to uphold Zabel as heir and her consort as king. However, the Hungarian prince did not arrive to take up his position, and Zabel was given to Philip of Antioch, a younger son of Bohemond IV of Antioch-Tripoli around 1222.[129] In order to marry her, Philip had to join the Armenian Church, signifying the increased independence of the new Cilician kingdom. The match attempted to smooth over recent conflict and gave nominal acceptance to Bohemond IV's title, but it did not provide lasting peace. The Armenian princes reputedly took offence at Philip's high-handed ways. Sempad accused him of tyrannical behaviour and despoiling Leon's wealth to take to Antioch. Philip was given over to the custody of the Teutonic knights at Amudain in 1225 and then eliminated, which Sempad claims was in the interests of peace.[130] Cahen, however, asserts that as a result of his murder, a state of almost constant warfare existed between the Antiochenes and Cilicia until at least 1250.[131] Zabel was subsequently married to an Armenian (Hethoum I, son of Konstandin). This match heralded the important union between the Rupenids and Hethoumids and attempted to provide dynastic stability within the kingdom, but it was not universally acclaimed. Zabel apparently tried to escape, leaving against the wishes of the king to visit her mother (Sybil) who was in a Hospitaller fortress at Seleukia. Her father-in law Konstandin came after her, and rather than cause further contention the Hospitallers handed over their fortress to the Armenians, along with the queen.[132] Cahen upholds the notion that this was a forced marriage, asserting that it was probably not given ecclesiastical sanction until 1240.[133] After this episode, however, Zabel bore Hethoum three sons – Leon, Thoros and Rupen – as well as five daughters.[134]

At this point, the royal line seemed secure, but gradually the Mongols were bringing more pressure to bear on the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia. In 1253, Hethoum made the journey to visit Mongke Khan, during which he placed the kingdom under Mongol suzerainty. Marriage alliances with the Latins continued, but as their power waned in the area to the south so the Armenians concentrated their attention in northern Syria or looked elsewhere for alliances, especially to the Lusignans of Cyprus.[135] One of the more significant marriages to take place in Hethoum's reign was that of his daughter Euphemie, who married Julian of Sidon, famous for supposedly losing his patrimony in a game of dice that resulted in its sale to the Templars.[136] A further daughter, Sybil, married Bohemond VI of Antioch in 1254, probably after Louis IX had helped to mediate the dispute between the latter and his mother, Lucienne of Segni, while he was encamped at Jaffa.[137] Joinville does not explicitly mention the marriage, but it was an important part of the transition to adulthood and would have supported the young prince's case in his bid for power. Even before the marriage Bohemond seems

to have favoured Armenian contacts. Joinville also recorded how he brought three Armenian pilgrims with him to Louis's court; they were also musicians and tumblers of consummate skill.[138] Bohemond's marriage to Sybil tied him into Hethoum's Mongol alliance, but he earned excommunication for his pains when the Mongols forced him to introduce a Greek patriarch, Euthymios, to the city of Antioch. The city itself – and most of the principality – had fallen by 1268. Bohemond VI struggled on until 1275, while his young son Bohemond VII was brought up in relative safety by his Armenian family in Cilicia. Sybil had a brief stint as regent during the next two years. She installed Bartholomew, the Bishop of Tortosa, as governor of Tripoli. He was an unpopular choice and the decision provoked civil unrest until Bohemond VII was old enough to inherit in 1277. On her son's death in 1287 Sibyl was not deemed suitable to hold the reins of power. The people of Tripoli argued that she was too grief-stricken to manage the city effectively, and when she recalled the Bishop of Tortosa they rebelled and formed an independent commune.[139] In 1288, her daughter Lucienne of Apulia made a bid for the title supported by her husband Narjot III of Toucy and the Hospitallers of Acre, in the face of opposition from the commune and the Genoese. A peace was negotiated but one year later her claim became a moot point when the city fell to Sultan al-Malik al-Mansur. She escaped with her mother, Sybil of Armenia, and Margaret of Antioch-Lusignan.[140]

Intermarriage between Armenian Christians and Latin newcomers was not just a feature of an initial 'phase' enabling crusader settlement, but a continuing practice that had increasingly significant effects as the power balance shifted in the Near East. Dynastic matches between Latins and Armenians were concentrated in northern Syria and had the most immediate impact there, but the political ramifications of those links spread to the rest of the Levant, and even to Europe as the Armenians of Cilicia became players on the European diplomatic stage during the later twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. In subsequent years their role in the Mediterranean became even more pronounced as intermarriage with the Lusignan dynasty cemented their position in Cyprus. Marriage alliances helped to secure good relations to a point, but relied on the successful fulfilment of terms, the proper behaviour of marriage spouses, and provision for the succession. In the case of the latter, the willingness of the nobility to support candidates was essential, but so was the elimination of potential competition, as Rüdt-Collenberg suggests.[141]

Marriage was a dangerous game, in which the players were not above sacrificing the occasional dynastic 'pawn' when it suited them. There is little doubt that initial dynastic alliances benefited crusaders in their early attempts to settle northern Syria and allowed Armenian lords to secure their position in the face of threats from Byzantium and from Seljuk Turks, but only with varying degrees of success. The settlers lost Edessa not long after Cilicia was briefly consumed by the Byzantine Empire under John Comnenus. As tensions between settler groups became more pronounced in the later twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, marital alliances with the increasingly powerful Armenians were insufficient to the

task of providing stable political regimes for society in northern Syria. During this period the rulers of Armenian Cilicia fostered a degree of political unity and successfully maintained their protected mountain fortresses, but they were unable to extend that power. Cilicia remained an enticing strategic goal for ambitious Antiochenes, Mongols and Mamluks alike. In the worst circumstances, an unsuccessful or overly ambitious dynastic policy such as that of Leon I only narrowly avoided severe consequences. The succession he envisaged was compromised because neither Latin nor Armenian society was willing to accept the suzerainty of the other. The resulting civil war drained resources on both sides, which damaged the chances of Latin and Armenian survival in the Levant and stimulated further discord among the divergent Christian groups struggling to coexist in the Holy Land during the thirteenth century.

Notes

1 Communities of Nestorians, Maronites and Melkites also existed and developed throughout the Latin East. See Christopher MacEvitt, *The Crusades and the Christian World of the East: Rough Tolerance*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008, pp. 7–12 and 29–39.

2 See especially Claude Mutafian, 'Prélats ou souverains arméniens à Jérusalem à l'époque des croisades: légendes et certitudes (XIIe–XVe siècle)', *Studia Orientalia Christiana – Collecteana* 37, 2004, 114–21. My thanks to Professor Mutafian for allowing me to view his forthcoming publication 'Les princesses arméniennes et le Liban latin (XIIe–XIIIe siècle)' from conference proceedings to be published by the Haigazian University of Beirut. See also Bernard Hamilton, 'Women in the Crusader States: The Queens of Jerusalem (1100–1190)', in Derek Baker (ed.), *Medieval Women*, London: Blackwell, 1978, pp. 143–74. Among others, Melisende has drawn particular attention because of her patronage of local Christian institutions, including Melkite and Jacobite communities. See Mutafian, 'Les princesses arméniennes' and MacEvitt, *Crusades and the Christian World*, pp. 122, 214 n. 90. Interrelations between Armenians and Cypriots have also been given significant consideration in Peter Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades 1191–1374*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Perhaps the most comprehensive work on the complex dynastic relationships entered into by the leading Armenian families of Cicilia is W.H. Rüdt-Collenberg, *The Rupenides, Hethumides and Lusignans: The Structure of the Armeno Cilician Dynasties*, Paris: Libraire C. Klincksieck, 1963.

3 Claude Mutafian, 'The Brilliant Diplomacy of Cilician Armenia', in R.G. Hovannisian and Simon Payaslian (eds), *Armenian Cilicia*, Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2008, pp. 93–110.

4 Mutafian, 'Brilliant Diplomacy', p. 94. Sempad was recorded as having a second bigamous marriage to a Mongol princess, Bkhatakhavor, whom Rüdt-Collenberg suggests was 'assigned' to him. Rüdt-Collenberg, *The Rupenides, Hethumides and Lusignans*, pp. 13, 64.

5 Most comprehensive studies on Armenian history devote a chapter or considerable attention to Cilicia during the crusader period. For example, see Ani Atamian Bournoutian, 'Cilician Armenia', in R.G. Hovannisian (ed.), *Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Volume I: The Dynastic Periods: From Antiquity to the Fourteenth Century*, New York: St Martin's Press, 2004, pp. 273–91; David Marshall Lang, *Armenia: Cradle of Civilisation*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970, pp. 200–11; Sirarpie der Nersessian, *The Armenians*, London: Thames and Hudson,

1969, pp. 44–53. See also Jospeh Laurent, 'Les Croisés et l'Armenie', *Handes Amsorya* 41, 1927, 885–906.

6 T.S. Boase, 'The History of the Kingdom', in T.S. Boase (ed.), *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia*, Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1978, p. 1.

7 For example, see R.G. Hosvannien 'Introduction', in R.G. Hovannisian (ed.), *Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times*, I.x.

8 For examples see Peter Lock, *The Routledge Companion to the Crusades*, Oxford: Routledge, 2006, pp. 375–82, and MacEvitt, *Crusades and the Christian World*.

9 J.H. Forse, 'Armenians and the First Crusade', *Journal of Medieval History* 17, 1991, 13–22.

10 R.W. Thomson, 'The Crusaders through Armenian Eyes', in A.E. Laiou and R.P. Mottahedeh (eds), *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World*, Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 2001, pp. 71–82, here 72–4.

11 Translations of sources into French and English, however, have done much to further scholarship in this area, e.g. those arising from *RHC Arm.*

12 See R.H. Hewsen, 'Armenia Maritima: The Historical Geography of Cilicia', in Hovannisian and Payaslian (eds), *Armenian Cilicia*, pp. 27–65, and Claude Mutafian, *La Cilicie au Carrefour des empires*, 2, Paris: Les Belles Lettes, 1988, I.22, who suggests that it was these precise geographical attributes which allowed Cilicia to establish and maintain a lasting independence.

13 For example, see Boase (ed.), *Cilician Kingdom of Armenia*, *passim*. For new perspectives on the role of fortifications, see R.W. Edwards, *Fortifications of Armenian Cilicia*, Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 1987, and R.W. Edwards, 'The Role of Military Architecture in Medieval Cilicia: The Triumph of a Non-Urban Strategy', in Hovannisian and Payaslian (eds), *Cilician Armenia*, pp. 153–220. The Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights gained particular significance in Cilician Armenia following the conflict with the Templars over Baghras after the Third Crusade. For a further early overview of the development of the kingdom, see Sirarpie der Nersessian, 'The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia', in K.M. Setton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, 6, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89, II.630–95.

14 For examples from this period, see Mutafian, *La Cilicie*, and a more popularised account in Claude Mustafian, *Le royaume arménien de Cilicie: XIIe–XIVe siècle*, Paris: CNRS Editions, c.1993.

15 J.G. Ghazarian, *The Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia during the Crusades*, Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000.

16 Gérard Dédéyans, *Les Arméniens entre Grecs, Musulmans et Croisés: études sur les pouvoirs arméniens dans la Proche-Orient méditerranéen (1068–1150)*, *Vol. I: Aux origins de l'état cilicien: Philarète et les premiers roubeniens*, *Vol. II: De l'Euphrate au Nil: le réseau diasporique*, Lisbon: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 2003. See also Gérard Dédéyan, *Histoire du peuple armenien*, Toulouse: Éditions Privat, 2007, pp. 327–75 for a series of essays on Cilicia at the time of the crusades.

17 Hovannisian and Payaslian (eds), *Armenian Cilicia*.

18 Claude Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des croisades et la principauté d'Antioche*, Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1940.

19 For a detailed discussion, see Peter Halfter, 'Papacy, Catholicosate and the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia', in Hovannisian and Payaslian (eds), *Armenian Cilicia*, pp. 111–33.

20 The changing role of the Armenian kingdom in the later part of the Hethoumid period has been discussed in detail by Angus Stewart, *The Armenian Kingdom and the Mamluks: War and Diplomacy during the Reigns of Het'um II (1289–1307)*, Leiden: Brill, 2001. See also Mutafian, *La Cilicie*, I.421–75.

21 MacEvitt, *Crusades and the Christian World*, pp. 77–8.

22 Rüdt-Collenberg, *Rupenids, Hethumides and Lusignans*, pp. 12–21.

23 MacEvitt, *Crusades and the Christian World*, pp. 77–8. Fulcher of Chartres famously commented on such intermarriage, but only mentioned marriage to Muslims as requiring the grace of baptism. FC 748.
24 Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem 1174–1277*, London: Archon Books, 1973, p. 133.
25 B.Z. Kedar, 'On the Origins of the Earliest Laws of Frankish Jerusalem: The Canons of the Council of Nablus, 1120', *Speculum* 74, 2, April 1999, 310–35.
26 A.V. Murray, 'Daimbert of Pisa, the Domus Godefridi and the Accession of Baldwin I of Jerusalem', in A.V. Murray (ed.), *From Clermont to Jerusalem: The Crusades and Crusader Societies, 1095–1500: Selected Proceedings of the International Medieval Congress, University of Leeds, 10–13 July 1995*, Turnhout: Brepols, 1998, pp. 81–102, at p. 87.
27 Hagenmeyer notes that she is referred to as Arda, but there is no contemporary authority for her name: FC 422, n. 7. See also Hamilton, 'Women', p. 144.
28 AA 188–9.
29 He only mentions Arda's reinstatement: FC 601. For a discussion, see H.E. Mayer, 'Études sur l'histoire de Baudouin Ier Roi de Jérusalem', in H.E. Mayer (ed.), *Melanges sur L'Histoire du Royaume Latin de Jérusalem*, Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1984, pp. 10–91, 53–4; Hamilton, 'Women', p. 145. The marriage is also absent from the chronicle of Armenian Matthew of Edessa. He may have been unaware of the connection, or too much shame may have been attached to the divorce, or he may simply have seen little political significance in the marriage. He was critical of both Baldwin I and II for their activities in Edessa, thus it seems unlikely he would have missed an opportunity to highlight the mistreatment of an Armenian wife.
30 GN 349.
31 AA 188–9.
32 AA 360–1. See also WT 350. Albert agreed that the marriage to Adelaide was unlawful and unjust: AA 860–1. See also Mayer, 'Baudouin Ier', pp. 56–7.
33 AA 646–7; FC 421.
34 WT 495–6. See also Natasha Hodgson, *Women, Crusading and the Holy Land in Historical Narrative*, Woodbridge: Boydell, 2007, pp. 122, 141–3, 148.
35 He records that she may have dishonoured her marriage vows, but asserted that after she was given permission to leave the convent for Constantinople she gave herself over to prostitution: WT 496. At least five years elapsed between Baldwin's divorce from Arda and his marriage to Adelaide.
36 Hodgson, *Women, Crusading and the Holy Land*, pp. 209–10.
37 For a discussion of the name and location of Baldwin II's family, see A.V. Murray, 'Kingship, Identity and Name-Giving in the Family of Baldwin of Bourcq', in Norman Housley (ed.), *Knighthoods of Christ: Essays on the History of the Crusades and the Knights Templar Presented to Malcolm Barber*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, pp. 27–38.
38 WT 482. Both Bar Hebraeus and Michael the Syrian criticise him for his religious persuasion; Dostourian discusses their opinions in ME 329–30.
39 Jean-Baptiste Chabot (ed.), *Anonymi Auctoris Chronicon Ad Annum Christi 1234 Pertinens, II, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium 82 (37)*, Paris: Typographeo Reipublicae, 1916; Albert Abouna and J.M. Fiey (trs), *Anonymi Auctoris Chronicon Ad Annum Christi 1234 Pertinens, II, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium 354 (154)*, Louvain: Imprimerie Orientaliste, 1974, pp. 45–6. (Henceforth Anon. Syriac Chronicle.) The author was probably a Jacobite priest or monk from Edessa who had access to monastic records. He also appears to have used a lost account written by Basil bar Shumana, who was Jacobite Archbishop of Edessa, experiencing and surviving the Turkish conquest of the city in 1144 to die in 1171. See MacEvitt, *Crusades and the Christian World*, p. 52.

40 ME 134, 176. FC 344–46. Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, Jean-Baptiste Chabot (ed. and tr.), 4, Paris: Leroux, 1905, III.188.
41 Thomas Asbridge, *The Creation of the Principality of Antioch 1098–1130*, Woodbridge: Boydell, 2000, p. 51.
42 For further details about the political roles of Baldwin's daughters, see Hodgson, *Women Crusading and the Holy Land*, *passim*.
43 WT 482.
44 WT 511: 'Mos enim est Orientalibus, tam Grecis quam aliis nationibus, barbas tota cura et omni sollicitudine nutrire, pro summoque probo et maiori que unquam irrogari possit ignominia reputare, si vel unus pilus quocumque casu sibi barba cum inuria detrahatur.'
45 WT 512.
46 Gabriel died some time after Melitene was captured by the Danishmends in 1102. Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, p. 232; Anon. Syriac Chronicle 47. The latter places his death in 1103.
47 Anon. Syriac Chronicle 67–8. The story was also told by Fulcher of Chartres, William of Tyre and Matthew of Edessa. For a more detailed account, see Y.N. Harari, *Special Operations in the Ages of Chivalry 1100–1550*, Woodbridge: Boydell, 2007, pp. 74–90.
48 Andrew Jotischky, *Crusading and the Crusader States*: *Recovering the Past*, London: Longman, 2004, p. 125.
49 MacEvitt, *Crusades and the Christian World*, pp. 77–8.
50 See ME 220–1 for the war on the Lord of Bira. For the marriage, see Anon. Syriac Chronicle 59. Saruj was a centre for trade and strategically important for protecting Edessa, populated by Arabs and Syriac Christians. Dédéyans, *Les Arméniens entre Grecs, Musulmans et Croisés*, II.1207.
51 WT 635. Chahin asserts that the marriage took place in celebration of the successful siege of Antioch at the same time as Baldwin of Boulogne married 'Arda' but neither Baldwin or Joscelin was present at the siege, the latter only arriving in the Holy Land in 1101. He also asserts that Joscelin married Maria of Salerno some time before 1119, but most others place this marriage after his captivity (see n. 54 below). M. Chahin, *The Kingdom of Armenia: A History*, Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001, p. 244. For the birth of Joscelin II as 1113, see Anon. Syriac Chronicle 58.
52 See MacEvitt, *Crusades and the Christian World*, pp. 92–4. The Anon. Syriac Chronicle was particularly fulsome in the praise of his exploits, and reported that Joscelin was asked to put on a display of his skills for the Muslim governor of Mosul, Jawali. Anon. Syriac Chronicle 53.
53 FC 683–6. According to Orderic Vitalis, the peasant was a Saracen, who later received baptism and whose daughter was betrothed to a Christian knight. OV VI.114–7.
54 Anon. Syriac Chronicle 64–5, places the marriage just before Joscelin's capture in 1123. See also Dédéyans, *Les Arméniens entre Grecs, Musulmans et Croisés*, p. 495. Asbridge, *Creation of the Principality of Antioch*, p. 149 records that this was Roger of Salerno's sister, following Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, pp. 539–40, who gives no source but cites the name Marie. He identified her with the wife of Guy Carpenal, Lord of Mamistra and Tarsus in a charter issued before 1114 by her husband: 'Chartes de l'abbaye de Notre-Dame de la vallée de Josaphat en terre-sainte 1108–1291', *Revue d'Orient Latin* 7, 1900, 108–222, no. 4, pp. 115–16. If she was old enough to be married and to witness a charter in 1114, it stands to reason that she was in fact the daughter of Richard of Salerno, who died during the First Crusade, rather than his son Roger. Orderic Vitalis, however, suggests that a Greek envoy had requested the hand of a daughter of Roger for John Comnenus, and there is some corroborative evidence of a Greek embassy in 1119. OV VI.129–31, Kemal ad-Din, *RHC Or.* III.622; Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, pp. 281–2. When the regency of Antioch passed to Baldwin II, apparently a Greek match was also discussed with one of his daughters. Cahen is

suspicious of Orderic's evidence here, especially as John Comnenus may have already been married to Piroshka/Irene of Hungary. JK I.4; Anon. Syriac Chronicle 63. Ultimately, if there had been a female heir to Antioch, even with the controversy over Roger's princely status, she might have been a significant pawn in the wake of the Field of Blood in 1119 and is therefore unlikely to have escaped the notice of historians. See also Asbridge, *Creation of the Principality of Antioch*, pp. 139–43.

55 MacEvitt asserts that Orderic Vitalis, who described Leon as Alice of Antioch's uncle, was the only primary source for this information and treats it as suspect, but Rüdt-Collenberg supports the idea (*The Rupenides, Hethumides and Lusignans*, pp. 49–50), as does Gérard Dédéyan ('The Founding and Coalescence of the Rubenian Principality, 1073–1129', in Hosvannisien and Payaslian (eds), *Armenian Cilicia*, pp. 69–92, and *Les Arméniens entre Grecs, Musulmans et Croisés* I.413, 502, 515). Beatrice may have been an honorary name taken on marriage.

56 FC 622–3. See also Anon. Syriac Chronicle 58, who placed the marriage not long before Joscelin II's birth in 1113.

57 OV VI.108.

58 ME 212. This may have been part of Kogh Vasil's will, or an attempt by his heir Dgha Vasil to establish himself. Asbridge, *Creation of the Principality of Antioch*, p. 67.

59 'Chartes de l'abbaye de Notre-Dame', no. 13, p. 123.

60 Asbridge, *Creation of the Principality of Antioch*, pp. 145–6, 157–9.

61 According to Dédéyan, he ruled over sizeable areas from the Marash Pass in the north-east to the Amanus Gates in the south-west. Dédéyan, 'Founding and Coalescence', pp. 86–7.

62 Thoros and Rupen. The latter died in captivity. Sempad the Constable, 'Chronique du Royaume de la Petite Arménie', RHC *Arm.* I.617. Poem de Hethoum II mentions other sons, Thoros, Stephan and Mleh: *RHC Arm.* I.551, as does Vahran of Edessa, *Chronique rimée des rois de la petite Arménie*, *RHC Arm.* I.501 and n. 1 (only Mleh and Stephan are mentioned here).

63 Through the marriage of Leon's sister Beatrice to Joscelin.

64 William inherited from his father Robert Fitz-Fulk the Leper after the latter's capture and death c.1119. See Asbridge, *Creation of the Principality of Antioch*, pp. 159–61.

65 One of William's last acts was to support Alice of Antioch's bid for power, and he may have died in a Muslim attack on Zardana. Asbridge, *Creation of the Principality of Antioch*, p. 160.

66 JK 22. See also Hodgson, *Women, Crusading and the Holy Land*, pp. 84–5.

67 Sempad, 'Chronique', I.615; Anon. Syriac Chronicle 81.

68 Gregory the Priest, 'Continuation', in ME 152; Sempad, 'Chronique', I.616; Ralph-Johannes Lilie, *Byzantium and the Crusader States 1096–1204*, J.C. Morris and J.E. Ridings (tr.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 106. Lilie could find no evidence of a Franco-Armenian alliance against John Comnenus's march through Cilicia in 1137. Lilie, *Byzantium*, p. 118, n. 89.

69 Michael the Syrian III.245. According to Choniates, Leon's goal had been to subjugate Seleucia. NC 14.

70 Michael the Syrian asserts that this was the daughter of Simon of Raban, but Rüdt-Collenberg points out that his lordship was in Joscelin's hands by 1149. Rüdt-Collenberg, *The Rupenides, Hethumides and Lusignans*, p. 50; Michael the Syrian III.281–2.

71 WT 781–2; Sempad, 'Chronique', I.618.

72 WT 777; Sempad, 'Chronique', I.618. See also Hodgson, *Women, Crusading and the Holy Land*, pp. 150, 213, 229.

73 JK 138–9, 142.

74 Anon. Syriac Chronicle 118.

75 JK 96–8. This marriage did not take place, and Constance went on to marry Reynald of Châtillon. See also Hodgson, *Women, Crusading and the Holy Land*, pp. 221–24.
76 Michael the Syrian III.324, 326. See also Hodgson, *Women, Crusading and the Holy Land*, pp. 223–4.
77 *La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr 1184–1197*, M.R. Morgan (ed.), Paris: Librairie orientaliste P. Geuthner, 1982, p. 115. NC 376.
78 RH I.261. Niketas Choniates supports Isaac's reputation as a ruthless murderer and rapist, but does not mention his Armenian wife, and viewed him as a rebel and despoiler of Byzantine property. NC 161.
79 'L'Estoire de Eracles Empereur', *RHC Oc.* II.163–9; Rüdt-Collenberg, *The Rupenides, Hethumides and Lusignans*, pp. 19, 51.
80 *Itinerarium peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, in *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I*, William Stubbs (ed.), 2, Rolls Series 38, London: Longman, 1864, I.202.
81 *La Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier*, Louis de Mas Latrie (ed.), Paris: Vve de J. Renouard, 1871, p. 269 (henceforth Ernoul) and RH III.228. She was Raymond's fourth wife, following his short-lived marriage to Joanna of Sicily.
82 Sabine Geldsetzer, *Frauen auf Kreuzzügen 1096–1291*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003, p. 191. Ernoul 352–3. 'Estoire de Eracles', *RHC Oc.* II.256–7. See also Peter Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades 1191–1374*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 10.
83 Rüdt-Collenberg, *The Rupenides, Hethumides and Lusignans*, p. 33.
84 See Mutafian, *La Cilicie*, I.400–2. For an Armenian account of Mleh's rule and relationship with Nureddin, see *La Chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat*, Gérard Dédéyan (ed. and tr.), Paris: P. Geuthner, 1980, pp. 53–6. According to Ibn Al-Athir, Nureddin faced criticism for enfeoffing a Christian with Islamic lands, but defended his actions by arguing that Mleh's antipathy for his co-religionists meant that he could rest his army, which would be ready to fight him if he decided to start raiding against Muslims. Ibn Al-Athir, *Extrait du Kamel-Altevarykh*, *RHC Or.* I.588.
85 Mutafian, 'Brilliant Diplomacy', 97. For the marriage, see Anon. Syriac Chronicle 133. After Mleh's assassination her brother Grigor sent her to safety and she was provided for by Rupen.
86 Jonathan Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land: Relations between the Latin East and West 1119–1187*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, pp. 101–67; Hodgson, *Women, Crusading and the Holy Land*, pp. 87–95.
87 Lilie, *Byzantium*, p. 214.
88 WT 1012.
89 Michael the Syrian III.389.
90 Lilie, *Byzantium*, p. 215. *Regesta Regni* 478, 493, 511, 523, 524.
91 *Lignages d'Outremer*, *RHC Lois* II.446; M.E. Nielen (ed.), *Lignages d'Outremer*, Paris: Académie des inscriptions et belles letters, 2003, pp. 83, 93, 144, 173.
92 Michael the Syrian III.389. W.H. Rüdt-Collenberg, 'A Fragmentary Copy of an Unknown Recension of the "Lignages d'Outre-Mer" in the Vatican Library', *EHR* 98, 387, April 1983, 311–27.
93 *La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr*, p. 165.
94 Vaticanus Latinus 7806 A. See Nielen, *Lignages d'Outremer*, pp. 153–74 and Rüdt-Collenberg, 'A Fragmentary Copy'.
95 Rey identified the Isabelle referred to in a letter by Innocent III in 1199 as a fourth new bride but there is also a charter referring to Sybil in that year: the similarity in name suggests they could be the same person. Emmanuel Rey, 'Histoire des princes d'Antioche', *Revue d'Orient Latin* 4, 1896, 321–407, at 381–2; *Lignages d'Outremer*, *RHC Lois* II.446; *Regesta Regni* 753, I.200.
96 See Rüdt-Collenberg, 'A Fragmentary Copy', 313–319, 324.

97 *Regesta Regni* 610, 629, 648, 649, 657c, 680, 689, 695, 753; *Fath*, p. 139; Abu Shama, *Le Livre des Deux jardins*, *RHC Or.* IV.373–4.
98 WT 1012, 1016.
99 WT 1013–15. Mleh was murdered in 1075, and Rupen spent a considerable part of his reign in captivity, retiring to a monastery in 1187 and dying in 1188.
100 *Chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat*, pp. 57–8. They had a child, Alice of Armenia, whose claim to Toron was upheld aganst Frederick II's attempts to turn it over to the Teutonic Order. See also Bernard Hamilton, 'King Consorts of Jerusalem and Their Entourages from the West from 1186–1250', in H.E. Mayer (ed.), *Die Kreuzfahrerstaten als multikulturelle Geselschaft*, *Schriften des Historischen Kollegs Kolloquien*, Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 1997, XXXVII.13–24.
101 *Chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat*, p. 57.
102 *La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr*, p. 165. The Florentine continuation agrees with her duplicitous role, p. 164, but this aspect of the story is not so prominent in the abridged account given by the Colbert-Fontainebleau Eracles: 'L'Estoire de Eracles Empereur', *RHC Oc.* II.214.
103 Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, pp. 582–3 n. 3.
104 *Chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat*, p. 65. Der Nersessian asserts that this actually took place in 1189, the same year as the marriages of his two nieces, Alice and Philippa, to the brothers Hethoum and Shahinshah of Sassoun. Sirape der Nersessian, 'The Armenian Chronicle of the Constable Smpad or of the Royal Historian', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 13, 1959, 143–68, at 153. See also Mutafian, *La Cilicie*, I.409.
105 *La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr*, pp. 165–9.
106 *Fath*, p. 139; Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, p. 430.
107 *Chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat*, p. 68.
108 See n. 95, above.
109 *Chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat*, pp. 71–2. Given Leon's reputation as a poisoner, it is tempting to suggest that he had a hand in Raymond's fate, but at a time of high infant mortality he would have been taking a serious risk without securing the presence of a healthy male child first.
110 *Chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat*, pp. 65, 69–71.
111 *Chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat*, p. 84.
112 Kirakos de Ganjak, *Extrait de l'histoire d'Arménie*, *RHC Arm.* I.424–5.
113 Rüdt-Collenberg, *The Rupenides, Hethumides and Lusignans*, p. 53.
114 'Estoire de Eracles', *RHC Oc.* II.305. Good relations had been established between Aimery and Leon when the latter rescued Aimery's wife Eschiva of Ibelin and their children from a kidnapping in Cyprus. *La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr*, pp. 163–5.
115 *Chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat*, pp. 87–8.
116 For an overview of events, see Mutafian, *La Cilicie*, I.413–14.
117 For a description of the fortress and its history, see A.W. Lawrence, 'The Castle of Baghras', in Boase (ed.), *Cilician Kingdom*, pp. 34–83. For a recent interpretation of these events in the context of the Teutonic knights, see Nicholas Morton, *The Teutonic Knights in the Holy Land, 1190–1291*, Woodbridge: Boydell, 2009, pp. 55–9.
118 Rüdt-Collenberg, *The Rupenides, Hethumides and Lusignans*, pp. 27–9.
119 *Chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat*, pp. 89–90. Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, p. 631.
120 For further detail, see Mutafian, 'Les princesses arméniennes'.
121 *Regesta Regni* 873 I.236. John married Maria of Jerusalem in 1210. She died in 1212 after producing a female heir, Isabella.
122 Most sources place the marriage in 1213. *La Chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat*, p. 89; Ernoul, p. 411; Rüdt-Collenberg, *The Rupenides, Hethumides and Lusignans*, p. 55. A further match between a niece (or sister) of Leon, Dolete and Bertrand of

Gibelet, is mentioned in the *Lignages D'Outremer*. See Mutafian, 'Les princesses arméniennes'; Nielen, *Lignages d'Outremer*, p. 115.

123 He later married the sister of Ferdinand III of Castile in 1224.

124 Oliver of Paderborn accused him of making excuses, and James of Vitry called him a deserter. Oliverus Scholasticus, *Die Schriften des kölner Domscholasters, späteren Bischofs von Paderborn und Kardinal Bishofs von S. Sabina*, Hermann Hoogeweg (ed.), Tübingen: Litterarischer Verein in Stuttgart, 1894, chs 43 and 45. *Lettres de Jacques de Vitry*, R.B.C. Huygens (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 1960, p. 135. See also J.M. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986, pp. 176–7.

125 'Estoire de Eracles', *RHC Oc.* II.349 There were rumours of Stephanie's ill-treatment at John's hands, but it seems unlikely that he would sabotage his own claim so effectively. See Rüdt-Collenberg, *The Rupenides, Hethumides and Lusignans*, p. 19.

126 Ernoul, p. 427.

127 Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, p. 631.

128 For the rapprochement between the Armenian Church and the papacy, see Bernard Hamilton, *The Latin Church in the Crusader States: The Secular Church*, London: Variorum, 1980, pp. 204–7.

129 *Chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat*, pp. 90–96.

130 *Chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat*, pp. 95–6. See also Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, pp. 631–5.

131 Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, pp. 398–9.

132 *Chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat*, p. 96.

133 Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord*, p. 635 and n. 14.

134 *Chronique du royaume de la petite Arménie par le connétable Sempad*, *RHC Arm.* I.648. This information comes from a later redaction of the text not included in Dédéyan's edition. For more information on the relationship between the texts, see der Nercessian, 'The Armenian Chronicle', pp. 141–68.

135 Hethoum's brother Leon was due to make a marriage alliance in Cyprus, but died before making the voyage. *Chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat*, p. 102.

136 *Chronique attribuée au connétable Smbat*, pp. 96–7.

137 For further detail on these later matches, and progeny of other marriages such as Marie, Dame of Tyre and Toron, see Mutafian, 'Les princesses arméniennes'.

138 John of Joinville, *Historie de Sainte Louis, Credo et Lettre a Louis X*, Natalis de Wailly (ed. and tr.), Paris: Renouard, 1874, p. 286.

139 'Les Gestes des Chiprois', *RHC Arm.* II.780.

140 'Les Gestes des Chiprois', *RHC Arm.* II.801–3.

141 Rüdt-Collenberg, *The Rupenides, Hethumides and Lusignans*, pp. 28–9.

5

NATIONAL IDENTITY, LANGUAGE AND CONFLICT IN THE CRUSADES TO THE HOLY LAND, 1096–1192[1]

Alan V. Murray

> Who ever heard so many different languages in a single army? For amongst it there were Franciens, Flemings, Frisians, Gauls, Allobroges, Lotharingians, Swabians, Bavarians, Normans, Englishmen, Scots, Aquitanians, Italians, Danes, Apulians, Iberians, Bretons, Greeks and Armenians. If any Breton or German had wished to question me, I would not have known how to reply. Yet, despite the diversity of our tongues, we seemed to be brothers united under God.[2]

Thus Fulcher of Chartres, writing the first version of his *Jerusalemite History* around the year 1106, chose to describe the response of Christendom to the call to crusade proclaimed by Pope Urban II at the Council of Clermont in 1095. He gives this catalogue of peoples to make the point that the linguistic diversity of the crusaders was unimportant, because they were united in a common purpose which was overseen and directed by God. Fulcher had been a participant in the First Crusade and subsequently chaplain to King Baldwin I of Jerusalem, and it is scarcely surprising that his work should reflect a sense of wonder about the great events through which he had lived. Even other contemporaries who had not been participants made similar statements to express the idea that divine direction and providence were the only possible explanation for the eventual triumph of a relatively small, diverse and often fractious army against a series of numerically superior enemies.[3] Yet at around the same time that Fulcher was writing, a rather different perspective of the same events was being formulated by another French cleric. In his own account of the crusade, Guibert, abbot of the monastery of Nogent-sous-Coucy, recalled an occasion when a certain archdeacon of the bishopric of Mainz had talked dismissively of the French king and people. According to his own testimony, Guibert had replied to the German archdeacon:

Map 5.1 Languages of the medieval Kingdom of France and neighbouring regions

> If you think them so lazy and feeble that you can denigrate a name celebrated as far as the Indian Ocean, then tell me: who was it that Pope Urban turned to for help against the Turks? To whom but the French? If they had not taken the lead with their diligence and fearless strength to stop the advance of the barbarian peoples, there would have been no help forthcoming from your Germans, whose name was not even to be heard there.[4]

Fulcher and Guibert were both natives of northern France, educated clerics writing in Latin. Yet the quotations cited seem to exemplify two diametrically opposed views of the significance of national and linguistic diversity in the genesis of the crusade movement. Fulcher's understanding of the crusade and its success derives from the fact that it was an enterprise which united Christians despite their

diversity; Guibert stresses national divisions by exalting the part played by one nation, the French, at the expense of another, the Germans. In some cases denigration of other nationalities occurred even when writers accepted their contribution to crusading. The English historian William of Malmesbury was impressed by the fact that crusaders came from the farthest reaches of Christendom to answer the appeal of Pope Urban II, yet he could not resist the opportunity to take a dig at the inhabitants of peripheral countries, who were in his opinion uncivilised compared to those of the Anglo-Norman realm:

> There was no people so remote and so isolated that it did not take part. For this love did not only affect the Mediterranean provinces; all who lived in the most remote islands or in the barbarian countries heard the name of Christ. The Welshman left his hunting, the Scotsman left his familiarity with fleas; the Dane gave up his permanent drinking sessions, and the Norwegian abandoned his raw fish.[5]

To the modern historian looking back on the period of the crusades to the Holy Land, it must seem that it was Fulcher's understanding, rather than Guibert's, which corresponded to the spirit of Pope Urban's conception of a great popular movement which would unite Western Christendom, irrespective of national divisions, in order to liberate Eastern Christendom from Turkish rule. Yet, paradoxically, as this chapter aims to demonstrate, there is much evidence to show that the mindset exemplified by Guibert took root and flourished over the course of the following three centuries, and indeed into the modern period. When the palace of Versailles was renovated by the French monarchy in 1839, a *Salle des croisades* was planned as a monument to the French families whose ancestors had taken part in the crusades; eventually a much extended crusade gallery had been designed to accommodate the great number of illustrations and coats of arms of actual, putative and invented crusaders whose claims were put forward, many of them supported by forged documents.[6] Most historical scholarship was less crass than this, but it is noticeable how much of the nineteenth-century research on the crusades was intended to record and thus glorify the contribution of individual countries to the movement.

From the evidence of texts such as those written by Fulcher, Guibert, William and many others we can accept that certain sections of medieval society were conscious of belonging to a particular nation. We can define national identity as a sentiment or sense which defined membership of a nation according to certain common characteristics. National identity could apply to a group to which an individual believed himself or herself to belong, just as it could serve to define those who did not belong. It could thus establish a sense of solidarity among those who subscribed to it, but also produce or reinforce a sense of difference from other nations, and in some circumstances might even be a source of conflict between different nations. One of the features that made many crusade expeditions different from other types of military campaign was that they brought together

large numbers of people not only from different nations, but from all classes of society in joint enterprises in a way that rarely occurred in other contexts in the Middle Ages. The aim of this chapter is to explore the relationship between the idea and practice of crusading, on the one hand, and concepts and manifestations of national identity, on the other, within the multinational or multi-regional crusade armies in the period between the Council of Clermont in 1095 and the Treaty of Jaffa, which concluded the Third Crusade in 1192.

Nations, kingdoms and languages at the time of the crusades

Guibert of Nogent couches his anecdote in terms of an opposition and rivalry between French and Germans, nationalities which are, of course, familiar to us today, but we must be careful not to imagine medieval nations as possessing the same or even necessarily similar defining characteristics as those which bear their names in the modern world.[7] At the time of the First Crusade, medieval Christendom regarded the known world as being inhabited by different ethnic groups: in the written sources which have come down to us, these might be described variously as *nationes* (nations), *populi* (peoples) or, just as (if not more) frequently, *gentes* (races or tribes). In practice these terms were largely used interchangeably, most often in the sense of 'nations' or 'peoples', and this chapter will not attempt to make significant distinctions between them.[8]

Nations were believed to possess various defining characteristics. A representative view of these was given at the beginning of the tenth century by Abbot Regino of Prüm, who in a much-quoted passage described how the diverse peoples of Christendom varied with regard to descent, customs, language and laws.[9] Medieval people tended to have a fond belief that such characteristics were immutable and that therefore national communities were of great antiquity. In fact, we know that the diverse peoples and political entities of the Migration period and the early Middle Ages varied greatly over time in their ethnic composition.[10] Indeed, many modern historians have been reluctant to use the term 'race' as a translation for the Latin *gens*, since it implies an idea of biological descent, as well as having numerous unfortunate connotations of misuse in more recent history. Yet common descent is precisely what most of those medieval people who considered the question believed, or affected to believe, and the period between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries saw a huge increase in the composition of stories in both Latin and vernaculars that described the descent of peoples from ancient ancestors or ancestral groups.[11]

One of the main reasons for the increase in the writing and elaboration of origin stories was that accounts of ancient migrations and conquests could be used to provide legitimation for political claims at the time of their composition, since it was commonly held that there was a congruence of national and political identities, and one salient characteristic of a nation was that it had some sort of political organisation which encapsulated customs and law. However, the vagaries

of history meant that by the time of the First Crusade, there was often no clear correspondence between political units and ethnic communities, with the result that, as Susan Reynolds has persuasively argued, the existence of a kingdom was increasingly being regarded as the most important defining feature of a nation, often outweighing other factors which might have been considered more important in earlier times.[12] Thus, by 1200, there was a clear sense of a nationality encompassing the entire kingdom of Scotland, even though an earlier age had defined its territory as being occupied by different peoples. The nationality that was defined by the existence of a kingdom even outweighed obvious linguistic differences; its inhabitants were perceived as Scots, even though the majority of them were divided between speakers of Gaelic and various Anglian dialects (the ancestors of the Scots language), and ruled over by a predominantly French-speaking elite.

The kingdom of the High Middle Ages was increasingly regarded and functioned as the principal institution which defined both a political and ethnic community. As Reynolds has expressed it, 'kingdoms and peoples came to seem identical – not invariably, but sufficiently often for the coincidence of the two to seem the norm to contemporaries'.[13] At the time of the early crusades the vast majority of Christians were the subjects of some twenty kingdoms. Seventeen of these were in existence in 1095: Germany (whose ruler was also King of Italy and Burgundy), France, England, Scotland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Castile-León, Navarre, Aragon, Bohemia, Poland, Hungary, Rus' and Byzantium. In the following century kingdoms were also established in Sicily, Portugal, and – as a result of the First Crusade – Jerusalem. The kings of Germany (through their authority as emperor, crowned as such by the pope) and the rulers of Byzantium claimed a super-regnal status.[14] Even the city-states of northern Italy formally belonged to the kingdom of Italy and ultimately derived their authority from the monarch or his representatives, such as archbishops and bishops.

Some of these kings were by no means as powerful as other rulers who were technically their subjects: for example, at the end of the twelfth century the King of France was often hard put to challenge the power of the Duke of Normandy (not least because the duke was also king of England) or the Count of Flanders, and it is no coincidence that during this period Normans and Flemings maintained a sense of being peoples who were separate from the French.[15] However, kings did have one great advantage: they were distinguished from other rulers by their coronation and associated sacral attributes such as anointing with sacred oil, which functioned as a recognition of their place in a divinely established order. It was felt that the king was owed a loyalty by his people and church that was different from, and superior to, obligations to lesser institutions. The complex of authority conferred by coronation was the reason why so many rulers who lacked a royal title were keen to acquire it.

The normative status of the kingdom as a governmental form can be seen in the context of the early crusades and the establishment of Latin principalities in Syria and Palestine, or, as these regions were known to contemporaries, Outremer.

The crusaders who conquered Palestine in 1099 regarded it as constituting a *regnum* (kingdom), but its first ruler, Godfrey of Bouillon, did not adopt the title of king, probably because of the crusaders' belief that this *regnum* belonged to Christ.[16] Yet Godfrey's dispute with the first patriarch, Daimbert of Pisa, over the sovereignty of Jerusalem led to a situation where his brother and successor, Baldwin I, insisted on a royal coronation and title as a public sign that he was a ruler independent of any ecclesiastical authority.[17] Contemporaries also had similar expectations of non-Christian peoples with regard to governmental forms. In his great history of Outremer written in the 1180s, the chronicler William of Tyre provides a rather fanciful account of how the Turks spent years wandering until they settled in Persia, but fled the oppression of the Persian ruler, fearing that they would be unable to overcome him because they had no king 'as was the custom among other peoples'. Only after the election of the eponymous ancestor Seljuk as king were they able to conquer Persia, and eventually all the lands of the Middle East.[18]

As well as providing a sacral, ideological focus for loyalty and identity, kingdoms formed a concrete mechanism of government with which the upper echelons of society, both lay and ecclesiastical, had to interact. We must remember that ideas of national identity were primarily – although by no means exclusively – embodied and expressed by a relatively small political class: kings and great magnates and their many vassals, officials, jurists and other advisors; bishops, abbots and members of cathedral chapters; and the patriciates of urbanised areas. These were the people who enforced laws, who made alliances and directed wars, who attended courts, councils and coronations, and who patronised the writing of history and literature and constituted – directly or indirectly – the consumers of such writing. Of course, many urban communities, such as the towns of Lombardy or Flanders, were developing precocious ideas of at least regional identity and solidarity, which often extended to a complete citizen body; but in the normal course of events, individuals and communities further down the social scale and relatively distant from the movers and shakers of political life were far less concerned with issues of national identity, apart from extraordinary circumstances, such as invasion, where they might actually be confronted with hostile forces belonging to a different nationality.

In such circumstances, language might well be seen as the main feature which differentiated friends from foes. It has always been a significant marker of national identity, but we must be careful not to project assumptions and circumstances current in the modern world back to the Middle Ages. The nationalisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries identified linguistic identity as the primary criterion used to define inhabitants of a particular territory as loyal and committed citizens of a state, or of a putative state. Each state required its own language, and within that state only one language was accepted as the medium of government, military service, education, commerce and culture. After the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires in 1918 and the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, new states

emerged which had never previously figured on the map of Europe, defined in their territorial extent primarily by the settlement patterns of a given predominant language.

In medieval Europe attitudes were rather different, at least from the perspectives of monarchs and elites. As we have seen in the case of Scotland, kingdoms could easily accommodate different languages within their communities. Indeed, diverse languages were seen as a source of strength, and kings of Hungary, Bohemia and Poland, for example, encouraged Germans and Walloons to settle for the skills that they would bring to their new homes, and German-speaking linguistic islands survived in these countries for hundreds of years.[19] Yet linguistic diversity was not only a product of economic advantage, but was often accorded a central place in political life. Thus the chronicler Johannes of Viktring records the enthronement ceremony of the Duke of Carinthia in 1286, which involved the duke being questioned as to his suitability by a Slavic-speaking free peasant. This ritual originated at a time when the duchy was almost completely Slavic in character, but it continued to be performed long after the ruling dynasty, the political and ecclesiastical elites and a large section of the population had adopted the German language.[20] At the other end of Christendom almost forty years before, part of the enthronement ceremony of Alexander III of Scotland was the recital in Gaelic by a *seanachaidh* (reciter of tales) of the king's genealogy back to his remote ancestor Iber Scot.[21]

One reason why monarchs and elites in the West were more comfortable with linguistic diversity than other social groups was that they were regularly confronted with the essential place of the Latin language alongside their own vernaculars as a vehicle of administration, the law and worship as well as much of the historiographical and imaginative literature they patronised. In some kingdoms the sociolinguistic situation was more complex than the simple diglossia of Latin and vernacular. After 1066 England was trilingual, with a French dialect (Anglo-Norman) in everyday use by the governing elite, English dialects spoken (but rarely written) by the bulk of the populace, and Latin as the language of the Church and of civil and ecclesiastical administration. In the kingdom of Sicily, which included much of the southern Italian mainland, the situation was even more complicated. The population comprised speakers of Arabic, Greek and Romance (i.e. a proto-Italian dialect), with a ruling class whose predominantly Norman origin meant that, at least initially, it used French, while the royal chancery worked with and issued documents in Greek, Arabic and Latin.[22] These cases of multilingualism were by no means a source of weakness, and both England and Sicily were remarkable for the efficiency of their administrations as well as the fiscal strength and royal power that these helped to support. We should not assume that kings and nobles necessarily had fluency in Latin or vernaculars other than their own mother tongues; the essential point is that they would invariably have access to those who did.

Merchants, pedlars, sailors and others who followed mobile or itinerant professions had incentives to acquire knowledge of additional tongues, but in their

everyday lives the broad mass of the European population, the absolute majority of whom lived and worked on the land, would rarely have been confronted with speakers of a different language unless they lived close to a linguistic frontier or in an area containing a linguistic minority, or if they faced a foreign invasion. The significance of the crusades in this respect is their character (at least until the late twelfth century) as mass movements: the appeal of Pope Urban II was primarily directed to those social groups which had traditionally been accustomed to waging war – that is, nobles and knights – but the status of the crusade as a penitential pilgrimage meant that it was difficult to prevent the participation of non-combatants belonging to both sexes and all classes. Over the course of the subsequent two centuries the crusade movement threw together many different sections of society outwith political elites and military classes, with the effect that large numbers of people were suddenly confronted with strangers of different nationalities and languages in a manner that rarely occurred in the normal course of their lives, in enterprises in which they were all expected to work and fight together for the good of Christendom as a whole.

Nationality, regional identity and language in the First Crusade

Of the entire crusade movement, the campaign which brought forth the broadest response in social and geographical terms was the First Crusade, whose forces left their homes in 1096 and reached Jerusalem in 1099.[23] However, it did not include any kings, although their status would have made them the most obvious military leaders. The most powerful monarch in the West was Henry IV, Holy Roman Emperor and King of Italy and Burgundy, but he was involved in a relentless struggle with the papacy over control of the Church in his dominions. King Philip I of France had been excommunicated because of adultery shortly before the crusade and was unacceptable to the papacy as a participant, although his brother, Count Hugh of Vermandois, took part.[24]

The groups usually known as the 'People's Crusades' comprised participants from northern and central France, western Germany, Lombardy and England. Most of these broke up or were dispersed long before they reached Constantinople, and only a minority reached Asia Minor under the charismatic leader Peter the Hermit.[25] In the better-ordered expeditions which kept to the official departure date of 15 August, crusaders from different parts of the West clustered around the leadership of regional magnates: the great dukes, counts and princes of France, western Germany and southern Italy. For most of the campaign each of these contingents marched, foraged and fought as separate units, coming together only for major battles and sieges. At various points in the campaign, the success of the crusade was hampered and even jeopardised as a result of quarrels between individual leaders, supported by their military retinues: these included disputes between the Apulian prince Tancred and Baldwin of Boulogne, the future King of Jerusalem, over possession of the port of Tarsus in Cilicia; between Raymond

of Saint-Gilles and Bohemund over the city of Antioch and, later, territories beyond the Orontes; and between Raymond and Godfrey of Bouillon over the rulership of Jerusalem and, subsequently, the possession of the town of Ascalon in southern Palestine.[26]

Historians of the crusade have rarely asked whether any of these or other disputes may have been exacerbated or even driven by factors of national, regional or linguistic identity and difference. The great majority of the crusaders who reached Asia Minor originated from the kingdom of France, but this does not imply any linguistic unity. It is now commonplace in both academic and popular histories of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century France to state that on the eve of the great revolution of 1789, less than half the population spoke a language that could be recognised as French. By the later Middle Ages the dialect of Paris and the Ile-de-France (known as Francien) had acquired a prestige above any other variety of French as the language of the royal court and the university of Paris. By the eighteenth century Parisian French was recognised as the universal language of diplomacy and polite society, yet travellers regularly reported difficulties in understanding and being understood in the French provinces.[27] If this was the situation on the cusp of the modern era, how much less standardisation – and thus communication – must there have been centuries before the printing press, regular coach services and the Académie Française?

Of course, the kingdom of the Capetian and Valois dynasties was considerably smaller than the France of Louis XVI or Napoleon. Yet even if we disregard those parts of the hexagon that were not part of the medieval kingdom of France, there were still substantial numbers of speakers of non-Romance languages: Breton in Brittany, Basque in the south-west, Catalan in the south-east and Flemish in the extreme north. Most of the Romance-speaking area between these extremes actually belonged to three distinct languages. The tongues of Gascony, Limousin, Auvergne, Languedoc and Provence were various dialects of Occitan (also known as Provençal or *langue d'oc*), while to the east of this area the language of most of the kingdom of Burgundy was Franco-Provençal. The majority of those who accompanied Raymond of Saint-Gilles (probably the largest single contingent in the First Crusade) originated from Occitan-speaking regions. The language of the northern two-thirds of France was (Old) French proper, sometimes known as the *langue d'oil*, in contrast to the *langue d'oc* of the south, after their respective words for 'yes'. Northern and central France, together with neighbouring French-speaking parts of Lotharingia in the kingdom of Germany, provided the armies which accompanied Count Hugh of Vermandois, Count Stephen of Blois and Duke Robert of Normandy, and many of the followers of Count Robert of Flanders and Godfrey of Bouillon. However, the latter two armies also included speakers of Flemish and Low and High German, while Bohemund's troops, most of whom were Norman knights with their Lombard followers, must have predominantly spoken Norman French and Italian.

There seems to be an unspoken assumption on the part of historians that communication between the different language groups within the First Crusade

armies was never a problem, since the issue is never raised in any of the standard modern histories. Yet Fulcher's comment on the different languages found within the armies highlights the fact that monoglots from different linguistic communities could not communicate with each other. Communication may not have constituted a major difficulty as far as most military and administrative issues were concerned. The members of the political classes of different nationalities, as previously defined, probably could speak or at least understand some form of northern French, or had access to those who could; after all, many of them, such as Robert of Flanders and Godfrey, had followers from both Romance- and Germanic-speaking areas. If bilingual individuals were not present in a given situation, most of the clerics could probably communicate by means of Latin, the international language of the Church. However, such mechanisms did not apply to the rank and file. For the vast majority of their speakers, French, Occitan and Franco-Provençal were not mutually comprehensible, and nor would Flemish, German, Catalan and Italian have been understood.[28] Even speakers of French from a given region might not necessarily be able to understand those from other dialect areas. The Norman dialect, for example, contained many words of Scandinavian origin that were unknown to other varieties. It also shared with Picard several phonological peculiarities, such as initial *k-* (before *a*) where the Ile-de-France, Champagne and elsewhere had *ch-*, a distinction that has produced modern English *castle* in contrast to French *château* from earlier *chastel*.[29] Peasants or townspeople who had only ever communicated with their immediate neighbours until they joined the crusade would not necessarily have understood those born hundreds of miles away, despite using forms of what linguists now define as the same language.

Part of the difficulty in interpreting the depiction of different nationalities and linguistic affiliations in the narrative sources derives from the ambiguities of the term *Franci*, a name which derived from the ethnonym of the Frankish people of the Migration period. In theory, *Franci* could refer to the entire population of the kingdom of France. However, the diminished authority of the king in the two centuries before the First Crusade and the powers of the great feudatories meant that it was most often applied to those French who inhabited the areas north of the River Loire, and often excluded some groups with a strong ethnic identity, such as Normans or Bretons. It might also be used in an even more restricted sense, for the inhabitants of the Ile-de-France.[30] However, another meaning became common in the course of the crusade, in that the crusaders seem to have adopted a group designation originally applied to them by Byzantines and Muslims: that is, *Frangoi* in Greek and *al-Ifranj* in Arabic. This term, which ultimately derived from the ethnonym of the Franks, was applied by Easterners to Latin Christians in general, and rendered as *Franci* in the Latin of the crusade narratives.[31] So it is sometimes difficult to know whether the writers of these works were referring to inhabitants of France or to the crusaders in general when they used the term. Sometimes authors resorted to the composite noun *Francigenae* (literally 'those born in France') when they wished to refer to the French, but in

general they seem to have been overwhelmed by the popularity of *Franci* as the general term for crusaders.[32]

However, the narrative sources suggest that those from the north of France perceived themselves as being different from southerners. The followers of Raymond of Saint-Gilles were regularly designated by other crusaders as *Provinciales*, that is 'Provençals', even though only a minority of these people actually originated in the marquisate of Provence.[33] Raymond of Aguilers, the author closest in sentiment to the count and his followers, explains that all those from Burgundy, Auvergne, Gascony and Gothia (i.e. the former Gothic area of Septimania around Narbonne) were called Provençals, and the others French (*Francigenae*), while the crusaders as a whole were known as Franks. There was no political unity among the regions listed by Raymond at this point, and he seems to be offering an explanation for a usage which is foreign to him. The most likely explanation for the term Provençals was that it was adopted by the French speakers of the north as a blanket designation for all those who spoke Occitan and Franco-Provençal dialects and who were much less readily understood by the majority of the crusaders.[34]

In cases of dispute, it would be natural for crusaders who shared a language or dialect to rally together to support their leader against others of a different linguistic affiliation. In 1097, Bohemund's nephew Tancred was disputing possession of the port of Tarsus in Cilicia with Baldwin, brother of Godfrey of Bouillon, and had actually besieged Baldwin's followers. Tancred's men were French-speaking Normans and Italian-speaking Lombards from southern Italy. Baldwin's troops must have been borrowed from his two brothers, Godfrey of Bouillon and Eustace III of Boulogne; it is likely that they formed the nucleus of the group later known as the *comitatus Baldewini*, and included many Flemish speakers from the county of Boulogne. The balance was tipped in favour of Baldwin by the arrival of an expedition of corsairs from Flanders, Frisia and Antwerp, who provided some 300 troops to assist his forces on the land. The leader of this association was one Winemer, who originated from the county of Boulogne. Yet while he evidently regarded himself as a subject of Baldwin, son of Count Eustace II of Boulogne, this did not necessarily apply to the majority of his followers. A key factor in this dispute was a linguistic affiliation between speakers of Germanic dialects spoken from Frisia as far south as Boulogne, Dunkerque and Guînes in the Pas-de-Calais.[35] As Albert of Aachen states, once Baldwin's men and the corsairs had recognised the speech of the other side, they made a treaty of alliance.[36]

The greatest number of disputes involving the leaders of the crusade were those involving Raymond of Saint-Gilles and other magnates. The Count of Toulouse seemed to possess a talent for antagonising his fellow princes, probably because he was set on establishing a principality for himself in the East, something he attempted on at least five occasions: disputing possession of Antioch with Bohemund, then trying to control the area known as the Jabal al-Summaq east of the Orontes; disputing possession of Jerusalem and then Ascalon with Godfrey,

before finally establishing a territory around Tripoli. Raymond was clearly a man of ambition, and he tended to take a more pro-Byzantine attitude compared to his fellow commanders. There were also grudges about money. Raymond was criticised for being greedy for tribute from the Muslim cities of the coast, while afterwards he attempted to take Tancred and his men into his own service, but failed to remunerate Tancred according to his expectations.[37] A final matter of contention was Raymond's continuing belief in the Holy Lance found at Antioch long after this relic had been discredited in the eyes of the majority of crusade leaders.[38]

The rivalries involving Raymond and his followers are also significant in a linguistic context. It is surely no coincidence that he and his large army, made up mainly of speakers of Occitan dialects (and probably including some speakers of Catalan and Franco-Provençal), often found themselves in opposition to the other contingents, most of whose members spoke northern dialects of French. Indeed, the most acrimonious and enduring disputes of the southerners were with two groups at the other end of the linguistic spectrum: the Norman-Italian contingent from Apulia, Calabria and Sicily, and the mixed French-, Flemish- and German-speaking army of Godfrey of Bouillon.

Not all the disputes during the crusade were driven by ambitions of the leaders. For those who were literally lower down the food chain, securing enough to eat was far more important than grand designs, above all during the siege and counter-siege of Antioch from the winter of 1097–8 through to the following summer, which formed the most critical period of the entire crusade.[39] As available supplies were used up, it became common for bands of crusaders to scour the surrounding countryside looking for food. These foraging parties seem to have comprised smaller units than the entire contingents commanded by princes, and it is striking that they were organised on regional or linguistic lines. Ralph of Caen tells of an incident when foragers from Bohemund's army came into conflict with others from southern France, saying that when fighting broke out, those who spoke the same language fought together, while others might be attacked because of the language they spoke, even though they were innocent. He goes on to explain that 'those from Narbonne, Auvergne, Gascony and all of the Provençal people' took one side, while 'the Apulians were supported by the remainder of the French [literally 'of Gaul'], especially the Normans', while others, such as Bretons and Swabians, held to those who spoke their languages.[40] Here we have a case of Occitan speakers fighting against French speakers, with language functioning as an immediate badge of identity. A similar incident occurred after the crusaders had gained control of Antioch. One section of the walls was guarded by Germans, who were used to keeping watch at night and sleeping by day. The Turks discovered this pattern and launched an attack in daytime, and were beaten back only when the Germans were rescued by other crusaders. Once the city was secure again, the latter – who must have been predominantly French-speaking – made their feelings known by parading through the streets, shouting, 'The Germans are shit,' a sentiment which Ralph of Caen gleefully recorded in Latin verse.[41]

Many members of the classes of lords and knights seem to have had little difficulty in transferring their loyalties between leaders. We know, for example, that among the men who made up the household of Godfrey of Bouillon during his short rule in Palestine, there were several who had originally left Europe with Bohemund or Raymond of Saint-Gilles.[42] Such people had simply acted in a way that was common among a social group characterised by feudo-vassalic ties, seeking new lords in order to better their own conditions. However, for the broad mass of the crusaders, antipathies between the different contingents drew on national or regional loyalties, in which linguistic affiliation played a predominant part. Language was an explicit test of loyalty, whether disputes derived from rivalries between leaders, or whether they originated in resentments within the broad mass of crusaders.

Crusading and the Holy Land in the twelfth century

Crusaders from all parts of Western Christendom settled in the Holy Land after the First Crusade and in the course of the twelfth century, but the majority seemed to have originated in northern France.[43] Certainly, irrespective of the origins of the population, and the possibility that some groups of settlers may have retained their own languages for a generation or so (as is common among immigrant communities), the language that established itself as the main vehicle of communication among the European settlers was a northern variety of Old French, although it should be stressed that linguistic investigations of the French language of the Levant are still in their infancy.[44] Yet, despite their own diversity, the settlers of all four principalities of Outremer seem to have regarded themselves as a single nationality, known as *Franci* (or sometimes *Latini*) in Latin and *Francs* in French.[45]

John of Würzburg, a German pilgrim who visited the Holy Land in the third quarter of the twelfth century, was struck by the number of settlers from different parts of France who were represented among the population of Jerusalem, but was shocked by how few Germans he could find.[46] He was even more concerned about the memory of the part played in the capture of the Holy City by the Germans, among whom he counted Duke Godfrey, fearing that their heroic deeds had been forgotten and ascribed only to the French. As a concrete example he cited the case of a German soldier called Wigger or Wicher, claiming that the inscription on his grave in the church of the Holy Sepulchre had been erased and replaced by another referring to 'some French soldier'. He produced his own epitaph characterising Wigger and his companions as 'not French, but Franconians', and consoled himself with the thought that if enough Germans had settled in the kingdom of Jerusalem, its frontiers would have stretched as far as the Nile.[47] John of Würzburg was, however, correct in one respect, namely that very few Germans settled in the Holy Land. Those who are known were, like Wigger, followers of Godfrey of Bouillon, and they are not known to have been joined by significant numbers of compatriots up to the time that John went to Palestine

as a pilgrim. It was only after the Third Crusade that we can find several high-status individuals from Germany who settled there, presumably with followers: Otto of Botenlauben, Wener of Eguisheim and Berthold of Nimburg and his son.[48] This observation raises the question of the relative contribution of different nationalities to the crusades to the Holy Land in the two centuries following its recovery by the First Crusade.

The organisation and structure of crusading underwent fairly rapid development soon after the inception of the movement. The popular crusades of 1096, disorganised bands led by charismatic leaders, had given way to better-organised forces which accepted the leadership of great secular magnates. The expeditions of 1101, which can be seen as delayed waves of the First Crusade, were similarly organised, with armies following the leadership of secular and ecclesiastical magnates such as William IX, Duke of Aquitaine, William II, Count of Nevers, Welf IV, Duke of Bavaria, and Anselm, Archbishop of Milan.[49] Thereafter, crusades were increasingly led by kings, who could mobilise financial resources which were not available to most of their vassals; this factor became especially important because of the costs of travelling to the East by sea, which was undoubtedly the preferred form of passage by the late twelfth century and the sole form employed after 1197.

The importance of kings as leaders of crusades extended beyond their borders, and it was common for crusaders from the smaller kingdoms to join contingents from the greater ones, accepting the leadership of foreign monarchs. Thus Danes and Bohemians often joined up with crusaders from Germany, as occurred during the Second and Third Crusades, while Scots tended to follow the kings of France or England.[50]

The relatively small numbers of Scots, Danes and others meant that there were few conflicts between them and their host nationalities on crusade. The authority that kings were accorded meant that they were able to exercise a much greater discipline among their followers than the diverse leaders of the early crusades, and they tended to travel separately to the East. We can observe little in the way of national disputes during the Second Crusade, in which the armies of Conrad III of Germany and Louis VII marched separately and came to grief separately, although this did not prevent Odo of Deuil, the French chronicler of the expedition, complaining of the Germans' aggressiveness, ignorance and predilection to plunder on Byzantine territory.[51]

The Third Crusade also saw separate hosts led by Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, King Richard the Lionheart of England and King Philip II Augustus of France set off to defend the few settlements left in Frankish hands after the great conquests of Saladin in 1187. The Yorkshire parson Roger of Howden, who accompanied Richard, commented on the diversity of the response in Latin verses reminiscent of the words of Fulcher of Chartres describing the First Crusade a century before:

> They march toward the East bearing the Cross
> And taking all of the West with them:

> They lead an army diverse in language, rites, customs and manners,
> But one which is fervent in faith.[52]

Yet the Third Crusade differed significantly from the expeditions of 1096–1101 in its composition. Since Richard and Philip travelled by sea, they were able to exclude many of the popular elements, while Frederick Barbarossa imposed strict regulations to ensure that participants were adequately financed and well equipped. This all meant that, compared to the masses who had left the West a century before, the Third Crusade contained a higher proportion of lords, knights and other fighting men and their ancillaries, such as grooms. This factor undoubtedly contributed to the phenomenon that national and regional differences during the campaign in Palestine found expression not in terms of language, but of allegiance to the royal commanders. Most of the German expedition returned home after the death of Barbarossa, and the minority who remained in the East were left leaderless after his son Frederick of Swabia succumbed to disease; these Germans played a fairly modest role, as did the small contingents of Danes and Frisians.[53] Richard's followers originated from all of the Angevin domains and satellites: England, Normandy, Anjou, Poitou and Brittany; in the sources they tend to be described as 'English and Normans' or simply 'Normans', and are thus distinguished from the 'French' (*Franci*), who were subjects of King Philip.[54] So while the great majority of crusaders spoke French, the main loyalty of most of them was to one or other of the two kings.

Had he survived to reach the Holy Land, the status of Frederick Barbarossa as Holy Roman Emperor might well have given him a pre-eminent position in the direction of the crusade, but as events turned out the entire campaign was bedevilled by opposition between the kings of France and England, heirs to a long-standing rivalry over control of the Angevin domains on the continent. Philip arrived in Palestine before Richard, and for some time was accorded considerable authority by the Franks of Outremer and crusaders alike, but his pretensions to leadership were soon eclipsed by the dynamism and superior financial resources of the Lionheart.[55] The fault lines between the Angevin and the Capetian monarchies rapidly extended to take in the Italian maritime states as well as the two rival claimants to the throne of Jerusalem, with Richard and the crusaders from Normandy, Anjou, Poitou, England and Pisa supporting the Poitevin king of Jerusalem, Guy of Lusignan, and Philip, the French and Genoa supporting Guy's Lombard rival, Conrad of Montferrat. This binary division hampered a combined effort, and even led to open warfare between members of the two factions at Acre in 1192.[56]

The return of Philip to France in mid-campaign, leaving the French crusaders under the command of Hugh, Duke of Burgundy, meant that Richard exercised undisputed leadership. Yet even though he was careful to try to associate Hugh and other French leaders in decision-making, and provided them with considerable financial support after most of their own funds ran out, the rivalries persisted, exacerbated by the continuing machinations of Conrad and his attempt

to bolster his ambitions by marrying Isabella, the heiress to the kingdom of Jerusalem. The withdrawal of the French from the crusade forces at Jaffa and Ascalon during the advance south led to understandable resentment on the part of Richard's forces, who took the French to task for giving themselves up to excess in taverns and brothels while more sober and upright crusaders attended to their duties. The murder of Conrad of Montferrat eventually allowed a resolution of the conflict over the throne of Jerusalem by the election of Henry, Count of Champagne, who as a nephew of both Richard and Philip was acceptable to both sides and thus regarded suitable as a husband for Isabella of Jerusalem. Nevertheless, the fractious nature of the entire campaign had done little for the papal idea that the kings of the West should set aside their differences and fight together for the common good of Christendom. The English author of the *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi* criticised the *Franci* (French) for their laziness, fickleness and arrogance, contrasting them unfavourably with the *Franci* (Franks) of Charlemagne, who had won victories over Saracens and pagans in Spain, Saxony and Calabria.[57]

Epilogue: the First Crusade and national histories

The failure of the Third Crusade to liberate Jerusalem from Muslim control did nothing to dampen enthusiasm for crusading; if anything, it spurred Christendom on to greater efforts, and the thirteenth century would see just as many crusades as the twelfth. Failure also concentrated the minds of contemporaries. Contemplating the stalemate in Palestine in 1192, our English author mused about how his contemporaries compared with those who had brought the First Crusade to a successful conclusion:

> These were not like the pilgrims who were once on the expedition to Antioch, which our people powerfully captured in a famous victory which is still related in the deeds of Bohemund and Tancred and Godfrey de Bouillon and the other most outstanding crusading chiefs, who triumphed in so many glorious victories, whose feats even now are like food in the mouth of the narrator.[58]

The undoubted triumph of the First Crusade, set against the failures of subsequent ages, meant that it gained the greatest attention in both Latin and vernacular history writing on the crusades throughout the Middle Ages. It also provided a vehicle for interpretations which sought to glorify particular nationalities or regions at the expense of others.

This had already begun to happen within a decade or two of the capture of Jerusalem. We have already seen how Ralph of Caen denigrates the Provençals, even singling some of them out for criticism for apostacy.[59] His main concern, however, is to glorify the Norman race, above all his heroes Tancred and Bohemund, both of whom he associates with Normandy, rather than with

southern Italy.[60] He even ascribes the victory of Baldwin of Boulogne over Tancred at Tarsus to the former's use of Norman troops![61]

By contrast, the hero of the German writer Albert of Aachen was Godfrey of Bouillon. In many ways his task was easier than Ralph's. Godfrey had a reputation for courage and piety, and the fact that it was his troops who made the breach into Jerusalem, coupled with his election as the city's ruler, made him the hero of the crusade *par excellence* for later generations. However, as Lord of Bouillon and Count of Verdun, Godfrey belonged to the western, French-speaking parts of the Holy Roman Empire, and so Albert of Aachen tries to give him a more unambiguously German identity by stressing his status as Duke of Lower Lotharingia and employing rhetorical formulations to give the impression of a substantial German participation in the crusade. Thus, while Albert names few prominent individual Germans (despite his liking for muster-rolls), he tends to associate Godfrey with lists of the different German tribes, as, for example, at Antioch, where he describes Godfrey being accompanied by 'countless thousands of Lotharingians, Saxons, Swabians and Bavarians', or later characterises him as 'Duke Godfrey with the Swabians, Bavarians, Saxons, Lotharingians, Germans and Romans'.[62] It is perhaps no coincidence that Albert and Ralph show such a great national bias in their writing, in that they were trying to glorify peoples who formed minorities within the hosts of the First Crusade. The semantic ambiguities of the word *Franci* as applied to the crusaders in general meant that most audiences and readerships would understand it as a French enterprise.

Yet it was not in the form of such primary Latin narratives that most people heard or read about the First Crusade in subsequent centuries, and sources beloved by modern historians for their unadorned immediacy, like the *Gesta Francorum*, or for the extent of their detail, like the history of Albert of Aachen, had a relatively poor circulation in comparison with other works and genres. The most popular forms were secondary in the sense that they comprised reworkings, continuations or translations of the primary accounts. Two of them stand out above all others. The first was the chronicle of William of Tyre. However, this was far less popular in its original, Latin form than in its Old French translation, usually with a continuation taking its narrative into the thirteenth century. The other was the *Historia Iherosolymitana* of Robert of Rheims, which the monk explicitly wrote in order to provide a more elegant and detailed account than that of the anonymous *Gesta Francorum*. The narratives of William and Robert were also significant sources for what we might describe as tertiary accounts: that is, cases where information on the crusades was incorporated into other universal histories, family chronicles or other compilations. The translations of William of Tyre's chronicle were naturally popular wherever French was spoken and formed the main source for the crusades in several sumptuous world history rolls commissioned for French courts in the fifteenth century.[63] Robert the Monk's history was extremely popular in Germany, having four different German translations, including two printed editions.[64]

The various secondary and tertiary accounts offered many opportunities to give a more nationalistic or regional slant to the history of the crusades, especially by being selective or giving emphasis to particular elements that their authors found in their source materials. Even the addition of titles could give a quite different perspective. The earliest German translation of Robert the Monk's history identifies the work in its opening line as dealing with 'the expedition of Duke Godfrey of Bouillon', implying – quite incorrectly – that the history was devoted to the duke.[65] The later of the two printed editions goes even further, with a title that sets out how Duke Godfrey 'fought against the Turks and heathens and won the Holy Sepulchre'.[66] The point of this focus on Godfrey is that to a German readership he was clearly regarded as a German hero. Illustrations also offered considerable scope for reinterpretation, especially through the use of heraldic devices to identify individual crusaders. A manuscript of the Middle Dutch *Spiegel Historiael* by Jacob van Maerlant produced in fourteenth-century Flanders contains three miniatures illustrating key events at the sieges of Antioch and Jerusalem.[67] They accord an especially prominent position to Count Robert II of Flanders, who is identified by his heraldic device of *or a lion rampant sable* (a black lion on a gold field) alongside Godfrey of Bouillon. Even though Robert is recorded as having played a fairly passive role in the crusade by most of the contemporaneous accounts, this manuscript glorifies the Flemish contribution to the crusade by elevating him to a position where he is on a par with Godfrey, by this time universally recognised as the greatest hero of the campaign.[68]

As accurate historical knowledge of the First Crusade declined and names of crusaders became garbled and corrupted in transmission, some reinterpretations became even more daring. Thus, in the early sixteenth century, the German poet Dietrich von der Werder produced an account of the crusade that was based in turn on the highly literary account in Italian by Torquato Tasso. Dietrich found no problem in claiming the crusader Baldwin of Bourcq, later King of Jerusalem, as a German who had originated in Burg in Westphalia.[69] The most breathtaking shift of identities in a national and regional interest, however, occurs in the family chronicle compiled by Count Froben Christoph of Zimmern that was completed in 1566.[70] The chronicle contains a long list of numerous German crusaders who supposedly joined the popular crusades of 1096, were defeated by the Seljuks at the massacre of Xerigordo, and whose survivors eventually joined up with Godfrey of Bouillon. These German names were accepted as genuine by numerous historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; since so many of them belonged to noblemen, they were also advanced as proof that the so-called People's Crusades were less popular in composition than had previously been believed. Almost all of the names, however, were pure invention, the majority of them chosen because they could be claimed as Swabians from Froben Christoph's homeland in southern Germany. The putative leader of the Germans, one Walther, Duke of Teck, actually derives from the historical figure of Walter Sans-Avoir, who is described by Robert the Monk and other contemporaneous sources as originating from the Paris region and having led one of the popular expeditions.

The chronicle of Zimmern simply takes this Frenchman and disguises him as a German.[71] The reason why the Count of Zimmern and other authors were so determined to glorify their nationalities was that as the advance of Ottoman Turks proceeded through Europe, the successes of the First Crusade seemed more important than ever, and it was vital for their nations to claim their place in it.

The crusades were events that threw together people from all classes of society and all regions of Christendom in a manner which rarely occurred in the lives of the great majority. It would be scarcely surprising if differences of nationality or language should come to the fore, particularly in circumstances of adversity. Beneath the surface of several of the primary accounts of the First Crusade we can find cases of solidarity and antipathy based on national or linguistic identity, which also fed into loyalties accorded to leaders and to the disputes that in which they became involved. In the course of the twelfth century issues of national identity remained important, although, as the broad mass of the population tended to be increasingly excluded from participation in favour of the military classes, linguistic identity became less significant as a marker of difference than allegiance to particular monarchies, which were also forming the main foci of national identity in later medieval Europe. Growing national sentiments also meant that authors reinterpreted and rewrote older narratives, so that accounts of the early crusades written in the later Middle Ages and the early modern period often show much more nationalistic interpretations than their exemplars.

Notes

1 This chapter was written while I was a guest researcher at Southern Denmark University, Odense. I am grateful to the Nordic Centre for Medieval Studies for financial support and to Dr Kurt Villads Jensen and Karen Fog Rasmussen for facilitating my stay.

2 FC 202–3: 'Sed quis unquam audivit tot tribus linguae in uno exercitu, cum ibi adessent Franci, Flandri, Frisi, Galli, Allobroges, Lotharingi, Alemanni, Baioarii, Normanni, Angli, Scoti, Aquitani, Itali, Daci, Apuli, Iberi, Britones, Graeci, Armeni? Quod si vellet me aliquis Britannus vel Teutonicus interrogare, neutro respondere sapere possem. sed qui linguis diversi eramus, tamquam fratres sub dilectione Dei et proximi unanimes esse videbamur.' Except in cases where English translations of medieval sources are explicitly referenced, all translations cited in the text are by the author.

3 Sigebert of Gembloux, 'Chronica', L.C. Bethmann (ed.), in *MGH SS* 6, p. 367; Henry of Huntingdon, *Henrici archidiaconi Huntendunensis Historia Anglorum*, Thomas Arnold (ed.), Rolls Series 74, London: Longman, 1879, p. 220; EA 138. On the idea of divine direction, see especially Antonius Hendrikus van Erp, *Gesta Francorum, gesta Dei? Motivering en rechtvaardiging van de eerste kruistochten door tijdgenoten en moslimse reactie*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982.

4 GN II.1: 'Audivi . . . dum cum archidiacono quodam Magontino super sua ipsorum rebellione congrederer, quod regem nostrum cum populo in tantum vilipenderit, ob hoc solum quia dominum papam Paschalem cum suis principibus grate ubique susceperit, ut eos non modo Francos, sed irrisorie Francones vocaverit. Cui inquam: "Si ita eos inertes arbitraris et marcidos, ut celeberrimum usque in Oceanum Indicum nomen, foede garriendo detorqueas, dic mihi ad quos papa Urbanus contra Turcos

praesidia contracturus divertit? nonne ad Francos? His nisi praeissent et barbariem undecumque confluentium gentium vivaci industria et impavidis viribus constrinxissent, Teutonicorum vestrorum, quorum ne nomen quidem ibi sonuit, auxilia nulla fuissent".'

5 William of Malmesbury, *De Gestis regum Anglorum libri quinque*, William Stubbs (ed.), Rolls Series 90, 2, London: Longman, 1887–9, II.399: 'Tunc Walensis venationem saltuum, tunc Scotus familiaritatem pulicum, tunc Danus continuationem potuum, tunc Noricus cruditatem reliquit piscium.'

6 Robert-Henri Bawtier, 'La collection de chartes de croisades dite Collection Courtois', *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres: Comptes rendus des Séances* 1956, 382–6; Robert-Henri Bautier, 'Forgeries et falsifications de documents par une officine généalogique au milieu du XIX siècle', *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes* 132, 1974, 75–93.

7 The range of published literature on this subject is vast. See, in particular, John Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982, and, for an especially broad but highly nuanced treatment of ideas of nations and national identity over several historical eras, A.D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1986; *The Antiquity of Nations*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004; and 'National Identities: Modern and Medieval?', in Simon Forde, Lesley Johnson and A.V. Murray (eds), *Concepts of National Identity in the Middle Ages*, Leeds: School of English, University of Leeds, 1995, pp. 21–46. Several of the essays in the last volume (especially Smith's) serve as an important corrective to the ideas of the highly influential work of Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (2nd edn), London: Verso, 1991 [1986], who has argued that nations as political communities were unthinkable in the Middle Ages (see esp. pp. 9–25).

8 Susan Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900–1300* (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997 [1984], pp. 250–6.

9 Regino of Prüm, *Chronicon*, *MGH SS*, *rer. Germ. in usum scholarum*, 50, p. xx: 'nec non et illud sciendum, quod, sicut diversae nationes populorum inter se discrepatant genere moribus lingua legibus, ita sancta universalis aecclesia toto orbe terrarum diffusa, quamvis in unitate fidei coniungatur, tamen consuetudinibus aecclesiasticis ab invicem differt'.

10 Reinhard Wenskus, *Stammesbildung und Verfassung: Das Werden der frühmittelalterlichen Gentes* (2nd edn), Köln: Böhlau, 1977 [1961]; Herwig Wolfram and Walter Pohl (eds), *Typen der Ethnogenese unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Bayern*, 2, Wien: Verl. d. Österr. Akad. d. Wiss., 1990; Herwig Wolfram, *History of the Goths*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.

11 Susan Reynolds, 'Medieval Origines Gentium and the Community of the Realm', *History* 68, 1983, 375–90; Herwig Wolfram, 'Le genre de l'origo gentis', *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire/Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Filologie en Geschiedenis* 68, 1990, 789–901; Arnold Angenendt, 'Der eine Adam und die vielen Stammväter. Idee und Wirklichkeit der Origo gentis im Mittelalter', in Peter Wunderli (ed.), *Herkunft und Ursprung: Historische und mythische Formen der Legitimation*, Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1994, pp. 27–52; Klaus Schreiner, 'Religiöse, historische und rechtliche Legitimation spätmittelalterlicher Adelsherrschaft', in O.G. Oexle and Werner Paravicini (eds), *Nobilitas: Funktion und Repräsentation des Adels in Alteuropa*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997, pp. 376–430.

12 Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900–1300*, pp. 256–302.

13 Reynolds, *Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900–1300*, p. 260.

14 There is not sufficient space here to go into the ramifications of the Byzantine monarchic title of *basileus*. It is most often translated as 'emperor', not least because its incumbents regarded themselves as heirs to the Roman Empire, but some Westerners, often with political intent, portrayed the *basileus* as simply another king.

15 On the Normans, see especially G.A. Loud, 'The "Gens Normannorum" – Myth or Reality?', in R.A. Brown (ed.), *Proceedings of the Fourth Battle Conference on Anglo-Norman Studies 1981*, Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 1982, pp. 104–16, 205–6; J.R. Bliese, 'The Courage of the Normans – A Comparative Study of Battle Rhetoric', *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 35, 1991, 1–26; Emily Albu, *The Normans in Their Histories: Propaganda, Myth and Subversion*, Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2001; and Nick Webber, *The Evolution of Norman Identity, 911–1154*, Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2005. On Flanders, Véronique Lambert, 'Methodologische beschouwingen bij het onderzoek naar de concepten "natie", "nationalisme" en "nationale identiteit" in de Middeleeuwen", *Jaarboek voor Middeleeuwse Geschiedenis* 4, 2001, 66–85.

16 Jonathan Riley-Smith, 'The Title of Godfrey of Bouillon', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 52, 1979, 83–6; A.V. Murray, 'The Title of Godfrey of Bouillon as Ruler of Jerusalem', *Collegium Medievale* 3, 1990, 163–78; A.V. Murray, *The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem: A Dynastic History, 1099–1125*, Oxford: Prosopographica et Genealogica, 2000, pp. 63–77.

17 A.V. Murray, 'Daimbert of Pisa, the Domus Godefridi and the Accession of Baldwin I of Jerusalem', in A.V. Murray (ed.), *From Clermont to Jerusalem: The Crusades and Crusader Societies, 1095–1500*, Turnhout: Brepols, 1998, pp. 81–102; Murray, *The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, pp. 94–7.

18 WT 116–17. For a detailed commentary on this passage, see A.V. Murray, 'William of Tyre and the Origin of the Turks: On the Sources of the *Gesta Orientalium Principum*', in Michel Balard, B.Z. Kedar and Jonathan Riley-Smith (eds), *Dei Gesta per Francos: Etudes sur les croisades dédiées à Jean Richard/Crusade Studies in Honour of Jean Richard*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, pp. 217–29.

19 Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950–1350*, London: Allen Lane, 1993, esp. pp. 106–96.

20 Iohannis abbatis Victoriensis, *Liber certarum historiarum*, Fedor Schneider (ed.), 2, Hannover: Hahn, 1909–10, I.251–2.

21 Johannes de Fordun, *Cronica gentis Scotorum*, William Forbes Skene (ed.), 2, Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1871–2, I.294–5.

22 Donald Matthew, *The Norman Kingdom of Sicily*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 207–53.

23 For the composition of the main expeditions during the First Crusade, see especially: E.M. Jamison, 'Some Notes on the *Anonymi Gesta Francorum*, with Special Reference to the Norman Contingent from South Italy and Sicily in the First Crusade', in *Studies in French Language and Medieval Literature Presented to Professor Mildred K. Pope*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1939, pp. 195–204; A.V. Murray, 'The Army of Godfrey of Bouillon, 1096–1099: Structure and Dynamics of a Contingent on the First Crusade', *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire/Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Filologie en Geschiedenis* 70, 1992, 301–29; Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders, 1095–1131*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; Conor Kostick, *The Social Structure of the First Crusade*, Leiden: Brill, 2008.

24 Marcus Bull, 'The Capetian Monarchy and the Early Crusade Movement: Hugh of Vermandois and Louis VII', *Nottingham Medieval Studies* 50, 1996, 25–46.

25 Heinrich Hagenmeyer, *Le Vrai et le faux sur Pierre l'Hermite*, Paris: Librairie de la Société Bibliographique, 1883; Jean Flori, *Pierre l'Hermite et la première croisade*, Paris: Fayard, 1999.

26 On these disputes, see John France, *Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; Murray, *The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, pp. 67–8; and T.S. Asbridge, 'The Principality of Antioch and the Jabal as-Summaq', in J.P. Phillips (ed.), *The First Crusade: Origins and Impact*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997, pp. 142–52.

27 For a representative treatment, see Graham Robb, *The Discovery of France*, London: W.W. Norton & Co., 2007, pp. 50–70.
28 To these language groups we should add some speakers of Breton and English (among the followers of Robert of Normandy) and Frisian (with Godfrey of Bouillon). There were probably also speakers of Lombardic dialects of Italian among the survivors of the People's Crusades.
29 Walther von Wartburg, *Evolution et structure de la langue française* (12th edn), Basel: Francke, 1993 [1946], pp. 73–5; Alain Rey, Frédérick Duval and Gilles Siouffi, *Mille ans de langue française*, Paris: Le Grand Livre du mois, 2007, pp. 101–57, 362–5.
30 Walter Kienast, *Der Herzogstitel in Frankreich und Deutschland (9. bis 12. Jahrhundert)*, Wien: Oldenbourg, 1968, pp. 11–35.
31 Michel Balard, '*Gesta Dei per Francos*: L'usage du mot "Francs" dans les chroniques de la Première Croisade', in Michel Rouche (ed.), *Clovis: Histoire & mémoire*, Paris: Fayard, 1997, pp. 473–84; A.V. Murray, 'Ethnic Identity in the Crusader States: The Frankish Race and the Settlement of Outremer', in Forde, Johnson and Murray (eds), *Concepts of National Identity*, pp. 59–73; Peter Thorau, 'Die fremden Franken – al-faranǧ al-gurubā'. Kreuzfahrer und Kreuzzüge aus arabischer Sicht', in Alfried Wieczorek, Mamoun Fansa and Harald Meller (eds), *Saladin und die Kreuzfahrer*, Mannheim: Zabern, 2005, pp. 115–25.
32 RA 244, 259; *GF* 33, 68, 91.
33 RC 651, 660–1, 675–6; AA 300–1, 330–1, 334–6, 478–9, 600–1, 604–5, 608–9. The marquisate of Provence, to the east of the Rhône, was actually part of the kingdom of Burgundy at the time of the First Crusade.
34 RA 244 var. E: 'Erat autem inter eos qui profecti fuerant ad prospiciendum fugae et clamoris causas, Flandrensis comes et cum eo quidam Provinciales: namque omnes de Burgundia et Alvernia, et Gasconia, et Gothi, Provinciales appellantur, ceteri vero Francigenae; et hoc in exercitu, inter hostes autem omnes Franci dicebantur.' The *RHC* edition gives *Francigenae* instead of *Franci* as the penultimate word of the quotation, which makes no sense as the term that is meant is clearly being contrasted with the previous use of *Francigenae*. I therefore prefer the variant reading.
35 Ludo Milis, 'The Linguistic Boundary in the County of Guînes: A Problem of History and Methodology', in Ludo Milis, *Religion, Culture, and Mentalities in the Medieval Low Countries: Selected Essays*, Jeroen Deploige, Martine De Reu, Walter Simons and Steven Vanderputten (eds), Turnhout: Brepols, 2005, pp. 353–68.
36 AA 160–1.
37 AA 380–1, 384–5.
38 RC 676–7.
39 France, *Victory in the East*, pp. 197–296; John France, 'The Crisis of the First Crusade: From the Defeat of Kerbogha to the Departure from Arqa', *Byzantion* 40, 1970, 276–308.
40 RC 675–6: 'Qui alterutri linguae consonabat, modo cum ea verberat, interdum pro ea innocens verberatur. Narbonenses, Arverni, Wascones, et hoc genus omne Provincialibus: Apulis vero reliqua Gallia, praesertim Normanni conspirabant; Britones, Suevos, Hunos, Rutenos et hujus modi linguae suae barbaries audita tuebatur.'
41 RC 662: 'Dum tandem exciti surgunt urgentque Alemanni: / Turba, Latinorum pudor! ut testantur et ipsi / per plateas Graeci clamantes "Caco-Alemanni".'
42 Murray, *The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, pp. 77–81.
43 A.V. Murray, 'The Origins of the Frankish Nobility of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1100–1118', *Mediterranean Historical Review* 4, 1989, 281–300; A.V. Murray, 'Norman Settlement in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1099–1131', *Archivio Normanno-Svevo* 1, 2008, 61–85.
44 See, for an overview, Laura Minervini, 'French Language in the Levant', in A.V. Murray (ed.), *The Crusades: An Encyclopedia*, 4 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2006), II.479–81;

and, for recent findings, Cyril Aslanov, 'Languages in Contact in the Latin East: Acre and Cyprus', *Crusades* 1, 2002, 155–81. It is often assumed that much of the populations of the principality of Antioch and the county of Tripoli had a definite Norman and Provençal character, respectively. This was probably at least true of much of the ruling elite. For example, Walter, the Chancellor of Antioch, on three occasions refers to the troops of Count Pons of Tripoli as *Provinciales*: Walter the Chancellor, *Galterii Cancelarii Bella Antiochena*, Heinrich Hagenmeyer (ed.), Innsbruck: Wagner'sche Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1896, pp. 96–7.

45 Murray, 'Ethnic Identity in the Crusader States'.

46 'John of Würzburg', in *Peregrinationes Tres*, R.B.C. Huygens (ed.), Turnhout: Brepols, 1994, pp. 125–6: 'tota civitas occupata est ab aliis nacionibus, scilicet Francis, Lotharingis, Normannis, Provincialibus, Alvernis, Hyspanis et Burgundionibus simul in eadem expeditione convenientibus, sic, ut nulla pars civitatis etiam in minima platea esset Alemannis distributa, ipsis non curantibus nec animum ibidem remanendi habentibus, tacito eorum nomine solis Francis liberatio sanctae urbis ascribitur, qui et hodie cum aliis prenominatis gentibus urbi praefatae adiacenti provinciae dominantur.'

47 'John of Würzburg', pp. 124–5. The most plausible explanation for this evident confusion was that John was simply in error about the identification of the tomb. The church of the Holy Sepulchre tended to be reserved for high-status burials in the Latin kingdom, and there is contemporary evidence that Wigger was buried in Jaffa: AA 584–5.

48 Bernd Ulrich Hucker, 'Das Grafenpaar Beatrix und Otto von Botenlauben und die deutsche Kreuzzugsbewegung', in Hans-Jürgen Kotzur (ed.), *Die Kreuzzüge: Kein Krieg ist heilig*, Mainz: Zabern, 2004, pp. 22–47; H.E. Mayer, 'Drei oberrheinische Kreuzfahrer des 13. Jahrhunderts: Berthold von Nimburg (Vater und Sohn) und Werner von Egisheim', *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins* 153, 2005, 43–60.

49 Steven Runciman, 'The Crusades of 1101', *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinischen Gesellschaft* 1, 1951, 3–12; James Lea Cate, 'The Crusade of 1101', in K.M. Setton *et al.* (eds), *A History of the Crusades*, 6, (2nd edn), Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89 [1969], I.343–67; Alec Mulinder, 'The Crusading Expeditions of 1101–2', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wales, Swansea, 1996; Marie-Luise Favreau-Lilie, 'Welf IV. und der Kreuzzug von 1101', in D.R. Bauer and Matthias Becher (eds), *Welf IV. – Schlüsselfigur einer Wendezeit: Regionale und europäische Perspektiven*, München: C.H. Beck, 2004, pp. 420–47.

50 Alan Macquarrie, *Scotland and the Crusades, 1095–1560*, Edinburgh: J. Donald, 1997.

51 OD 40–5.

52 RH III.38: 'Tendunt cruce praevia versus Orientem / Atque secum contrahunt totum Occidentem: / Lingua, ritu, moribus, cultu differentem / Producunt exercitum sed fide ferventem.'

53 *Das Itinerarium Peregrinorum: Eine zeitgenössische englische Chronik zum dritten Kreuzzug in ursprünglicher Gestalt*, H.E. Mayer (ed.), Stuttgart: A. Hiersemann, 1962, pp. 311–12.

54 RH III.175, 179, 183; *Itinerarium Peregrinorum*, Mayer (ed.), pp. 332–3; *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, in *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I*, William Stubbs (ed.), Rolls Series 38, 2, London: Longman, 1864–5, I.229, 249–50, 269, 389; *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade: The Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, H.J. Nicholson (tr.), Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997, pp. 217, 225, 237, 253, 277, 342.

55 Jim Bradbury, *Philip Augustus, King of France 1180–1223*, London: Longman, 1988, pp. 87–91.

56 *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, Stubbs (ed.), I.295; RH III.113.

57 *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, Stubbs (ed.), I.325–7, 330–2, 394–6, 431–2; *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, Nicholson (tr.), pp. 299, 300, 345–6, 373.

58 *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, Stubbs (ed.), I.396: 'Non enim hi fuerant quales olim vere peregrini in Antiocheni expeditione, quam gens nostra potenter obtinuit, unde quoque et adhuc recitatur in gestis super tam famosa victoria Boimundi et Tancredi, necnon et Godefridi de Builon, et aliorum prcerum praestantissimorum, qui tot praeclaris triumparunt victoriis, quorum opera jam nunc fiunt tanquam cibus ab ore narrantium'; *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, Nicholson (tr.), p. 346.
59 RC 672.
60 RC 693–4.
61 RC 632–3.
62 AA 200–1, 328–9. On Albert's rhetorical techniques, see Peter Knoch, *Studien zu Albert von Aachen*, Stuttgart: Klett, 1966, pp. 108–46.
63 O.S. Pickering, 'The Crusades in Leeds University Library's Genealogical History Roll', in A.V. Murray (ed.), *From Clermont to Jerusalem: The Crusades and Crusader Societies*, Turnhout: Brepols, 1994, pp. 251–66.
64 Friedrich Kraft, *Heinrich Steinhowels Verdeutschung der Historia Hierosolymitana des Robertus Monachus*, Straßburg: K.J. Trübner, 1905.
65 Barbara Haupt (ed.), *Historia Hieroslymitana von Robertus Monachus in deutscher Übersetzung*, Wiesbanden: Steiner, 1972, p. 1: 'Dis ist die vzrüstünge dez herczaugen Gotfriden von Bullion. so hebet hie an die vorrede Rüprechten vff die historie Gotfrides hirczaugen dez vorgenanten.' The translation also has the effect of producing very German-sounding names of crusaders, so that, for example, Achard of Montmerle becomes Achardus von Mörelberg while Everard of Le Puiset becomes Eberhard von dem Brünnlein. However, it is difficult to claim that the German translator consciously set out to Germanise the entire work. For example, the term *Franci*, which we have seen was often used to apply to all of the crusaders, is often mistranslated as *Frankricher* (the inhabitants of *Frankrich*, that is, France), thus giving the impression that the crusade was more of a French enterprise than was actually the case.
66 *Hertzog Gotfrid wie er wider die Türgen und hayden gestritten und das heylig Grab gewunnen hat*, Augsburg: Lucas Zeissenmayer, 1502.
67 MS's-Gravenhage, Koninklijke Bibliotheek, KA XX.
68 For illustrations and commentary, see Martine Meuwese, 'Antioch and the Crusaders in Western Art', in Krijnie Ciggaar and Michael Metcalf (eds), *East and West in the Medieval Western Mediterranean, I: Antioch from the Byzantine Reconquest until the End of the Crusader Principality. Acta of the Congress held at Hernen Castle in May 2003*, Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2006, pp. 337–56.
69 A.V. Murray, 'Kingship, Identity and Name-Giving in the Family of Baldwin of Bourcq', in Norman Housley (ed.), *Knighthoods of Christ: Essays on the History of the Crusades and the Knights Templar Presented to Malcolm Barber*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, pp. 27–38.
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6

INIMICUS DEI ET SANCTAE CHRISTIANITATIS?

Saracens and their Prophet in twelfth-century crusade propaganda and western travesties of Muhammad's life

Sini Kangas

This chapter discusses the popular image of Muslims and the Prophet of Islam among western audiences in twelfth-century crusade-related sources. 'Popular' here indicates both oral and written transmission, the basic assumption being that the texts under discussion were read aloud in public, as well as studied in the privacy of reading rooms. The primary sources under discussion consist of four eleventh- and twelfth-century Latin travesties of Machomet's[1] (Muhammad's) life written in medieval France and Germany: Embricon of Mainz's *Vita Mahumeti*, written by 1033, Guibert of Nogent's description of the founder of Islam included in his *Dei gesta per Francos* from about 1108, Gautier of Compiègne's *Otia de Machomete* from 1137–55 and Adelphus's *Vita Machometi* of about 1150. These texts are compared with their contemporary crusader chronicles and scholarly works on Islam, as well as the descriptions of Saracens in the *chansons de geste* from c.1180 onward.[2] In investigating the sources, it is necessary to consider two core issues. First, what kind of information do the texts relate to the Prophet Muhammad and Muslims? To what extent can this information be interpreted as conventional and common to a wider selection of sources? And are there any specific sets of details distinctive to the source or a limited group of sources?

The second issue that arises from an examination of these *vitae* derives from those sections of the text in which the author chose a particular mode of presentation to inform his readers. Why did he do so? Whereas traditionally applied terminology tends to prevail and resist time and personal choice, the addition of an idiosyncratic detail may be significant, especially if it appears unaltered in several texts.

At the beginning of the twelfth century, Latin Christendom had experienced recent military success on several fronts. Christian victory at Toledo in 1085 had furthered the Spanish *reconquista* (temporarily at a halt); the Norman conquest

of Muslim Sicily had been completed in 1091; and the last Byzantine settlements in Apulia and Calabria had come under Norman rule. On the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, the conquests of Antioch and Jerusalem during the First Crusade (1095–9) had resulted in the founding of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. In the Near East, the first major setback would not occur until 1144, when the first of the crusader states, the County of Edessa, would fall before Zengi. The first four decades of the twelfth century represent a period in European history during which hopes for a universal Christian conquest were high and crusading enthusiasm was unchallenged by large-scale military failure.

John Tolan has convincingly argued that western twelfth- and thirteenth-century responses to Islam were provoked as a defensive reaction to the strengthening power of the Muslim world.[3] This is a valid conclusion, to which I would like to add one observation. While the defensive tone sharpens throughout the period, it becomes clearly audible only from the mid-twelfth century onward, when the failure of the Second Crusade begins to gnaw at the credibility of the Christian championship. This upswing in crusader propaganda against Islam was preceded by a century of relative silence, but when we proceed to the early eleventh-century source material, it seems that a similar reaction had taken place already in the 1020s and 1030s, although on a minor scale. Around the 1020s the first instances of heresy occurred in the west, died away, and were revived a century later. By the mid-twelfth century heresy had become an acute challenge of the western Church.

This is no coincidence. Onward from Ademar of Chabannes, who vividly attacks the heretics of Aquitaine and central France in his *Chronicon* from c.1028,[4] the Catholic texts tend to refer to pagans, Jews, heretics and Saracens as the members of a joint conspiracy against the Church. In those cases when non-Catholic groups are also discussed independently, they represent a common source of diabolic menace. The polemical texts against Islam should not be read as an isolated expression of crusade-provoked xenophobia, but rather as an integral part of the Catholic counter-attack against the concept of religious dissidence, which was intensified by the reformist revival and the clash of popular beliefs and new clerical elites from the 1140s onward.

Crusading remained a crucial theme in the official preaching of the Church throughout the twelfth century, and, along with papal instigation, stories and songs of various sorts were circulated all over Catholic Europe.[5] The Saracen enemy had an important role within this tradition. The western image of Islam, spontaneously fusing traits from ecclesiastical textual tradition and popular notions, took the form of negation and caricature. Moreover, it served an audience comprising both the learned and the unlearned sectors of society; whether produced for laymen or ecclesiastics, in Latin or the vernacular, prose or rhyme, the texts share a common stock of ideas. Its historical longevity prevailed from the late twelfth century well into the modern era.

While learned Christian authors from Byzantium and the Iberian peninsula wrote treatises on Islam from the seventh century onward, the great masses of

transmontane Europe first came to terms with Islam only at the turn of the twelfth century with the outbreak of crusading fervour. The knowledge of Islam among the learned strata of the western society remains a matter of academic conjecture. Clearly some people had some information on Islam in the pre-crusade west,[6] but who they were, what kind of material they were familiar with, and how many they numbered remain matters of speculation. Obviously, such information would have been scattered and unevenly distributed. In about 1108, the Benedictine abbot Guibert of Nogent wrote that since he had not been able to find any information on this Mathomus in texts of the Church fathers, it was likely that this man lived after their time, and that in the absence of any authoritative ecclesiastic sources he was compelled to base his description upon contemporary oral tradition.[7]

Even more crucial than the question of available information are why and by what contextual means crusading raised the general western interest in Islam. Or did the latter generate the former? And to what extent did the relative topicality of Islam arise from extensive structural changes in the intellectual and ideological climate, the rise of popular heresy and the so-called twelfth-century Renaissance? Of similar importance is the question of what factors and processes facilitated rapid establishment of a popular western image of Muslims once interest in the Muslim world had been aroused. It is remarkable how uniform this image already was at the beginning of the twelfth century and how its fundamentals would remain basically intact for centuries.

The first part of the twelfth century was more receptive to the production of western texts concerning Islam than earlier periods. Embricon of Mainz completed his work on Mammutius some sixty years before the First Crusade, but his text survives in versions contemporary with the works of Guibert of Nogent, Gautier of Compiègne and Adelphus. The dating and provenance of the western *vitae* of Machomet/Mammutius/Mathomus supports the idea of active circulation of written material from the late 1130s onwards, which would concur with Guibert's complaint about the inaccessibility of source material around 1105–8. About seventy years later, Alain of Lille briefly mentioned Mahomet's monstrous sectarian life at the beginning of his *De fide catholica contra haereticos* against the Albigensian heretics, apparently assuming that the reader would be familiar with the story.[8] If *Mahometi monstruosa vita* were understood to belong to common knowledge among the learned by the turn of the thirteenth century, the situation would have changed considerably from the time of Guibert's writing.

If Europeans were not interested in Islam in the mid-eleventh century, why did they change their minds? Crusading had an integrating effect on the developing idea of western Christendom, and such a consensus was essentially supported by effective propaganda. One obvious explanation is that the principal idea of the new crusading institution was founded on the image of a violent encounter between Christendom and its arch-enemy, reflecting a variety of Jewish and Christian myths of the wars of the chosen people. Islam was ideologically close enough yet conveniently remote to form an appealing contrast to Christianity in

polemical western writings. The crusading ideal depended on the presence of the bad religion set against the good.

Western writings on Islam in the twelfth century

From the 1140s, within a relatively short period, a wide range of texts concerning Islam emerged. Some of them, like chronicles, sermons, canon law and papal bulls and letters, belong to an established historical tradition. Others, like epic poetry or the western travesties of Machomet's life, represent a textual tradition which either received a literary form to complement oral transmission or made its initial appearance at that point of time. If the terminology concerning Islam was not so well established, it would almost look to modern historian as if a whole new genre emerged from thin air.

Crusading ideology was manifested in a great variety of texts, which can be crudely divided into three categories: authorized preaching and history-writing (crusade chronicles written by ecclesiastics, sermons held in public, papal bulls and letters), popular stories (crusader chansons, oral poetry and songs) and texts intermingling material from both of these (crusader genealogy, hagiography and the lives of Machomet). There were no sharp boundaries between these groups, which typically borrowed narrative elements and stylistic patterns from each other. Similarly, it is not possible to distinguish crusader fact from crusader fiction in an absolutely pure form. For an early twelfth-century historian, historical chronology involved inseparable unities of the ordinary and the extraordinary.

These texts represent an ample and loosely connected mixture of high medieval western ideas rooted in multiple cultural traditions. Consequently, their aim, emphasis and sphere of shared information vary, and although the basic attitude to crusading, the Holy War and Christian conquest is positive, the description of Muslims, or Saracens in medieval terms, is far from uniform. In most cases, Muslims are understood as religious and military opponents; objects to be eradicated. The emphasis on conflict, however, is not limited to Christian–Muslim relations; nor does it rule out the existence of Muslim allies, partners and kinsmen.

The terminology used by the medieval authors was relatively coherent across the different source groups, with 'Saracen' indicating Muslims in general. When necessary, ethnic subcategories such as Turks, Pechenegs, Persians and Babylonians (indicating Shi'ite Egyptians) were employed. Furthermore, biblical terms such as Ishmaelites, Agareni and sometimes 'pagan' replace or exist parallel to 'Saracen' in the sources.[9] The name-variants of the Prophet in the sources refer to the leader of Saracens or their god in forms such as Mahon/Machomet/Machomete/Mathomus. The words 'Muslim' and 'Islam' are absent, only emerging in English and French in the later sixteenth century.[10]

Parallel to the ecclesiastically oriented and scholarly works on Islam,[11] popular stories of various origin circulated the ideas of 'the other'. Many of these texts show no particular interest in the non-Christian case and, even when notable Muslim characters are involved, they tend to think and act according to the

conventional social rules and settings of the western military elite. The influence of western Christianity on crusading was direct and absolute but, as a major cultural connector, religion inevitably also comprised layers other than the purely theological.

After their initial appearance in western textual tradition during the earlier part of the twelfth century, Saracen villains and heroes remained permanently in the literary imagination of the medieval west. Their distinctive characterizations in various genres of fact and fiction, already apparent by early years of the twelfth century, became more sharply discernible over the decades. While ecclesiastical propaganda persistently attacked the blasphemous error of Islam, in the vernacular storytelling tradition the Saracen religion never became a critical issue. At the same time as strengthening discriminatory canonical legislation on Christian–non-Christian relations and crusader propaganda, the *chansons de geste* and romances placed their Saracen princes in prominent roles.

Between factual and fictional texts, semi-fictional works of hagiography, crusading genealogy and the polemical lives of Machomet formed an interrelating historiographical connection between the learned and popular cultural layers. Characteristically, these works borrowed material from both historical sources and the storytelling tradition. These lives are biographies of the Prophet, loosely compliant with the contemporary patterns of western hagiographical writing. In these texts, however, hagiographical models are deliberately inverted to produce a parody of the enemy, fundamentally transforming the initial Koranic example into a work of fantasy. In the western *vitae*, the Prophet of Islam acts as the obverse of the virtuous Christian, prone to diabolical ploys, false prophecies, fabricated miracles and spiritual corruption.

These lives conform to the official line of the Church, promoting the pre-eminence of Catholic Christendom. They underline the decadent basis of Islam, and support the defensive rhetoric of the crusading ideology, showing the necessity of protecting Christianity from its adversaries. The authors describe Machomet as a ruthless opportunist, a trickster keen to benefit from those willing to follow him. They also borrow material from fictional romances and the *chansons de geste*, and Gautier of Compiègne's text may even be interpreted as a parody of knightly virtues.

The existence of the *vitae* is tangible evidence of the keen interest that medieval western Catholics had in the early history of Islam. It has been assumed that because of the absurdity of the accusations made against Machomet, the writers were unfamiliar with the tenets of Islam. While this might be a valid claim concerning the great western public and indeed some of the authors as well, in the case of the western lives of the founder of Islam this view does not bear close scrutiny. The *vitae* are polemical texts, diverting their audience with a wealth of fanciful details, but they were based upon the same traits that are apparent in the Hadith and the Arabic biographies of the Prophet, however blasphemous their interpretation would have seemed to any Muslim. These texts were not written to be critical analyses, but effective tools of public indoctrination. In this basic aim, they seem to have become

successful as a by-product of crusading. Within the genre, the *Vita Mahumeti*, by Embricon of Mainz (by 1033), the description of Mathomus included in Guibert of Nogent's *Dei gesta per Francos*, *Otia de Machomete* by Gautier of Compiègne (c.1138–55) and the *Vita Machometi* by Adelphus (c.1150) represent the earliest versions of the genre produced in the west.[12]

Of these authors, Guibert of Nogent (c.1055–1124), a crusade historian and the abbot of a small Benedictine house at Nogent-sur-Coucy, is the most well known. It is possible that Guibert attended the Council of Clermont in November 1095, thus witnessing the launch of the First Crusade (1095–9) by Pope Urban II. Guibert did not march to Jerusalem with the crusader army, and his history, as well as his description of Mathomus and the rise of Islam, was based upon secondary information. Gautier of Compiègne tells us that he was a Benedictine monk, writing in his house. We know only Embricon's name and that he was connected to the city of Mainz. Adelphus does not reveal his place of origin, but he seems to have been an educated man of sufficient means. Guibert dedicates his chronicle to Bishop Lisiard of Soissons, while the other three texts do not include dedications.

Embricon, Guibert and Gautier came from areas that had never been occupied or populated by Saracens. It is indeed possible that none of the four authors ever talked to a Muslim in person, with the possible exception of Adelphus, who had visited Jerusalem as a (crusader) pilgrim. The authors do not describe their oral informants in great detail, but they are careful to point out their dependence on reliable eyewitnesses who had first-hand information on Saracens. Adelphus had learned of Machomet from a multilingual Greek dracoman on the way from Jerusalem to Antioch. Gautier of Compiègne had been informed by Abbot Warnerius, who had heard of Machomet from a converted Saracen at the cathedral of Sens.[13] With the exception of Embricon, who does not reveal his sources, the authors refer to contemporaries and the primacy of oral transmission of information. Guibert stated unequivocably that the *vita* passage of his chronicle was based upon that which he had heard sung in public. As performance artists would have been sponsored by lay magnates and sporadic audiences in population centres rather than clerical societies or individual ecclesiastics, it seems reasonable to assume that this section of his text genuinely reflected popular ideas as the writer perceived them. Their lives of Machomet were also aimed at oral circulation, and various audiences would probably have been interested in the story for its vivid content and exotic scenery. The narrative is easy to follow, and the basic religious, social and cultural concepts would have been intelligible to illiterate listeners, including children and adolescents. In Guibert's case, we know that he took up the matter out of personal interest, while Gautier was likely to have been commissioned by his abbot, perhaps the same Warnerius he mentions as his source. Of Embricon and Adelphus, we cannot tell. The texts reflect their awareness of their own culture as much as that of Muslims.

Unlike crusader chronicles, which tend to emphasize the importance of documenting rare and excellent deeds, the writers of the *vitae* did not mention

their reasons for writing. The earliest and latest of the texts are in verse, while Guibert and Adelphus chose to write in prose. Guibert's description of Mathomus was included in a more comprehensive crusader chronicle, while the other three sources survive as separate entities. Although the substance of the story is similar in all four works, all of them reflect personal tastes and show some originality. It is crucial to stress, however, that the writers' freedom was limited by genre-specific conventions and the audience they addressed, perhaps much more than it would be today. The apparent contradictions within the same author's texts may not be accidental marks of personal change of attitude, but 'facts' dictated by genre.[14] In respect of the crusade-related textual tradition, these facts would support the idea of the Catholic faith as the only acceptable religion, the pre-eminence of the western code of manners, and the damnation of Christian heretics.

The lives of Machomet are as directly related to the outlook of the ecclesiastical and military elite of the Christian world as are the genres of crusader chronicle and vernacular poetry. The three text groups are closely interrelated, and hardly contradictory in their core ideologies and values. The approach in the lives of Machomet, however, differs from the other two genres in that they reverse familiar themes: spiritual struggle and the necessity of military conflict; submission to divine will; and prowess and loyalty. These now become subjects of religious parody.

Other than the Bible, the authors do not mention any written sources as regards Islam. Guibert tried and failed to find textual sources, but we do not know how extensive his search was. If Nogent had not purchased such material, Guibert might have been able to find interesting texts in some larger monastic libraries in France, and certainly in those on the Iberian peninsula. Before the so-called Cluniac corpus of 1142, including the first Latin translation of the Koran and other texts, such as the famous polemical *Risala* of Pseudo-Kindi, the available source material on Islam may have included Anastasius the Librarian's mid-ninth-century translation of Theophanes' *Chronographia*, and perhaps also *De haeresibus* by John of Damascus (c. 676–749), the *Liber apologeticus martyrum* of Eulogius (d. 859), or Petrus Alfonsi's *Dialogus* from 1106, complemented by sporadic references in western annals and chronicles.[15] Byzantium, the Christian kingdoms of Spain, southern Italy and Sicily formed possible channels of information. The number of pilgrims to Jerusalem also increased throughout the eleventh century, after the first decade.[16] It is likely that the substance of the emerging popular interest in Islam had been incubating in the collective western memory, and that the preaching of the crusades brought this process to fruition.

The multiplication of written sources did not promote an accurate image of Islam. Quite the contrary, the more widespread the idea of the Saracens became in the west, the more peculiar it became by the later Middle Ages. Whereas crusading inevitably embedded Saracens in the popular western imagination, the (reading) public was mostly interested in the exotic stereotypes included in a good story, not scholarly qualified information. Peter the Venerable's introduction to the new Koran translation of 1156, which d'Alverny described as a text that gathered together the complete medieval view on Islam,[17] was clearly not a

bestseller of its time, with one surviving manuscript. Robert Ketton's translation of the Koran survives in more copies (eighteen), but most of these have been dated later than the twelfth or thirteenth century.

Saracens in crusade-related sources

Before the late eleventh century, references to Islam from central and western Europe occur mostly in annals. Although frequent enough, they are rarely more than brief mentions of Saracen raiders assaulting the Catholic lands, or war parties sent to attack Muslim adversaries. The tone of such annalistic entries is neutral, and the reference consists of concise facts: the year and place with an additional sentence or two on the nature of the military campaign and its leaders.

The term 'Saracen' was used even earlier than in these historical sources, in fact well before the emergence of Islam. The earliest mention of them in Migne's *Patrologia Latina* consists of short Syrian stories written down by the third century AD. They take the form of having a Christian hermit as the main character, who is attacked by Saracens while wandering alone in wilderness. The holy man is miraculously rescued by saying the name of Christ or calling for divine aid. In *Vita Antonii* the saint cries, '*Domine Jesu Christe, voluntas tua fiat,*' after which the earth swallows the murderous Saracen.[18] In another story, demons possess the Saracen aggressors, and make them turn their swords on themselves when the words '*Salvator noster Christe Deus, salvum fac servum tuum*' are said aloud.[19] In one case, the Saracen permits the monk to leave peacefully on hearing the words '*per Deum, quem coelis, dimitte me!*'.[20]

In the early Christian texts, the term 'Saracen' indicates ethnicity and place of origin, the Arabian peninsula, as well as religious exclusion of either Christianity or Judaism. When a particular Saracen happens to be Christian, this will be specifically pointed out by calling him either 'Christian Saracen' or 'baptized Saracen' before the rise of Islam. The exact origin of the term is enigmatic. Medieval authors follow the Church fathers Eusebius, Jerome, Orosius, Isidore and Augustine, who derive the Saracen race from Ishmael. Isidore of Sevilla's brief explanation (quoting Eusebius of Caesarea) comes up repeatedly in later sources, including those from the medieval west. Accordingly, before free Sarah bore Isaac, Abraham's slave maid Hagar gave birth to Ishmael, whose descendants were called Agarens after his mother and eventually Saracens.[21] In medieval texts, the latter is clearly the more popular etymology. While learned people used both terms for Muslims, storytelling tradition refers only to Saracens.

Another frequently quoted text is an excerpt from Augustine's *Errationes in psalmos* nos. 81–2. Agarens are here described as proselytes, and enemies of the people of the Lord, whom they are inclined to kill. Their name in Latin indicates alien – this might appear to be a rather surprising remark, but Augustine probably had in mind the Hebrew root הגר (hgr), which includes a connotation of emigration and being a stranger – and thus they are inimical and prone to wicked behaviour.[22] Psalm 82, the *Song of Asaf*, on which Augustine comments, lists the

enemies of the ancient Israelites and calls for their eternal shame, burning and devastation.

These two excerpts reappear from time to time in western history-writing from the eighth century onward.[23] The mentions of Saracens are usually brief, and before the latter part of the eleventh century Christian authors do not appear to be very interested in Saracens, who are seen as the enemies of Christendom, but still enemies *inter pares* among other raiders. In Carolingian chronicles and annals as well as those written in southern Italy and Sicily, the tone remains quite neutral until the turn of the eleventh century, although the references become more frequent during the ninth century. The same applies to Iberian texts from the areas involved in the *reconquista*.[24] In the descriptions of any length, Saracens are depicted as in the early Christian tradition: non-Christians from the desert. Sometimes the term seems to be used synonymously for any non-Christian invaders of European heartlands,[25] including Tatars and Vikings: it would be very surprising for Arab pirates to have attacked France from the northern seas. Generally speaking, the western use of the term is not always precise before the eleventh century.

In the Koran, Ishmael is the firstborn son of Abraham and co-founder of the Temple.[26] The Koran does not refer to competition between Ishmael and Isaac and both half-brothers are spoken of as equally important men of faith. Although Hagar is known to Hadith and Arabic folklore, the Koran does not mention Ishmael's mother at all, and does not refer by name to Sarah either, simply describing Isaac's mother as the wife of Abraham. As Islam strictly forbids idolatry, it is hardly surprising that the alternative Talmudic interpretation of Ishmael as the first idolater,[27] repeated by Christian authors, is completely absent from the Islamic tradition.

With the advent of crusading, the term 'Saracen' became restricted exclusively to the Muslim enemy in western sources. Along with the rising number of historiographical entries from the turn of the twelfth century onward, Saracens began to emerge in various fictional and semi-fictional roles in *chansons de geste*, as well as less known sources, including the *vitae*. In clerical treatises, chronicles, bulls, letters, canonical legislation and preaching, the tone sharpened along with an increase in the amount of space dedicated to Muslims. Abbot Suger refered to them in his *Vita Ludovici Regis VI* as 'inhuman, crude and homicidal barbarians with a striking bodily resemblance to wolves and ravens as a visible mark of their perpetual shame'.[28]

Barbarian violence and the imagery of pollution become customary characteristics of Saracens in crusade propaganda from the beginning. In his sermon launching the First Crusade at the Council of Clermont in 1095, Urban II refered to Muslims as people alienated from God, whose presence pollutes the holy ground.[29] The sermon concentrated on Christian suffering and defilement at the hands of unbelievers,[30] with no mention of the Prophet Muhammad or Muslim religious practices. The sermon of Clermont became a model for later preaching and popularized some negative images of non-Christians, but rather than including

original ideas, the pope gathered and intensified views already present in earlier texts.[31] His naming of a crusader arch-enemy was important, however, because of the extensive publicity that the sermon achieved. The pope could have chosen different terminology. A letter to the Mauritanian prince Anazir written in 1076 by Urban's predecessor, Gregory VII, who likewise was an ardent advocate of crusading, still exists. The letter is polite and diplomatic, thanking the prince for setting free Christian captives. The pope stated that omnipotent God wants to save every soul, and that both he and Anazir believe in one God, the creator and governor of the universe.[32] Alas, this letter remains exceptional among the extant sources.

The outburst of crusading fervour by both authorized and unauthorized preachers coincided with the literation of the epic poetry, *chanson de geste*. From the earliest-known written version of the *geste* onward, the Bodleian version of the *Chanson de Roland* of about 1100, Saracens played an important part in the exploits of the military elite of the west. In *Chanson de Roland* as well as many later works of *geste* scenes occur in the crusading framework, and crusading ideals appear seamlessly interwoven into the perception of knightly virtues of the military nobility. Here, however, the view of Saracens is essentially different from clerical instigation. In the world of the *chansons*, faith supports fighting, but does not necessitate it. The basic obligation to wage war is derived from vassalage, not the crusading vow. The plot merges the cultural conventions of the aristocracy and, while some of these were related to Catholic religiosity, others were not. The division of characters into heroes and villains was certainly not dictated by religious norms. The stress on religion is simply less compared to the preaching of the crusades, related canonical legislation and crusade chronicles combining ideas from ecclesiastic indoctrination and the heroic tradition of the military elite. This basic setting also gave more flexibility to the description of the Saracen within epic poetry and later romances.

The main function of Saracens in the *chansons* is to offer a worthy enemy for the Christian hero, thus underlining the protagonist's military excellence.[33] Secondly, the hints of the marvels of the exotic, unknown east give a special flavour to the story by their presence. Detailed references to Saracen culture remain superficial, however, with no serious attempt to gather information about Muslims. Essentially, the Saracens of the *geste* share the chivalric culture of the west, their emotions and reactions resemble those of Christian knights, and they act according to the social norms and rules of their Christian opponents. If a virtuous Saracen warrior accepts baptism,[34] the difference fades altogether, and he will be integrated into the Christian community. The same applies to the sensual Saracen princess. Epic fighting takes place as a quarrel between rival barons, or on crusade. In the latter case, the essence of the story also comprised military pursuit: aggression and vengeance for the lord and kin, the quest for fortune and glory, acquisition of a fief and fighting for the lady. Intermarriage between Christian knight and converted Saracen lady is a familiar event in the poems. In various famous stories, Guillaume d'Orange marries Guibourc, Baldwin of Bouillon the

sultan's daughter Margalie, and Godfrey Corbaran's sister Florie. In Perceval/Parzival tradition, Queen Belacane does not even have to accept baptism to become married to Gahmuret.

In real life, princesses who married abroad acted as intermediaries between royal houses. If they were successful, they might be able to introduce elements of their familiar culture into the courtly circle and perhaps even contribute to the circulation of various popular traditions. In the *chansons*, Saracen queens adapt so well that they become indistinguishable from Christians: poets do not mention learned Saracens landing in Normandy with the great ladies, or hint at female Saracens advocating cultural diversity. The statement by Wolfram von Eschenbach's Gyburg about the heathenism of Adam and every Christian before baptism, indicating the basic equality of Christian and Saracen in birth, has no contemporary parallel.[35] For the compilers and their audience, complete equality could exist only between Christians of similar class.

Saracens of *geste* are nevertheless understood as human beings, in which view vernacular poetry follows the early Christian thinkers' claim that all people are human.[36] When Meredith Jones claimed that *chansons* describe Saracens as monstrous and 'intensely emotional and excitable people',[37] he was quite right, although it should be added that monstrosity, the miraculous and the magical in these sources involve Christian characters as well, and that reactions that we would stigmatize as unrestrained or even as ferocity would indicate proper knightly behaviour for the medieval audience used to protagonists taken over by berserk rage.[38]

For Eschenbach, what is alien is marked by unconventional behaviour, often by members of foreign cultures, but also by *ellende*, persons exiled from their homeland.[39] The idea of familiar society is limited to lineage, family and feudal ties concerning the sub-class of the main characters.[40] Thus otherness not only marks people outside Christianity, but groups within it. According to David Tinsley, peasants meant little more than animals for medieval western nobility; clerics understood the laity as an outsider group as compared to their own as well as the other way round; men proclaimed superiority over women; and so on.[41]

Albrecht Classen writes in the introduction to *Meeting the Foreign in the Middle Ages*, 'the epistemological function of the other for medieval culture cannot be underestimated and seems to have been one of its major components. Even though feared and dreaded, misappropriated for cultural stereotypes, and misused for the justification of military operations and religious offensives, the other was not yet the absolute negative.'[42] This would also be an appropriate remark in the context of the poetry of the Crusade Cycles.

In *chansons de geste*, Machomet does not occur among the Saracen enemies and allies. When his name is mentioned, he is the supreme god of the Saracen pantheon, whose idol is worshipped in *mahomeries* together with gods familiar from classical antiquity and pre-Christian Frankish lands, typically Apollo, Jupiter and Tervagant.[43] These notions can also be found in crusader chronicles. In a famous scene of his *Gesta Tancredi*, historian Ralph of Caen tells of Tancred of Hauteville's first impression of the Temple of Solomon in Jerusalem in 1099:

> A cast image, made from silver, sat on the highest throne. It was so heavy that six men with strong arms could barely lift it, and ten barely sufficed to carry it. When Tancred saw this he said, 'alas, why is this image here which stands on high? What is the purpose of this image with its gems and gold? What is the purpose of the purple cloth?' For it was an image of Mohamet, entirely covered with gems, purple cloth and shining with gold. 'Perhaps it is a statue of Mars or Apollo, for it could never be Christ. There is no insignia of Christ here, no cross, no crown, no key, no pierced side. Therefore, this is not Christ but rather the first antichrist, the depraved and pernicious Mohamet.[44]

Tancred was clearly accustomed to seeing decorated sculpture, paintings, frescoes and stained glass, which mainly depict human beings in churches. He was only halted by the unconventional magnificence and placement of the idol, which afterwards was torn into pieces. In *chansons* such vehement interventions do not take place. In general, Machomet does not seem to represent more than one pagan god in a lengthier list, although he is often the first of them. He is most frequently mentioned when Saracens habitually emphasize their religion by swearing in his name (*par Mahomet mon deu*),[45] just as Christian knights swear in the name of Christ. In addition to the references to Saracen idolatry, the *chansons* do not discuss Muslim worship or show any particular interest in Saracen spirituality. The writers take the existence of Saracen gods as a fact and describe the demons that inhabit the idols, but these evil spirits do not represent any real danger for Christians. Tancred's antichrist is absent from these works.

The early western *vitae Machometi*

Unlike the *chansons,* the western lives of Machomet concentrate on the religiosity of the founder of Islam. In these texts, idolatry and swearing by exotic godheads is unimportant, but the danger is real. Embricon's compilation is the longest, at 1,145 lines, while the other three are treatises of variable length: Gautier's *Otia de Machomete* is 1,090 lines, Adelphus's *Vita Machometi* 322 lines, and Guibert's text some 230 lines.

The conspicuous feature of the *vitae Machometi* is that they are closely connected, not to one or two but to several medieval genres. The link to hagiography is clear: the lustful and violent heathen prerequisite for Christian martyrdom is discernible in Machomet's character. Unlike a Christian saint, Machomet is not mistreated by pagans, but is the source of violent conflict himself. Machomet is the arch-enemy, but similarly injurious to Saracens and Christians alike. The *vitae* share the tenets of crusade propaganda: the universal primacy of Christian faith; the existence of aggressive nonconformists willing and able to harm Christendom; and the requirement to lessen the danger surrounding the community of the faithful. They claim to narrate facts about important series of past events in chronological order, as well as to refer to reliable eyewitnesses in the manner of a

chronicle. Moreover, they also devote plentiful space to the relation between the protagonist and his lady, miracles and monstrous outbursts of madness, reflecting the themes of the *chansons* and romances. The narrative remains parodic: Machomet is depicted as a low-born swindler unable to win his lady's favour by knightly virtues; the miracles are not real; and the outbursts of choleric rage are reduced to epilepsy.

The four texts agree on the basic chronology of Machomet's life and career. They claim that he was orphaned at an early age, that he was poor and uneducated, that he was an upstart with low connections, but that he nevertheless managed to rise to an influential position by a fortunate marriage to a rich widow. The man of spirit behind Machomet is a Christian heretic or hermit,[46] who teaches him the basic tenets of Christianity (in a corrupt form). Having acquired his wealth and some learning, Machomet succeeds in finding support. The audience is convinced by a series of pseudo-miracles, which Machomet produces by conjuring tricks and through the use of trained animals: a cow, a bull and a dove. Machomet's sectarian ideology is based on the negation of the sacraments, especially marriage and marital chastity. Simple people follow him because of the laxity of the rules he preaches, and remain faithful to his teachings after his death. Machomet dies as the leader of the religious community, mourned by many, although his death is described as being bizarre. Detailed descriptions of Saracen worship are also omitted from the lives, and Allah is not mentioned at all. Machomet acts without divine mandate and, indeed, without any relation to divinity. His personal beliefs are not discussed. The literary convention dictates the main ideas, but in each case the details are flavoured by more individual nuancing.

The earliest of the texts, Embricon of Mainz's *Vita Mahumeti*, is set in Libya, where Mammutius is the servant of the consul.[47] A certain mage, an estranged and bitter heretic, makes Mammutius his disciple, causes the death of the good consul by black magic, and arranges Mammutius' marriage with a displeased widow, who claims that Mammutius is not her equal in rank, and gives her consent only when pressed by the will of God. Mammutius becomes consul in his master's place.[48] Dull-witted Mammutius obeys the mage implicitly, carries out his plans like a mindless tool, and disperses the heresy.[49] When a good son of the Church, the King of Libya, dies, the honour of his kingdom perishes with him.[50] With the vile mage on his side, Mammutius rises to power and defiles the sacred law, preaches the sanctity of adultery and provokes incest.[51] God punishes him with epilepsy, *epileptica pestis*,[52] and he ends his days lacerated by pigs.[53] His followers curse pigs and bury Mammutius in a tomb, which levitates into the air through the use of magnets.[54]

Guibert of Nogent similarly emphasizes the menace of heresy. His treatise begins with a list of famous heretics: Pelagius, Arius and Manes, the Eunomians, Eutychians and Nestorians.[55] After lamenting his inability to name all the thousands of hideous groups of sectarians, he continues with the errors of the Orthodox Greeks, whom he claims to have been justly punished by God because

of their many sins: denial of the Trinity, marriages of priests, supplying pagans with Christian slaves, and promoting prostitution.[56] Next Guibert turns to Mathomus, who, according to popular belief, led Christians astray: he had claimed that the Father was but one, and that Christ was a human being.[57] Guibert is vexed by the fact that he has not been able to find mentions of this Mathomus in the pages of the 'doctors of the church', thus assuming that Mathomus had probably lived quite recently.[58] Guibert, too, ascribes Mathomus' wickedness to his teacher. The Christian community had disqualified him from becoming the Patriarch of Alexandria because of his heretical views.[59] Enraged and vengeful, the wicked hermit chose poor Mathomus as his apprentice, raising him to wealth and importance. He even advised a rich widow to marry Mathomus by promising her a place in paradise. However, the widow was disappointed by his epileptic fits and sought to annul the marriage. The heretical hermit succeeded in convincing her that Mathomus was not an epileptic, but a visionary.

The hermit told everyone that Mathomus was a prophet, and helped him to write a law in which every possible vice was recommended.[60] Mathomus then amazed an audience by the miraculous appearance of a cow, which carried the law book on its horns.[61] Thus normal became abnormal, and the sectarians who once had been Christians wiped out the name of Christ in the east, Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya and parts of Spain.[62] Meanwhile, Mathomus' epilepsy grew worse, and he finally fell down before some pigs, which devoured him, except for his heels. His followers imagined that Mathomus, whom they venerated as an honest man and their patron but not as their god, had ascended to heaven, leaving nothing but his heels to be buried, and condemned the consumption of pork.[63] Later their wicked ways grew worse, they practised their religion in their temples called mahomeries, slaughtered Catholics, deflowered virgins, and even committed sodomy against a certain bishop who died during the act.[64]

Lepage dates Gautier of Compiègne's *Otia de Machomete* in an inter-crusade period between 1137 and 1155. This is an interesting period, witnessing both the high point of crusading enthusiasm after the conquest of Jerusalem in 1099 and the turning of the tide by the Turkish reconquest of Edessa (1144), after which the Second Crusade (1147–9) was preached in the west. If the compilation of the text had been provoked by the looming crusade, it might well have been intended to complement preaching. Consequently, it might well also be that several other *vitae* were commissioned by the time of Gautier's writing: Bischoff dates Adelphus's text to c.1150, and this is close enough to lend the theory more plausibility.[65] While Adelphus's version survives in one nearly contemporary copy and Gautier's in two, it is difficult to draw more precise conclusions, especially when each is as genre-specifically formulated as these are. The content of Gautier's text, however, supports a date previous to the launching of the Second Crusade. Compared to Adelphus's version, the tone is relaxed and Muslims represent no immediate danger to western Christendom. Surprisingly, Gautier's theme is love.

In *Otia de Machomete* Machomet is a clever upstart, educated in the seven liberal arts and Christian faith,[66] and acting in his own interest. A Christian hermit

is again present, but in this case he is depicted as a genuinely holy man, who assists Machomet to win a virtuous Christian lady's hand to spare the Christian community from greater harm.[67] The quest for the love and wealth of this great lady is the main thread of the story, and Gautier primarily describes Machomet as a cunning serf rather than a pseudo-prophet.[68] Machomet fails to impress the lady with his own merits, and has to bribe the barons to be able to woo her. Unlike the other examples, this Machomet is a cold-blooded opportunist and completely indifferent towards religion, whether virtuous or sinful. He knows very well that he is not a prophet, but wants to be rich and famous, and works hard to attain this end using means that could be called Machiavellian.[69] The villains of the story are the Christian barons who betray a noble and pious lady for money.[70] Marital problems arise because of Machomet's epilepsy, but the hermit eventually succeeds in assuring the lady that his fit during the wedding night was actually a divine apparition during which archangel Gabriel had visited him. Her sorrow turns into overwhelming joy.[71] Through his beneficial marriage and successful bribery Machomet is able to become the religious leader of the society. By virtue of the Saracen law brought to him on the horns of his trained bull he renounces baptism, brings back circumcision, and allows one man to have ten wives – and vice versa![72]

After his religious leadership has been secured, Machomet becomes involved in warfare against the Persians: Gautier's remark about God giving victory to those who are humble and who repent could be a direct quotation from a crusade chronicler describing the outcome of a battle.[73] Machomet abandons his men to be slaughtered by the enemy on the battlefield, and tells the soldiers' wives and children that God has destroyed the army for their sins.[74] The new religion spreads and Machomet dies old and famous, only to suffer the pains of hell. After his death his disciples embalm the body and make him a miraculous arch, in which his body seems to float in the air. They believe that his soul has ascended to the stars, and his body remains venerated in the city of Mecca.[75]

Gautier's main themes – winning the affection of the lady, the wedding festivities and waging war – are essentially closer to *chanson de geste* than other *vitae*. The author refers frequently to Machomet's licentiousness and error, but equally to the consequences of deliberate sinning. The text emphasizes the search for power and social mobility. Gautier's text is a travesty but, unlike the other three, it is a travesty of a heretical knight and, more precisely, a crusader knight.

Adelphus likewise places the story in a crusading milieu, explaining that he heard it on his way from Jerusalem to Antioch,[76] and Bischoff's dating of c.1150[77] gives further support to the claim of the author's participation in the failed Second Crusade.[78] In comparison with Gautier's text, Adelphus's version is more realistic, and more pessimistic. Accordingly, Machomet's sect creates monstrous danger for Christendom, representing another example of the eternal fight between 'the sacred faith and paganism, the Temple of the Lord and the idol'.[79] As the text proceeds, it nevertheless becomes clear that Machomet is completely human, and that the mentions of monstrosity refer to his ruthlessness rather than any biological abnormality. What makes Adelphus's text interesting is that he describes

Machomet's career as a process indicating personal change. It is power that corrupts Machomet, a poor swineherd from the remote mountains of Lebanon.

Adelphus describes learning as a means of social mobility, and draws a direct link between successful dogmatism and communal power. He is the only one among the writers who includes the traditional definition of Saracens – that they should be called Agareni after Hagar, not Saraceni as if they were related to Sarah[80] – which is frequently found in ecclesiastic authors' texts from the Church fathers onward. Machomet changes when he meets a Nestorian heretic who has been excommunicated and exiled by his community to sylvan, uninhabited mountains. On describing the hermit, Adelphus quotes Paul's metaphor of foxes despoiling grapevines, which is another commonly quoted verse in learned passages describing the heretical enemies of the Church.[81] While tending his herd, a demon leads Machomet to meet this vile man, whom he reveres for his learnedness and authority. Machomet returns again and again to listen to the hermit teaching his diabolical doctrine, and eventually becomes his trusted disciple.[82]

Together these men begin to preach among Machomet's people. Adelphus states that the new cult belonged neither to orthodox Christiany nor pagan idolatry, but to Nestorian heresy reformulated by Machomet and his teacher.[83] At this phase, Machomet still accepts the hermit as his leader, and swears his loyalty and belief in the piety, dignity and authority of the holy man.[84] Machomet's devotion is obviously real, and his suggestion that the hermit's doctrine be written down as a holy book is based on genuine devotion. A description of the faked miracle and the training of the cow to give the book to Machomet follows.[85] When their following among ignorant people becomes numerous, however, Machomet begins to envy his teacher, who is now venerated as a holy man among the Agarens. Besides, Machomet is not the sole disciple any more, but has to face competition from other favourites. In the middle of the night, Machomet takes his knife and stabs his teacher, later pretending his death is natural.[86]

In the three remaining paragraphs of Adelphus's story, Machomet is chosen as the leader of the religious community in his teacher's place. Not long afterwards, the good King of Babylonia dies, and Machomet, who has secret support even in the court, manages to press the widower queen to marry him.[87] Thereafter Machomet is the universal leader of the Saracens, and is able to use his power to distribute his erroneous beliefs until he is eventually lacerated by wild pigs while hunting in a forest. Only the right arm of the false prophet is left behind.[88]

Adelphus chose the origin, rise and diffusion of a heresy as the central theme of his text. He shows that a clever young man among the landless poor can be raised to religious leadership and that, with adequate support, his ambition will become limitless. Remote areas where the authority of the Church is less pronounced are in particular danger of becoming stained by heresy. Whereas in Gautier's text Machomet was motivated by love, fortune and glory, Adelphus's teaching is that Machomet's opportunism is particularly dangerous, because it derives from spiritual decay. The moral of the story is that all who take up the sword of heresy will perish by that very sword, even if they originally act in good faith.

Adelphus does not discuss the imagined perversions of Machomet: accusations of bigamy, sodomy and other indications of loose sexual morals are not once mentioned. The text similarly omits any details of his teaching, other than pointing out that it was not idolatrous. The only act of violence is limited to personal aggression concealed from the community; no declaration of war takes place.

These four texts refer to Muslims as Saracens.[89] The geographical place names mentioned – Babylon, Lebanon, Libya, Jerusalem and Alexandria – coincide with the mythical fringes of the known world mentioned in crusader chronicles as well as with the medieval western notion of the east as the cradle of heretical beliefs. According to Embricon, Mammutius became the Consul of Libia and married the Queen of Babylon. Adelphus locates him in a cave in the mountains of Lebanon, while Gautier originates Machomet among the Idumean race. Typically of medieval treatises, the words Muslim and Islam are not used.

The texts agree on the historical existence of Machomet and his pre-eminence among the Saracen people. Similar to the brave Saracen opponent who brightens the glory of the Christian knight in the *chansons*, a powerful villain offers an indispensable travesty of the majesty of Christ and his warlike champions. Unlike the noble enemy of epic poetry, however, the *vitae* deliberately ridicule Machomet before consigning him to hell. Colourful and entertaining, they were produced to appeal to various types of audience. Gautier's text was later translated into the vernacular, and similar translations of the other three texts may have been circulated at some point. The texts intentionally describe Machomet in pejorative terms, representing the hard edge of crusade sources' rhetorical attack against the publicly nominated enemy, which in general terms was not produced to educate people, but to arouse them to take up arms.[90] The core of medieval religious prejudice is efficiently summarized in this genre, but this is not the complete explanation.

What do we actually learn about Machomet? The authors tell us that he was poor and lacked connections. He lived in a community which knew about Christianity and even had Christian members. At the fringes of this community were individual religious nonconformists, from whom Machomet drew his doctrinal support. Basically, the Saracen society resembles its western counterpart so much as to be an allegory of it. Unlike the *chansons*, references to the exotic east are absent; nor is Machomet genuinely skilled in magic or trained in oriental astrology. In fact, he is not even possessed by a demon. In his western lives, Machomet is entirely human. At the beginning of the story he is described as a young man, sometimes an imbecile, sometimes cunning, but essentially of servile status, meagre expectations and great hunger for wealth and dignity.[91] If the geographical setting were altered, it would not be a difficult task to imagine his twin brother living in a village in the medieval west.

In contrast to *chansons* and crusader chronicles from the early twelfth century, the western lives of Machomet do not refer to paganism and idolatry.[92] Machomet's followers are mainly mentioned in terms of heresy. They represent a

sect within a community, and the values that they renounce are essentially Christian: Machomet does not create new doctrine, but turns the old one upside down. He attacks the sacraments and the Christian order and, because he preaches a religion that gives simple people the freedom to sin, he becomes popular. He does not seek to conquer some remote kingdom, but attacks his own community, eventually polluting it by schism. The main charges against him – the denial of sacraments, incest, adultery and prostitution – are all problems that well up from *within* society, not outside it.

The most detailed and accurate twelfth-century treatise on Islam, Peter the Venerable's summary *Adversus nefandam haeresim sive sectam Saracenorum* (1142), suggests the Saracen heresy. As the abbot of Cluny, Peter commissioned the first Latin translation of the Koran; he was personally involved in the process, knew where to find adequate scholars to accomplish the project and carefully studied the information gathered by the brothers responsible for the translation work. He was aware of the monotheism of Islam, of Muhammad's role as the Prophet, of the holiness of the Koran, and of the five pillars of faith,[93] but he decided to regard Islam as a heretical movement.

By the mid-twelfth century, two parallel literary traditions concerning Muslims occur in the Catholic west. Peter's text manifests the standpoint of ecclesiastic scholarship, lumping Islam together with Christian heresy.[94] At the same time, popular poetry and the storytelling tradition describe Muslims in terms of idolatrous pagans venerating Muhammad as if he was their god. Both perceptions of Islam were derived from established forms of writing. In Peter's case, we can trace the origins of Saracen heresy to the ancient dispute between the descendants of Abraham, while the fantastic figure of the Saracen of the *geste* seems to have been more recent. From the Islamic point of view, both perceptions were erroneous, if not outright blasphemous.

Medieval literary genres reflect these ideas and often combine them. Whereas *chansons* mostly describe Saracens as idolaters, notions of heresy sometimes emerge between the lines. The western lives of Machomet relied primarily on the heretical interpretation, but they also borrow elements from popular poetry, especially in Gautier's case. Similarly, crusader chronicles include both the idea of the worthy pagan warrior and the vile heretical adversary in their depiction of Saracens. While the medieval ecclesiastical history-writing and literature often favoured the heresy line,[95] such popular major works as Vincent of Beauvais's *Speculum historiale* (1220–44) refer to the worship of the idol of Mahomet.[96]

The Christian idea of Islam as a heresy was, of course, almost as old as Islam itself, originating in the writings of John of Damascus and Theophanes from the early eighth century.[97] The typical accusations related to heresy were likewise present from the beginning, portraying Islam as a negation of true Christianity, guilty of moral and religious pollution, perverse sexuality, and hatred for the orthodox faith. Keeping in mind that crusading intensified the strife between the eastern and western Churches, it is no coincidence that crusader chronicles often mention Muslims and Byzantine Christians in the same breath. The effeminate

and corrupted Greek makes his appearance in crusader propaganda in parallel with the textual invention of Muhammad in the west.

The theme of pollution is especially pronounced in the western *vitae*. After Machomet had strengthened his rule among his people, he condemned the sacred laws of Christianity and forced his followers to resort to bestiality. After his death, Saracens invaded Christian lands, turned churches into stables and filled sanctuaries with their filthy practices.[98] To strengthen their ranks, they even recruited inhuman barbarians, the horrible Agulani.[99]

Heresy becomes an acute problem in Christian writings during the twelfth century, with the appearance of several heretical movements in various parts of Catholic Christendom. It was not a crucial theme in crusader chronicles written between 1100 and 1110; by the middle of the century, the situation had altered considerably. When we look at the themes discussed in detail in the western lives of Machomet – false prophecy, denial of sacraments, spiritual laxness and pollution, envy of true believers, moral opportunism, loose sexual morals, perversion – it is evident that exactly the same accusations are directed towards sectarians and Saracens alike.[100] Furthermore, the four *vitae* refer to Machomet's refusal to observe the doctrines of the Church, his resistance against legal and moral authorities, cerebral disease and unprivileged status, all features that Moore includes in his classical definition of a medieval heretic in the *Formation of a Persecuting Society*.[101]

The communities described are attacked by their own members, often bitter clerics, whose ecclesiastical careers have failed and whose following essentially consists of young adults. The *primus motor* of the ideology in all four lives was not Machomet, but a fellow Christian acting as a mentor of heresy. In Guibert's account, Islam was the invention of an enraged hermit who wanted to avenge himself, while Embricon portrays an apostate mage using a simpleton as his vessel. In this case, the mage takes his revenge through Mammutius after a ploy intended to make him the *pontifex* of Jerusalem has come to nothing and he has been repudiated by the Christian community. Adelphus tells a similar story, although in his case the hermit has been exiled from Alexandria. Gautier's version is exceptional, because the hermit seeks to protect Christendom by assisting Machomet.

The events take place in rural peripheries and in half-mythical cities that are geographically remote from the European heartlands. Ishmael, the ancestor of the Saracen people, was within the Christian tradition conventionally described as a countryman, *rusticus homo*.[102] Although medieval heresies stemmed from both urban and rural networks, the most persistent of them, Catharism, found its major following in the rural communities of southern France. With the intensification of the Cathar question, crusade ideology was gradually extended to include the fight against Christian dissidents, which eventually developed into expansive warfare during the Albigensian crusades (1209–29).

At the beginning of this chapter, the western lives of Machomet were described as semi-fictive connectives between various crusade-related genres. To be more

specific, they represent a phase in which crusading was turning inward, towards societies which themselves claimed to be piously Christian. Their adversary is the traditional arch-enemy of the warriors of Christ, but the context transcends the conventional themes treated in crusader chronicles: sacred warfare, blood vengeance for God, and redemptive acts of violence. The travesties of Machomet are intentional crusade propaganda, but they are primarily targeted against erroneous fellow Christians, and were meant to be read as *examplae*, warning examples about what could happen to a Christian community when a heretic is given free rein. The founder of Islam was a logical choice. Western writers had traditionally attributed heresy to alien infection,[103] and at the peak of crusading fervour Saracens were regarded as a common threat in the medieval west. They made an ideal target for religious propaganda, because they were safely distanced from people's everyday lives and appeared in the exotic east, where the impossible could become possible, and from where heretical influences were known to have originated in earlier years. Although non-Christians, they nevertheless mentioned biblical characters in their holy texts, which could be criticized in a manner that any Christian audience would be able to grasp. Finally, they were part of sacred history through Hagar and Ishmael, and this history had traditionally been discussed in the works of Christian theological authorities.

From the medieval western point of view, Muhammad's gravest error had been the denial of the hegemony of Christians. Peter the Venerable was especially shocked by the fact that after having studied the tenets of Christianity, which can be seen in reworked biblical quotations in the Koran, Muhammad rejected the Christian faith.[104] For Peter, he represented the most successful of the 'false prophets' and the western masses had to be warned against diabolical plots, which had led to suppression of the true faith in vast areas.

The four lives share a view of Machomet as a diabolical trickster, but unlike later treatises, they do not speak of him as antichrist. He is not a giant, not black as a devil, does not wear horns or bark like a dog; there is nothing in the description to relate him to the monstrous races of the *chansons de geste*. However, because he is indistinguishable from the mass of landless poor, he is even more dangerous, a heretical insider who despoils the flock.

The eschatological interpretation of history incorporating the beginning of the era of antichrist, the persecution of the pious and the final battle is absent from the western descriptions of Machomet's life, even Guibert's account, which is famous for its apocalyptical framing of the First Crusade. Nor is mission among the Saracens discussed. Because heretics had traditionally been associated with antichrist, it would have been possible to interpret the rise of Islam as a sign of antichrist's coming,[105] as is typical of eighth-century Syrian Christian and Byzantine writings. This idea had only very limited impact in the early western lives of Machomet.[106] Not that the authors would have been unaware of earlier Christian tradition. The early twelfth-century *vitae* represent a genre with a genuine basis in the international textual tradition of the Middle Ages. The works of Guibert, Embricon, Gautier and Adelphus include references not only to earlier

Byzantine and Iberian texts on Islam, but to the Hadith texts on the Prophet through eastern Christian writings. More often than not, their fantastical interpretation was based upon facts, however distorted from the original context. The writers were correct in claiming that Muhammad did not come from the highest circle of society, that he had contacts with Christians, that he married his former employer, and that he gave a sacred law to his followers. The major Islamic sources on Muhammad, the Koran, Hadith, Sira, the sayings attributed to Muhammad prior to the ninth century, as well as the popular stories of his life and miracles,[107] include elements familiar from his parodic western lives. The biography of the Prophet by Ibn Hisham (d. 828/833) mentions Muhammad's background, the Christian hermit Bahira as the first person to acknowledge Muhammad's sacred vocation, Muhammad's marriage to Khadidja, the writing of the Koran, and its main premises. The fundamental difference resides in interpretation, not in the basic content. Although derogatory and offensive, the tradition of the Prophet in western texts would have been recognizable to any Muslim reader.[108]

Two of the four parodists, Guibert and Adelphus, viewed Islam as a monotheistic religion.[109] The other two did not dispute monotheism, but rather showed Machomet as a man of no inborn religion. It is worth stressing that throughout the crusading era the learned writers were able to depict Saracens as monotheists, as well as to understand Muhammad's role as the Prophet of Islam correctly. The sub-plots of cows and pigs are similarly relevant. Peculiar as these remarks are, they nevertheless show that their writers had some idea of the special image of the cow[110] (the second sura of Koran is called the 'cow's sura') and the pig[111] (not to be eaten because of its filthiness) in Islamic tradition. The four parodies discussed here are by no means idle chit-chat: they did not invent the details, but rather extracted them from the original context and turned them into venomous propaganda.

Conclusions

Crusading had a deeply unifying effect on the developing idea of western Christendom. Recording an essentially European phenomenon, crusade sources reflect the inner tides and tensions of western religiosity rather than a genuine clash of civilizations. For the crusading ideology, the existence of an integral Christendom was the crucial aim. This aim was supported by military struggle against non-believers, but whereas campaigning was a useful method for achieving the innermost objective, it could not be an objective in itself.

What really bothered medieval Christians, in respect to both Jews and Muslims, was the idea that they had deliberately chosen not to be Christians. The ambiguous rabbinical inheritance of Ishmael's idolatry would never have developed into a mature theory of Saracen heresy in medieval Christian writings had Islam as a religion never emerged. Suspicion principally stemmed from the fact that *they had decided to leave the common stock*, the stock that should have formed an undivided Christendom. Societal peace could be seriously fractured by

pogroms, and Jews were to convert by the end of time in any case, according to the Bible and the medieval view, but what was to become of Muslims?

The idea of adversary rivalism is keenly related to heresy in Christian thought from the early centuries AD onwards. The revival of heretical groups in western Christendom during the twelfth century stimulated written attacks against heterodoxy; renouncing heresy is also the crucial moral convention behind the travesties of Machomet.[112] The description of Saracens in twelfth-century western sources has particular, genre-specific forms, but more often than not they are depicted in terms of mirroring and imitation. Whereas the *geste* portrays them as superficially exotic reflections of the Christian knight, the travesties set them in the framework of familiar heresy. Otherness is based on religion in the source material. Saracens are mentioned by chroniclers as the enemies of Christendom, but their hatred is not directed against an individual Christian, but rather against Christianity as a concept. Conflict ends in conversion.

The present academic discussion habitually divides treatises into those discussing medieval heresy and those concerning Christian–Muslim relations. Having written this chapter, I am not convinced that the medieval mind would have seen this division as clear-cut. One of the main functions of the western parodies of Machomet's life was to be a warning against heresy. The authors seem to be afraid not of unknown foreign invaders attacking the Christian heartlands from Khorasan, but of the idea of dissident heretics looming within the religious community. In this sense the Islamic world indeed represents for them a perverse Christendom, a realm which was once truly Christian, but which became corrupted by Machomet, the wicked arch-heretic. The religious zeal of the early crusaders becomes more nuanced if they can be perceived as attacking treasonous ex-Christians rather than non-Christians, about whom no reliable information was available in public. Such notions would also have facilitated the ideological extension of crusading against Catholic heretics by the thirteenth century.

An important question is how Embricon of Mainz, Guibert of Nogent, Gautier of Compiègne and Adelphus were able to attack the key Islamic doctrines of the Prophet Muhammad: his revelation and prophecy, the transmission of the Koran and the divine law given by Gabriel, his resurrection, as well as his social origin and marriages. Their accusations are not simply a continuation of the timeless vituperation against various enemies – loose morals, perverse sexuality, false doctrine – but specifically based upon Islamic tradition.

The writing of these historical travesties of Machomet coincided with the preaching of the crusades and the rise of popular heresy, which further boosted their composition. Many researchers, myself among them, have claimed that the great transmontane masses of Europe had no direct connection with Muslims before the First Crusade. This is probably true, but whether medieval westerners had been and remained without reliable sources of information on Islam is another matter. The contents of the four lives of Machomet considered here simply do not support the notion of the absence of historical source material. They polemicize historical events and most often revert them, but the fact is still discernible.

Jean Flori has argued that the medieval western audience was genuinely interested in Muslims, whereas Norman Daniel has denied the existence of intercultural inquisitiveness.[113] I can agree with both. The fact that imagined Muhammad and his followers occur frequently in a great number of western historical sources from the early twelfth century onward indicates widespread awareness of Islam and the continuing popularity of the subject. These sources are not limited to purely crusade-related topics, but include canon law, historiography, education, diplomacy and so on. At the same time, the western interest was primarily directed inwards, and Muslims continued to be discussed in terms of inclusively Christian terminology. No serious treatise of Islam as an authentic faith was produced in the medieval west.

We know very little of the reception of the early western lives of Muhammad, and it is impossible to tell whether the audience regarded the texts as entertainment, moral tales, the historical truth, a mixture of all these, or something else. The key message – the preference for one faith and an integral and uniform Christian Church – was believed and commonly accepted.

Notes

1 The historical person is hereafter referred to as 'Muhammad', whereas the fictional character, discussed here in medieval western context, will be described according to the texts under discussion, most often as 'Machomet'.

2 With the exception of *Chanson de Roland*, which survives in a late eleventh- or early twelfth-century version. Among the works discussed, *La Chanson d'Antioche* and *Les Chétifs* of the early Crusade Cycle survive in Graindor of Douai's reworked edition from the 1180s. *La Chanson d'Antioche*, Suzanne Duparc-Quioc (ed.), *Documents relatifs a l'histoire des croisades*, 2, Paris: L'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1976–8; *Les Chétifs*, G.M. Myers (ed.), *The Old French Crusade Cycle 5*, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1981.

3 John Tolan, *Saracens*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 171.

4 Ademar of Chabannes, *Chronicon*, Pascale Bourgain *et al.* (eds), *CCCM* 129, Turnhout: Brepols, 1999, III.49, p. 170.

5 Tolan, *Saracens*, p. xix; Dana Munro, 'The Western Attitude towards Islam during the Period of the Crusades', *Speculum* 6, 1931, 329–43; Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (2nd edn), London: Phoenix, 2000 [1982], p. 91; Sini Kangas, 'Militia Christi Meets the Prince of Babylon: The Crusader Conception of Encountering the Enemy', in Outi Merisalo and Päivi Pahta (eds), *Frontiers in the Middle Ages*, Proceedings of the 3rd Medieval Congress, Jyväskylä, 10–14 June 2003, Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, 2006, pp. 107–20.

6 For instance, in the ninth century the monastery of Saint-Germain-des-Prés in Paris purchased relics of three so-called Cordoban martyrs. These saints had been executed between 850 and 859 for publicly renouncing the tenets of Islam, and seem to have been venerated outside Spain relatively early. Tolan, *Saracens*, p. 100.

7 GN 94.

8 Alain of Lille, *De fide Catholica contra haereticos sui temporis, praesertim Albigenses*, *PL* 210, Col. 0421B, Lib. 4. Cap. 1: 'Contra paganos seu Mahometanos. Nunc contra Mahometi, discipulos styli vestigium vertamus. Cujus Mahometi monstruosa vita, monstruosior secta, monstruosissimus finis, in gestis ejus manifeste reperitur; qui

maligno spiritu inspiratus, sectam abominabilem invenit, carnalibus voluptatibus consonam; et ideo, multi carnales ejus secta illecti, et per errorum varia principia dejecti, miserabiliter perierunt, et pereunt; quos communi, vulgo, vocabulo, Saracenos vel paganos nuncupant.'

9 See, e.g., *GF* 20, 49, listing Saracens along with Turks, Arabs, Persians, Paulicians, Agulans, Azymites and Kurds.

10 For the etymology of Muslim (Mussulman/musulman) and Islam, see the Oxford English Dictionary, http://dictionary.oed.com/entrance.dtl; Trésor de la Langue Française informatisé, http://atilf.atilf.fr/tlf.htm, accessed 30 December 2008.

11 Among these, the major work was the so-called Cluniac collection commissioned by Peter the Venerable (c. 1092/1094–1156), and completed by 1143. The collection included the first Latin translation of the Koran by Robert Ketton.

12 GN; Embricon de Mayence, *Vita Mahumeti*, Guy Cambier (ed.), *Collection Latomus* 52, Brussels: Latomus, Revue d'études Latines, 1962; Gautier of Compiègne, *Otia de Machomete*, R.B.C. Huygens (ed.), in Alexandre du Pont, *Roman de Mahomet*, Y.G. Lepage (ed.), Paris: Kliensieck, 1977, pp. 96–208; Adelphus, *Vita Machometi* as *Ein Leben Mohammeds (Adelphus?)*, Bernhard Bischoff (ed.), *Anecdota novissima. Texte des vierten bis sechzehnten Jahrhunderts, Quellen und Untersuchungen zur Lateinischen Philologie des Mittelalters 7*, Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann Verlag, 1984, pp. 106–22.

13 Lepage has claimed that Alexandre du Pont's *Roman de Mahon* from 1258 is a translation of Gautier's Latin original, which could indicate the continued circulation and repute of the text in medieval France. Lepage, *Roman de Mahomet*, p. 15.

14 Sini Kangas, 'The Genesis of a Crusade Chronicle in the Early Twelfth Century', in Marko Lamberg, Jesse Keskiaho, Elina Räsänen and Olga Timofeeva (eds), *Methods and the Medievalist: Current Approaches in Medieval Studies*, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008, pp. 103–22.

15 Svetlana Luchiskaya, 'The image of Muhammad in Latin Chronography of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries', *Journal of Medieval History* 26, 2000, 115–26; Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, 'La connaissance de l'Islam en Occident du XI au milieu du XII siècle', in *Settimane di studio del Centro italiano di studi sull'alto medioevo 12, l'Occidente e l'Islam nell'alto medioevo, Spoleto 2–8 aprile 1964*, 2, Spoleto: Presso la sede del Centro, 1965, pp. 577–602; Tolan, *Saracens*, pp. 155–7.

16 Medieval pilgrimage itineraries do not discuss Islam. They concentrate on the Christian holy places visited and show little interest in religions other than Christianity. However, pilgrims on the journey apparently met Muslims and, after returning home, probably spoke of their trips to the people around them. Pilgrimage may well have indirectly enhanced interest in people and areas outside Europe.

17 Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, 'Pierre le Vénérable et la légende de Mahomet', in M.C. Oursel (ed.), *A Cluny, Congrès scientifique, Fêtes et cérémonies liturgiques en l'honneur des saints Abbés Odon et Odillon, 9–11 juillet 1949*, Dijon: Société des Amis de Cluny avec le CNRS, 1950, pp. 161–70.

18 Joannes Moschus, *Pratum spirituale, Vita Antonii senis monasterii in Scopulo*, *PL* 74, Cap. 99, Col. 0169A.

19 Joannes Moschus, *Pratum spirituale, Relatio abbatis Jordaniis de tribus Saracenis qui se invicem interfecerunt*, *PL* 74, Cap. 155, Col. 0198D.

20 Joannes Moschus, *Pratum spirituale, De sancto Monacho, qui Saracenum venatorem per duos dies immobile reddidit*, *PL* 74, Cap. 133, Col. 0187B.

21 Isidorus Hispalensis, *Chronicon*, *PL* 83, *Tertia aetatis*, Col. 1024B: 'Abraham annorum C, genuit Isaac, ex Sara libera. Nam primum ex ancilla Agar genuerat Ismael, a quo Ismaelitarum gens qui postea Agareni, ad ultimum Saraceni sunt dicti.'; Eusebius of Caesarea, *Eusebii hieronymi, Stridonensis presbyteri, Interpretatio chronicae*, *PL* 27, early translation from Greek, Col. 121: 'Abraham ex ancilla Agar generat Ismael, a quo Ismaelitarum genus, qui postea Agareni, et ad postremum Saraceni dicti.'

22 Augustine, *Enarrationes in psalmos*, in Psalmum LXXXI, *PL* 37, Col. 1053: 'Agareni, Proselyti, id est, advenae: quo nomine significantur inter inimicos populi Dei, non illi qui cives fiunt; sed qui in animo alieno atque adventitio perseverant, et nocendi occasione inventa se ostendunt. Gebal, Vallis vana, id est, fallaciter humilis: Amon, Populus turbidus, vel Populus moeroris: Amalech, Populus linguens; unde alibi dictum est, "Et inimici ejus terram linguent" (Psal. LXXI, 9). Alienigenae, quamvis et ipso nomine latino se indicent alienos, et ob hoc consequenter inimicos, tamen in hebraeo dicuntur Philistiim; quod interpretatur Cadentes potione, velut quos fecit ebrios luxuria saecularis. Tyrus lingua hebraea dicitur Sor; quod sive Angustia sive Tribulatio interpretetur, secundum illud accipiendum est in his inimicis populi Dei, quod ait Apostolus: "Tribulatio et angustia in omnem animam hominis operantis malum" (Rom. II, 9). Omnes ergo hi sic enumerantur in hoc psalmo: "Tabernacula Idumaeorum et Ismaelitae, Moab et Agareni, Gebal et Amon et Amalech, et alienigenae cum habitantibus Tyrum" (Psalm 82).'

23 Leo I (440–61), *de Manicheorum haereses*, *PL* 55, 0784A; Fredegar, *Chronicum* (various authors 584–641), *PL* 71, Cap. LXVI, Col. 0674A; Beda, *Quaestionem super genesim ex dictis partum dialogues*, *PL* 93, Col. 0311A. Smaragdus of St Michel on the Meuse (c.760–c.840) in northern France includes a long and detailed text on the geography of the Holy Land in the *Lectio actuum apostolorum* from about 820. He mentions that the Arabs consist of several peoples, such as Moabites, Ammonites, Idumeans and Saracens, among many others. He also mentions that Damascus is a famous Saracen metropolis. *Lectio actuum apostolorum*, *PL* 102, Cap. VIII, Col. 0254C–D; Liutprand of Cremona, *Liutprandi adversaria* (auctor incertus), *PL* 136, Col.1156D; Rabanus Maurus (c.780–856) writing in about 844, *De universo, Lib. Sextus Decimus*, Cap. 2, *De gentium vocabulis*, *PL* 111, Col. 0438A–C; Walafrid Strabo (d. 849), *Liber genesis*, *PL* 113, Cap. XVI, Col. 0122A–B; Bernard of Clairvaux, *Parabolae Sancto Bernardi*, Parabola 1, *De pugna spirituali*, *PL* 183, Col. 0760B; Petrus Venerabilis, *Epistola sive tractatus adversus petrobrusianos haereticos*, *PL* 189, Col. 743B.

24 For example, the *Chronicon Abeldense* (*PL* 129, Col. 1142B–1143C) describes the Moorish conquest as follows: 'Saraceni Spaniam sunt ingressi anno regni Ruderici de Abdelmelic, anno Arabum c. Ingressus est primum Abzuhura in Sapania sub Muza duce in Africa commanente et Maurorum patrias defecante. Alio anno ingresso est Tarik. Tertio anno jam eodem Taric praelio agente cum Ruderico, ingressus est Muza Iben Muzeir, et periit regnum Gothorum, et tunc omnis décor Gothicae gentis pavore vel ferro periit. Et rege quoque Ruderico nulli causa interitus ejus cognit manet usque in praesentem diem.' The writer continues with the conventional explanation of the origin of Saracens: 'Saraceni perversi se putant se esse ex Sara; verius Agareni ab Agar, et Ismaelitae ab Ismaele.'

25 For example, the Saracens against whom Charlemagne fights in eighth-century Gothia in *Annales Quedlinburgenses* and *Weissenburgenses.*

26 Cow's Sura, II.127.

27 Louis Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1946–7, I.237–40, 263–9; V.230–3, 246–7. Genesis 21:9 was interpreted by some rabbis as meaning that Ishmael was being idolatrous, while others claimed that Ishmael simply turned against Isaac.

28 Suger, *Vita Ludovici Regis VI*, Cap. XXI, *PL* 186, Col. 1319B: 'Saracenos immisericorditer trucidare, inhumata barbarorum corpora lupis et corvis ad eorum perennem ignominiam exponere, tantorum homicidiorum et crudelitatis causam terrae suae defensione justificare.' For an English translation of Suger's chronicle, see Suger, Abbot of Saint Denis, *The Deeds of Louis the Fat*, Richard Cusimano and John Moorhead (trs), Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1992, Cap. 21.

29 RM 727–8.

30 RM 727–8; BD 12–13; RA 288.

31 For example, Hrabanus Maurus, *Commentatriorum Genesim libri quatuor*, De conjunctione Agar, *PL* 107, Cap. XVIII, Col. 0544A; *Super Jeremiam prophetam*, *PL* 111, Lib. 1, Cap. 2, Col. 0813B; Bruno Carthusianorum (c.1030–1101), *Expositio in psalmos*, Psalm 82, *PL* 152, Col. 1078B.

32 Gregory VII, *Gregorii VII Registrum libri I–IX*, Erich Caspar (ed.), *MGH* Epistolae Selectae, Lib. III, 21, 2.1, 287–8: 'Nam omnipotens Deus, qui omnes homines vult salvos facere et neminem perire, nichil est, quod in nobis magis approbet, quam ut homo post dilectionem suam hominem diligat et, quod sibi non vult fieri, alii non faciat. Hanc utique caritatem nos et vos specialius nobis quam ceteris gentibus debemus, qui unum Deum, licet diverso modo, credimus et confitemur, qui eum creatorem seculorum et gubernatorem huius mundi cotidie laudamus et veneramur.'

33 The idea of the noble Saracen as an alternative hero was already present in the earliest surviving works of *geste*, developing later into highly impressive characters in the works of Chrétien de Troyes and Wolfram of Eschenbach (writing in c.1170–80 and by c.1220, respectively). For Saracen heroes, see Baligant in *Chanson de Roland*, Soliman in *Chanson d'Antioche*, Almes in *Chanson d'Aspremont*, Fierabras in *Parzival* and Rainoart in *Chanson de Guillaume d'Orange*. Wicked Christians also occur in the tradition without a break from Roland's opponent Ganelon onward. In the thirteenth-century continuations of the *Chanson de Jérusalem*, the Saracen Corbaran is depicted as a virtuous knight, while the Patriarch Eraclius of Jerusalem is the rotten apple of the story. *Chanson de Jérusalem*: part 1, *Chrétienté Corbaran*: part 2, *La prise d'Acre*, *La mort de Godefroi*, *La Chanson des Rois Baudouins*. In the poems of the second Crusade Cycle from the fourteenth century, perhaps echoing the *Chronicon* by William of Tyre (c.1185) and its vernacular continuations, Saladin acts as a chivalrous hero.

34 Saracen conversion did not form a consistent crusader policy in the First Crusade, and did not become a subject of interest before mendicants took up the issue in the thirteenth century. Christian mission did not form a part of the preaching of the First Crusade. Conversions occur in poetry from the conquest of Nicea in 1097 onward, *Chanson d'Antioche*, LXXIX.791–2. In the chronicles, the earliest convert mentioned by name is *Pirus, the Turkish Emir* (of Antioch), in 1098. *GF* 44; BD 52–3.

35 Wolfram von Eschenbach, *Willehalm*, M.E. Gibbs and S.M. Johnson (trs), Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984, book VI, 155f.

36 According to Joyce Salisbury, by the Late Middle Ages this consensus wanes, and certain groups are labelled as less human than others. J.E. Salisbury, *The Beast within: Animals in the Middle Ages*, New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 153.

37 C.M. Jones, 'The Conventional Saracen of the Songs of Geste', *Speculum* 17 (1942), 201–25, at 205.

38 As Dorothy Sayers writes in her delicious foreword to her edition of the *Chanson de Roland* in 1957, 'the idea that a strong man should react to great . . . calamities by a slight compression of the lips and by silently throwing his cigarette into the fireplace is of very recent origin'.

39 D.F. Tinsley, 'The Face of the Foreigner in Medieval German Courtly Literature', in Albrecht Classen (ed.), *Meeting the Foreign in the Middle Ages*, New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. 45–70, at p. 46.

40 Tinsley 'The Face of the Foreigner', p. 47.

41 Tinsley, 'The Face of the Foreigner', p. 48.

42 Classen (ed.), *Meeting the Foreign in the Middle Ages*, p. xvi.

43 For example, *Chétifs* mentions as Saracen gods Mahon, Tervagant, Apollin, Sathanas, Jupin, Caju and Margot, 1.33 (Mahon and Tervagant), 3.117 (Apollin and Sathanas), 24.687 (Mahomet, Tervagen and Jupin), 51.1536 (Mahomet and Cahu), 134.3999–4000 (Mahon, Margot, Apollin, Jupiter Baraton).

44 RC 695: 'Stabat in excelso simulacrum fusile throno, / Scilicet argentum grave, cui

vix sena ferendo/ Dextera sufficiat fortis, vix dena levando. / Hoc ubi Tancredus prospectat: "Proh pudor! inquit. / "Quid sibi vult praesens, quae stat sublimis, imago? / "Quid sibi vult haec effigies? quid gemma? quid aurum? / "Quid sibi vult ostrum?" Nam gemmis totus et ostro / Mahummet redimitus erat, radiabat et auro. / "Forsitan hoc Martis vel Apollinis est simulacrum / "Numquid enim Christus? non hic insignia Christi, / "Non crux, non sertum, non clavi, non latus haustum. / "Ergo neque hic Christus: quin pristinus Antichristus. / "Mahummet pravus, Mahummet perniciosus."' Translation from Bernard and David Bachrach, *The* Gesta Tancredi *of Ralph of Caen*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, p. 202. Another chronicler of the First Crusade, Fulcher of Chartres, also mentions the idol of Mahumet. FC, 289–90. Neither of the writers was present at the conquest of Jerusalem in July 1099. Both of them, however, had met Tancred, had access to the Latin ruling circles, and spent decades in Syro-Palestine.

45 For swearing in the name of Mahomet or Mahon, see, e.g., *Chanson d'Antioche*, XXI.460, XXV.550; *Chétifs*, 2.75, 2.80, 5.174, 8.246, 55.1731, 62.2032, 89.2933, 125.3784. It appears frequently also in later works of the Crusade Cycles.

46 For the tradition of the Nestorian Monk Bahira, see Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, 'Deux traductions latines du Coran au moyen âge', *Archive d'Histoire Doctr. et Litterature de Moyen Âge* 16, 1948, 69–131. It reaches the west through St John of Damascus and Theophanus and also via a Latin translation of Arabic *Apocalypse of of Bahira* and *Risalat-al-Kindi*. Bahira is originally mentioned in Muhammad's biography by Ibn Hisham.

47 Embricon of Mainz, *Vita Mahumeti*, lines 219–20.

48 Embricon of Mainz, *Vita Mahumeti*, lines 255–84, 299–320.

49 Embricon of Mainz, *Vita Mahumeti*, lines 744–58.

50 Embricon of Mainz, *Vita Mahumeti*, lines 388, 420–2.

51 Embricon of Mainz, *Vita Mahumeti*, lines 695, 711–34, 788–810.

52 Embricon of Mainz, *Vita Mahumeti*, lines 835–45.

53 Embricon of Mainz, *Vita Mahumeti*, lines 1055–7.

54 Embricon of Mainz, *Vita Mahumeti*, lines 1104, 1138–9.

55 GN 90.

56 GN 92–3.

57 GN 94.

58 GN 94.

59 GN 94–5.

60 GN 96–7.

61 GN 97–8.

62 GN 98–9.

63 GN 99–100.

64 GN 101–2.

65 Bischoff, *Vita Machometi*, introduction to Adelphus's text, p. 106.

66 Gautier of Compiègne, *Otia de Machomete*, lines 22–5.

67 Gautier of Compiègne, *Otia de Machomete*, lines 627–8.

68 Gautier of Compiègne, *Otia de Machomete*, line 26.

69 Lepage, *Roman de Mahomet*, introduction to Gautier's text, p. 79.

70 Gautier of Compiègne, *Otia de Machomete*, lines 279–84.

71 Gautier of Compiègne, *Otia de Machomete*, lines 400–5, 441–52, 635–6.

72 Gautier of Compiègne, *Otia de Machomete*, lines 839–45, 850–6, 1013–16.

73 Gautier of Compiègne, *Otia de Machomete*, lines 943–6. For the comparison between battle and joint ascetic observance, see RA 296; *GF* 67, 90; BD 17, 22.

74 Gautier of Compiègne, *Otia de Machomete*, lines 1007–8.

75 Gautier of Compiègne, *Otia de Machomete*, lines 1057–65, 1078.

76 Adelphus, *Vita Machometi*, lines 5–12.
77 Bischoff, *Vita Machometi,* introduction to Adelphus's text, p. 106.
78 Adelphus does not directly mention the crusade, or give out any personal data, except for his name in line 323.
79 Adelphus, *Vita Machometi*, lines 9, 16–17. The polemical beginning is not in line with the rest of the story, which refers to Islam as a heresy including no further mentions of pagan practice. With this particular phrase, Adelphus links Islam with the ancient fight between God and the Devil.
80 Adelphus, *Vita Machometi*, lines 22–30.
81 Adelphus, *Vita Machometi*, line 46; see, e.g., Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermones in Cantica Canticorum, Sermo LXV, De clandestinis haereticos. PL* 183, Col. 1089A–1095B, Cap. 1 (1089A): '[Heretics are like] generis vulpium qui sunt adulatores, detractores, ad seductorii quidam spiritus, gnari et assueti mala sub specie boni inducere'; Cap. 4 (1091D): 'vastatia vineae [the metaphor of wasted grapevines referred to]'; (1094B): 'Capite nobis vulpes parvulas, quae demoliuntur vineas [another reference to foxes despoiling grapevines, Cant. II, 15]'.
82 Adelphus, *Vita Machometi*, lines 80–91.
83 Adelphus, *Vita Machometi*, lines 115–17.
84 Adelphus, *Vita Machometi*, lines 135–48.
85 Adelphus, *Vita Machometi*, lines 225–57.
86 Adelphus, *Vita Machometi*, lines 258–70.
87 Adelphus, *Vita Machometi*, lines 276–300.
88 Adelphus, *Vita Machometi*, lines 301–21.
89 Adelphus, *Vita Machometi*, lines 22–30.
90 Norman Housley, 'The Crusades and Islam', *Medieval Encounters* 13, 2007, 189–208, at 206.
91 Hermit promises Machomet *dignitas vel divitiarum prosperitas.* Adelphus, *Vita Machometi*, lines 131–2.
92 Among the authors of the *vitae*, Embricon is the only one to mention the deities of antiquity. In his case, the list of deities serves as a dramatic opening of the text without implying anything other than that the sect of Mammutius is yet another example of these *gens revera*. Embricon of Mainz, *Vita Mahumeti*, lines 47–52.
93 Petrus Venerabilis, *Adversus nefandam haeresim sive sectam Saracenorum*, *PL* 189, Col. 0675A–0687D. Peter criticizes the teaching of Muhammad, whom he calls Mahumeth (Cap. 3, Col. 0675C), and proceeds to Muhammad's role in the Koran as a messenger of God (Cap. 4, Col. 0677D). Peter also states that many Jewish and Christian texts mention Muhammad, and that they do not venerate him as a prophet (Cap. 14, Col. 0685C). The feast month 'Ramazan' is mentioned (Cap. 16, Col. 0687D).
94 Eulogius Cordubensis, *Apologetiucs martyrum*, *PL* 115; Bruno Carthosianorum, *Expositio in psalmos*, *PL* 152, Psalm 82, Col. 1078B; Petrus Pictavianus in a letter to Petrus Venerabilis, *PL* 189, Col. 0661C; Petrus Venerabilis, *Adversus nefandam haeresim sive sectam Saracenorum*; Alain of Lille, *De fide catholica contra haereticos sui temporis*, Lib. 4, *Contra paganos seu mahometanos*, *PL* 210, Col. 0421A–0422B. See also Michael Frassetto's analysis of Ademar of Chabannes's sermons in 'The Image of the Saracen as Heretic in the Sermons of Ademar of Chabannes', in D.R. Blanks and Michael Frassetto (eds), *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1999, pp. 83–96.
95 In Dante's *Divina Commedia* (1304–21), Muhammad is still described as *seminator di scandali e di scisma*. Dante Alighieri, *Divina Commedia, Inferno* XXVIII, 35.
96 Vincent of Beauvais's primary source for the Prophet was Helinandus of Frigidi Montis's *Chronicon* from 1212, which states that *salam* (peace) indicates God in

Arabic, that Saracens fabricate idols in the name of Mahomet, and that there was an image of Mahomet in the Temple of Jerusalem. Helinandi Frigidi Montis, *Chronicon*, *PL* 212, Lib. 45, Col. 0849A; Lib. 47, Col. 0995B. Saracen idolatry comes up in papal bulls as late as in 1418 (Martin V). Norman Housley, *Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400–1536*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 182.

97 John of Damascus, *De haeresibus*, *PG* 94, 761–71; *Theophanes Chronographia et Anastasii Bibliothecarii Historia ecclesiastica sive Chronographia tripartite*, 2, C. de Boer (ed.), Leipzig, 1883–5, I.333–5, II.208–10; D'Alverny, 'La connaissance de l'Islam', 577–602.

98 GN 98, 101–2; Embricon of Mainz, *Vita Mahumeti*, lines 727–34, 801–15. By 'filthy practices', Guibert and Embricon refer to sodomy, widespread prostitution and incest.

99 GN 209.

100 See, e.g., the writings Bernard of Clairvaux and Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay. Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermones in Cantica Canticorum, Sermo LXV, De clandestinis haereticos*, *PL* 183, Col. 1089A–1095B, n. 81 above; Cap. 8, Col. 1093A: 'Fecimusne aliquid? Puto quia fecimus. Cepimus vulpem, quia fraudem percepimus. Manifesti sunt qui latebant falsi Catholici, veri depraedatores catholicae'. *Sermo LXVI, De erroribus haereticorum circa nuptias, baptismum parvulorum, purgatorium, orationes pro defunctis et invocationem sanctorum, Capite nobis vulpes parvulas, quae demoliuntur vineas* [another reference to foxes despoiling grapevines, Cant. II, 15]; Cap. 1, Col. 1094B: 'Rusticani homines sunt et idiotae, et prorsus contemptibiles: sed non est, dico vobis, cum eis negligenter agendum. Multum enim proficiunt ad impietatem, et sermo eorum ut cancer serpit (II Tim. II, 16, 17)'; Cap. 3: 'laetentur in perditione hominum. Tolle de Ecclesia honorabile connubium et torum immaculatum (Hebr. XIII, 4); nonne reples cam concubinariis, incestuosis, seminifluis, mollibus'; Cap. 7: 'Immundis autem, et infidelibus nihil est mundum, sed polluta est eorum mens et conscientia (Tit. I, 15)'; Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay, *Historia Albigensis*, *PL* 213, Cap. 8, Cap. 43. Peter the Venerable agrees on the false prophecy of Muhammad, *PL* 189, Cap. 29, Col. 0698A: 'nec propheta fuerit, nec Dei nuntius, sed seductor et profanus sequentia declarabunt'. See also C.M. Kurpiewski, 'Writing beneath the Shadow of Heresy: The *Historia Albigensis* of Brother Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay', *Journal of Medieval History* 31, 2005, 1–27; Frassetto, 'The Image of the Saracen'; R.I. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 17–19.

101 Moore, *Persecuting Society*, pp. 68, 98, 122, 139.

102 Beda, *Quaestionem super genesim ex dictis partum dialogues*, *PL* 93, Col. 0311A; Hrabanus Maurus, *Commentariorum Genesim libri quattuor. De conjunctione Agar*, *PL* 107, Cap. 18, Col. 0544A; Walafrid Strabo, *Liber genesis*, *PL* 113, Col. 0122A–B; Bernard of Clairvaux, *Sermones in Cantica Canticorum*, *PL* 183, Col. 1094B.

103 Moore, *Persecuting Society*, 1987, pp. 22, 111.

104 Petrus Venerabilis, *Adversus nefandam haeresim*, *PL* 189, Col. 0685D–0686B: 'Ex quo ab aliquot annis lex Mathumetica de lingua Arabica in patriam, id est Latinam, meo translata est, mirari non desino, nec satis mirari sufficio, qua ratione propheta ille vester suo Alchoran quaedam de Hebraica, quaedam insuper de Christiana lege excerpta admiscuit . . . Si acquiescit Judaicis vel Christianis scriptis ex parte, cur non acquiescit ex toto? . . . Cur bonam dixit legem Judaicam, quam non sequitur? cur Christianum Evangelium praedicat, quo vituperat?'

105 Bernard McGinn, *Antichrist: Two Thousand Years of the Human Fascination with Evil*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, p. 85.

106 Eulogius of Cordoba Eulogius names Muhammad a heresiarch and forerunner of antichrist, *PL* 115, Col. 744C–D; and Petrus Alvarus identifies him with Behemoth and Leviathan, in the line of the predecessors of antichrist, *PL* 121, Col. 535A.

However, these two authors were writing in the Iberian peninsula, and their texts reflect ideas specially related to the *reconquista*. Except for the remotely possible exception of Ademar of Chabannes, crusade historians from the Franko-Norman and Teutonic realms did not discuss crusading in terms of the appearance of antichrist before the thirteenth century.

107 According to the Koran, Muhammad's only miraculous act was the production of the holy book, whereas the Hadith and biographies contain several references to the miracles of the Prophet.

108 As Norman Daniel states in 'Learned and Popular Attitude to the Arabs in the Middle Ages', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 41, 1977–8, 41–51. However, he is painstakingly correct in pointing out the difficulty of explaining medieval western texts, which seem to include fact and fiction at the same time. He could have been describing the interpretation of these early travesties of Machomet's life.

109 GN 100; Adelphus, *Vita Machometi*, lines 115–17. Several later crusade-related authors were aware of the monotheism of Islam, including Peter the Venerable and his translators, Otto of Freising, William of Malmesbury, William of Tyre and Humbert of Romans.

110 The animal motif is developed in the story of the bovine disciple of Machomet. According to Adelphus and Guibert, the false prophet trained a cow to perform his false miracles. The cow ran to him with the Saracen law on her horns at his command, acting as a messenger of faith. In Gautier's version, Machomet has a white bull arrive bearing the Koran, and Embricon includes in his *vitae* a lengthy series of bovine miracles, which culminate in the removal of the King of Babylon from the throne and his replacement by Mammutius before the eyes of an admiring audience. GN 97–98; Adelphus, *Vita Machometi*, lines 225–32; Gautier of Compiègne, *Otia de Machomete*, lines 839–56; Embricon of Mainz, *Vita Mahumeti*, lines 518–41, 605–44, 667–9, 695.

111 The western tradition relates the prohibition on the eating of pork to the death of the Prophet. In Guibert's account Mathomus dies during an epileptic attack, and is eventually eaten by pigs, which leave nothing behind but his heels. His followers think that he has gone to heaven. Adelphus's work includes a similar story, although this time the part of the body left behind is the right arm. Machomet's link with pigs is here stressed by making him a swineherd from Lebanon. In Embricon's text, God strikes Mammutius with epilepsy and makes him fall among pigs, which lacerate his body and separate his head from his shoulders. GN 99; Adelphus, *Vita Machometi*, lines 311–22; Embricon of Mainz, *Vita Mahumeti*, lines 835–45, 1055–7.

112 Generally speaking, the majority of medieval learned treatises emphasized heresy and the denial of Christ rather than idolatry in their explanation of Islam. However, genre dictated the interpretation to some extent, and in cases of the *chansons* and chronicles, idolatry prevails or occurs in parallel with heresy.

113 Jean Flori, 'La caricature de l'Islam dans l'Occident médiéval: origine et signification de quelques stéréotypes concernant l'Islam', *Aevum* 2, 1992, 245–56; Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (3rd edn), Washington: Oneworld, 2000, p. 193.

7

THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST CRUSADE ON WESTERN OPINION TOWARDS THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE[1]

The *Dei Gesta per Francos* of Guibert of Nogent and the *Historia Hierosolymitana* of Fulcher of Chartres

Léan Ní Chléirigh

While the fall of Jerusalem in 1099 to the forces of the First Crusade led to centuries of strained relations between the 'West' and the Islamic world, ironically, the effect of the crusade on the most important local Christian power, the Byzantine Empire, was disastrous. Disputes during the course of the 1096–9 expedition coloured Western attitudes against 'New Rome', entered into the consciousness of Latin Christendom and laid the basis for a direct assault on the empire – a Christian empire – by crusaders in 1204. Chapter 3 of this volume provides a detailed examination of the political, economic and military interaction between the crusades and the Byzantine Empire, but in this chapter the mentality of the first crusaders towards their co-religionists will be examined in detail. The devastating consequences of the enmity between the Latins and the Byzantines are well known, but the origin of this antagonism remains more obscure. Did the crusaders leave Western Europe hoping, as Urban II almost certainly did, to reconcile any religious grievances with the orthodox Christians and combat Islam as a unified Christianity? Or had they preconceived negative attitudes towards the Byzantines that were given flight when political circumstances brought conflict between them? Was Urban II's conciliatory attitude towards the Eastern Christians echoed among the majority of the crusaders, or was it even understood? Did the events and outcome of the campaign of 1096–9 harden attitudes that had initially been positive?

The relative abundance of sources for the First Crusade, those written by eyewitnesses and those written by contemporaries, allows us to canvass a broader section of opinion than for many periods in the Middle Ages. In particular, through an examination of two early twelfth-century chronicles of the First

Crusade, which offer widely differing views of the Byzantines, this chapter will demonstrate that there was not a consensus of opinion towards the Byzantines even up to a number of years after the fall of Jerusalem. The *Dei Gesta per Francos* of Guibert, abbot of Nogent-sous-Coucy, contains religious, political and moral denunciations of the Byzantines and their emperor, Alexios I Komnenos, while the *Historia Hierosolymitana* of Fulcher of Chartres, chaplain to King Baldwin I of Jerusalem, contains almost no criticism of the emperor or his subjects. The influences on these two authors are investigated to assess the effect that the events of the crusade and its aftermath had on their attitudes, allowing for some insight into the impact the First Crusade had on the evolution of the views of the Latin West towards the Byzantine Empire.

The announcement of the First Crusade at the Council of Clermont in 1095 by Pope Urban II and the subsequent preaching by himself and others prompted an enormous response from military men and unarmed pilgrims. Whether intentionally or not, the call to combat the enemies of God created a dichotomy between Christians and non-Christians in the minds of the crusaders with violent results, such as the massacres of the Rhineland Jews in 1096. This theological background to the preaching of the crusades placed the Byzantine Empire in a difficult position. In 1095 Alexios had sent envoys to the Council of Piacenza to ask for Western aid against the encroaching Muslim forces.[2] It is almost certain that Alexios had in mind aid of a similar nature to that which the West had been providing for generations, namely mercenaries or groups of knights who would be assimilated into the imperial forces. The imperial forces would then presumably have been employed in strategic operations designed to reconquer the lands lost by the empire; indeed, this is how Alexios conducted his military affairs in the wake of the crusade. In contrast with this more limited perspective, the actual crusade was an independent, all-out assault on the non-Christian East up to and including Jerusalem.

When the crusade armies began to arrive in imperial territory in 1096, Alexios was faced with the difficult task of accommodating substantial armies with their own independent leaders as well as large numbers of non-combatants who were poorly funded and even worse behaved.[3] Having requested aid from the West, Alexios now had to deal with that aid and the crusaders apparently expected the empire to take full part in the expedition. The poor discipline of the initial crusade contingent led by Peter the Hermit on their journey through imperial territories and their disturbance of public order near Constantinople had put the Byzantines on their guard.[4] When the following crusaders arrived to a hostile population and close attention from imperial forces, relations deteriorated and violence broke out. Once reasonably harmonious relations had been restored and the crusading army moved into Asia Minor, there was a degree of Latin–Byzantine cooperation on the expedition, most notably during the siege of Nicaea in June 1097, when Alexios provided boats to the crusaders to blockade the city from the lake side.

During the siege of Antioch, with the apparent failure of Alexios to join the expedition, as well as the departure of Tatikios, the Byzantine envoy to the

crusade, many crusaders felt that they no longer owed political or religious loyalty to the Byzantines. Establishing a Latin principality centred on Antioch, Bohemond I, the Norman Prince of Taranto, defended his occupation of lands held previously by the emperor by accusing Alexios of defaulting on his promises to the crusaders.

In 1101 groups of crusaders left Western Europe and travelled through the empire to reinforce Latin forces in the new crusader principalities. These crusaders were defeated heavily in their journey through Asia Minor and some commentators blamed the outcome on Byzantine treachery.[5] It was at this time that the earliest written reports of the crusade made their way back to Western Europe.

Probably the earliest and certainly the most influential of the narratives of the First Crusade was the anonymous *Gesta Francorum et Aliorum Hierosolymitanorum*. That this chronicle was available in multiple copies can be seen in the extent to which it was used by other authors both the Levant and Western Europe.[6] The *Gesta Francorum* was almost certainly written by a follower of Bohemond, the leader of the southern Italian Normans. Not long after the defeat of the forces of Kerbogha, Atabeg of Mosul, by the crusade forces after the siege of Antioch in 1098, Bohemond had established himself as Prince of Antioch. This had brought him into conflict with the Byzantine emperor, who claimed the city for himself. Bohemond returned to France in 1106 and preached a new crusade with the support of Pope Paschal II. This crusade never made it to the Near East; instead, it turned aside at Dyrrachium and engaged the Byzantine forces there. It has been suggested by modern historians that the intention of the Norman prince had been to attack the Byzantines from the start, and one contemporary commentator reported that Bohemond had verbally attacked the Byzantine emperor while preaching the 'crusade' of 1106–7 in France.[7] This perspective, developed by A.C. Krey in a famous article, led him to suggest that the *Gesta Francorum* was brought to the West by Bohemond to support his preaching campaign and that the anti-Byzantine tone of the *Gesta* suited his purpose.[8] The subsequent criticisms of the Byzantines by those medieval authors who used the *Gesta Francorum* as the basis of their chronicles have therefore been traced to this attempt by Bohemond to lead an assault on the Byzantine lands.

An overly strict adherence to the above interpretation releases the authors of narratives derived from the anonymous *Gesta* from having their own input with regard to a negative portrayal of the Byzantines and reduces their chronicles to derivatives of their source. At least three authors in France read the *Gesta Francorum* in the opening years of the twelfth century. Each of these writers felt that the style of the anonymous chronicle was deficient and that the events it described needed to be presented in a more correct style and within a coherent theological framework.[9] All three added information that they had received from other sources, in particular a more detailed description of the Council of Clermont, which the anonymous author described only briefly.[10] The extent to which each of these authors reinterpreted the material in the *Gesta Francorum* to suit their theological and exegetical agenda demonstrates that they were by no

means passive copyists and there is, therefore, no reason to assume that they included statements of anti-Byzantine sentiment unintentionally. Guibert of Nogent, in particular, developed the criticisms of the Byzantines in his source to criticise their character traits, their religion and above all their emperor.

The *Gesta Francorum* was not the only eyewitness account of the First Crusade: at least three other eyewitnesses wrote accounts of the expedition. It is clear, however, that each of these authors made use of the anonymous history in their own works. In the case of Fulcher of Chartres, although he took part in the crusade, he borrowed a number of sections of his history directly from the *Gesta*. This is because Fulcher was absent from the main body of the Christian army from 17 September 1097, when the lord to whom he was affiliated, Baldwin of Boulogne, detached his forces to march towards Tarsus. When Baldwin then took up the opportunity of becoming Lord of Edessa, Fulcher accompanied him as his chaplain.[11] It was not until Baldwin completed his pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1100 that Fulcher reached the Holy City, and he settled there permanently after 1101, when Baldwin became king on the death of his brother Godfrey of Bouillon. It is clear that Fulcher used the anonymous chronicle (among other sources) to provide details for those events of the First Crusade at which he had not been present, in particular the sieges of Antioch and the journey to Jerusalem.[12] The departure of Tatikios from the siege of Antioch and the failure of Alexios to join the crusade at this point brought crusader–Byzantine relations to their lowest level. The *Gesta Francorum*, Fulcher's principal source, described the Byzantine envoy as 'our enemy'. Even if Fulcher were meticulously balanced in his portrayal of the Byzantines up to this point, the unequivocal tone of his source could reasonably be expected to find an echo in his *Historia*. Yet the *Historia Hierosolymitana* contains virtually no hint of this deterioration in relations.

In the cases of Guibert and Fulcher, it is clear that these crusading historians did not adopt the point of view of their source wholesale with regard to the Byzantine Empire, and indeed other subjects. They filtered the material they were using through their own respective perspectives. Through a close examination of the attitude expressed towards the Byzantines in the works of these historians and in providing an assessment of the influences helping shape these attitudes, it can be seen that the events of the First Crusade had, in fact, only a limited effect in changing the very different attitudes of these two authors towards the Byzantines.

Guibert, abbot of Nogent-sous-Coucy

The *Dei Gesta per Francos* is only one of Guibert of Nogent's written works, which include a work on sermons, biblical exegesis of the Book of Genesis, his autobiography or memoirs, a treatise against the Jews and a work on the treatment of relics.[13] Our knowledge of Guibert's life comes from the autobiography or *De Vita Sua sive Monodiae*. He was born into a noble family and gives us his father's name, Evrard, but not his mother's. When Guibert was born, medical complications put both his and his mother's lives at risk, prompting Evrard to pledge his

son to the monastic life, should both survive. His father died when he was very young and his mother provided him with a tutor. When Guibert was twelve his mother joined the local monastery of St Germer-de-Fly and his tutor joined the same house soon after.[14] After living with his cousins for a time, Guibert also joined St Germer and began his monastic career. By the time of the composition of the *Dei Gesta per Francos* in 1109, Guibert was abbot of Nogent-sous-Coucy.[15]

Guibert was not an eyewitness participant on the crusade yet his extensive classical reading informed him that the classical and Isidorean definition of history was that written by 'him who had taken part'.[16] The question of whether he was fit to write a history of the First Crusade troubled Guibert and he paused on a number of occasions to assure his reader that he should not be criticised for writing the *Dei Gesta*. Guibert explained that he had compared his source, the *Gesta Francorum*, with the testimony of eyewitnesses to determine its reliability.[17] Although he had added considerably to his source, he was keen to emphasise the care he took: 'any [information] which I added, I heard either from those who had seen, or I learned by myself'.[18] Still sensitive to criticism, he continued to defend himself, insisting that writers of saints' lives had not always witnessed the events they recorded.[19]

The *Dei Gesta* of Guibert of Nogent is substantially longer than the *Gesta Francorum* – added length which is not merely the product of embellishment. While he mentioned having consulted eyewitnesses, Guibert also had access to a number of written sources in addition to the *Gesta Francorum*. He received an early version of the *Historia Hierosolymitana* of Fulcher of Chartres and a letter apparently from Alexios, Emperor of Byzantium, to Robert I of Flanders in which the emperor described the devastation of Asia Minor by the Turkish advances and asked for military aid.[20] Many of the additions were designed to address gaps in his source, the most striking example being his description of Clermont and the speech of Urban II, which were only briefly described in the *Gesta Francorum*. Similarly, while the account of the anonymous source ends in 1099 after the Battle of Ascalon, Guibert's *Dei Gesta* continued to include the death of Godfrey of Bouillon and the disastrous crusade of 1101.[21] Guibert's additions to his source were not just details missed by the *Gesta Francorum*, however: they included a long introduction discussing the situation in the Near East and his interpretation of how these conditions came about as well as theological and exegetical interpretations of the crusade's outcome.

Clearly these additions are of interest here as they are aspects of the *Dei Gesta* for which Guibert can be held entirely responsible. It is in these additions too that much of Guibert's attitude towards the Byzantines is in evidence. In Book I, where he detailed the situation in the East and the advances of the Turks, Guibert argued that the Byzantines were, to a large degree, to blame for the successes of the Turkish invasions. In his representation of the letter of Alexios Komnenos to Robert of Flanders, Guibert commented that the emperor was responsible for the situation that now engulfed him.

It is not enough to look only at the 'original' parts of the *Dei Gesta*. The *Gesta*

Francorum could be hostile to the Byzantines and in his acceptance of the criticisms within his source, Guibert made them his own, in some cases exaggerating events to suit an anti-Byzantine agenda. The criticism of the Byzantines in the *Gesta Francorum* tended to be succinct denunciations of a particular action by Alexios or his officials, while Guibert asserted that, because of their ethnicity, the Byzantines were religiously and politically corrupt, inviting the Turkish invasions on themselves.

Guibert's discussion of ethnicity had a classical origin, ascribing certain characteristics to individual ethnic groups. Above all, the Franks were to be praised and, in an aside, Guibert stated that it was to the Franks that the pope had looked in the first place to make the expedition to the Holy Land, arguing with a certain German cleric that the Germans (*Teutonici*) had consistently disobeyed the Holy See and proved themselves to be militarily worthless on crusade.[22] Bohemond of Taranto, the hero of the crusade, was a southern Italian Norman, but Guibert adopted him as a Frank, claiming the ancestry of the Italian Normans was French and also noting that Bohemond had married the daughter of the King of France, Constance.[23] The military skill of the Turks was emphasised to demonstrate the prowess of the Franks in defeating them, and Guibert attacked those imagined voices who would deny the strength of the Turks as a foe: 'but perhaps, someone or other suggests that they [the Turks] were a peasant band and common soldiers, refuse collected from every part'.[24]

The Greeks as an ethnic group displayed a number of negative characteristics, according to Guibert. When Hugh of Vermandois, brother of the King of France, was the first of the princes to arrive in Byzantine territories, Guibert claimed that he was particularly respected as royalty by the 'Greeks, laziest of men'.[25] When the Byzantine emperor demanded that the princes swear an oath of loyalty to him, the *Gesta Francorum* reported that they considered this to be unfair, while Guibert explained that to swear an oath to the 'puny Greeks' would have been shameful.[26]

The Byzantines were not just puny or lazy, the Eastern personality brought about by the climate had rendered them politically and religiously inconstant, and this had led to their downfall. Following Isidore of Seville, Guibert described the overriding characteristic of the Greeks as *levitas* (lightness): 'Clearly these men, according to the purity of the air and skies to which they are born, are with a lightness of body [*levitas*], and therefore of keen talent.'[27] The Byzantines, however, had abused this keenness and they had used it to question the true faith with 'many useless commentaries'.[28] The negative definition of *levitas* is clearly in use by Guibert when he states that 'Asiatic instability' (*Asiaticam levitatem*) led them to overthrow and elect leaders frequently, a trait particularly abhorrent to a Benedictine abbot.[29] It was not just political authority that the Byzantines had rejected. Theologically, this *levitas* had rendered them unable to stay true to the correct teachings of the Church: 'the faith of Easterners, however, as it consistently was staggering and inconstant and wandering with the grinding of new things – always derailing rules of true belief – defected from the authority of the ancient Fathers'.[30]

Guibert attacked the Eastern Church for its use of the *filioque* clause in the Creed; its acceptance of married clergy; the use of leavened bread in the Eucharist; and its refusal to accept papal primacy over the Eastern patriarchs. These complaints were not peculiar to Guibert: they had been contested between the Churches for some time, most notably during the 'schism' of 1054. In his rendition of the speech of Urban at Clermont, Guibert presented the case for the primacy of Rome:

> If among the churches distributed throughout the whole world, some deserve reverence before others, on account of persons and on account of places – on account of persons, I say, because greater privileges are attributed to the sees of the Apostles, but in the case of places the same degree of dignity which is granted on account of persons, is also attributed to royal cities such as the city of Constantinople – we owe the greatest reverence to that church from which we received the grace of redemption and the origin of all Christianity.[31]

Like most Western clerics, Guibert argued that Rome, as the see of St Peter, inherited authority over the Eastern patriarchates.

While Guibert accepted the view of many in the West, including Anselm of Canterbury, that the use of leavened or unleavened bread in the Eucharist did not upset its validity, he would not accept either the use of the *filioque* clause in the Eastern Creed or the acceptance of married clergy. In the second half of the eleventh century, the reform papacy had campaigned against clerical marriage with renewed vigour. Guibert, as a monk, was unsurprisingly supportive of this policy and attacked the Eastern Church, stating that 'no one is made a priest unless he has first chosen marriage'.[32] This, he claimed, was due to their misunderstanding of Paul's first letter to Timothy, which stated that priests should be 'the husband of one wife'. Guibert's response was in line with that of the reform papacy: 'that this is said not of him who takes and has possession [of a wife], but of him who had and sent away her whom he had and possessed, is confirmed most constantly by the authority of the Western Church'.[33]

Although the Eastern Church accepted the legitimacy of clerical marriage, the letter of Paul to Timothy was not cited as the basis for this. It was in fact used by those in the West who opposed clerical celibacy, particularly in the letter *Pseudo-Udalrici Epistola de Continentia Clericorum*, which was condemned by the papacy in 1079.[34] This letter seemed to have influenced a number of German and French commentaries and it is possible that Guibert, knowing that the Eastern Church approved of clerical marriage, assumed that the Pauline letter formed the basis of this approval just as it was used to support clerical marriage in the West.[35]

Since the Western Church added the *filioque* clause to the Nicene Creed during the third Council at Toledo in AD 589, the Eastern and Western Churches both argued that the other's creed upset the nature of the Trinity. The addition of the clause in the West had formed part of the Church's attempt to combat Arianism.

According to Guibert, the Eastern Creed led to an inequality within the Trinity: 'they have added this pinnacle to their damnation, they consider God to limp, having inflicted upon him an inequality of his own nature'.[36]

This inequality implied by the Eastern Creed led the Eastern Christians into the Arian heresy, according to Guibert: 'what are they about to say of the Holy Spirit, who contend with a profane mind that he is less than the Father and the Son, following the remnants of the Arian heresy'.[37] From this accusation of heresy, Guibert proceeded to declare that heresy was an Eastern habit and he listed the heresies which had come from the East: 'from Alexandria, Arius, from Persia, Mani emerged . . . What should I say of Eunomius, Eutychians Nestorians?'.[38]

According to Guibert, with the exception of Pelagius, the West had never produced a heresy: 'if the catalogues of all the heresies are read, if the books of the ancients written against heretics are examined, I will be amazed if, besides Africa and the East there are discerned scarcely any [heresies] from the Latin world'.[39]

The Turkish encroachments into Byzantine territories and the persecution of the Eastern Christians were, according to Guibert, a direct result of their religious failings:

> But while God places a stumbling block before those who sin voluntarily, their land vomited forth its own inhabitants, first they became deprived of true faith and deservedly, then, by all rights, they were deprived of all their earthly possessions. Since they deviate from faith in the Trinity, so that hitherto they who are in filth become filthier, gradually they have come to the final degradation of having taken paganism upon themselves as the punishment for the sin proceeding from this, they have lost the soil of their native land to invading foreigners, or if it happens that any one of them remains there the natives have subjected themselves to the payment of tribute to foreigners.[40]

Contemporaries saw the success of the crusade as the result of God's divine favour. This divine benevolence is one of the central themes in the *Dei Gesta* and on a number of occasions Guibert highlighted the seemingly insurmountable obstacles which the crusade had overcome in order to demonstrate how divine will had brought about its success. Conversely, divine displeasure could bring tragic consequences. The lapses of the Eastern Christians, according to Guibert, were directly responsible for their suffering at the hands of invaders. In order to demonstrate that the Turkish invasions were punishment of the Eastern Christians in particular, Guibert stated that Western settlers in the Near East were flourishing.[41]

In particular, Guibert criticised Alexios Komnenos for failing to defend his empire and for betraying the crusade. As we saw, the papal response to Alexios' request for aid far outweighed that which he had envisaged. The crusade presence in Asia Minor disrupted the typically Byzantine tactics of diplomacy and tactical

warfare that the emperor had been employing, albeit with limited success, against the Muslim powers. The crusaders were not interested in diplomatic contact with 'pagans' and, from the outset, they had no intention of remaining in Asia Minor. When dealing with the crusaders, therefore, Alexios was conscious that their presence was only temporary and that diplomatic relations with the Muslim powers would have to be resumed once the crusade had left Anatolia. Added to this was his concern that the leaders of the crusade would attempt to establish themselves in the Near East permanently; presumably he was particularly anxious in this regard about the ambitions of Bohemond, whom he had previously encountered on the battlefield. Alexios' twin concerns were therefore to maintain wherever possible good relations with the local Muslim powers and to ensure that the leaders of the crusade would not establish themselves in lands claimed by Byzantium. In his pursuit of these aims, he alienated the crusaders and most of their chroniclers.

Alexios' first concern upon hearing of the approach of the crusade armies was to ensure their peaceful passage through the empire beyond Constantinople and to ensure the loyalty of the leaders. Initially his worst fears were confirmed with the arrival of Peter the Hermit and his followers. This group contained the largest proportion on non-combatants and Peter was often unable to keep good order. Alexios had recommended that they remain in the outskirts of the city until one of the other armies arrived but they soon became restless and disturbed the public order. This prompted the emperor to transport them across the Bosphorus to Asia Minor, where he advised them to remain in Byzantine territory. This advice was ignored and groups of foraging crusaders penetrated further into Asia Minor, where they were heavily defeated by the local Turkish forces. Any who escaped were transported back to Constantinople to await the other armies. Both the *Gesta Francorum* and Guibert reported that Alexios was pleased to hear of the Latin losses.[42]

The next leader to arrive in Byzantine territories was Hugh of Vermandois, brother of the King of France. Hugh had been shipwrecked crossing the Adriatic and when he arrived in Byzantine territory, the local governor, Alexios' nephew, transported him to Constantinople. Hugh then swore an oath of loyalty to the emperor and undertook to return to the empire any lands reconquered from the Turks that had formerly been imperial possessions. This oath was unpopular with many of the crusaders and Guibert accused the emperor of taking advantage of Hugh's lack of military strength to force him to take it. This was the first example, according to Guibert, of the means that the emperor would employ to extract the oath from the crusaders: 'thus the plight of this most famous man caused a weakening of the courage of the great leaders who came after him, for the cleverness of the treacherous prince compelled the others, either by force, or in fraud, or by imprecations, to do what he had done'.[43]

When the other princes arrived at Constantinople, they were reluctant to take the oath. Raymond of Toulouse, in particular, declared that he had not come on crusade to serve any lord other than God. For the author of the *Gesta Francorum*,

hostile to Alexios, the swearing of an oath to him was unfair: 'certainly, this is unworthy of us, and it seems to us by no means just to swear an oath to him'.[44] For Guibert, the thought of the Latins swearing an oath to the Greeks in particular was the issue: 'and certainly, they said, "if no fear of the future weighed upon us, only that we had been compelled to swear by the puny Greeks, laziest of all people, would be, perpetually shameful to us; clearly they would say that we, with little hesitation, willing or unwilling, had submitted to their authority"'.[45]

For many of the crusaders, the crusade had been instigated for the defence of the Eastern Christians. The skirmishes with the Byzantine forces during their journey to Constantinople and the emperor's demand for an oath of loyalty fell far short of the welcome that they envisaged as a liberating army and many questioned the loyalties of the empire. For Guibert, the behaviour of the emperor placed in doubt the sincerity of his request for aid in the first place and from this point on in the *Dei Gesta per Francos* the emperor becomes an opponent of the crusade: 'the perfidious Alexis, who formerly had been thought eager for help against the Turks, gnashed his teeth in the bitterness of his anger and pondered on a means to bring about the total destruction of the large army that was, as he thought, threatening to him'.[46]

The hostility of the emperor towards the Latins was such that he was depicted as having aided the Turks against the crusade. After the successful siege of Nicaea, Alexios granted the Turkish leaders of the city, safe passage to Constantinople with their families and belongings. The crusaders were not permitted to enter the city to loot it, instead the emperor gave the leaders of the crusade gifts and rewards and distributed alms to the poor. The *Gesta Francorum*, attacking the emperor as 'full false and with unjust thoughts', claimed that the emperor hoped to use the Turks as allies against the crusade at a later stage, an accusation which Guibert adopted enthusiastically.[47]

When Stephen, count of Blois, having left the crusade during the siege of Antioch, met the emperor at Philomelium, the *Gesta Francorum* reported that he exaggerated the danger to the crusade, thus deterring the emperor from joining the siege. Stephen had retired from the crusade due to illness. The anonymous claimed that Stephen's illness was feigned and that in his efforts to justify his departure, he overstated the danger to the crusaders.[48] Guibert, however, reorganised the material to state that it was Alexios who exaggerated the situation to his followers in order to avoid having to help the crusaders. The emperor was reported as being pleased: 'because those whom he hated no less than the Turks had perished'.[49]

According to Guibert, the emperor directly betrayed the crusade of 1101 to the Turks. Part of this crusade was all but defeated by the Turks attempting to follow the route taken by the First Crusade. According to Guibert, when William IX of Aquitaine left Constantinople, the emperor sent word to the Turks announcing the arrival of the crusade, leading to its destruction.

> This wretched traitor [Alexios] informed the Turks by letters of his arrival, before the count had left the royal city. 'Lo,' he said, 'the fattest

> sheep from France are moving in your direction, led by a foolish shepherd.' What more can I say? The count went beyond the borders of the tyrannical prince, suddenly before him stood an army of Turks, who scattered, preyed upon and conquered the disorganized foreigners.[50]

The following army, which contained Stephen of Blois, stayed at Constantinople where they were given generous gifts by Alexios and advised not to follow the route of the first expedition. Ignoring this warning, the crusaders insisted on keeping to the route of the First Crusade and asked the emperor to provide markets along the route. The emperor advised them to only bring forty days worth of supplies according to Guibert, pleased that they were bringing about their own destruction.[51]

The anonymous *Gesta Francorum* was particularly scathing of Alexios calling him 'unjust' (*iniquus*), 'most wicked' (*nequissimus*), 'a fool as well as a knave' (*plenus uana et iniqua*) and 'wretched/miserable' (*infelix*).[52] Guibert followed his source's criticisms adding emphasis: Alexios is 'this most wicked tyrant' (*miseri imperatoris, sordidissimus ille tirannus*), 'treacherous' (*perfidus*), 'impious'(*impio*) and 'most wicked' (*nequissimus*).[53] Despite being frightened of the crusade princes, he was 'clever' (*astutus*) and 'fraudulent/treacherous' (*fraudulentusa*).[54] As well as his opposition to the crusade, Alexios had contributed to the ruin of his empire through poor rule. Paralleling the religious failures of the Eastern Christians, which Guibert claimed had brought about the degradation of the empire by Islam, Alexios' degenerate rule rendered the empire unable to defend itself. Guibert attacked Alexios' rule as illegitimate, since he was not emperor by hereditary right, 'this emperor had received the purple not by legitimate succession'.[55] He had obtained the throne through a rebellion against the Emperor Nicephorus III Botaniates.[56] From the perspective of a monk and an abbot, defiance of legitimate authority was unforgivable, 'without right, he usurped the right of imperial authority'.[57] Once in power, wrote Guibert, Alexios had enacted two 'well known' edicts, one of which decreed that the younger daughters of large families should be given over to prostitution, part of the proceeds of which went to the emperor. The other required younger sons of large families to be castrated, which rendered them militarily redundant and unable to defend the empire.[58]

Once Alexios had brought his empire to the edge of ruin through his own mismanagement, he asked for help from the West, 'therefore he who had brought destruction upon himself was now compelled to seek help from foreigners'.[59] 'Compelled by necessity', he had sought for military aid. In the letter to Robert of Flanders, Alexios, unable to comprehend the higher spiritual ideals of the crusaders, offered them the beauty of Greek women and gifts of gold and silver.[60] Ignorant of his own responsibility for the empire's destruction, Alexios called for help from men wiser and more virtuous than him, but their arrival filled him with anxiety. In particular, his respectful treatment of Godfrey of Bouillon was borne of fear rather than any affection.[61] Once Jerusalem was conquered by the Westerners, Alexios' envy increased, as did his fear. [62]

There is no doubt that the anonymous *Gesta Francorum*, Guibert's source, was hostile to the Byzantine emperor. In his *Dei Gesta per Francos*, however, Guibert expanded this animosity and extended it to the subjects of the emperor. The Eastern Christians were likened to heretics who had brought the Turkish invasions upon themselves through their disobedience. Their emperor had brought his empire so low that he was forced to ask for outside aid and when that aid came he rejected it out of fear and envy. Originally thought to have been an ally of the crusade, he quickly became hostile to it and even conspired with its opponents to bring about its destruction. Guibert's criticisms of the Byzantines went far beyond those of his source and to assert that they were merely an embellishment of the criticisms of the *Gesta Francorum* rather than Guibert's own opinions would be an error.[63] It is therefore necessary to explore the roots of his hostility and try to determine if it was prompted by the events and outcome of the crusade.

The heavy emphasis on religion in Guibert's attacks on the Byzantines initially suggests that he may have been influenced by papal attitudes, as they harness the principal points of contention between the two Churches: *filioque*, the Eucharist and clerical marriage. It is clear from the accounts of Pope Urban's speech at Clermont in 1095, however, that the papacy had adopted a conciliatory tone towards the Church of Constantinople at this time. Most accounts of the speech reported that Urban had exhorted his audience to come to the defence of the Eastern Church, emphasising their common religion rather than their liturgical differences.[64] Since the opening of his pontificate, Urban had worked for a *rapprochement* with Constantinople.[65] It has even been suggested that Urban's crusade plan was part of this conciliatory effort.[66] Guibert's complaints regarding the Eastern Christians were in line with the issues highlighted in the dispute of 1054 by Cardinal Humbert, but by the 1090s the papacy was pursuing a less aggressive policy towards Constantinople. While Guibert's polemic drew upon the issues of contention between the two Churches, it is unlikely that this approach was inspired by the papacy of Urban II.

The tension between the crusaders and the Byzantines which arose almost as soon as the Latins arrived in imperial territory and the perceived failure of Alexios to support them caused many of those on the expedition to attack the Byzantines as enemies of the crusade. Immediately after the victory over Kerbogha at Antioch, Bohemond claimed the town on the basis that Alexios had broken his part of the oath sworn at Constantinople. As Prince of Antioch, Bohemond proved to be the most consistent enemy of the Byzantines after 1099, and in 1106 he used the forces he had gathered for a crusade to attack the emperor at Dyrrachium.

Bohemond's opposition to Byzantium is apparent from an early stage. In the letter from the princes at Antioch to Urban II in 1098, a letter which Bohemond is likely to have inspired, the Greeks were labelled heretics.[67] When travelling through France in 1106, ostensibly preaching a new crusade, Orderic Vitalis reported that Bohemond had verbally attacked the emperor. The Norman leader had brought with him a Byzantine noble who claimed that he was the heir to the emperor whom Alexios had ousted.[68] Guibert was certainly aware of Bohemond's

visit to France as he mentioned the marriage between him and Constance, daughter of the King of France.[69]

Once Bohemond had gathered forces for this new crusade, he journeyed east. Instead of travelling to the Near East, however, his forces turned aside to attack Alexios at Dyrrachium. This attack failed and Bohemond was forced to come to terms with Alexios through the Treaty of Devol.[70] Bohemond wrote a letter to Pope Paschal II in either 1106 or 1108, in which he outlined his reasons for his enmity to the emperor and justified an attack on the Byzantine Empire.[71] The emperor, Bohemond claimed, was a usurper who had violently risen up against his rightful lord and seized the imperial throne: 'Let us be silent about how he, with bloodstained hands, through savage crimes and such fierce betrayal achieved that office [emperor] by ejecting his lord, as a result of which, he sits on a throne of plagues [*cathedra pestilentiae sedit*].'[72] It was Alexios' fault that the empire's Christians were dissenting from the Roman Church and Bohemond requested that the pope himself journey to the East, 'for the removal of schisms, heresies and diverse traditions which exist in that church; of the procession of the Holy Spirit, of baptism, of the Eucharist and of marriage in ordained priests'.[73] If the pope could not journey himself, Bohemond requested that a certain Iohannem Burgundoniem, whose ability to confront heresy was well established, be sent as his legate.[74]

This letter gives us an insight into another possible influence on Guibert. Two of the additions made by Guibert to the criticisms inherent in the *Gesta Francorum* were his accusations of treachery against Alexios for having gained the imperial throne through rebellion rather than succession and the labelling of the Eastern Church as heretical for its differing traditions regarding the Trinity, the Eucharist and clerical marriage. If the increased availability of the *Gesta Francorum* at this time was due to a concerted effort on Bohemond's part to damage the reputation of Alexios, it is likely that his verbal attacks on the emperor echoed those in the two letters of 1098 and 1106/8. The use of these arguments in particular by Guibert would suggest that he was exposed to this rhetoric during Bohemond's journey to France in 1106 or that he had seen the letter to the pope. However, the tone of Bohemund's letter is very much anti-Alexian rather than anti-Byzantine. Bohemond blamed Alexios for the distance between the two Churches: 'he takes away from the universality of the universal and apostolic church, in as much as he is able, from which it is clear that he and his men dissent from the Roman Church'.[75] The Eastern Christians in themselves were not the focus of the Norman prince's attack, nor were they held responsible for the 'heresies' of their Church. Guibert's focus on the deficiencies of the Eastern Christians as a group, and their moral flaws which led to the 'heresies' and consequently to the Islamic advances in imperial territory, is a development beyond the criticism found in the *Gesta Francorum* or in the sources for Bohemond's 'propaganda'.

The arguments used by Guibert against the Byzantines and their emperor reflect to a large extent the anonymous *Gesta Francorum* and the rhetoric of Bohemond of Taranto. However, neither of these sources applied their criticisms

to the Eastern Christians as a group; presumably, in the case of Bohemond, because he was aware of papal policy in this regard. It is unclear whether Guibert was aware of the papacy's desire for better relations with Eastern Christianity, but he was far more willing to blame the Eastern Christians collectively for their religious failings and to ascribe this to an ethnically based personality trait. The source of this ethnic bias was neither the writer of the *Gesta Francorum* nor Bohemond's rhetoric.

Fulcher of Chartres

Anti-Byzantine sentiment was not unanimous, however, and those who read and used the anonymous chronicle were not bound by its opinions. Despite his incorporation of some of the material from the *Gesta Francorum* in his own work, Fulcher of Chartres' *Historia Hierosolymitana* cannot be described as anti-Byzantine. In Fulcher's history religious differences between the Eastern and Western Churches were ignored and those actions of Alexios that prompted an angry response from other chronicles were defended.

The only reliable biographical information available for Fulcher comes from the *Historia* itself.[76] In 1123, he stated that he was almost sixty-five, while in 1125 he was sixty-six, giving him a year of birth of 1059.[77] His name, Fulcherus Carnotensis, implies that Chartres was his place of birth; and in 1100, when he described being under attack near Beirut, he prayed to be in either Chartres or Orléans, implying that one of those cities was his home.[78] Although he began the crusade in the contingent of Count Stephen of Blois, Robert of Flanders and Robert of Normandy, Fulcher quickly became associated with Baldwin of Boulogne, and he was Baldwin's chaplain around the time that he became Lord of Edessa (10 March 1097).[79] It was not until 1100, when Baldwin completed his pilgrimage, that Fulcher reached Jerusalem. In 1101, Godfrey of Bouillon died and Baldwin, as his heir, became King of Jerusalem. From this time Fulcher appears to have been permanently resident in the Holy City. For much of the crusade, therefore, Fulcher was absent from the main army, so he relied on the testimony of eyewitnesses and written sources to write his history.

The *Historia Hierosolymitana* was divided into three books: the first described the events of the First Crusade up to the establishment of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem; the second outlined the reign of Baldwin I; and the third described the reign of Baldwin II from his accession in 1118 until 1127. The first book was completed around 1105 and was circulated in the West.[80] When the second and third books were completed, Fulcher revised parts of the first and added a prologue to the work.[81]

The *Historia Hierosolymitana* does not reflect the growing animosity towards the Byzantines which is evident in the other eyewitness chronicles of the First Crusade. This may be due, in part, to the relatively good relations between Alexios and the contingent in which Fulcher was travelling. Before the arrival of the northern French army at Constantinople, relations with the imperial forces had

been uneventful. On their arrival in Constantinople, the leaders took the oath of loyalty to Alexios, apparently without protest. Stephen of Blois, in a letter to his wife Adele, reported that the emperor had treated them extremely well.[82] Fulcher was extremely impressed by the beauty of the imperial city, writing: 'what monasteries, what palaces are in her, wonderful fortifications, skilfully built . . . [with] all the possessions and riches, gold of course, silver, multiformed cloths and holy relics'.[83]

According to Fulcher, the emperor had placed restrictions on the number of Western pilgrims entering the city at any one time, because 'he feared that we would contrive some powerful injury to him'.[84] The oath of loyalty which the princes had to swear to Alexios seemed reasonable to Fulcher: 'it was essential that all establish friendship with the emperor since without his aid and counsel [*auxilium et consilium*] we could not easily make the journey, nor could those who were to follow us by the same route'.[85]

Although he could not omit to mention the harsh treatment of Hugh of Vermandois by the emperor, which had angered the anonymous author and Guibert, Fulcher's choice of words for the situation downplayed any suggestion of conflict when he stated that Hugh had remained at Constantinople, 'not entirely freely'.[86]

In order to emphasise the importance of the emperor's material aid to the crusade, Fulcher noted that the gifts which he had provided made the journey possible: 'Therefore this emperor offered to them [the princes] as much of his coins and silken cloths as he wished; and horse and money which they would need exceedingly to finally complete their journey.'[87]

In describing the siege of Nicaea, the emperor's contribution was reiterated: 'Let it be known that, as long as we besieged the city Nicaea, provisions were brought to us to be bought, by sea ships with permission of the emperor.'[88] Once the city had surrendered to the emperor, Fulcher's only observation was that it had been reduced by the 'strength and ingenuity' of the Latins.[89] He did not pass comment on Alexios' benevolent treatment of the defeated Turks, instead focusing on the emperor's generosity in the aftermath of the siege: 'Wherefore after all this money was seized the emperor ordered gifts to be presented to our leaders, gifts of gold and silver and raiment; and to the foot-soldiers he distributed copper coins which they call *tartarones*.'[90]

During the siege of Antioch and the subsequent besieging of the crusade by the forces of Kerbogha, the Christian army suffered under extremely difficult conditions. There were severe food shortages and illness was widespread. The Turkish garrison in Antioch was able to mount sorties and harass the crusade, while desertions among the Latin army increased. The departure of Tatikios, the Byzantine envoy, from the army and the news that Alexios had turned back at Philomelium convinced many that the Byzantines had deserted the crusade. In the letter from the princes to Urban II sent from Antioch, the first statements of anti-Byzantine sentiment appeared when a list of heresies included the Greeks.[91] The departure of Tatikios was depicted by the anonymous author, Raymond of

Aguilers, Albert of Aachen, Guibert of Nogent and Baldric of Dol as an outright betrayal.[92] Given the deteriorating relations between the crusaders and the Byzantines at this time and Fulcher's use of the *Gesta Francorum* for this portion of his work, one would expect a change in his tone towards the Byzantines, or at least a criticism of Tatikios. However, Fulcher makes no mention of the incident and does not refer to the Byzantine envoy at all in his narrative. The desertion of Stephen of Blois and his subsequent meeting with Alexios, which Guibert interpreted as the emperor's treacherous abandonment of the crusade, were also avoided entirely by Fulcher when he reported that Stephen left by sea and made no mention of the meeting with Alexios. When Fulcher recorded the death of Alexios in 1118, he listed him among the 'leading men in the world':

> For in succession died Pope Paschal in the month of January, Baldwin, King of Jerusalem in the month of March, and also his wife in Sicily whom he had forsaken, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Arnulf, and also the Constantinopolitan emperor, Alexios, and how many other leading men in the world.[93]

There is one exception to Fulcher's generally positive treatment of the Byzantine emperor. When reporting the battle between Bohemond and Alexios at Dyrrachium in 1106, Fulcher criticised the emperor: 'there was an emperor of Constantinople, Alexios by name, extremely hostile to our people, a disturber of those making the pilgrimage to Jerusalem – through secret deception or open violence, either by land or by sea – and a tyrant'.[94] This criticism is unique in the *Historia* and it is not clear why it should differ so much from Fulcher's prevailing tone of conciliation. Apart from this single criticism, the *Historia Hierosolymitana* is consistent in its attitude towards the emperor, portraying him as an ally of the crusade and omitting any episodes that contradicted this image.

While Guibert of Nogent claimed the Eastern Christians were heretics by virtue of the differences between them and the Latins, Fulcher presented them as brothers in faith. When relating Urban's speech at Clermont, Fulcher had the pope describe them as 'your brothers dwelling in eastern parts', 'worshippers of Christ', 'a people shining in faith in all powerful God and the name of Christ', 'those who are reckoned in the worship of Christ just as you'.[95] Nowhere is there an indication that Fulcher took issue with the different liturgical practices between the Latin and Greek Churches. In later references he made it clear that he considered the Greeks, Armenians and Syrians to be Christian. For example, in writing about the siege of Antioch, Fulcher lamented the loss of the lives of the Christian inhabitants of the city at the hands of the Turks.[96] When the crusade arrived at Bethlehem in 1099 and when Baldwin reached Jerusalem to take up the crown on the death of his brother Godfrey, the local Syrian and Greek Christian populations were represented as being supporters of the crusade, rejoicing at its arrival.[97]

The *Historia Hierosolymitana* consistently presented the events of the First Crusade in such a way as to depict the Byzantines as allies of the Latins. In

situations where the evidence mitigated against such an interpretation, Fulcher avoided a negative portrayal of the Byzantines by leaving out potentially damaging details, the most striking example of which was the omission of any mention of Tatikios. The instances where the empire cooperated with the crusade were heavily emphasised and on more than one occasion Fulcher stated that the crusade could not have succeeded without the input of the emperor. In spite of the single, albeit vehement, criticism of Alexios, the overall tendency of Fulcher to provide a conciliatory and fraternal image of the Byzantines is unmistakable.

The contrast between the treatment of the Byzantines by Guibert and Fulcher is striking. Each departed from their principal written source to assert their own opinions, neither one adopting or unconsciously inheriting the prejudice of the *Gesta Francorum*. As with Guibert, it is necessary to attempt to establish if Fulcher's relatively positive portrayal of the Byzantines was inherited from another source and to what extent the events of the crusade impacted on his opinions. These opinions appear to have been formed from an early stage, as Fulcher's statements concerning the Byzantines which appear in Book I were not revised in the second redaction, suggesting that they had not altered significantly between c.1105 and the 1120s.

The earliest discussion of the Byzantines in the *Historia Hierosolymitana* arises in the rendition of the speech of Urban II at Clermont in 1095. In this version of the famous oration, the main goal of the crusade was the liberation of the Eastern Church from oppression. Urban lamented the treatment of 'your brothers dwelling in eastern parts'.[98] The pope described the devastation of the Eastern Church at the hands of the Turks and the extent of the imperial lands which had been lost. This rendition of the pope's speech bears a strong resemblance to contemporary accounts of eyewitnesses and it has been suggested that Fulcher himself was an eyewitness at the council. On their journey through Italy, the crusaders of northern France met Urban at Lucca, where Fulcher indicated he was present.[99] This early exposure to the pope may be responsible for Fulcher's efforts to present the actions of Alexios and the Eastern Christians in as positive a light as possible.

In his 1913 edition of the *Historia Hierosolymitana*, Hagenmeyer suggested that Fulcher had been an eyewitness at Clermont.[100] Following the example of Hagenmeyer, a number of modern authors have assumed Fulcher's presence at the council, most strikingly Verena Epp, who suggests that he attended in the company of Bishop Ivo of Chartres.[101] This assertion is based on the assumption that Fulcher was one of the clerics at Chartres Cathedral, even though there is no clear evidence for this.[102] Indeed, Ivo of Chartres' own presence at the council is not certain. Clermont was convened to discuss a number of reforms of the French Church as well as the excommunication of the French king, Philip I. Consequently, Ivo may have felt it more prudent to abstain from attending.[103]

The report of Urban's speech by Fulcher contains the same elements as the eyewitness accounts of Robert the Monk and Baldric of Dol, as well as the letter of Urban to the Count of Flanders.[104] Unlike Robert and Baldric, Fulcher did not claim that he had been at Clermont. Like Guibert, Fulcher was aware that

history was to be written by one who had witnessed it and he makes reference on a number of occasions to having seen events that he described: 'I arranged diligently, yet truthfully – deeming those things appropriate to trust to memory – just as I was able, those things I observed in that journey.'[105] And 'This I, Fulcher of Chartres – myself travelling with other pilgrims – afterwards, diligently and carefully collected as a memorial for those who came after, just as I saw with my own eyes.'[106] And again, 'I would not have believed that there were so many wonders unless I had seen them with my own eyes.'[107]

As well as referring to himself as a witness to events, Fulcher, for the most part, changed his verb usage when describing events that he had not witnessed – from the first person plural into the third person.[108] In his description of the Council of Clermont, Fulcher used the third person, implying that he was not present: 'His dictis, et audientibus gratanter ad hoc animatis, nihil actu tali dignius aestimantes, statim plures astantium se ituros, et caeteros absentes inde diligenter se evocaturos *spoponderunt* [my emphasis].'[109]

Given the evidence that Fulcher was not an eyewitness to Clermont yet was extremely well informed as to the substance of Urban's address, it seems likely that he had a written source at hand. It is worth taking the trouble to establish this, because Fulcher's relationship to the policy of Urban II might well have been the key to his depiction of the Byzantines in his history.

The written sources for Clermont are broadly divided into two categories: those which detail the reform decrees of the council and those which report only the summons to crusade. Fulcher's account is remarkable in that he includes both. Robert Somerville has identified an 'Anglo-Norman' tradition of the Clermont decrees, and a comparison of this tradition with formulations in Fulcher's account shows a surprisingly close match:

(17)[110]
Orderic: Qui episcopum ceperit, omnino exlex habeatur.
P L C: Quod qui episcopum ceperit, omnino exlex habeatur.
William: Quod episcopum qui ceperunt, omnino exlex habeatur.
Fulcher: Qui igitur episcopum ceperit, omnino exlex habeatur.

(18)
Orderic: Qui monachos, vel clericos, vel sanctimoniales et eorum comites ceperit, vel exspoliaverit, anathema sit.
P L: Quod qui monachos, vel clericos, vel sanctimoniales et horum famulos ceperit, vel expoliaverit, anathema sit.
C: Quod qui monachos, vel clericos, vel sanctimoniales et horum famulos ceperit, anathema sit.
William: Quod qui sacri ordinis viros vel eorum famulos ceperit, anathema sit.
Fulcher: Qui monachos vel clericos aut sanctimoniales et eorum famulos ceperit aut exspoliaverit, vel peregrinos vel mercatores, anathema sit.

(1)
Orderic: Ecclesia sit catholica, casta et libera: catholica in fide et communione sanctorum, casta ab omni contagione malitiae, et libera ab omni saeculari potestate.
P L: Quod ecclesia catholica sit, casta, et libera: catholica in fide et communione sanctorum, casta pudicitia, et libera ab omni seculari potestate.
C: Quod ecclesia in catholica sit, casta, et libera: catholica in fide et communione sanctorum patrum, casta pudicitia, et libera ab omni seculari potestate.
William: Quod ecclesia catholica sit in fide casta, libera ab omni servitute.
Fulcher: Ecclesiam suis ordinibus liberam ab omni saeculari potestate.

(7)
Orderic: Ecclesiasticae dignitates, vel canonicae, a nullo vendantur, vel emantur.
P L C: Quod ecclesiastice dignitates, vel canonicae, a nullo vendantur, vel emantur.
William: Quod ecclesiasticae dignitates a nullo emantur vel vendantur.
Fulcher: Res ecclesiasticas praecipue in suo iure constare facite, ut et simoniaca haeresis nullatenus apud vos cavete ne vendentes ac ementes flagris flagellati dominicis per angiportus in exterminium confusionis miserabiliter propellantur.

(26)
Orderic: Laicus decimas nec vendat, nec retineat.
P L C: Quod laicus decimas nec vendat, nec retineat.
William: Quod laicus decimam nec emat, nec vendat.
Fulcher: Decimas Deo de omnibus terrae cultibus fideliter dari facite, ne vendantur aut retineantur.

What this comparison shows is more than a passing familiarity between Fulcher's history and the works of the 'Anglo-Norman' tradition. It strongly suggests that Fulcher had access to a written version of decrees, which in turn brings him much closer to papal policy than has hitherto been appreciated. Moreover, the speech of Urban in Fulcher's *Historia* does correspond with the reports of Robert the Monk and Baldric of Dol. Both Robert and Fulcher refer to the Turks as a Persian race.[111] In all three accounts there are descriptions of the torture and enslavement of Christians and the destruction of churches.[112] Similarly, all three authors reported the papal emphasis on the common bonds of religion which the Eastern and Western Christians shared.[113] In Urban's letter to the Count and faithful of Flanders, the pope referred to the Council of Clermont, where, he wrote, he had detailed the suffering of their Eastern brothers and the Church in Eastern parts and exhorted them to aid the liberation of this Eastern Church.[114]

The speech of Urban as it appeared in the *Historia Hierosolymitana* contained a number of phrases which can be found in the letters of the late eleventh-century papacy. Reference to the papacy as *apostolatus apice* is found rarely before Urban's pontificate, but it appears in three of his surviving letters.[115] Scriptural metaphors for the comportment of the clergy referred to by Urban in his reported speech are found in the writings of contemporary reformers. They were exhorted not to be *mercenarii* but *pastores*;[116] they were not to allow the sin of Simony to take root (*radicere*)[117] among them; and they were to administer discipline with *baculos semper in manibus*.[118] As well as particular phrases, a number of verbs which the papacy used to denote reform are found in Fulcher's account. The papacy used a set of key terms to describe the reform process and Fulcher's use of these in his narrative suggests an exposure to papal literature. [119] The clergy at Clermont were urged by the pope to restore (*restaurare*), correct (*corrigere*), and free their flock from errors (*emendare*).[120] The pope also called on the ecclesiasts to reform (*reformare*) the Truce of God, a peace movement which forbade the nobility from waging war during certain Christian festivals on pain of excommunication. [121]

The reliability of this source is affirmed by the parallels with eyewitness accounts of the speech and with the letter of Urban to Flanders. The phrasing of the account which bears such a resemblance to papal terminology would suggest that this source may have been papal in origin. Given Fulcher's contact with Urban at Lucca, it is likely that his urge to follow papal policy towards the Byzantines as he understood it tempered his view of the events of the First Crusade and influenced his depiction of the Byzantines in his narrative.

Conclusion

Despite the unifying impulse of Pope Urban II in his policy towards the Eastern Church, tensions ran high between the Latins and the Byzantines almost as soon as the crusade entered the European territories of the empire. The poor discipline of Peter the Hermit's army and the mistrust of the Normans of southern Italy put the Byzantines on their guard immediately. Alexios' response, an oath of allegiance to him personally by many of the leading crusaders, was received indignantly by many of the Latins, with Raymond of St Gilles declaring that he had not travelled to the East to serve any lord but God.[122] According to Raymond of Aguilers, when the Count of St Gilles suggested that Alexios lead the crusade himself, the emperor prevaricated. The emperor's first duty was to the empire and his efforts to maintain its stability in the face of the crusade and its outcome were viewed as moral cowardice. Alexios' attempts to maintain relations with the Turks angered the crusaders, particularly at Nicaea, and the failure of the Byzantines to meet the crusaders' expectations as allies of the crusade was seen by many as treachery. At Antioch, in particular, Tatikios' departure and Alexios' non-arrival allowed Bohemond to argue that the oath of loyalty was void. In his attempts to establish himself as Prince of Antioch and to justify his occupation of the city,

Bohemond most likely distributed the *Gesta Francorum* in France in 1106, supplying a new generation of writers, removed from the events, with a source which was biased against Alexios.

Guibert of Nogent was one of this 'new generation' who took the anonymous source as his raw material and added significantly to it from eyewitness statements, written sources and his own knowledge. Having been influenced by the hostility towards Alexios in the *Gesta Francorum* and most likely by the views of Bohemond, Guibert added still more invective against the Byzantines, claiming that their misfortunes had been caused by their religious errors and ethnically based political inconstancy. Unaware or unconcerned that his religious invective was no longer in line with the papacy's position towards the Eastern Church, Guibert was inspired by the events of the First Crusade as they were presented to him, as a tremendous, divinely inspired success over the enemies of God, despite the consistent failure of the Byzantines to support the Latins.

By contrast, Fulcher of Chartres, predominantly an eyewitness but also an author who relied on the *Gesta Francorum*, did not share his source's antagonism towards Alexios. Although his initial impressions of the Byzantines, like those of Stephen of Blois, were positive, Fulcher must have been aware of the heightened tensions between the other armies and the emperor on his arrival at Nicaea. Despite this, he defended the actions of Alexios and avoided reporting on the most controversial events in Latin–Byzantine relations by omitting them from his chronicle. Fulcher's respect for the Eastern Christians was most clearly articulated in his account of the speech of Urban II at Clermont, an account based on a written source, possibly papal in origin. This direct contact with the papal conception of the crusade, 'for the liberation of the Eastern Churches', influenced Fulcher's interpretation of the events which followed and led him to excise the conflict between the crusade and the Byzantines from his chronicle.[123]

Neither Fulcher nor Guibert adopted the attitudes of their source without question. Clearly, Fulcher altered events presented in the *Gesta Francorum* significantly in order to maintain the fraternal tone of his history. Even though Guibert echoed the criticism of Alexios found in his source, he was also probably influenced by Bohemond's rhetoric in 1106, but his interpretation of the Turkish invasions as a divine instrument of correction for the religious failures of the Eastern Christians appears to be his own. The events of the crusade did not in themselves prompt Guibert's criticisms, but their presentation in the *Gesta Francorum* and the rhetoric of Bohemond may have. Fulcher was clearly predisposed towards treating Eastern Christians sympathetically, both by his understanding of the papal position with regards to Constantinople and perhaps from the good impressions of Alexios during his stay in Constantinople, impressions which Stephen of Blois included in his letter to his wife Adele.

A comparison of these two crusading histories shows that it would be an error to suggest that the experience of the First Crusade led to a universal anger in Western Christendom towards the Byzantines. Rather, it might be more accurate to speak of a polarisation of opinion, one in which the raw materials provided by

the clash of policy between crusaders and the Byzantines was either worked up to a new level of polemic and hostility or toned down in a consciously conciliatory fashion.

Notes

1 The author would like to acknowledge the generous financial support of the Irish Research Council for Humanities and Social Sciences, which facilitated this research.

2 Bernold of Constance, *Chronicon 1054–1100*, I.S. Robinson (ed.), *MGH Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum*, *Nova Series* 14, Hanover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 2003, p. 520 lines 3–11.

3 AC 308, related her father's trepidation at the arrival of the Latins.

4 *GF* 3.

5 EA 29–32, 37–8; Richard of Poitiers, *Chronicon*, *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France 12*, Martin Bouqet (ed.), Paris: Palmé, (1877), pp. 411–21, at p. 412; GN 312–13.

6 For the date of the anonymous *Gesta Francorum* and its use by later authors, see Heinrich Hagenmeyer, 'Einleitung', §6, in *Anonymi Gesta Francorum et Aliorum Hierosolymitanorum*, Heinrich Hagenmeyer (ed.), Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1890, pp. 49–92; John France, 'The Anonymous *Gesta Francorum* and the *Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem* of Raymond of Aguilers and the *Historia de Hierosolymitano Itinere* of Peter Tudebode', in John France and W.G. Zajac, *The Crusades and their Sources: Essays Presented to Bernard Hamilton*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, pp. 39–69; John France, 'The Use of the Anonymous *Gesta Francorum* in the Early Twelfth-Century Sources for the First Crusade', in A.V. Murray (ed.), *From Clermont to Jerusalem: The Crusades and Crusader Societies, 1095–1500*, Turnhout: Brepols, 1998, pp. 29–42; Jay Rubenstein, 'What Was the *Gesta Francorum* and Who Was Peter Tudebode?', *Revue Mabillon* 16, 2005, 179–204.

7 OV VI.68–71; J.G. Rowe, 'Paschal II, Bohemond of Antioch and the Byzantine Empire', *Bulletin of John Rylands Library* 49, 1966–7, 165–202, at 184–6.

8 A.C. Krey, 'A Neglected Passage in the Gesta and its Bearing on the Literature of the First Crusade', in Louis Paetow (ed.), *The Crusades and Other Historical Essays*, New York: F.S. Crofts, 1928, pp. 57–78. Krey suggests that a passage, describing a secret agreement between Bohemond and Alexios in which the emperor promised Bohemond territory in the environs of Antioch, was a later interpolation, as part of this propaganda campaign. This has been disputed by a number of historians, including France, 'The Use of the Anonymous *Gesta Francorum*'; Colin Morris, 'The *Gesta Francorum* as Narrative History', *Reading Medieval Studies* 19, 1993, 55–71; Rubenstein, 'What Was the *Gesta Francorum*', p. 195. Evelyn Jamison, 'Some Notes on the *Anonymi Gesta Francorum*, with Special Reference to the Norman Contingent from South Italy and Sicily in the First Crusade', in M.K. Pope (ed.), *Studies in French Language and Medieval Literature Presented to Professor Mildred K. Pope* (reprint), Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969 [1939], pp.183–208, at p. 195 suggests that the emperor had granted land beyond Antioch to Bohemond to create an 'outpost against Islam'.

9 RM 725: 'quidam etenim abbas nomine Bernardus, litterarum scientia et morum probitate præditus, ostendit mihi unam historiam secundum hanc materiam, sed ei admodum displicebat, partim quia initium suum, quod in Clari Montis concilio constituum fuit, non habebat, partim quia series tam pulchræ materiei inculta jacebat, et litteralium compositio dictionum inculta vacillabat. Præcepit igitur mihi ut, qui Clari Montis concilio interfui, acephalæ materiei caput præponerem et lecturis eam accuratiori stilo componerem'; BD 10: 'sed nescio quis compilator, nomine suppresso,

libellum super hac re nimis rusticanum ediderat; veritatem tamen texuerat, sed propter inurbanitatem codicis, nobilis materia viluerat; et simpliciores etiam inculta et incompta lectio confestim a se avocabat'; GN 79: 'Erat siquidem eadem Historia, sed verbis contexta plus equo simplicibus et quae multotiens grammaticae naturas excederet lectoremque vapidi insipiditate sermonis sepius exanimare valeret.'

10 See Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading*, London: Athlone, 1986, pp. 135–52, esp. pp. 149–52, for a discussion of the nature of the 'improvements' made by these authors.

11 FC 215: 'ego vero Fulcherus Carnotensis capellanus ipius Balduini eram'.

12 FC 64–70.

13 Guibert of Nogent, *Monodiae*, Edmond-Rene Labande (ed.), Paris: Belles Lettres, 1981; Guibert of Nogent, *Quo Ordine Sermo Fieri Debeat*, R.B.C. Huygens (ed.), *CCCM* 127, pp. 7–9, 47–63; Guibert of Nogent, *De Bucella Iudae Data et de Verite Dominici Corporis*, R.B.C. Huygens (ed.), *CCCM* 127, pp. 9–13, 65–77; Guibert of Nogent, *De Sanctis et eorum Pigneribus*, R.B.C. Huygens (ed.), *CCCM* 127, pp. 13–16, 79–109. See Huygens, 'Introduction', in GN 1, n. 1, for the use of *Dei Gesta per Francos* rather than *Gesta Dei per Francos.*

14 Guibert, *Monodiae*, I.iv.25, I.xiv.99, I.xv.107.

15 GN 51–2.

16 *Isidori Hispalensis Episcopi Etymologiarum sive Originum, Libri XX*, W.M. Lindsay (ed.), *Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985 [1911], I.xli.1: 'Apud veteres enim nemo conscribebat historiam, nisi is qui interfuisset, et ea quae conscribenda essent vidisset. Melius enim oculis quae fiunt deprehendimus, quam quae auditione colligimus [Indeed, among the ancients, nobody wrote history, except him who had taken part, and had seen that which was to be written].' See also Horace quoted in GN 166: 'segnius irritent animos demissa per aurem, quam quae sunt oculis subiecta fidelibus [What has been thrust into the ears stirs the mind more slowly than those things which have appeared before reliable eyes]'.

17 GN 166.

18 GN 78: 'Quae autem addiderim, aut ab his qui videre didicerim aut per me ipsum agnoverim'.

19 GN 166: 'tamen quis historiographos, quis eos qui sanctorum Vitas edidere ambigat non solum quae obtutibus, sed ea scripsisse quae aliorum hauserant intellecta relatibus? Si namque verax, ut legitur, quidam et quod vidit et audivit, hoc testatur, autentica proculdubio vera dicentium narratio, ubi videre non suppetit, comprobatur.'

20 For the letter of Alexios to Robert, see Heinrich Hagenmeyer (ed.), *Epistulae et Chartae ad historiam primi belli sacri spectantes* (reprint), Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1973 [1901], pp. 129–36. Although the integrity of this letter as it has survived has been much queried, Guibert was apparently convinced of its authenticity. For the arguments against its authenticity, see Einar Joransen, 'The Problem of the Spurious Letter of Emperor Alexios to the Count of Flanders', *American Historical Review* 55.4, 1950, 811–32.

21 For the death of Godfrey, GN 317; for the 1101 expedition, GN 312–13.

22 GN 108, 109–10.

23 GN 106.

24 GN 158. For Guibert's use of the term '*gregarii milites*', see C. Kostick, *The Language of* ordo *in the Early Histories of the First Crusade*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Trinity College Dublin, 2005, p. 164.

25 GN 135: 'inertissimos hominum Grecos'.

26 GN 142.

27 GN 90–1: 'Ipsi plane homines, pro aeris et coeli cui innati sunt puritate, cum sint levioris corpulentiae, et idcirco alacrioris ingenii'; Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiarum*, 9.2.105: 'Secundum diversitatem enim coeli et facies hominum, et colores, et

corporum quantitates, et animorum diversitates existunt. Inde Romanos graves, Graecos leves, Afros versipelles, Gallos natura feroces atque acriores ingenio pervidemus, quod natura climatum facit.'

28 It is likely that Guibert is here referring to the Eastern tradition of *oekumene*, a form of religious debate. See Steven Runciman, *The Eastern Schism*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1971 [1955], p. 4; GN 90.

29 GN 91.

30 GN 89: 'Orientalium autem fides cum semper nutabunda constiterit et rerum molitione novarum mutabilis et vagabunda fuerit, semper a regula verae credulitatis exorbitans, ab antiquorum Patrum auctoritate descivit.'

31 GN 111: 'Si inter aecclesias toto orbe diffusas aliae pre aliis reverentiam pro personis locisque merentur – pro personis inquam, dum apostolicis sedibus privilegia maiora traduntur, pro locis vero, dum regiis urbibus eadem quae personis dignitatis, uti est civitas Constantinopolitana, prebetur; illi potissimum Ecclesiae deberemus, ex qua gratiam redemptionis, et totius originem Christianitatis accepimus.

32 GN 93: 'nemo ad presbiterium provehatur nisi primo coniugium sortiatur'.

33 GN 93: 'idem dictum non de eo qui habeat et utatur sed de eo qui habuerit habitamque dimiserit constantissime Occidentalis aecclesiae auctorite firmetur'.

34 *Pseudo-Udalrici Epistola de Continentia Clericorum*, Lothar von Heinemann (ed.), *MGH Libelli de Lite Imperatorum et Pontificum*, Hanover: Impensis Bibliopolii Hahniani, 1891, I.256 line 22; A.L. Barstow, *Married Priests and the Reforming Papacy: The Eleventh Century Debates*, New York: E. Mellen Press, 1982, pp. 107, 115, 116.

35 Barstow, *Married Priests and the Reforming Papacy*, pp. 115–16.

36 GN 92: 'hunc dampnationi suae adiecerunt cumulum ut claudicare perhibeant, inflicta ei propriae naturae inequalitate, deum'.

37 GN 92: 'quid de Spiritu sancto dicturi sunt qui adhuc eum secundum reliquias hereseos Arianae minorem Patre et Filio prophana mente contendunt?'.

38 GN 90–1.

39 GN 90: 'Omnium hereseon catalogi perlegantur, libri antiquorum scripti adversus hereticos recenseantur, mirabor si preter Orientem et Affricam vix aliqui sub Latino orbe cernentur.' See also GN 90–1, Book I, lines 142–7, 149–61. For the opinion that the East was the origin of all heresy, see Liutprand of Cremona, *Legatio ad Imperatorem Constantinopolitanum*, Paolo Chiesa (ed.), *Liudprandi Cremonensis Opera Omnia*, in *CCCM* 156, Turnholt: Brepols, 1998, p. 196, lines 341–3.

40 GN 92: 'At quoniam offendiculum ponit deus coram his qui voluntarie peccant, terra eorum ipsos sui habitatores evomuit, dum primo fiunt a noticia verae credulitatis exortes ac merito deinde a iure omnis suae terrenae possessionis extorres. Dum enim a Trinitatis fide desciscunt ut adhuc sordescant qui in sordibus sunt, paulatim usque ad extrema suscipiendae gentilitatis detrimenta venerunt et procedente pena peccati, alienigenis irruentibus etiam solum patriae amiserunt aut, si quempiam ibidem remanere contigit, externis indigenae sese sub tributi reddibitionibus subdiderunt.'

41 GN 92.

42 *GF* 5; GN 128.

43 GN 135: 'Is ergo illustrius viri casus maximam sequentium procerum fortitudini enervationem intulit; idem namque facere quod ab isto exigebat seu vi seu clam seu precario ceteros coegit principis fraudulenti astutia.'

44 *GF* 12: 'Certe indigni sumus, atque iustum nobis uidetur nullatenus ei sacramentum iurare.'

45 GN 142: '"Et certe si nobis", inquiunt, "nullus incumberet timor futurorum, id solum, quod per Greculos istos, omnium inertissimos, iurare cogeremur, nobis esset sempiterne pudendum: plane eos dicturos minime ambigimus quia, velimus nolimus, ipsorum imperio parverimus".'

46 GN 141–2: 'Tunc Alexis perfidus, qui olim contra Turcos auxiliorum putabatur avidus, aceritate rancoris infrenduit et qua fraude tot militias, sibi ut putabat ingruentes, turpi precipitaret exitio sepe revolvit.'
47 *GF* 7; GN 152.
48 *GF* 63–4.
49 GN 230: 'quia perisse audierat quos non minori quam Turcos invidentia execrebatur'.
50 GN 313: 'Qui, cum maiestatis suae passim personaret testis ambitio, Constantinopolim venit, cum perfidissimo hominum Alexi tiranno colloquium habuit. Cuius proditor ille nequissimus adventum, antequam regia comes isdem digrederetur ab urbe, Turcis per epistolas detulit: "Ecce", inquit, "e Franciis pinguissimae ad vos progredientur oves, quae minus provido tamen pastore reguntur". Quid plura? omes tirannici principis fines excesserat, Turcorum ei exercitus repente obvius astat, vires hominis adventicias incompositasque debilitans dispergit, predatur et superat.' See note 5 above for contemporary commentators who also blamed the Byzantines for the failure of this expedition.
51 GN 314.
52 *GF* 6, 10, 12.
53 GN 93, 104, 128, 129, 130, 141, 142, 143, 144, 152, 153, 182.
54 GN 130, 135.
55 GN 105: 'ipse imperator non ex legitima purpuram successione susceperit'.
56 GN 105.
57 GN 105.
58 GN 104: 'edicto celebri'.
59 GN 105: 'Qui ergo dampnaverit ultro sua, iam querere merito cogitur aliena.'
60 GN 104.
61 GN 129–30: 'At perfidus imperator, territus audito clarissimi ducis adventu, detulit ei reverentiam sed nimis extortitiam.'
62 GN 105.
63 Marc Carriere, 'Pour en finir avec les *Gesta Francorum*: une réflexion historiographique sur l'état des rapports entre Grecs et Latins au début du XIIe siècle et sur l'apport nouveau d'Albert d'Aix', *Crusades* 7, 2008, 13–34, esp. 21, asserts that the anti-Byzantine rhetoric of Guibert cannot be traced solely to the anonymous *Gesta Francorum*.
64 D.C. Munro, 'The Speech of Pope Urban II at Clermont 1095', *American Historical Review* 11, 1905, 230–42.
65 Alfons Becker, *Papst Urban II (1088–99) Teil 2: Der Papst, die griecische Christenheit und der Kreuzzug*, Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1988, pp. 108–27, 177–205.
66 A.C. Krey, 'Urban's Crusade – Success or Failure?,' *American Historical Review* 58, 1948, 235–50, esp. 236–7.
67 Hagenmeyer, *Epistulae et Chartae*, pp. 161–5.
68 OV VI.68–71.
69 GN 138.
70 R.J. Lilie, *Byzantium and the Crusader States*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1993, pp. 75–82.
71 Walther Holtzmann, 'Zur Geschichte des Investiturstreites 2. Bohemond von Antiochien un Alexios I', *Neues Archives der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde* 1, 1935, 270–83, esp. 280–2, suggested a date of September 1106 for the composition of the letter, assuming that it was written prior to the attack at Dyrrachium. Rowe, 'Paschal II, Bohemond of Antioch and the Byzantine Empire', 165–202, proposed a later date of 1108.
72 Holtzmann, 'Zur Geschichte des Investiturstreites 2', 281: 'ut quam sanguinolentis minibus, horrendis scleribus, quam seva proditione dominum suum de inperio eiciendo honorem illum adeptus est, sileamus, ex quo in cathedra pestilentiae sedit'.

73 Holtzmann, 'Zur Geschichte des Investiturstreites 2', 280–1: 'ad scismata et heresies et diversas traditions removendas, quae in ecclesiae in ecclesia de processione sancti [spiritus], de baptismate, de sacrificio, de coniugio in sacris ordinaibus [existent]'.
74 Holtzmann, 'Zur Geschichte des Investiturstreites 2', 282. See also pp. 275–9 for a discussion of the identity of this Iohannes.
75 Holtzmann, 'Zur Geschichte des Investiturstreites 2', p. 281: 'universali ecclesiae et apostolicae universalitatem, quantum in ipso fuit, e suis abstulit, unde eum et suos a Romana ecclesiae dissentire manifestum est'.
76 As Hagenmeyer notes, the name 'Fulcherus' appears on three twelfth-century witness lists on charters from the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. The toponym 'Carnotensis' does not appear alongside the name, however, and this 'Fulcherus' cannot therefore be satisfactorily identified as Fulcher of Chartres. FC 2.
77 FC 687; FC 771.
78 FC 153, 215, 330. Fulcher does not appear in the register, *Dignitaires de l'Eglise de Notre Dame de Chartres*, Lucien Merlet and René Merlet (eds), *Archives du Diocèse de Chartres 5*, Chartres: C. Métais, 1900, and it is not certain that he was ever a canon of that cathedral. See Verena Epp, *Fucher von Chartres*, Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1990, p. 25 for speculation as to the influence of Ivo of Chartres on Fulcher; FC 360.
79 FC 203–15: 'ego vero Fulcherus Carnotensis capellanus ipius Balduini eram'.
80 See above, p. 165 for Guibert's use of the *Historia Hierosoloymitana*.
81 FC 115, n. 1.
82 Hagenmeyer, *Epistolae et Chartae*, pp. 138–40.
83 FC 176–7: 'O quanta civitas nobilis et decora! quot monasteria quot palatia, sunt in ea, opere miro fabrefacta! quot etiam in plateis vel vicis opera ad spectandum mirabilia! taedium est magnum recitare quanta sit ill bonorum omnium opulentia, auri scilicet, argenti, palliorum multiformium sanctorumque reliquiarum.'
84 FC 175: 'timebat enim ne forte aliquod damnum ei machineramur'.
85 FC 178: 'erat enim omnibus hoc necesse, ut sic cum imperatore amicitiam consoliderant, sine cuius consilio et auxilio nostrum iter nequivimus expedire, neque illi, qui nos erant subsecuturi eodem tramite'.
86 FC 155; *GF* 138–40; GN 135.
87 FC 179: 'Quibus ideo praebuit ipse imperator de nummismatibus suis et de panniis sericis quantum placuit; et de equis et de pecunia, qua nimis indigebant ad tantum iter explendum'.
88 FC 185: 'sciendum quia quamdiu Nicaeam urbem circumsedimus, navigio marino, concessu imperator adlatus est nobis victus ad emendum'.
89 FC 188: 'urbem cum iam vi et ingenio valde esset coercita'. See F.R. Ryan (tr.), H.S. Fink (ed.), *Fulcher of Chartres: A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem 1095–1127*, Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1969, pp. 37, 83, n. 1.
90 FC 188: 'quapropter pecunia illa tota retenta, iussit imperator de auro suo et argento atque palliis proceribus nostris dari; peditibus quoque distribui fecit de nummis suis aenis, quos vocant tartarones'.
91 See Hagenmeyer, *Epistolae et Chartae*, pp. 161–5.
92 RA 245–6; AA 310–13; *GF* 35; GN 182–4; BD 44–5.
93 FC 608: 'Subsequenter enim mortui sunt: Paschalis papa mense Ianuario, Balduinus, res Hierosolymorum, mense Aprili, necnon uxor eius in Sicilia, quam dereliquerat. Hierosolymis etiam patriarch Arnulfus, imperator quoque Constantinopolitanus Alexis et alii quamplures proceres in mundo.'
94 FC 521: 'erat quidem imperator Constantinopolitanus, Alexios nomine, genti nostrae tunc valde contrarius et Hierosolymam peregrinantibus vel fraude clandestina vel violentia manifesta tam per terram quam per mare perturbator et tyrannus'.
95 FC 130–1: 'confratribus vestris in Orientali plaga conversantibus'; FC 134:

'Christicolis'; FC 135–6; FC 136: 'gentem omnipotentis Dei fide praeditam et Christi nomine fulgidam, eos . . . qui professione Christiana censentur, sicut et vos'.

96 FC 221: 'heu! quam multos de Christianis, Graecis, Syris, Armenis qui in urbe conversabantur, Turci rabie permoti occidebant'.

97 FC 278: 'Christiani, qui inibi conversabantur comperirent, Graeci videlicet et Syrii'; FC 368.

98 See note 95 above.

98 FC 163–4.

100 FC 3.

101 Epp, *Fulcher von Chartres*, p. 25; Michael Foss, *People of the First Crusade*, London: Arcade Publishing, 1997, p. 50; Edward Peters, *The First Crusade: The Chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres and Other Source Material* (2nd edn), Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998 [1971], p. 46; Peter Lock, *The Routledge Companion to the Crusades*, Oxford, 2006, p. 236; Jean Richard, *The Crusades c.1071–c.1291*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 21; Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading*, p. 15.

102 See n. 78.

103 For the doubts as to Ivo's presence at the Council of Clermont, see Rolf Sprandel, *Ivo von Chartres und seine Stellung in der Kirchengeschichte*, Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1962, p. 178, n.8.

104 Hagenmeyer, *Epistulae et Chartae*, pp. 136–7.

105 FC 116: 'tamen veraci, dignum ducens memoriae commendandum, prout valui, et oculis meis in ipso itinere perspexi, diligenter digessi'.

106 FC 153: 'Quod ego ipse Fulcherius Carnotensis, cum caeteris peregrinis iens, postea, sicut oculis vidi, diligenter et sollicite in memoriam posteris college.'

107 FC 818–19: 'Non crederem cuiquam tot esse prodigia, nisi sumpta ipse oculis meis ponderavissem.'

108 Where he was not present at the events he has described, Fulcher mentioned having questioned eyewitnesses on a number of occasions. See Y.N. Harari, 'Eyewitnessing in Accounts of the First Crusade: The *Gesta Francorum* and Other Contemporary Narratives', *Crusades* 3, 2004, 77–100, at 81–2.

109 FC 135.

110 Enumeration of the decrees used here is taken from Somerville's edition of the canons of Clermont: R. Somerville (ed.), *Decreta Claromontensia*, Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1972, p. 94. While Somerville used the Stubbs and Le Prevost editions for Orderic and William, respectively, the Oxford Medieval Text Series editions, not then available to Somerville, will be used here. The manuscripts are as follows: C – Cambridge, University Library Kk. 4.6; L – London, British Museum Harleian 633; P – Paris, Bibliotheque nationale lat. 134413.

111 FC 133; RM 727.

112 RM 727–8; BD 12–15.

113 RM 727; BD 12–13.

114 Hagenmeyer, *Epistulae et Chartae*, pp. 136–7.

115 *PL* 151, Cols. 316a, 354c, 516a, 537a.

116 FC 124–5. For usage by reform papacy see *PL* 143, Cols. 779c, 835b, 1065a, 1197c–d, 1198d–1199a, 1199b–1200c, 1201d–1203a, 1207a–1208b, 1211a–1212a; *PL* 144, Col. 669b; *PL* 145, Col. 327c; *PL* 146, Col. 1364d; *PL* 148, Cols. 364a, 432a.

117 FC 126. For usage by the reform papacy, see *PL* 143, Cols. 622b, 1033b, 1035d, 1209d; *PL* 148, Col. 759b.

118 FC 125. For usage by the reform papacy see, *PL* 143, Col. 935c; *PL* 144, Col. 221a.

119 I.S. Robinson, 'Reform and the Church 1073–1122', in D.E. Luscombe and Jonathan Riley-Smith (eds), *The New Cambridge Medieval History c.1024–c.1198, Volume 1*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 268–334, at p. 268.

120 Peter Damian, *Various Writings*, *PL* 145, Col. 179; FC 126: 'ceterum vos ipsos prius corrigite, ut inreprehensibiliter subditos vestros queatis emendare'. For reform papacy use of the term '*corrigere*', with regards to vice and abuses in the Church, see *PL* 143, Cols. 696, 1150, 1348; *PL* 144, Col. 216; *PL* 146, Col. 1329; *PL* 148, Col. 296.
121 FC 129: 'quapropter treviam, sic vulgariter dictam, iam dudum a sanctis patribus determinatam, reformari oportet'.
122 RA 238.
123 Hagenmeyer, *Epistulae et Chartae*, pp. 136–7: 'ad liberationem Orientalium ecclesiarum'.

8

ORIENTAL AND OCCIDENTAL MEDICINE IN THE CRUSADER STATES[1]

Susan B. Edgington

The epic poem about the capture of Jerusalem in 1099, the *Chanson de Jérusalem*, recounts an episode when Peter the Hermit was captured and maltreated by enemy guards. He was brought into the sultan's presence and asked to account for himself:

> As Peter finished speaking,
> he fainted away in the middle of the tent.
> Seeing him in this state, the emir summoned Lucion,
> the most learned doctor anyone had ever seen.
> 'Make up a potion straight away,' said the Sultan.
> 'Cure this Frank for me and be quick about it!'
> Unlocking a chest, [Lucion] pulled out some marabiton,
> a most holy herb prepared by the skill of the Simeon
> who rescued the seven sages when they were put in prison.
> Forcing the medicine past Peter's jaws,
> he treated the wound which was gaping so wide that the lung was visible.
> Peter immediately bounced up in better shape than a sparrowhawk or a falcon.[2]

I quote this impressive cure not because it happened in reality, but because it clearly shows the esteem in which 'Saracen medicine' was held in thirteenth-century France, where the poem was composed.[3] Oriental physicians were thought to be very learned and to have access to drugs that were magical in their potency. In this chapter I shall investigate whether this perceived gulf in knowledge really existed, and examine the interaction between oriental and occidental medicine in the crusader states.

Before proceeding it is necessary to make the point that Saracens and Christians shared the same conceptual framework for medical science, which they inherited from the classical world. This system, usually attributed to Hippocrates, had been

elaborated in a corpus of writings in the period BCE.[4] It was believed that the health of the body depended on maintaining the balance of the four humours, or liquids, of which it was composed: blood, yellow bile, black bile and phlegm. Each humour was associated with a season of the year (spring, summer, autumn, winter), and – importantly – each had two 'qualities'. Thus, blood was moist and hot; yellow bile hot and dry; black bile dry and cold; and phlegm cold and moist. If one of the humours predominated in a person's body, then his health was compromised and he or his physician would seek to redress the balance. The first way of doing this was by adjusting the patient's regimen, or lifestyle. There were six subdivisions of regimen: the air around us; movement and rest; eating and drinking; sleeping and waking; excretion and retention; and the soul's moods.[5] Thus a person suffering from an excess of yellow bile would be encouraged to eat and drink substances that were classed as cold and moist, and perhaps to sleep on an airy balcony. A patient with an excess of phlegm would be given 'hot, dry' foods and encouraged to sit by the fire. This was physic, or internal medicine, and by the end of the eleventh century it had been practised by 'physicians' for some fifteen hundred years. It was rational and required some book-learning. It was also relatively non-aggressive.

More interventionist strategies for treatment included drugs, which could be vegetable, animal or mineral in origin, and which were administered by the apothecary, often under instruction from the physician. Third in the hierarchy of treatments was surgery, such as bloodletting or administering an enema to remove the superfluous humour physically. It is important to realise that in the period under discussion this was not the treatment of first choice: only in later times did copious bloodletting become routine, and the medic's first resort rather than the last.

Three categories of practitioner might be involved in orthodox medical treatment, therefore: the physician, who was the only one entitled to be called 'doctor', since that referred to his education; the druggist or apothecary, a tradesman who might act under the physician's orders, or be consulted by members of the public independently; and the surgeon, who was called upon to carry out manual treatments (the origins of his name) but frequently made his living as a barber and occasional dentist and/or lancer of boils. When a western source uses '*medicus*', '*mire*' or '*miège*', one should be aware that it could refer to any of these practitioners. In the *Chanson de Jérusalem* extract, Lucion is described as a '*mire*', but he is (a) learned (like a physician), (b) uses drugs to cure (like an apothecary), and (c) is dealing with a wound (normally the province of the surgeon). The distinctions which existed in later times were only beginning to be drawn in the twelfth century, and even later were often blurred or crossed. In particular, this is the period during which the university was emerging in Western Europe, standardising medical education to the point that by, say, 1400, only a university-educated practitioner could call himself a physician, or 'doctor of physic', like the one in Chaucer's prologue to *The Canterbury Tales*.[6] The term 'medic' will be used in this chapter, unless it is certain that another should be preferred.

Although the same Hippocratic legacy underlay medical theory and practice in all of Europe and the Mediterranean world, its transmission and reception had been different in Greek Christendom, in Latin Christendom and in Islam. While the Byzantine world centred on Constantinople preserved important elements of Greek and Roman medicine, Western Europe had only patchy survival of classical learning, usually preserved by the Church, which had a virtual monopoly of literacy.[7] In the Islamic lands, however, literacy was much more highly valued and widespread, and from the eighth century CE the Abbasid dynasty were patrons of an active and prolific translation movement from Greek (often via Syriac) into Arabic.[8] Some of the medical texts were retranslated into Latin, first in southern Italy at the great monastery of Monte Cassino and the linked site at Salerno, and then in Spain. This retranslation was going on at the same time as the crusades to the Holy Land: for example, Constantine the African, who translated Al-Majusi's *Complete Book of the Medical Art* at Salerno, arrived there in 1077 and died by 1099; and Gerard of Cremona went to Toledo to learn Arabic and there translated works by Ibn Sina and al-Razi, before dying in 1187.[9] This synchronicity greatly complicates an examination of the interface between Christian and Islamic medicine in the Holy Land.

In 1971 Ann F. Woodings tackled this complexity in a seminal article.[10] Acknowledging the importance of the 'two points [in Europe] where Moslems and Christians met, the kingdoms of Sicily and Spain', she sought to investigate the crusades and 'to discover what benefit, if any, the Franks derived from this direct confrontation with more advanced Moslem medical science'.[11] The assumption underlying the latter quotation inhibited a fully critical approach to the evidence, which was anyway limited almost entirely to sources available in English translation.[12] More recent investigations, particularly by Beni Kedar and Emilie Savage-Smith, have added enormously to the body of evidence from Arabic sources, I and others have expanded the range of western sources, and Piers Mitchell has contributed his knowledge of archaeology and palaeopathology and as a practising doctor.[13] This chapter presents an overview of this more recent research.

Medics on crusade

The eyewitness accounts of the First Crusade have little to say about medical matters in the army on the march, or during the earliest period of settlement, times at which it might be expected that the Latins were relying on medical expertise brought with them from Western Europe.[14] The surviving letters sent by participants are unhelpful, as is the anonymous *Gesta Francorum*. Raymond of Aguilers is apt to ascribe both illness and cure to divine intervention. Fulcher of Chartres, whose testimony should be invaluable, does include a chapter on native cures encountered by the settlers, including a medicine made of bedbugs and the use of snake poison as an antidote, but his information appears to derive not from experience, but from Solinus, and thus ultimately from Pliny.

Contemporaries writing at a distance do mention doctors and surgeons, but of course their testimony has to be treated with some caution. Thus Robert the Monk describes the ministrations of doctors after the Battle of Dorylaeum, but whether it is an invented depiction, or based on evidence not in the *Gesta Francorum*, cannot be known.[15] An episode when Godfrey of Bouillon was injured while fighting a bear is reported independently by Albert of Aachen and Guibert of Nogent.[16] It took place in northern Syria in the summer of 1097: Godfrey responded to cries from a poor pilgrim who was being attacked, and in the ensuing rescue he managed to slash his own thigh with his sword. The flow of blood from the wound was 'unstaunchable',[17] though (since he survived) he had probably damaged the femoral vein rather than the artery. He collapsed, and was carried on a litter to the crusaders' camp, where his distressed peers summoned 'the most skilled doctors to heal him'.[18] Godfrey recovered and went on to become the first Latin ruler of Jerusalem, but it is clear both from Albert's account and from Guibert of Nogent that he was seriously ill for some weeks: Guibert claims he had to be carried on a litter until after the siege of Antioch.[19] Nevertheless, he did recover, perhaps aided by the skilled medics. Without attaching undue weight to a source written hundreds of miles from the action, it is reasonable to argue that Albert was well informed about the personnel in Godfrey's army and that it included medical staff. If other, more closely involved writers did not mention them, it was because their presence was routine and unremarkable.

Albert referred to the attendants as '*medici*', the general term. When William of Tyre, writing two generations later and almost certainly using Albert's account, reported the same incident, he used the more specialist word '*cirurgici*' (surgeons).[20] If indeed medics were travelling with Godfrey's army, then it is likely that they were surgeons rather than physicians. As outlined above, surgeons were essentially artisans, who dealt with wounds, fractures, skin complaints and anything else that manifested itself externally and visibly on the body. In civilian life, and probably in the army too, they often subsisted day to day as barbers, and could also be called upon to pull teeth, let blood, or carry out any minor operation that required a sharp blade. Physicians, on the other hand, had some education, and they practised humoral medicine: pre-eminently they aimed to keep their patrons healthy; failing that, they specialised in internal medicine, considering themselves socially superior to the surgeons, who were manual workers. If there were specialist physicians in the crusading armies of 1096–1100, then it is likely that they were attached to the households of the leaders. Godfrey, therefore, may well have been attended by surgeons working under the supervision of physicians. The only other scraps of evidence for medics going on the First Crusade are the names of two witnesses to early documents: Lambert, a '*medicus*' and Genoese, witnessed a charter in 1098; and Geffroi, a '*medicus*' from Nantes, witnessed the will of Count Herbert of Thouars at Jaffa in 1102.[21]

Evidence for medics accompanying later crusades is equally sparse.[22] It is possible that Gilbertus Anglicus went on the Third Crusade with Hubert Walter,

and he claimed to have successfully treated Bertram, son of Hugh of Gibelet, for an eye condition when local Syrian doctors had failed to help him.[23] Ralph Besace was a physician to Richard I on the crusade, and witnessed Saladin's execution of noble captives.[24] On the same expedition was John of St Albans, a physician who treated Philip Augustus of France for 'a double tertian fever'.[25] Two English medics, Roger and Thomas, are documented as participating in the Fifth Crusade, 1218–21; and there were two physicians, John of Brideport and Robert of Murisien, as well as a surgeon, Hugh Sauvage, on Prince Edward's expedition of 1270.[26] An eminent Italian surgeon, Hugh of Lucca, went with Bolognese troops to Egypt as part of the Fifth Crusade, along with another Luccan medic, Robert.[27]

The most intriguing reference is to a female medic (she is called '*magistre*' and '*physica*'). Hersent went with the crusade of St Louis to Egypt, 1248–50. The evidence for this includes a promise of a pension of twelve Parisian deniers a day, dated at Acre, August 1250. Hersent was evidently highly valued, and she was employed directly by the royal household, but it goes beyond the evidence to suggest that she was university educated and Louis's personal physician.[28] Louis's queen had given birth to a son in Damietta in the spring of 1250, and it is likely that Hersent's primary responsibility was as royal midwife.[29] She returned to Paris at the end of 1250 and married an apothecary. Hersent is a reminder that alongside the acknowledged medics, the crusading armies would have contained numbers of empirics, and some of these were undoubtedly women – midwives, wise women and others. It used to be thought that another 'female physician', Laurette de Saint-Valery, was present on the Third and Fourth Crusades, but this has been comprehensively disproved.[30]

The real challenge to medicine during the crusading campaigns was epidemic disease. However, since there could be no concept of germ theory or real understanding of the transmission of disease, prevention and treatment were not generally seen as medical problems. For example, when pestilence first appeared during the siege of Antioch (1097–8) the leaders thought that the 'devastating mortality' had arisen among the people because of their 'great number of sins'.[31] Therefore, they forbade sinful behaviour and imposed penances. They were forced to consider other causes when a second, even more devastating epidemic struck: according to Albert of Aachen, it lasted for six months and killed over 100,000 people.[32] Godfrey left Antioch for Edessa because he recognised this as the same disease that had afflicted Rome in 1083, and the two epidemics were linked by the 'plague-bearing month of August'.[33] This was repeated later, in reference to the same epidemic, but 'the unhealthiness of the place' was also offered by some as a cause.[34] This is a thoroughly orthodox explanation, informed by Hippocrates' influential tract *On Airs, Waters, Places.*[35] Various writers associated the disease with the famine that preceded it: Ralph of Caen suggested the crusaders were poisoned because they were driven by hunger to eat unfamiliar plants.[36] William of Tyre put it thus: 'Others believe that when the people, so long victims of cruel hunger, finally obtained an abundance of food, they were overeager to eat in order to make up for their privations. Thus their unrestrained gluttony was the cause of

their death.'[37] William's moralistic tone seems to us unwarranted, but harks back to sin as the cause of corruption. The other cause he put forward is surprising and prescient: 'Some say that it arose from seeds of disease that were latent in the air.'[38] The more common concept of airborne disease was miasma, or corruption of the air: Guibert of Nogent, describing an earlier outbreak of disease in Apulia, gave the possible causes as the unaccustomed heat, corruption of the air, and unfamiliar food.[39] Ekkehard, writing of an epidemic in 1100, similarly blamed the heat and the stink of corpses corrupting the air, but also said some thought that the water had been poisoned.[40] A further explanation is found in Baldric of Dol:

> Let us rest quietly while our sick and wounded recuperate, and meanwhile let us relieve the poor among us. Let us wait for the autumn rains and avoid the harmful influences of the Crab and the Lion. In November the temperature will fall; then let us assemble and set out again together along the chosen road. Otherwise all our people will be prostrated with the untimely heat.[41]

The reference to the astrological signs of Cancer and Leo was not pure superstition, as it would be viewed now, but grounded in the natural philosophy (the science) of the period.

This range of explanations for the major epidemics put forward by people writing very early in the crusading period is very similar to causes proposed by the eleventh-century Islamic physician Ibn Ridwan.[42] It suggests that the writers, and probably the crusading leadership, did not lag behind in their scientific understanding of disease, even before they settled among the natives of Outremer. No matter how they described the reasons for epidemics, there was little practically that could be done to limit or counteract them. Pragmatically, the leaders survived the major epidemic at Antioch by leaving the scene and taking refuge in Edessa or the port of St Symeon: they were very aware of the limitations of medical knowledge and capability.

Neither knowledge nor capability had improved a great deal by the time of the Third Crusade. Malnutrition was certainly a problem – even King Richard suffered from '*leonardie*' during the siege of Acre.[43] Mortality was very high among the common soldiers right from their arrival at Acre: 'No small number of them died soon afterwards from the foul air, polluted with the stink of corpses, worn out by anxious nights spent on guard, and shattered by other hardships and needs.'[44] An epidemic took even more of them during the siege; it was ascribed to the famine and the excessive rain.[45] In all, said the author of the *Itinerarium*, '300,000 pilgrims and more died from infection and from hunger, both during the siege of Acre and afterwards within the city.'[46] Although medieval numbers are not to be trusted, this, which is part of the author's summing up of the crusade, reflects the scale of the loss. The Turks also blamed corruption of the air for promoting disease, and they tried to reduce the danger: '[Following the great Battle of Acre, 4 October 1189] the Sultan ordered the withdrawal of the baggage-train back to

a place called al-Kharrūba, fearing the smells from the corpses and the unhealthy effects of the battlefield on the troops.'[47]

It is interesting that the sources make no mention of Richard receiving medical attention during his illness. We know that he was accompanied by a physician (see above), and there is a passing reference to his being bled, which Nicholson interprets as a general health measure rather than for any specific ailment.[48] Possibly the physician's prescription for the king is to be read in Richard's constant requests to Saladin for fruit and snow, to which the sultan acceded.[49] But overall, it is likely that the physician's responsibility was conceived as advising on the maintenance of health. Illness was an act of God and recovery was in God's hands, so medical intervention was necessarily limited.

In the same way, St Louis is known to have had medics in attendance, and early in his narrative Joinville reported a discussion with the king as to whether wine should be watered or not; Joinville claiming that his doctors (*sic*) had told him he did not need to dilute his wine.[50] Once on crusade more serious matters were in question. In Egypt the river became polluted by corpses; it was Lent, and the only fish available were from the same river:

> On account of this evil circumstance, and because of the unhealthy climate . . . a disease spread throughout the army, of such a sort that the flesh on our legs dried up, and the skin became covered with black spots and turned a brown earthy colour like an old boot. With those who had this disease the flesh on the gums became gangrened; and no one who fell a victim to it could hope to recover, but was sure to die.[51]

Within a short time, 'so many people suffered from mortification of the gums that the barber surgeons had to remove the gangrenous flesh before they could either chew their food or swallow it'.[52] Joinville himself was ill, but the king was in a worse state, 'suffering from the sickness that had attacked the army, and from very bad dysentery as well . . . That night he fainted several times, and because the dysentery from which he suffered continually obliged him to visit the privy, they had to cut away the lower part of his drawers'.[53] When Joinville lay ill at Acre, suffering from a fever, he prayed to be delivered from his sickness, and the prayer was granted.[54]

Thus on three crusading expeditions, generations apart, the pattern of medical care seems to have been similar. The leaders were prepared for battle casualties and they took along numbers of surgeons and barber surgeons, who had the practical skills necessary to deal with wounds. The conditions on campaign, and particularly siege warfare, inevitably promoted diseases, both endemic and epidemic, and these were explained rationally according to Hippocratic theory. But it was accepted that recovery from disease was out of human hands. The armies resorted to penance and prayer; avoidance and endurance. Many died. It is anachronistic to assume that physicians would take any responsibility for combating infectious disease on this scale: the few educated doctors were in the

employ of the elite, and their primary role was to advise their lords on the maintenance of health. This was the heyday of the *regimen sanitatis* – rules for health, usually addressed to a king or noble. There is a good example from 1335, written by Guido da Vigevano for Philip VI of France and entitled *The Treasury of the King of France for the Recovery of the Holy Land beyond the Sea, and for the Health of his Body and the Prolongation of his Life, and Also with a Safeguard against Poisons*. It comprised nine folios of medical advice, subtitled *Regimen sanitatis senis*, or *Rules of Health for an Old Man*.[55] The rules were to do with keeping the body's humours in balance, conforming closely with accepted theories about human physiology and pathology. In brief, medical practice in the crusading armies of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was empirical and probably as effective as it could be in the circumstances. There is little evidence as to how far practice was informed by theory, although surviving manuscript evidence confirms that Islamic writers were more advanced than western ones.

In Outremer – medical theory

Recent research in medieval Islamic medicine has stressed the distinction between medical theory and medical practice: because a procedure was described in medical literature, it should not be assumed it was carried out in practice.[56] Many Islamic cities were centres of scholarship, and Antioch, which the first crusaders captured in 1098, was a flourishing intellectual centre with a tradition of medical writing and translation.[57] A major Roman city, Antioch had been captured from the Byzantines by the Persians and then occupied by the Arabs, and it was not until CE 969 that it returned to Byzantine hands. By now the population was speaking Arabic, and it was during this Byzantine occupation that a major and influential medical theoretician lived in Antioch. Ibn Butlan's career illustrates the cosmopolitan nature of the city: he was a Christian, born in Baghdad, who first visited Antioch in the 1040s, and his vivid description indicates why he chose to settle there towards the end of his life:

> In the middle of the town is the citadel . . . a palatial building . . . and round the palace are halls in which are accommodated the judges of the [Byzantine] government, and the teachers of grammar and language . . . There is an innumerable amount of churches; they are all adorned with gold mosaic work, coloured glass and mosaic pavement. In the town is also a hospital in which the patients are under the personal care of the Patriarch. In the town are, moreover, agreeable and excellent baths . . . In Antioch is a shaikh who is known as Abu Nasr ibn al-'Attar ('the son of the druggist'). He is chief judge of the town, has some knowledge in sciences, and is of agreeable conversation and understanding.[58]

Ibn Butlan travelled widely and engaged in a notorious dispute with a rival physician, Ibn Ridwan of Egypt.[59] This obliged him to leave Cairo, and after

visiting Constantinople he returned to Antioch, where he became a monk and where he died (c.1066). According to his biographer, he was entrusted with the building of a hospital in the city, and for this institution he wrote a discourse on how Greek rules of treatment had been modified by Arab physicians.[60] For his monastic community, he wrote a compendium: *On the Management of Diseases for the Most Part through Common Foodstuffs and Available Medicaments, Specifically for the Use of Monks of the Monasteries and Whoever is Far from the City.*[61] This has not yet been translated, although another relevant work has now appeared in print: *Le banquet des médecins* is structured as a symposium, where medics put forward competing medical theories.[62] Ibn Butlan is better known for an earlier work, *Taqwim al-sihhah*, or *Almanac of Health*, which was translated into Latin in the later Middle Ages as *Tacuinum sanitatis in medicina*.[63] He wrote in Arabic but acknowledged the influence of Hippocrates, Galen and other Greek physicians, as well as Arabic sources.[64] His career illustrates the dynamism of Antiochene intellectual life, which survived at least the early period of Latin occupation. Note too that, because Ibn Butlan was a Christian, his works and those of others like him were potentially more acceptable to the Franks. When western sources referred to 'oriental' or even 'Saracen' doctors, it usually meant only that they were natives of Outremer, and their language was Arabic. Most were probably Eastern Christians.

The early princes of Antioch were Normans from southern Italy: the captor Bohemond of Taranto, his nephew Tancred and their kinsman Roger of Salerno. Their provenance (particularly Salerno) may also have contributed to Antioch's continued importance as a translation centre. Antioch continued to attract travellers from near and far. Walter the Chancellor refers to 'Latins, Greeks, Syrians, Armenians, strangers and pilgrims' in the town during the earthquake of November 1114,[65] and we know that one of these strangers was Adelard – author of the popular *Quaestiones Naturales* – who had been born in Bath (England), had spent time in Laon (northern France), and had journeyed to Syria via southern Italy, Sicily and Greece: he described being shaken by the quake as he crossed a bridge at Mamistra.[66] Adelard's modern biographer has made much of the possibility that he learned his Arabic in Antioch, since he spoke of Arab masters and also mentioned an old man of Tarsus who explained methods of dissection for the study of anatomy. He could equally well have learned the language in Sicily, but his choosing to travel thereafter to Antioch does suggest that he expected to find it a centre of scientific learning.[67] Burnett has made a persuasive case for Adelard's having brought manuscripts back from Antioch to Bath.[68]

Another translator working in Antioch at this time was Stephen of Pisa, who made the first complete translation into Latin of al-Majusi's *kitab al-malaki*, which Stephen called *Regalis dispositio*. He also compiled a catalogue and glossary of Greek *materia medica*.[69] Stephen's activities show that important Arabic texts were available in Antioch. His translation of al-Majusi was made in 1127 and it is known to have been used by a physician in Hildesheim before 1140.[70] It was to

be immensely influential in western medicine.[71] More than a century later, in the 1240s, Bar Ebroyo was living in Antioch. A prolific writer in Syriac and Arabic, among his works was a condensed version of the *materia medica* of Dioscorides and Ahmed al-Ghafiqi – evidence of his linguistic range.[72] In short, the first generations of settlers were brought into contact with a flourishing tradition of Islamic medical theory in Outremer, but how far was this reflected in practice?

In Outremer – medical practice

As is the case for the army on the march, there are few contemporary records of medical treatment in the early years of Frankish settlement. The most detailed is an account by Guibert of Nogent of a wound sustained by Baldwin I (1100–18), probably in 1103:[73]

> [Baldwin] sustained a very severe wound in battle. The doctor whom he had summoned made a diagnosis but he feared to cover the wound outside by applying poultices, knowing that the wound had reached the insides of the body quite deeply, and while the surface of the skin might heal smoothly, on the inside a build-up of pus would be encouraged. So he proposed a wonderful expedient from his praiseworthy opinion and experience. He asked the king that he might order one of the Saracens he was holding in custody (for it would be wicked to ask for a Christian) to be wounded in such a position and place as the king himself had been wounded, and then to order him to be killed, so that the doctor might investigate freely upon the dead body and examine certainly from looking at it what the king's wound was like on its inside. The pious prince was utterly horrified at this . . . saying that he was not going to be the cause of anyone's death whatsoever, even a person of the worst sort, for the sake of repairing his own health, when even that was in the balance. Then the doctor said: 'If you draw a line at depriving anyone of life for the sake of repairing your own health, then at least order that the bear, which is useless enough except as a sideshow, be brought; command that it be killed with a weapon when it is upright with its front paws stretched out on high; and when I examine the dead beast's internal organs afterwards, I shall be able to make a sound judgement one way or the other from how far it has penetrated, how great also is your wound.' The king said to him: 'Since it is necessary, the beast is no problem; consider it done.' Therefore, when the experiment had been carried out on the wild beast to please the doctor, he ascertained that, as we have hinted above, it would be troublesome to the king if a covering were applied too quickly to the wound without the pus being drained first and the torn part brought together.[74]

This is an intriguing episode: if it was indeed 1103 (and it must have been before 1109, when Guibert's *Dei Gesta* was completed), then it is all but inconceivable

that Baldwin had a relationship of trust with any doctor but a Frank, and this is supported by the doctor's casual proposal that a Saracen prisoner-of-war be used in the experiment. The medic in question was fully aware of the danger of infection and the probable necessity to drain the wound – though, of course, his understanding of pus (*purulentia*) was humoral.[75] Assured by the autopsy on the bear that his fears were justified, the practitioner drained the wound and possibly sutured it. (Among unanswered questions is how the king survived the long wait for the outcome of the experiment.) Other historians described more briefly the near-fatal wounding in 1103. There is some disagreement as to the site of the wound, whether 'through the thigh and kidneys' (Albert); 'in the back, near the heart' (Fulcher); or 'from behind through the ribs near the heart' (William).[76] However, all three agree that Baldwin was saved through 'the skill and experience of very able doctors' (Albert); 'after an incision' (Fulcher); by 'the care of physicians . . . with their use of incisions and cautery' (William).[77] The substantial agreement between the three independent and contemporary writers – Albert, Fulcher (who was the king's chaplain) and Guibert of Nogent – enables us to say with some certainty that the King of Jerusalem had at least one medical practitioner in his retinue very early in the settlement period. The context suggests he was a Western European, and the king's survival that he was knowledgeable in theory and practice.

Unfortunately, this case study is a unique survival, and of course it tells us only what medical resources were available to the royal household, and nothing about the rest of the Latin population. It does, however, challenge received wisdom about the inferiority of western practical medicine early in the twelfth century. Later, it appears that there was a fashion among the Frankish nobility for employing oriental doctors:

> Desiring to take a physic before the approach of winter, as was his custom, [King Baldwin III] obtained certain pills from Barac, the physician of the count [of Tripoli], a part of which were to be taken at once and the rest after a short interval. For our Eastern princes, through the influence of their women, scorn the medicines and practice of our Latin physicians and believe only in the Jews, Samaritans, Syrians and Saracens. Most recklessly they put themselves under the care of such practitioners and trust their lives to people who are ignorant of the science of medicine.[78]

Some months later Baldwin III died.

Baldwin's successor also consulted oriental doctors as a first resort, though he considered he knew more about medicine than they did:

> On the way home [from the siege of Banyas, Amalric] complained to those about him that he was feeling rather ill . . . He dismissed his forces and went on with his personal retinue to Tiberias, where he began to

> suffer from a severe attack of dysentery. Fearing . . . illness, he [went on] to Jerusalem. There he continued to grow worse, and a violent fever came on, although the dysentery yielded to the physician's skill. After suffering intolerably from the fever for several days, he ordered physicians of the Greek, Syrian and other nations to be called and insisted that they give him some purgative remedy. As they would not consent to this, he had Latin physicians called and made the same request of them, adding that whatever the result might be he would take the responsibility upon himself. They administered medicines which [purged him several times and] seemed to give him some relief. But before he could take nourishment to strengthen his body which had been weakened by the violent remedy, the usual fever returned, and he yielded to his fate.[79]

The unwitting testimony of these passages from William of Tyre is the coexistence of competing Latin and oriental doctors. William's own prejudices are very clear, but it is also interesting that in both cases the king took a great interest in his own treatment: Baldwin III was accustomed to take a tonic before winter, and Amalric insisted that he needed a purgative. They are behaving according to their own understanding of the theory of the four humours. According to the (admittedly prejudiced) author of the *Itinerarium*, this attitude of the patient knowing best was taken to an unfortunate extreme by Conrad of Montferrat soon after his arrival at Tyre in 1189:

> **The marquis falls ill and kills his own doctors.** Meanwhile the marquis was struck down by a familiar and recurring illness; but because this time it happened to be worse than usual he supposed that he had drunk a deadly potion. So a harsh edict went out against the doctors who make potions. Because of an unjust suspicion the innocent were destroyed, although their profession does not bring death but health to the sick.[80]

William's descriptions of the terminal illnesses of the two kings are usually cited to demonstrate the fashion for non-Latin doctors, and this is indeed a feature which is borne out by other evidence. Amalric is known to have employed an oriental Christian doctor, Abu Sulayman Da'ud, to treat his leprous son, the future Baldwin IV.[81] Abu Sulayman had been born in Frankish Jerusalem, but had moved to Egypt, where he served the caliph. Amalric met him there, and induced him to move back to Jerusalem. Abu Sulayman made the young Baldwin an 'appropriate theriac' for his leprosy, although unfortunately, as William observed: 'Repeated fomentations, ointments, and even drugs were employed without result in the attempt to help the prince.'[82] Abu Sulayman was the first of a dynasty: one son succeeded him as Amalric's physician, and another became Baldwin IV's carer and riding teacher. When Jerusalem was recaptured in 1187 the family entered the service of Saladin and his successors.[83]

The way in which doctors worked across the cultural divide, as well as Usama ibn Munqidh's personal fascination with medical matters, is illustrated in his 'memoirs'. He records two cases where the barbarous intervention of a Frankish doctor had fatal consequences: one was on a knight who had an abscess on his leg and the doctor amputated; the second was on a woman with 'consumptive fever', whose head he cut open and rubbed with salt.[84] But Usama also notes two effective cures the orientals learned from the occidentals: the use of wine to disinfect wounds, and an ointment for scrofula.[85] These examples are too well known to need quoting in full, and anyway, as Hillenbrand observes, they should be used with caution: 'Usama's work . . . [has] been overexploited, often rather too simplistically, by scholars.'[86] It is worth adding that Usama's 'memoirs' cover his long life, 1095–1188, and his anecdotes cannot be closely dated. Therefore, they cannot, or should not, be used to make judgements about the comparative 'progressiveness' of medical science in the twelfth century.

Medical regulation

By the middle of the thirteenth century, however, there is some fairly secure evidence concerning the licensing, regulation and legal status of medical practitioners in the kingdom of Jerusalem. *Le livre des Assises de la Cour des Bourgeois de Jérusalem* was formerly thought to record the laws for non-nobles as they were during the first kingdom of Jerusalem (1099–1187), but Prawer showed that in fact the book was written as a private treatise in Acre, almost certainly between 1240 and 1244.[87] The author was himself a burgess, and had practical experience of the law, but he was not an academic lawyer. Prawer concluded that the two chapters on medicine and surgery were added by the author to show off his own knowledge of the medical profession, not taken from any previous treatise.[88] The whole collection comprises 278 chapters and is a chaotic mixture of property, criminal, civil and commercial laws. The 'medical' chapters are towards the end, among the commercial regulations.

These two chapters contain a wealth of information about the circumstances in which a doctor would be called, and the treatments he might administer. The cases within each chapter follow a formula: if my slave is sick in such a way, and I call a doctor, and he does *this* when he should have done *that*, and so the slave dies, then the following penalty is due – usually the price of the slave. The first chapter contains surgical remedies; the second concerns the work of the physician. They are separated by a chapter on doctoring horses, and the repeated references to slaves (*serf ou serve*) in the medical chapters may be why they were put in the 'commercial' section of the *Assises*. Slaves were unfree, usually non-Christian, and in certain circumstances could be bought and sold, so, like the horses in the intervening chapter, they could be viewed as property.[89]

Cases in the surgery chapter[90] exhibit a mixture of empirical treatment and humoral theory. For example, wounds 'in a hot place' or a place where the doctor should put hot things – for example, the brain, the nerves or the joints – 'which

are of a cold nature' must not be treated with cold things. An abscess should be treated with cold and moist remedies 'to soften and ripen and draw the badness out'; if the doctor put hot and dry things on it, the badness might burst inside and the patient die. Skull fractures had to be cleaned 'with instruments', otherwise the broken bone might pierce the brain and the patient die. The doctor might fail by leaving wounds without dressings, or by applying 'too many hot things as a result of which the cut arm or thigh goes bad', or the wound might stink, or he might neglect to attend to it every day, any of which could be fatal. In all of these cases where wounds proved fatal, compensation to the value of the slave was due to the owner, and the doctor was banned from practice in the city. However, if the patient was a free man or woman, then the doctor was to be hanged. Another case in the same chapter indicates the procedure for a broken arm or leg. The doctor's treatment, pulling the patient about and applying 'useless' plasters, might result in the slave being crippled, in which case the doctor had to take the slave and pay his master his purchase price; or, if he could not do this, then pay compensation for the slave's loss in value. If he treated a Christian (i.e., free) patient in a similar manner, then his right hand was forfeit.

Thus the work of the surgeon – dealing with wounds, broken bones and swellings, such as abscesses – was practical, and this, along with the focus on treating slaves (with references to free people seemingly secondary), might suggest that the surgeon was seen as an artisan and comparatively uneducated. It should be noted, however, that the entries relating to surgeons and those relating to physicians are structured in exactly the same way, and furthermore the surgeon, like the physician, was expected to advise on regimen in accordance with prevailing theory. The case reads:

> Item: if a doctor can show in court, on good evidence, that the person he was treating lay with a woman, or drank wine, or ate any bad food which the doctor had forbidden him, or did anything which he ought not to have done so soon, judgement is and should be that even though the doctor might have treated him otherwise than he should, the doctor is under no obligation to pay compensation, because more obvious opinion is that the patient died because he should not have done that which was forbidden to him, rather than from bad treatment, and this is the law and judgement of the assize. But if the doctor did not forbid him to eat anything, or drink, or touch a woman, and he touched, or ate or drank what he should not have done, and he died of it, the sentence is that the doctor is obliged to pay compensation for him, by law; for the doctor is obliged, by law, as soon as he sees the patient, to tell him what he should eat, and what he should not eat; and if the doctor does not do this and something goes wrong, this is the doctor's responsibility. But if the doctor, even though he has undertaken to administer a course of treatment, has the misfortune to be captured by Saracens, or an illness befalls him, or some other mischance as a result of which he cannot come

> afterwards to see the patient, opinion is that the doctor is not obliged to pay any compensation at all, by law.[91]

In view of this evidence of theoretical knowledge, it is possible that the *Assises* are not dealing with different occupational groups at all, but different areas of expertise: that is, that the same 'doctor' was called upon to deal with surgical and physical illnesses. The *Assises* do, however, preserve the distinction between external and internal complaints in the structuring of the chapters. Humoral theory also pervades the chapter on physic.[92] In the case of diarrhoea, the doctor should give 'cold and binding things' and not 'laxative things or hot things'. In the case of fever it might be fatal to bleed the patient excessively, or before the right time. The doctor was expected to recognise when a patient had a chill from looking at the urine, and not to bleed him. For dropsy, controlled draining via an incision was recommended. A quotidian fever, which was marked by fluctuations in temperature in the course of the day, seems to have been treated by administering a purgative containing the herb scammony, an overdose of which could lead to death: 'He goes so much to the privy that before it is daylight he has voided everything he had in his body, both liver and lungs, and dies.'[93] Diseases of the bowel might be treated with drugs – 'some powder or strong herb to drink' – or by cautery. There is a graphic description of how the latter might go wrong. In all these cases the penalty was high: the price of a slave; or, if a free person died, the doctor responsible was to be beaten around the town, urine-flask in hand, and then hanged 'to deter others from this malpractice'.

There is one exception to these high penalties, and that is when the illness caused spots:

> Item: if I have one of my slaves ill with spots, or with a dry rash, or with any other illness, and I come to a doctor and I make an agreement with him that if he cures him, then half of what the slave shall be sold for will be his and the other half go to his lord who bought him, and the doctor takes him for treatment, and does for him what he can, but it does not work, and the slave dies, opinion is that on this account the doctor is not obliged by law to pay compensation for the slave, first of all because he lost his work, and everything he should have received; and this is the law and opinion of the assize.[94]

It appears that the *Assises* recognised that doctors were powerless when faced with certain infectious diseases. This is consonant with the findings above, regarding epidemics on campaign. Another feature of this chapter is the preponderance of cases of dysentery, which may be taken to reflect the realities of life in Outremer. These two types of illness are the only ones to feature elsewhere in the *Assises*: if a purchased slave should develop dysentery within a year and a day, then the vendor was obliged to take him or her back and refund the price. Similarly, if the

slave developed '*mezele*' (leprosy, or spots), the same applied, and this seems to have been a 'frequent occurrence' (*Mainte feis avientque*).[95]

In view of the high price of failure, it is a wonder that doctors were prepared to practise in Outremer. One possible explanation is that success was more usual than failure, and another is that the rewards were high enough to compensate for the risks. There was some protection in the law, in that the doctor could not be convicted on unsupported testimony.[96] But who were these doctors who risked their lives every time they undertook to treat a patient? In both chapters they are referred to as *mièges* (*medici*) – no distinction is made between surgeons and physicians, and indeed the distinction may not have existed, as suggested above. There was a formal procedure for licensing these *mièges*, which went as follows:

> Item: no foreign doctor, that is one who comes from overseas or from pagan lands, should practise as a urine-doctor to anyone until he has been tested by other doctors, the best in the land, in the presence of the bishop of the land, before whom this should be done. And if it is ascertained that the doctor knows how to practise medicine properly, the bishop, before whom he is examined, should give him a licence to practise in the town henceforth, wherever he will, by letters from the bishop which he will have as testimony, that the doctor has been examined and can practise, by law, as a urine-doctor. And this is the law and opinion of the assize of Jerusalem . . . And if it happens that he does not know good medicine, that he cannot cure, opinion judges that the bishop and the court should order him to leave the city, or if not, that he stay in the land without treating anyone. And if it should happen that any doctor practises in the town, without leave of the court and the bishop, the court should take him and have him beaten out of town, by law and by the assize of Jerusalem.[97]

Note that the bishop was responsible for overseeing the examination of doctors and for granting their licences, although it is clear that the same regulations applied to all foreign doctors, whether from Western Europe ('Outremer') or from 'Païnime' (lands under Muslim rule). Bearing in mind the passages from William of Tyre and Usama, above, it is probable that not all these doctors were Christian, although the majority probably were.

This testimony of the *Assises* with regard to the licensing of doctors is relevant to a wider debate about the development of the medical profession. The licensing of medical practitioners is earliest recorded in Arabic sources, including al-Razi in the ninth century CE. The first known example in Western Europe dates from Sicily in 1140, but there is no other example until 1231, again in Sicily, as part of legislation issued by Emperor Frederick II.[98] This was soon followed by enactments in other regions, and the *Assises*, dating from the early 1240s, could be related to these – or it could be independent and influenced by practice in Outremer.

The clue to the inclusion of these medical chapters in the *Assises*, and their position in the 'commercial' section is found in an accompanying document entitled '*un abrégé*', or abridgement.[99] The relationship of this document with the *Assises* is by no means clear, but it is certainly more than a précis. Among the court officers in the *abrégé* is the '*mathessep*', who is further identified as a 'master-sergeant'. Prawer realised that this was an attempt to render in French the Arabic word '*muhtasib*'.[100] The *muhtasib* was an official in Syrian towns who had responsibility for enforcing fair trade in the markets, upholding public morality, and ensuring the maintenance of standards in various crafts and professions.

Some manuals survive which describe the role of the *muhtasib* in detail. One available in English translation is *The Book of the Islamic Market Inspector*.[101] Its author, al-Shayzari, was based in Syria in the twelfth century and wrote for Saladin, so it could scarcely be better suited for comparison with our medical chapters.[102] In fact, the manual gives regulations for all sorts of trades, including butcher and baker. There are chapters on apothecaries, phlebotomists and cuppers, physicians, eye doctors, bone setters and surgeons. The book includes a definition of physician and the knowledge he needed, and the information that all physicians had to take the Hippocratic oath before the *muhtasib*. He was also to examine them on Galen and a book by Hunayn b. Ishaq (d. 873), *The Trial of the Physician*. The medical instruments the physician should have were itemised, and included several we should call surgical. Eye doctors were also to be tested, as were bone setters and surgeons. All were expected to have considerable book-learning as well as a knowledge of anatomy.[103]

With this insight into the role of the *muhtasib*, the inclusion of the medical chapters in the *Assises* seems a great deal less arbitrary. The thirteenth-century author may well have been showing off his knowledge by expanding the content to include details of treatments and maltreatments (as Prawer thought), but the chapters were included as a matter of course within that part of the collection which dealt with the various aspects of the *muhtasib*'s role. We cannot assume that the knowledge required of doctors who treated the Franks was the same as in Islamic lands, but we can see that their practice was probably regulated as a craft or trade in a similar way. The regulation of medical practice and practitioners does appear to be one aspect of medicine where crusaders and settlers learned from the natives of Outremer.

Hospital development

An institution that underwent significant change in Outremer was the hospital. It is relatively easy to describe the development, but more difficult to decide whether it was the result of Islamic influence.

Institutions called hospitals ('*hospitales*' or '*hospitalia*' in Latin) were well established across Europe before the time of the crusades. They originated as guest-houses of monasteries ('*hospites*' means guests or strangers), and provided accommodation for travellers and others in need. Those on pilgrimage routes

were especially in demand, and attracted the poor and the infirm in great numbers. It would be more accurate to call them hostels or hospices – two other English words derived from the same Latin root (and no doubt the wealthy used them as hotels, a third derived word). It was in this spirit that a group of merchants from Amalfi, Italy, set up a small hostel/hospice in Jerusalem in the middle of the eleventh century, confiding it to the care of a group of Benedictine monks. The hostel was sited conveniently close to the church of the Holy Sepulchre, and it was dedicated to St John the Baptist. When Jerusalem was in Christian hands after 1099, it became even more attractive as a pilgrimage centre, and the buildings were expanded to meet the need for accommodation. Administration of the hospital was placed in the hands of the new Order of St John, which developed into a military order, but always had the care of the sick as its primary concern.

Excavations early in the twentieth century revealed a major building programme in the 1140s.[104] By 1169, when the German pilgrim Theoderich visited, the buildings were palatial:

> Unless he has had the opportunity of seeing it with his own eyes, no one can credibly tell another how beautiful its buildings are, how abundantly it is supplied with rooms and beds and other material for the use of the poor, and sick people, how rich it is in the means of refreshing the poor, and how devotedly it labours to maintain the needy. Indeed we passed through this palace, and were unable by any means to discover the number of sick people lying there; but we saw that the beds numbered more than one thousand.[105]

John of Würzburg, writing at about the same time, put the number of patients at two thousand, and the daily mortality as high as fifty.[106] Nevertheless, when Saladin captured Jerusalem in 1187, he was so impressed by the hospital that he allowed it to remain open for a year so that it could dispose its affairs in good order.

Records from the early 1180s give an insight into the running of the hospital. These include an Old French translation of the Statutes entitled *Des viandes as malades et des mieges et de lordenement qui a este uzei au palais des malades a Jerusalem* (*Concerning food for the sick and doctors and the organisation of the palace of the sick in Jerusalem*).[107] There is also a description by a German pilgrim of his experience in the hospital in the 1170s.[108] He not only noted down his observations, but questioned staff and patients. These two sources confirm the exceptional size of the hospital, though its maximum capacity may have been achieved only at the expense of the brothers' own beds. There were eleven wards: ten were general and one was for the weakest patients. All had comfortable beds, sheepskin covers and dressing-gowns. Salaried staff comprised four 'doctors', a physician for the weakest patients, and three or four surgeons, plus blood-letters. The hands-on nursing was done by serjeants of the Order of St John, though the regulations also stipulated that the knights should be prepared to take on menial tasks.

In terms of treatment, the most important recourse was to 'celestial medicine', or the power of prayer. Patients were part of the daily liturgical life and there were also special processions. Second only to religion was dietary regulation (regimen). Patients were prescribed strengthening foods to counteract the 'cold, moist' humours of old age and infirmity. Their diet included luxuries such as wine, sugar and almonds, as well as meat, vegetables and white bread. Much less is known about which medicines were administered, though electuaries, syrups and a sweet–sour tonic called oxymel are all recorded. (The hospital seems to have used at least two hundredweight of sugar a year.) Surgery was important after battles, and the German pilgrim claims the knights had first-aid stations on the battlefield, from which the wounded were brought back to the hospital. There was a separate hospital alongside for women, with wards for lying-in and for the care of foundlings. This was dedicated to St Mary Magdalene and the attendants were female.

The references in the sources to special facilities for the weakest patients and the low ratio of medical staff to patients suggest that the majority of inmates were not ill at all; they were pilgrims, perhaps aged and infirm, who needed nursing care. However, salaried medical staff were employed, further identified in the Statutes of the Hospitallers, 1182: 'for the sick in the Hospital of Jerusalem there should be engaged four wise doctors, who are qualified to examine urine, and to diagnose different diseases, and are able to administer appropriate medicines'.[109] In a decree of 1184/5 Pope Lucius III stipulated 'that in the house of the hospital there should always be five doctors and three surgeons, at whose disposition should be administered those things which are necessary for the sick, both foodstuffs and other things'.[110] The German pilgrim text further says that the doctors were learned in physic, salaried, employed exclusively in the hospital, and bound by oath. They were to know the nature of the sick and to use electuaries and other medicines, with which they were fully supplied. They visited the sick every morning and evening to check their urine and pulse, accompanied by two serjeants ('*clientes*') from the ward concerned, one of whom carried syrups, a vinegar–honey mixture, electuaries and other medicines; the other held up the urine samples, discarded them when they had been seen and cleaned the urinals, and recorded the doctor's dietary instructions or arranged for the blood-letter to attend. These blood-letters ('*minutiores*') were also waged. On the advice of the doctors and the superintendent, they also used foods to treat patients.

The hospital of St John in Jerusalem was both less and more than a hospital in any modern sense. There has been debate about its antecedents, but contemporary institutions like the Pantokrator in Constantinople and the Nur ed-Din hospital in Damascus were institutions both on a vastly smaller scale and with a more specialised medical mission. Much of the work of the Jerusalem hospital was caring rather than curing, and in this context it is significant that Raymond du Puy's Rule for the order, which dates from the middle of the twelfth century (before 1153), has been shown to draw on the Augustinian *Praeceptum*, a document with much emphasis on good food and comfortable conditions for the

infirm, and reliance on the advice of doctors in these matters.[111] Lucius III, confirming the Rule in 1184/5, certainly believed that the order followed St Augustine: 'canonicis regularibus beati Augustini regula concessa est'.[112] This means that the hospital looked for its organisation and ethos to a model popular in more northerly parts of Europe.[113] Even in the 1180s it still functioned as a hostel/hospice as well as offering medical care according to the ideas of the time, with their emphasis on regimen. It was an institution which could have developed only in Jerusalem, where the influx of needy pilgrims coincided with the professionalisation of medical occupations, and the organisation of institutional care.

Writers on medical matters in Outremer have often started with preconceptions about the superiority of oriental medicine, with the implication that the occidentals had much to learn. It is uncontestable that Islamic writings on medicine were both more prolific and more sophisticated: translations into Latin were as yet few in Western Europe. However, the interchange of medical ideas was facilitated by the two peoples sharing the same classical heritage, and it is impossible to state categorically that it took place in Outremer rather than elsewhere. A study of the crusading armies suggests that they brought with them surgeons who were well up to the demands of battlefield surgery. There may also have been educated physicians with the armies, but their role was to keep the leaders healthy rather than to deal with such medical emergencies as epidemic disease. Once settled in Outremer, occidentals seem to have been prepared to consult oriental doctors – probably mostly Christians – and even to employ them in the hospital in Jerusalem and its successors. A system of licensing medics was developed which was probably influenced by Islamic models, but the most impressive development was the hospital of St John in Jerusalem, and this was a religious institution rather than a medical one.

Notes

1 I am grateful to Piers Mitchell for reading and commenting on a draft of this chapter. For more detail on every aspect of this subject, see his *Medicine in the Crusades: Warfare, Wounds and the Medieval Surgeon*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

2 *The Old French Crusade Cycle: La Chanson de Jérusalem*, Nigel Thorp (ed.), Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1992, pp. 191–2:

> Ains que Pieres eüst finee se raison
> Li covint a pasmer en mi le pavellon.
> Quant l'amirals le voit s'apela Lucion –
> C'ert li plus sages mires c'onques veïst nus hom.
> 'Or tost,' dist li Soudans, 'faites une puison.
> Garisiés moi cest Franc sans grant demorison!'
> Cil desfrema.I. cofre s'en trait marabiton –
> C'est une saintime herbe de l'argut Simeon,
> Qui jeta les .VII. sages del cartor en prison.
> Pui que Pieres en ot trespassé le menton,

Li sana sa grans plaie dont parut li pomon:
Plus fu sains enesleure qu'espreviers ne faucon.

My thanks to Carol Sweetenham for help with translation. ('*Marabiton*' is usually used for Arabic gold coins (*maravedis*). Here it is an exotic word chosen to fit the metre, and perhaps because it echoes both the Arabic word and '*marathrum*', or fennel, a Mediterranean herb which had many pharmaceutical uses.)

3 S.B. Edgington, 'Pagans and "others" in the Chanson de Jérusalem', in Liz James and S.D. Lambert (eds), *Languages of Love and Hate: Conflict: Communication and Identity in the Medieval Mediterranean*, International Medieval Research 15, Turnhout: Brepols, forthcoming.
4 See, for example, Jacques Jouanna, *Hippocrates: Medicine and Culture*, M.B. DeBevoise (tr.), Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
5 For the 'non-naturals', see Manfred Ullmann, *Islamic Medicine*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1978, pp. 97–103.
6 'A doctour of phisik'. For a modern translation, see Geoffrey Chaucer, *The Canterbury Tales*, Neville Coghill (tr.), Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1951, pp. 30–1.
7 See the essays in Peregrine Horden and Emilie Savage-Smith (eds), *The Year 1000: Medical Practice at the End of the First Millennium*, Social History of Medicine 13, 2000, pp. 197–321.
8 P.E. Pormann and Emilie Savage-Smith, *Medieval Islamic Medicine*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007, pp. 24–35.
9 Pormann and Savage-Smith, *Medieval Islamic Medicine*, p. 164.
10 A.F. Woodings, 'The medical resources and practice of the crusader states in Syria and Palestine 1096–1193', *Medical History* 15, 1971, 268–77.
11 Woodings, 'The medical resources', 268.
12 The exception was the *Assises* (see n. 87 below), in Old French.
13 Mitchell, *Medicine in the Crusades.*
14 The eyewitness accounts are: *GF*; FC; RA; letters: Heinrich Hagenmeyer (ed.), *Epistolae et chartae ad historiam primi belli sacri spectantes* (reprint), Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1973 [1901].
15 RM 764.
16 AA 144–5; GN 285–6.
17 AA 144–5: 'sanguis incessabili unda proflueret'.
18 AA 144–5: 'medicos peritissimos ad sanandum ei'.
19 GN 286: 'usque ad finem plane Antiochenae obsidionis egre prorsus nisi lecticia devehi potuit'.
20 WT 220.
21 Lambert: *Regesta Regni*, p. 2, no. 16; Geffroi: in Mitchell, *Medicine in the Crusades*, p. 17, citing *Cartulaires du Bas-Poitou*, Paul Marchegay (ed.), Vendée: L. Gasté, 1877, pp. xv, 7–8.
22 See Mitchell, *Medicine in the Crusades*, pp. 17–30, for a much fuller and more detailed list.
23 Mitchell, *Medicine in the Crusades*, pp. 21–3, citing Gilbertus Anglicus, *Compendium Medicine*, Michael de Capella (ed.), Lyon: In vico Mercuriali sub intersignio Angeli [Impressum per Jacobu[m] Saccon[um] expensis Vincentij de Portonarijs], 1510, fol. 137a.
24 Mitchell, *Medicine in the Crusades*, p. 23, citing Matthew Paris, *Historia Anglorum*, Frederic Madden (ed.), Rolls Series 44, 3, London: Longman, 1866–9, II.37.
25 Mitchell, *Medicine in the Crusades*, p. 23, citing *La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr 1184–1197*, M.R. Morgan (ed.), Paris: Librairie orientaliste P. Geuthner, 1982; P.W. Edbury (tr.), *The Third Crusade: Sources in Translation*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996, pp. 11–145, at 108–9.

26 See Mitchell, *Medicine in the Crusades*, pp. 24–5, for details and sources.
27 See Mitchell, *Medicine in the Crusades*, pp. 26–7, for details and sources.
28 Mitchell, *Medicine in the Crusades*, p. 19. See also Régine Pernoud, *La femme au temps des croisades*, Paris: Stock, 1990, pp. 227–8.
29 Jean Joinville, *The Life of St Louis*, in M.R.B. Shaw (ed. and tr.), *Chronicles of the Crusades*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963, pp. 262–3.
30 S.B. Edgington, 'A female physician on the Fourth Crusade? Laurette de Saint-Valery', in Norman Housley (ed.), *Knighthoods of Christ: Essays on the History of the Crusades and the Knights Templar, Presented to Malcolm Barber*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, pp. 77–85.
31 AA 228–9: 'clademque mortalitatis in populo [principes] considerantes, ex peccatorum multitudine hec fieri asserebant'.
32 AA 342–5.
33 AA 354–5: 'in pestifero mense Augusto'.
34 AA 366–7: 'ex loci infirmitate'.
35 *Hippocratic Writings*, G.E.R. Lloyd (ed.), John Chadwick and W.N. Mann (trs), Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978, pp. 148–69.
36 RC 663.
37 WT 344: 'aliis vero id pro causa assignantibus quod populus, longo tempore famis acerbitate vexatus, postquam alimentorum attigit opulentiam cibos cum aviditate sumens nimia, preteritos defectus querens redimere sibi ipsi causam mortis inmoderata gulositate inferebat'.
38 WT 344: 'dicentibus aliis quod ex occultis quibusdam aeris passionibus hoc accideret'.
39 GN 134–5.
40 EA 160.
41 BD 80: 'Sileamus ergo et quiescamus; et vulneratos et infirmos nostros reparemus; et interim pauperum nostrorum misereamur. Expectemus humida solstitia et declinemus Cancri et Leonis nocivos successus. Kalendris Novembribus, tempus refrigerabitur, et tunc congregati, unanimiter condictum iter aggrediamur. Alioquin totum populum intempestivis ardoribus affligeremus.'
42 Pormann and Savage-Smith, *Medieval Islamic Medicine*, p. 58.
43 Or '*arnaldia*': see *Itinerarium peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, in *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I*, William Stubbs (ed.), Rolls Series 38, 2, London: Longman, 1864–65, translated as *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade: The Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, H.J. Nicholson (tr.), Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, p. 204 and n. 14. See also D.S. Richards (tr.), *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin or al-Nawadir al-Sultaniyya wa'l-Mahasin al-Yusufiyya by Baha' al-Din Ibn Shaddad*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, pp. 153–5.
44 *Itinerarium peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, p. 74: 'non minor pars in brevi decessit, tum foetore cadaverum, aere corrupto, tum vigiliis sollicitis consumptis, aliis injuriis et penuriis afflicta'; Nicholson (tr.), *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 83.
45 Nicholson (tr.), *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, pp. 126–34; see also pp. 278–9.
46 *Itinerarium peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, p. 440: 'Item revera novimus et infirmitatis corruptione et famis inedia decessisse peregrinorum trecenta millia et amplius, et in obsidione Achonensi, et post in ipsa civitate'; Nicholson (tr.), *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 380.
47 Richards (tr.), *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, p. 105; Woodings, 'The medical resources', 272.
48 Nicholson (tr.), *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 273 and n. 87.
49 Richards (tr.), *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, pp. 159, 227–8.
50 Joinville, *The Life of St Louis*, Shaw (tr.), p. 168.
51 Jean de Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis: texte original*, Natalis de Wailly (ed.), Paris: Hachette, 1874, p. 160: 'Et pour ce meschief, et pour l'enfermetei dou païs . . . nous

vint la maladie de l'ost, qui estoit teix, que la chars de nos jambes sechoit toute, et li cuirs de nos jambes devenoit tavelés de noir et de terre, aussi comme une vieille heuse; et à nous qui aviens tel maldie, venoit chars ourrie es gencives; ne nulz ne eschapoit de celle maladie, que mourir ne l'en couvenist.' Joinville, *The Life of St Louis*, Shaw (tr.), p. 237. Shaw identified the disease as scurvy.

52 Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, Wailly (ed.), p. 166: 'il venoit tant de char morte es gencives à nostre gent, que il couvenoit que barbier ostassent la char morte, pour ce que il peussent la viande maschier et avaler aval'. Joinville, *The Life of St Louis*, Shaw (tr.), p. 239.

53 Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, Wailly (ed.) p. 168: 'li roys, qui avoit la maladie de l'ost et menoison mout fort . . . Le soir, se pasma par plusours foiz; et pour la fort menuison que il avoit, li couvint coper le font de ses braies, toutes les foiz que il descendoit pour aler à chambre'. Joinville, *The Life of St Louis*, Shaw (tr.), p. 240.

54 Joinville, *The Life of St Louis*, Shaw (tr.), p. 268.

55 Paris, BN lat. 11015.

56 Pormann and Savage-Smith, *Medieval Islamic Medicine*, pp. 75, 115–43; Cristina Álvarez-Millán, 'Practice versus theory: tenth-century case histories from the Islamic Middle East', in Horden and Savage-Smith (eds), *The Year 1000*, pp. 293–306; Emilie Savage-Smith, 'The practice of surgery in Islamic lands: myth and reality', in Horden and Savage-Smith (eds), *The Year 1000*, pp. 307–21.

57 S.B. Edgington, 'Medieval Antioch as an intellectual centre, and its influence on Western European medicine', in Nil Sari *et al.* (eds), *Proceedings of the 38th International Congress on the History of Medicine*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2005, pp. 481–7.

58 Joseph Schacht and Max Meyerhof, *The Medico-Philosophical Controversy between Ibn Butlan of Baghdad and Ibn Ridwan of Cairo: A Contribution to the History of Greek Learning among the Arabs*, Cairo: The Egyptian University, 1937, pp. 54–5, quoting Ibn al-Qifti, Tarikh al-Hukama.

59 Schacht and Meyerhof, *The Medico-Philosophical Controversy*; *Medieval Islamic Medicine: Ibn Ridwan's Treatise 'On the Prevention of Bodily Ills in Egypt'*, M.W. Dols (tr.), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984; Lawrence Conrad, 'Scholarship and social context: a medical case from the eleventh-century Near East', in Don Bates (ed.), *Knowledge and the Scholarly Medical Traditions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 84–100; Pormann and Savage-Smith, *Medieval Islamic Medicine*, pp. 92–3.

60 See Schacht and Meyerhof, *The Medico-Philosophical Controversy*, p. 65.

61 Translation of title from http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/arabic/mon2.html accessed 2 February 2010.

62 Ibn Butlan, *Le banquet des médecins: une maqāma médicale du XIe siècle*, Joseph Dagher and Gérard Troupeau (trs), Paris: Geuthner, 2007.

63 *Le Taqwim al-Sihha (Tacuini Sanitatis) d'Ibn Butlan: un traité médical du XIe siècle*, Hosam Elkhadem (ed.), Louvain: Peeters, 1990. See also Pormann and Savage-Smith, *Medieval Islamic Medicine*, p. 50.

64 M.W. Adamson, *Medieval Dietetics: Food and Drink in Regimen Sanitatis Literature from 800 to 1400*, Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1995, p. 90.

65 *Galterii Cancellarii Bella Antiochena*, Heinrich Hagenmeyer (ed.), Innsbruck: Verlag der Wagner'schen universitäts-buchhandlung, 1896, p. 63: 'Latini, Graeci, Syri, Armeni, aduenae et peregrini'; translation from T.S. Asbridge and S.B. Edgington (trs), *Walter the Chancellor's The Antiochene Wars*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999, p. 81.

66 Louise Cochrane, *Adelard of Bath: The First English Scientist*, London: British Museum Press, 1994, p. 34.

67 Cochrane, *Adelard of Bath*, pp. 32–50.

68 Charles Burnett, 'Antioch as a link between Arabic and Latin culture in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries', in Isabelle Draelants, Anne Tihon and Baudouin van den Abeele (eds), *Occident et Proche-Orient: contacts scientifiques au temps des croisades*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2000, pp. 1–77, at 2–4.
69 Burnett, 'Antioch as a link', pp. 5–9.
70 Burnett, 'Antioch as a link', pp. 6–7.
71 See Ullmann, *Islamic Medicine*, pp. 53–4, 97–106; Adamson, *Medieval Dietetics*, pp. 42–9.
72 Max Meyerhof and G.P.G. Sobhy (eds), *The Abridged Version of the 'Book of Simple Drugs' of Ahamd ibn Muhammed al-Ghafiqi by Greorius abu'l-Farag (Barhebraeus)*, 4 vols in 3 (incomplete), Cairo: al-Ettemad Printing Press, 1932–8.
73 See discussion in S.B. Edgington, 'Medical knowledge in the crusading armies: the evidence of Albert of Aachen and others', in Malcolm Barber (ed.), *The Military Orders: Fighting for the Faith and Caring for the Sick*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994, pp. 320–6, at 321–3; Rudolf Hiestand, 'König Balduin und sein Tanzbär', *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 70, 1988, 343–60.
74 GN 287–8: 'gravissimum similiter in prelio vulnus exceperat. Verebatur providentia illius quem sibi adhibuerat medici inditis cataplasmatibus exterius cicatricem obducere – noverat enim idem vulnus interiora corporis profundius attigisse – ne, dum cutis superficies equaretur, intrinsecus saniei congeries foveretur. Quod ita fieri miro modo, laudabili coniectura experientiaque proposuit. Regem petierat ut aliquam ex his quos custodia detinebat Sarracenis personam eo statu, tali in loco, quo ipse sauciatus fuerat, vulnerari preciperet – christianam enim petere nefas erat – et post illationem vulneris occidi iuberet, quatinus in interfecti corpore licentius disquireret, immo ex eius dispectione perpenderet qualiter se in suis plagia regia internis haberet. Horruit ad haec nimium pietas principalis et . . . negat se cuiuspiam hominum, etiem deterrimae omnium conditionis, causam mortis ullatenus pro tantilla, cum etiam sit dubia, salute futurum. Tum medicus: "Si", inquit, "reparandae tibi gratia sospitatis nemini vitam adimere definisti, saltem ursum, inutilem satis nisi spectaculo bestiam, admoveri manda, prioribus pedibus in sublime porrectis erectam ferro feriri impera, cuius peremptae postmodum cum pervidero viscera, metiri sane utcumque potero quorsum intro processerit, quantum quoque, lesio tua". Cui rex: "Bestia", ait, "non in mora, cum opus fuerit, erit: factum puta". Facto igitur ad libitum medici ex fera periculo, comperit incommodum, ut prelibavimus, regi si obductio celerius vulneri proveniret, nisi prius exhausta purulentia pars intrinsecus scissa coiret.' My translation.
75 Mitchell, *Medicine in the Crusades*, pp. 160–3.
76 AA 664: 'trans femur et renes'; FC 460–1: 'prope cordi regem a dorso'; WT 485: 'a parte posteriori per cratem costarum cordi vicinum'.
77 AA 666: 'medicos peritissimos illi . . . quorum arte et peritia'; FC 460–1: 'post incisionem etiam cicatricis'; WT 485: 'medicorum adhibita sollicitudine post incisiones et cauteria'.
78 WT 859: 'rex apud Antiochiam ante ingruentem hiemem, prout consueverat, farmaco uti volens, per manum Barac, medici Tripolitani comitis, pillulas accepit, et quas in instanti sumeret et quas postmodum, modico interiecto tempore, esset accepturus. Nostri enim Orientales principes, maxime id efficientibus mulieribus, spreta nostrorum Latinorum phisica et medendi modo solis Iudeis, Samaritanis, Syris et Sarracenis fidem habentes, eorum cure se subiciunt inprudenter et eis se commendant, phisicarum rationum prorsus ignaris.' Translation from E.A. Babcock and A.C. Krey (trs), *A History of Deeds Done beyond the Sea by William Archbishop of Tyre*, Records of Civilization 35, 2, New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. 292–3.
79 WT 956–7: 'soluta obsidione reversus est, apud familiares conquerens quod non satis sanus esset nec in bona corporis habitudine. Inde dimissis expeditionibus cum familiare

comitatu Tyberiadem pervenit, ubi dissinteria cepit periculosissime laborare; inde, morbum metuens . . . Ierosolimam ingressus est, ubi ingravescente valitudine febre etiam cepit vehementissime laborare, cessante phisicorum artificio dissinteria. Cumque per dies aliquot ea febre supra vires affligeretur, precepit ad se accersiri medicos Grecos, Syros et illarum nationum homines, petens instantisissime ab eis ut aliqua decoctiuncula alvum eius solverent. Quod cum ab eis impetrare non posset, fecit ad se consequenter evocare Latinos, a quibus adipsum exigens, adiciens etiam ut sibi omnes rei imputeretur eventus. Dederunt ergo ei decoctiunculam unam, qua sumpta sine difficultate assellavit aliquotiens, ita ut sibi videretur quod ei esset melius; ante tamen quam corpus, medicine violentia exhaustum, sumpto cibo posset reficere, febre solita recurrente in fata concessit.' Babcock and Krey (trs), *A History of Deeds*, p. 395.

80 *Itinerarium peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, p. 61: '**Marchisus infirmatus medicos peremit proprios.** Interea, morbus quidam familiaris et solitus Marchiso incutitur: at quia consueto asperior tunc casu irruerat, potionem pestiferam hausisse conjectat. Triste igitur in medicos, potionum artifices, exit edictum, et iniqua suspicione perimuntur innocui, quorum professio non mortis discrimen ingerit, sed morbi salutem promittit. Itinerarium.' Nicholson (tr.), *The Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 70.

81 Carole Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 354.

82 WT 961–2: 'consultisque medicis, crebris fomentis, unctionibus, farmaciis etiam, ut ei subveniretur diligenter, sed frustra, procuratum est'. Babcock and Krey (trs), *A History of Deeds*, p. 398.

83 Claude Cahen, 'Indigènes et Croisés: quelques mots à propos d'un medecin d'Amaury et de Saladin', *Syria* 15, 1934, 351–60. For more on Baldwin IV's leprosy, see Bernard Hamilton, *The Leper King and His Heirs: Baldwin IV and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, and especially the appendix by Piers Mitchell, 'An evaluation of the leprosy of King Badwin IV of Jerusalem in the context of the medieval world', pp. 245–58.

84 According to Woodings, 'The medical resources', p. 271, this treatment is described by Roger of Salerno.

85 *An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades: Memoirs of Usāmah Ibn-Munqidh*, P.K. Hitti (tr.), New York: Columbia University Press, 1929, pp. 162–3.

86 Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, p. 262; see also Lawrence Conrad, 'Usāmah ibn Munqidh and other witnesses to Frankish and Islamic medicine in the era of the crusades', in Zohar Amar, Efrayim Lev and Yehoshua Schwartz (eds), *Medicine in Jerusalem through the Ages*, Tel-Aviv: Bar Elan University Press, 1999, pp. xxvii–lii.

87 *Le livre des Assises de la Cour des Bourgeois de Jérusalem*, M. le Comte Beugnot (ed.), *RHC Lois* II.3–274; Joshua Prawer, *Crusader Institutions*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, pp. 358–411. See also Ernest Wickersheimer, 'Organisation et législation sanitaires au royaume franc de Jérusalem (1099–1291)', *Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences* 4, 1951, 689–705, at 694–8. S.B. Edgington, 'Medicine and surgery in the *Livre des Assises de la Cour des Bourgeois de Jérusalem*', *Al-Masāq* 18, 2005, 87–97, contains a translation of the two chapters and a commentary.

88 Prawer, *Crusader Institutions*, p. 368.

89 For the status of slaves, see Prawer, *Crusader Institutions*, pp. 208–9.

90 *Assises*, ch. 236, pp. 164–6.

91 *Assises*, ch. 236, p. 165: 'Encement se celuy miege peut mostrer en la cort, par bone garentie, que celuy qu'il meget gesi ou feme, ou but vin, ou manga aucune mauvaise viande que celuy li avoit defendu, ou fist aucune chose que ne dut faire si tost, la raison juge et coumande à juger que encores l'eust le miege autrement megé qu'il ne deust,

si n'en est il de riens tenus d'amender, por ce que plus esperte raison est d'entendre qu'il chiet mors par ce qu'il ne devet faire ce que defendu li estet, que par le mau megere, et ce est dreit et raison par l'assise. Mais se le miege ne li avet riens defendu de mager, ne de bevre, ne de feme toucher, et la toucha ou manga ou but se qu'il ne dut, et il en moruth, la raison juge que le miege est tenus de celuy amender, par dreit; por ce que le miege est tenus, par dreit, si tost come il veit le malade, de comander li se que il devra manger et ce qu'il ne devra manger; et ce il ne le fait et il mesavient, si det estre sur le miege. Mais se celuy miege, en tant come il ot pris celuy en cure de meger, li avint meschance, qu'il fu pris des Sarasins, ou qu'il li avint maladie, ou aucune autre mesaventure par qui il ne le post venir veyr seluy malade, et celuy meurt, la raison juge que le miege n'est tenus de riens amender, par dreit.'

92 *Assises*, ch. 238, pp. 167–9.

93 *Assises*, ch. 238, p. 168: 'ou il ala tant à chanbre que avant qu'il fust jor il l'ot geté can que il avet dedens le cors, et fiege et polmon, et moruth'.

94 *Assises*, ch. 238, p. 168: 'Encement se je ai un mien esclaf malade de meselerie, ou de roigne seche, ou d'aucune autre maladie, et je viens à un miege et li fais couvenant que c'il le garisse, par ensi que la moitié de ce que il sera vendus sera sien et l'autre de son seignor qui l'a acheté, et celuy miege le prent en cure, et i fait ce que il sait, mais ne vaut riens, que celuy meurt, la raison juge que de ce fait n'est point tenus par dreit le miege d'amender le serf ou la serve, por ce qu'il i pert tout premier son travaill, et tout ce qu'il en devet aver; et ce est dreit et raison par l'assise.'

95 *Assises*, chs. 34, 35, p. 38.

96 *Assises*, ch. 238, pp. 168–69.

97 *Assises*, ch. 238, p. 169: 'Encement nul miege estranger, ce est qui veigne d'Outremer ou de Païnime, ne det meger d'orine nuluy jusques à ce que il soit esprovés par autres mieges, les meillors de la terre, en presence dou vesque de la terre, devant qui se det estre fait. Et s'on counut que celuy soit dreit heir de megerie meger, coumandement li det douner le vesque, d'iqui en avant, de meger par la vile, là où il vora, par les lettres dou vesque, que il en aura de guarentie, que mieges est provés et que meger peut, par dreit, d'orine. Et ce est dreit et raison par l'asise de Jerusalem. Encement et c'il avient qu'il ne set pas bon miege, que meger ne puisse, la raison juge que le vesque et la cort li devent coumander qu'il vude la cité, ou ce non, qu'il estaise en la terre sans nuluy meger. Et s'il aveneit que aucun miege megast par la vile, sans congé de la court et de l'evesque, la cort le deit prendre et faire frustrer hors de la vile, par dreit et par l'asize de Jerusalem.'

98 Joseph Schatzmiller, *Jews, Medicine, and Medieval Society*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, p. 14 and n. 1, p. 15.

99 *RHC Lois* II.277–350.

100 Joshua Prawer, *The Crusaders' Kingdom: European Colonialism in the Middle Ages*, New York: Praeger, 1972, pp. 147, 153, 410. See also Conrad, 'Usāma ibn Munqidh', p. xlix.

101 *The Book of the Islamic Market Inspector: Nihayat al-Rutba fi Talab al-Hisba (The Utmost Authority in the Pursuit of Hisba) by 'Abd al-Rahman b. Nasr al-Shayzari*, R.P. Buckley (tr.), Journal of Semitic Studies Supplement 9, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. See also Ghada Karmi, 'State control of the physicians in the Middle Ages: an Islamic model', in A.W. Russell (ed.), *The Town and State Physician in Europe from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment*, Wolfenbütteler Forschungen 17, Wolfenbuttel: Herzog August Bibliothek, 1981, pp. 63–84.

102 *Book of the Islamic Market Inspector*, pp. 12–14.

103 *Book of the Islamic Market Inspector*, pp. 65–9, 108–18.

104 Conrad Schick, 'The Muristan, or the site of the hospital of St John in Jerusalem', *Palestine Exploration Fund, Quarterly Statement*, 1902, 49–50, and plan. The plan is

reproduced by B.Z. Kedar, 'A twelfth-century description of the Jerusalem hospital', in Helen Nicholson (ed.), *The Military Orders, Vol. 2: Welfare and Warfare*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, pp. 3–26, at 9.

105 Theoderich in *Peregrinationes tres: Saewulf, John of Würzburg, Theodericus*, R.B.C. Huygens (ed.), *CCCM* 139, Turnhout: Brepols, 1994, pp. 157–8: 'Que quantis edificiis decorata, quantis domiciliis et lectulis atque aliis utensiliis in usus pauperum et infirmorum atque debilium exhibendis habundans, quam in substantia pauperum recreationibus impendenda locuples, quam in ipsa egenorum sit sustentatione sollicita, nullus alteri verbis fidem posset facere nisi ipse propriis hoc oculis valeret deprehendere. Siquidem transeuntes per palatium numerum simul accumbentium nullo modo quivimus discernere, lectorum vero numerum millenarium vidimus excedere.' Aubery Stewart (tr.), *Theoderic's Description of the Holy Places (c.1172 AD)*, Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society 5.4, London: Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society, 1896, text D, p. 22.

106 *Peregrinationes tres,* p. 131; Stewart (tr.), *Theoderic's description of the Holy Places*, text B, p. 44.

107 Codex Vat Lat 4852. See also Katja Klement, '"Von Krankenspeisen und Ärzten . . ." Eine unbekannte Verfügung des Johannitermeisters Roger des Moulins (1177–1187) im Codex Vaticanus Latinus 4852', unpublished doctoral thesis, Salzburg, June 1996; and S.B. Edgington, 'Administrative regulations for the hospital of St John in Jerusalem dating from the 1180s', *Crusades* 4, 2005, 21–37, which contains the full text and an English translation.

108 Munich Clm. 4620. A 'provisional edition' of the text is presented by B.Z. Kedar, 'Twelfth-century description', pp. 13–26. See also S.B. Edgington, 'Medical care in the hospital of St John in Jerusalem', in Nicholson (ed.), *The Military Orders, Vol. 2*, pp. 27–33.

109 J.M.A. Delaville Le Roulx (ed.), *Cartulaire général de l'ordre des hospitaliers de S. Jean de Jérusalem, 1100–1310*, 4, Paris: E. Leroux, 1894–1906, No. 627, I.426: 'ad servicium pauperum Hospitalis Jerusalem quatuor sapientes medici deputentur, qui urinarum qualitates et infirmitatum diversitates discernere sciant, et qui in medicinis conficiendis consulere possint eis'. E.J. King (tr.), *The Early Statutes of the Knights Hospitallers*, Historical Pamphlets 5, London: Library Committee, Order of St John of Jerusalem, 1932, No. 2, p. 34.

110 *Acta Pontificum Romanorum Inedita*, J.A.G. von Pflugk-Harttung (ed.), 3, Stuttgart: Fues, 1884, No. 441, II.389: 'Remedia preterea ad infirmorum curam deliberatione provida constituta, videlicet, ut in domo hospitalis semper quinque medici et tres sint cirurgici, ad quorum dispositionem ea, que in cibariis aut aliis infirmis necessaria fuerint, ministrentur.' But see also Rudolf Hiestand, *Papsturkunden für Templar und Johanniter Archivberichte und Texte*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972, No. 172, p. 361: three out of eight copies of the manuscript have 'quatuor medici et totidem chirurgici'.

111 Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St John in Jerusalem and Cyprus 1050–1310*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1967, pp. 466–52; Luc Verheijen, *Nouvelle approche de la Règle de Saint Augustin*, Maine et Loire: Institut historique augustinien, 1988.

112 *Acta Pontificum*, II.389.

113 J.C. Dickinson, *The Origins of the Austin Canons, and Their Introduction into England*, London: S.P.C.K., 1950, pp. 40–8.

9

ARCHITECTURE OF THE CRUSADERS IN THE HOLY LAND

The first European colonial architecture?

Jürgen Krüger

The church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem was rebuilt significantly during the crusaders' era. During the twelfth century it gained the structure that still determines its appearance today. The building structure and architectural details of the church can be traced as patterns to various influences, which thus provide the optimal means of focusing on questions concerning the cultural interchange between the orient and the occident.[1]

It was the Emperor Constantine the Great who, during the years 325 to 335, initiated the first multifaceted erection of a church at this location, a building that underwent numerous alterations over the following centuries.[2] The integrity of the originally complex structure – containing the atrium, basilica (called martyrium), inner court with the rock of Golgotha, a rotunda with the grave site, and additional side areas for baptism and the palace of the patriarch – was compromised profoundly over time. Due to the conquest of the Arabs in 638 the basilica seems to have lost a part of its precious furnishings and equipment. More decisive, however, were the events of the year 1009, when Caliph al-Hakim ordered the destruction of the church of the Holy Sepulchre for reasons that remain unfathomable even now. In contrast to the earlier events, there is no doubt that the destruction of 1009 was carried out on a large scale.[3] Even though the caliph permitted a reconstruction of the church shortly afterwards – accomplished with the financial, material and logistical help of the Byzantine emperor – the church, completed around 1040/50, had been greatly reduced in its dimensions compared to former times: the basilica remained in ruins, which reduced the area taken up by the church by almost half. A new main portal had to be created, since the old one situated towards the cardo could not be used any longer.[4] Rows of chapels were erected along this new entry area, which was now placed south of the old inner courtyard including the rock of Golgotha and in the inner court itself, in order to house the relics that had been salvaged in the meantime. The

most significant alteration concerned the rotunda of the tomb: through the addition of a large apse which encroached upon the inner courtyard it had now become a round church with an altar in an apse and was certainly comparable in its dimensions with middle Byzantine church structures of the eleventh century.[5]

This new structure is the one that greeted the crusaders upon their conquest of Jerusalem in 1099 and they utilised it initially for about fifteen years without considering any changes, since a sense of the church's continuity in the Holy Land only gradually emerged in the crusaders' kingdom.[6] Only then, after barely one generation, did the wish to create their own new structures materialise. In the case of the church of the Holy Sepulchre this happened after the year 1114, when this wish led to a radical alteration of the sanctuary, completed by the year 1160 (the exact date of the consecration has not been recorded). There were several reasons for these changes, a notable one being the selection of the Augustinian canons to attend to the altars and the Latin services. This necessitated the creation of secluded buildings – cloisters, dormitories and a refectory, but the Augustinian canons also no longer considered the Byzantine choir – the apse by the rotunda – sufficient for their needs. At a time when in Western Europe increasingly elaborate choir treatments were coming into being in accordance with Gregorian reforms (as can be see in the Romanesque churches of Cologne, for example), it was deemed necessary for the most distinguished church of Christianity to find a



Figure 9.1 Plan of the church of the Holy Sepulchre, alterations of the twelfth century

timely solution as well. In accordance with that goal, the Byzantine apse was torn down and in its place in the former inner court a choir aisle surrounded by radiating chapels was established at the rotunda. Choirs just like this were the recently constructed trademarks of the big pilgrimage churches on the way to Santiago de Compostela.

The design of such a pilgrimage church – transept, high choir and radiating chapels – can be clearly detected from the outline of the church of the Holy Sepulchre, yet in a strangely mangled form. This raises the question of whether perhaps a grander plan existed, according to which criteria the new structure had been erected but whose implementation had been only partially executed. An analysis of the building that emerges from numerous details, however, points clearly to a different explanation. This analysis indicates that even though the new choir building eliminated the former Byzantine construction practically in its entirety, at the same time it spared the old building – the original Constantinian structure – as much as possible. The rock of Golgotha was now modified as a two-storey chapel. The old inner courtyard remained clearly traceable with several of its typical components, such as coupled columns. It is evident that the architects and builders treated the original building materials with increasing reverence the closer they found themselves to sacred locations. The sanctuaries themselves – the Mount of Golgotha and the Holy Sepulchre – remain completely preserved in their original states, and other parts have been added in a delicate manner. The 'fragmental' plan for a pilgrimage church turns out to be thus an intentionally executed partial structure which aims to preserve the original building in as complete a way as possible within the new structure.

The desire of crusading builders to preserve the early church can be clearly deduced from additional details.[7] The Mount of Golgotha, for example, has contained two altar locations for a long while: the upper altar on the rocky ridge at a location where, according to tradition, a hole in the rock marks the position of the cross trunk; and a lower altar at the flank of the rock where the tomb of Adam was revered. This chapel of Adam contains several different building styles. The Roman apse of the clergy is surrounded by the Byzantine apse, in front of which the stone blocks of the crusaders' vault were added. This means that the earlier Byzantine builders were also intent on preserving the Roman apse and that the church from the crusaders' time contained the former building structures in the manner of a reliquary. From such observable details it can be concluded that beyond those completed parts no further building components of a pilgrimage church '*à la compostelana*' had been planned. In particular, the rotunda was not to be replaced by a main aisle. The rotunda with the tomb in the middle instead created a second focus within the layout.

This leads to the question of the actual concept of the building additions to the church of the Holy Sepulchre. In the Spanish version the crypt is located *under* the high choir; it was and still is the place of the revered relics, and the high choir above it houses the clergy. This version dates back to a corresponding choir alteration of St Peter in Rome under Pope Gregory the Great around the year 600.

In Jerusalem, however, a different approach was chosen. The Holy Sepulchre and high choir are located on an axis *behind each other*, not on top of each other. Undoubtedly this is connected to the particular significance of the tomb, which did not permit its disappearance into a crypt. The gravesite and the Mount of Calvary are authentic places of veneration; in place of the (obviously non-existent) relics, the location itself becomes the object of worship, which therefore cannot be given up by any means and which remain the same until today. The location of the Holy Sepulchre always stays the same, regardless of any epoch, be it the fourth, the eleventh or the twelfth century, and this despite numerous reconstructions of the tomb even in periods that would have provided opportunities for change.[8]

The elaborations above create the impression that the religious architecture of the twelfth century was almost completely influenced by occidental ideas and that western models of architecture had been imported to the Holy Land. This impression is based primarily on the fragmentary state of building structures in the Holy Land. Yet there must have been a multitude of local builders and artisans who were enlisted to major projects of the crusaders. In particular, the Armenians represented a relatively strong group whose structures can still be viewed today in Jerusalem and whose influence we also detect in Helena's chapel of the church of the Holy Sepulchre. A line of Armenian stonemason inscriptions can be observed at the central cupola of this chapel. Armenian architecture in Jerusalem distinguishes itself especially through the building of centred cupolas and creative tower decorations, elements that are rarely found in the contemporary Romanesque building style of churches.[9]

Having established that the evidence of the crusader constructions at the church of the Holy Sepulchre points to the conclusion that they brought their architectural ideas from the west, this chapter will now focus on two detailed questions, since an issue is often easier to perceive in regard to specific case studies. The first phenomenon to be discussed here concerns the use of *spolia*; the second with the search for distinct personalities in the artistry displayed in the craftsmanship of the masonry.

The quest for possible ideological reasons behind the reuse of building materials – often termed *spolia* – has been a focus of increasing study over the last few decades.[10] Great caution has to be used in such inquiry and argumentation, however, since nothing is more obvious than that builders would reuse existing material near a construction site. It is often easier to spoliate a no-longer-utilised building structure than to import new building material from far away. The many structures of the Roman period at the eastern edge of the Mediterranean provided a natural reservoir for medieval construction activities, and, at the same time, the lack of material in this region encouraged the reuse of materials from antiquity. The reuse of capitals was especially favoured, since they were generally very elaborately finished and diminished the workload significantly when put to new use. Yet there was not always such a readiness to incorporate older capitals into new buildings during every epoch. In Romanesque times this inclination was relatively strong,

since the style of Roman and Romanesque architecture display a certain affinity. The capitals of the hall of the Holy Communion in Jerusalem can serve as an example for this – that is, those dating to the Romanesque building epoch.[11]

Since the reuse of *spolia* from antiquity can be observed relatively frequently and is often discussed, another issue is more interesting: the conscious contempt for the ancient body of the capital. In the area of the church of the Holy Sepulchre a capital has been preserved from antiquity (it is believed that there were several of that kind), which was slated for the belfry.[12] At that time (c.1160/70), however, the early Gothic style was desired; obviously, a new perception of style had evolved. The existing capitals were now utilised in such a way that their ancient surface was no longer visible and orientated so that the side facing the spectator contained early Gothic bud ornamentation.

In many places interpreting the architectural findings in the church of the Holy Sepulchre demands great effort. While the singular building components – among them the rotunda, the Golgotha rock and the high choir with the radiating chapels – are already so intertwined with each other that the many different building phases and restorations are barely distinguishable, the situation is further complicated by today's façade.[13] This is located on a spot where one would expect the southern surrounding wall of the Constantine layout, yet it appears with an early Gothic twin portal. The architectural décor, however, is once more steeped

Figure 9.2
Roman capital, remodelled in early Gothic style, on the terrace of the church

Figure 9.3 Capitals of the façade of the church

in such an intensively ancient style that the question as to when the particular parts of the décor were created has for a long time been answered in a contradictory manner. The 'windswept capitals', the plastic frieze and other parts bring to mind structures like the Simeon monastery – *qualat Siman* – near Antioch (now in northern Syria, reachable from Aleppo). Only a few details, such as that the capitals were created for staggered portal walls, disclose the fact that the façade with its embellishment has to be a product of the twelfth century. Thus the façade of the church of the Holy Sepulchre belongs to the genre of buildings of the so-called proto-Renaissance, similar to structures in Florence or Provence. But whereas in the European regions stylistic inspiration is drawn from classical antiquity, the décor of the church of the Holy Sepulchre refers to late antiquity, in particular to early Christian buildings of the Near East. Thus it arises from a specific sense of the Christian architecture of the region. This façade therefore indicates an end to a tradition of communal architecture centred in Western Europe in favour of more local influences.

Turning to the question of distinct artists obliges us to make this conclusion rather more nuanced. It is increasingly recognised that there were local traditions and artists within the Holy Land. It is, however, very difficult to capture them due to the rarity of the preserved sources. One artist that we do know of, for example, was the creator of the mosaic of the church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, who designated himself with an inscription as 'monk, painter and mosaic artist Ephraim' and who was also responsible for the mosaics of that main aisle.[14]

Figure 9.4 Capital in the north aisle of the church, perhaps done by the 'Plaimpied-Master'

Yet, along with the development of local traditions, there seem to have been migrations of artists from Europe to Palestine. The most spectacular case concerns the sculptor who created the famous capitals of Nazareth.[15] Although we cannot give him a name, we can trace him through his distinct style. It begins near Bourges, in the church of Saint-Martin in Plaimpied. This church possesses a capital on its long aisle supports as well as an undated grave marker in the southern side aisle, both of which have been carried out in a similar manner. Certain similar features can be detected in churches in the Rhone Valley and in Upper Italy. After them, similarly formed capitals occur again only in the Holy Land. Two little-appreciated capitals of the church of the Holy Sepulchre are among them.

Ascribing diverse anonymous building sculptures to a single creator is common in the field of art history, but it should be done only with the greatest care. The nucleus of the sculptures' formation that is displayed in these three locations (Plampied, Jerusalem and Nazareth), however, is so closely related and, at the same time, so original that it seems very far fetched to assign the work to different artists. At any rate, it is possible to conjure a connection of workshops, which in our case would also be sufficient for the above argumentation.

An additional question connected to these capitals is the chronological sequence of their parts. As in all cases, the capitals are not dated, so the date of their creation can be determined and estimated only on the basis of circumstantial evidence. It can be stated with great certainty, though, that the capitals in Nazareth were made around 1187. In Jerusalem, it can be deduced from the

building components of the church of the Holy Sepulchre that its capitals are earlier – around 1160. Consequently, it can be concluded that the sculptor of Plampied came to the Holy Land and migrated northwards, from Jerusalem. This matches the building history of the French churches well. The possibility that the sculptor worked first in Jerusalem and Nazareth and only later (around 1190) in Plampied is not feasible.[16]

How far were there any influences upon European architecture from the establishment of crusader kingdoms and lordships in the Near East? The answer must be considered in two respects: namely, with regard to how far certain architectural styles travelled and to what extent architectural motives were transferred – that is, the question of form and content.

Not too long ago, it was stated that Gothic architecture (which primarily denotes the method of working with pointed arches) was invented in the Holy Land and exported to Europe.[17] Primary evidence for this hypothesis was the compound of the Knights of St John in Akko, where the so-called hall of the refectory exhibits such arches. This hall, which is very impressive, has been connected to the appearance of the first foundation of the Knights of St John in Akko and thereby provided an early dating and the corollary that such a style must have migrated from Akko to Europe. The excavations in Akko, however, have progressed considerably in the meantime and now provide a much better picture of the medieval town than was available a few years ago. As a result, some correction is needed to the dating of building components. Thus it is generally acknowledged today that the compound of the Knights of St John does not belong to the building

Figure 9.5 So-called Refectory of the Knights of St John in Acco



Figure 9.6 Figured sculpture from the portal of the lost church of S. Maria in the Muristan; now in the Museum of the Greek Patriarchate

phases of the twelfth but the thirteenth century.[18] In making this correction, art historians are also obliged to recognise that the example no longer serves as evidence for the migration of the Gothic style from the Near East. In any case, current debates on the architectural history of the early development of the Gothic building style no longer argue in such a mono-causal manner: the style has many roots and they are widely scattered in the European cultural area.

The second possibility concerns the deliberate export of Near Eastern architecture. Here, especially, a large group of recreations of sacred localities needs to be mentioned. Such emulations of the holy places may have taken place in all times, yet they clearly blossomed during the Middle Ages. In investigating such recreations, the focus, by tradition, has primarily been on copies of Jerusalem's Holy Sepulchre – such as the Holy Sepulchre of Eichstaett – but the topic has scarecly been investigated fully. Many monuments have not been recognised and perceived as being inspired by the original church of the Holy Sepulchre. And even the mainstays of this genus, like the Holy Sepulchre in Eichstaett, have not been researched thoroughly.[19] Thus this field of architectural research is still in its infancy.

Most of the copies were embedded within liturgical and private forms of devotion. Another assembly of monuments has been preserved in the area of Worms, the so-called 'Saracene turrets'. A few churches, starting with that of St Paul in Worms, added turrets – mostly located on the façade – which were, according to tradition, connected to the return of people who had been on crusade. The turrets display exceptionally creative embellishments on their tops, which cannot have been developed within the regional Romanesque architecture; and an eastern motif seems to be apparent. Scarce sources meant that their dating always used to be controversial. Nobody could be sure whether the warriors who commissioned these structures had just returned from the Second or the Third Crusade. However, the latest dendrochronological probes into the few wooden beams that were found within the turrets suggest a dating of the whole group to shortly after 1100. Of course, this finding generated considerable surprise: if these turrets were indeed donated by returning crusaders – possibly in thanks for a safe homecoming – a considerable section of the knighthood of Worms must have participated in the *First* Crusade, something which had never previously been suggested. But are the findings accurate? The stylistic markers hardly point to such an early date of construction. And, unfortunately, art-historical methods of analysis were under-utilised in the above investigation, so the end results are open to question. Further investigation is therefore eagerly anticipated in order to solve the mystery of the saracene turrets.[20]

Artistic exchange between east and west has always been multifaceted. There have been no one-way streets, as was previously supposed. Instead, there have been reciprocal relationships, developments which were initiated within a geographical region and continued from there, in addition to quite purposeful 'migrations', be it by people or by motifs. In order to understand how this artistic exchange occurred during the crusades, individual objects need to be more thoroughly researched than has been the case so far.

For various reasons, the church of the Holy Sepulchre provides a perfect example for such research. As the most distinguished Christian structure of the entire region, it belongs to a group of structures that have been intensively researched, but further insights are needed. Even a simple study of the materials from which the church is built offers more preserved building components than

can be found in other buildings, whether clerical or secular. The density of historical materials is relevant here, too. Although the actual archival sources for all the buildings of the Kingdom of Jerusalem have been lost almost in their entirety, there are a large number of other historical sources that pertain to the church of the Holy Sepulchre. However, the rivalries between the denominations that are in possession of parts of the church have, until now, delayed and sometimes even prevented systematic study of these sources.[21] Meanwhile, the history of research itself has become a part of the archaeological–historical research – that is, evaluation of the restorations and investigation of the last 200 years. Here we will recover a great deal of information on the ancient building.

It is necessary to utilise the methods of research concerning the history of architecture in a more systematic manner than that adopted by earlier generations of scholars. The only halfway-reliable study of the ancient nucleus of the church of the Holy Sepulchre was carried out during a restoration in the 1960s.[22] Similar studies for the medieval building phases are lacking. With the aid of an investigation into the building techniques, stonemasonry, samples of mortar and so on, and by utilising the latest scientific methods, a more sophisticated chronology of the sequence of the building structures might be obtained.

The church of the Holy Sepulchre is closely connected to its neighbouring structures. Due to subsequent Islamic construction projects, these buildings are intertwined now more than ever before. After the recapture of the city by Saladin in 1187, several Islamic institutions within the quarter of the church of the Holy Sepulchre became immediate neighbours of both the church and the convents. In order to understand the compound of the church of the Holy Sepulchre better within historical chronology it is necessary also to set our sights on the neighbouring buildings. This refers especially to the south side of the area where the hospital of the Knights of St John was erected during the twelfth century. The development of both institutions, the Augustinian clergy of the church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Order of the Knights of St John around the hospital, suggests that the two compounds were closely connected and started to diverge in their development only later in the twelfth century. It is very probable that both constructions – the hospital and the church – were handled by the same crew. If that proves to be true, it gives further investigations a stronger basis: there are more material remains and the historical tradition is closer knit. Through this, there is a better chance of establishing a more detailed chronology, and we might gain more insights into the building sequence and further facts about the construction crews.

A clue to understanding this complex building in its historical development can be found in front of the south façade of the church of the Holy Sepulchre. Here the church and the hospital of the Knights of St John collide; here there were paths to both buildings; here the largest rebuilding activity took place to erect the entryways that can still be traced today. The façade of the church, the chapels on both sides and the entry area to the hospital offer a wealth of material to be examined. Once that has been done, it might be possible to establish a clear

building sequence; to discover which building techniques were used; to understand how the building components were designated in historical sources. All of this might shed light on the events in Jerusalem during the time of the crusades.

As it is, we can already use the insights available to us to address the theme of artistic interaction between occident and orient. Here, the evidence of the church of the Holy Sepulchre points to a western-orientated tradition until the middle of the twelfth century, when more local influences came to the fore. And while the direct evidence for a crude transference of the Gothic style from the Near East to the west has recently been called into question, the under-reported examples of recreations of the architecture of the holy places in Europe and the distinct career of the sculptor of Plampied demonstrate that there was a significant interchange of architectural culture in both directions.

Notes

1 Regarding the church of the Holy Sepulchre, in brief, see Klaus Bieberstein and Bloedhorn Hanswulf, *Jerusalem. Grundzüge der Baugeschichte vom Chalkolithikum bis zur Frühzeit der osmanischen Herrschaft, Beihefte zum Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients (TAVO)*, Reihe B, 100, 3, Wiesbaden: L. Reichert, 1994; Jürgen Krüger, *Die Grabeskirche zu Jerusalem. Geschichte – Gestalt – Bedeutung*, Regensburg: Schnell und Steiner, 2000; see also Denys Pringle, *The Churches of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem: A Corpus. Vol. III: Jerusalem*, 4, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, III.3–72.
2 Krüger, *Die Grabeskirche zu Jerusalem*, pp. 39–60.
3 Heinz Halm, *Die Kalifen von Kairo. Die Fatimiden in Ägypten 973–1074*, München: C.H. Beck, 2003, pp. 217–26. Compare with the Berlin conference 'Conflict Management 1000 Years Ago: The Destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem in the Year of 1009', Berlin, September 24–6, 2009.
4 Krüger, *Die Grabeskirche zu Jerusalem*, pp. 77–80.
5 Robert Ousterhout, 'Rebuilding the Temple: Constantine Monomachus and the Holy Sepulchre', *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 48, 1989, 66–78.
6 Krüger, *Die Grabeskirche zu Jerusalem*, pp. 83–153.
7 Robert Ousterhout, 'Architecture as Relic and the Construction of Sanctity: The Stones of the Holy Sepulchre', *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 62, 2003, 4–23.
8 Ousterhout, 'Rebuilding the Temple' and 'Architecture as Relic'; Krüger, *Die Grabeskirche zu Jerusalem*, pp. 83–153, 223–28.
9 Krüger, *Die Grabeskirche zu Jerusalem*, p. 90.
10 The groundbreaking initiative was provided by Arnold Esch, 'Spolien. Zur Wiederverwendung antiker Baustücke und Skulpturen im mittelalterlichen Italien', *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 51, 1969, 1–64. This work, designated by the author as a minor article, has yet to be surpassed in the clarity of its message.
11 To be distinguished from the building epoch of the thirteenth century when the hall for communion was finished with arches, see Jürgen Krüger, 'Der Abendmahlssaal in Jerusalem zur Zeit der Kreuzzüge', *Römische Quartalschrift* 92, 1997, 229–47.
12 Krüger, *Die Grabeskirche zu Jerusalem*, p. 97.
13 Krüger, *Die Grabeskirche zu Jerusalem*, pp. 111–17.
14 For paintings within the kingdom, see Gustav Kühnel, *Wall Painting in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, Frankfurter Forschungen zur Kunst 14, Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 1986.

15 Jaroslav Folda, *The Nazareth Capitals and the Crusader Shrine of the Annunciation*, Monographs on the Fine Arts 42, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988; Jürgen Krüger, 'I capitelli di Nazareth: una nuova proposta di ricostruzione', in M.S.C. Mariani (ed.), *Il cammino di Gerusalemme. Atti del II Convegno Internazionale di Studio (Bari–Brindisi–Trani, 18–22 maggio 1999), a cura di Maria Stella Calò Mariani*, *Rotte mediterranee della cultura*, 2, Bari: M. Adda, 2002, II.223–32, with additional literature.

16 The argument, presented by Nurith Keenan Kedar, which suggests the reversal of the sequence of the capitals, placing the piece in Plampied towards the end, appears contrived to me, since it requires a single capital in a finished building to have been exchanged decades later. There is no indication whatsoever of such an occurrence. This argument, recently voiced, would cause the complete evaluation of the architecture in the Holy Land to be turned upside down: it would mean that a mature artisan left Palestine (after assignments in Nazareth and Jerusalem) in order to continue to work in France. For reasons inherent to the particular buildings, this conclusion cannot be justified.

17 Zeev Goldmann, *Akko in the time of the Crusades: The Convent of the Order of St John* (2nd edn), Haifa: Government Tourist Office, Municiplaity of Akko and the Old Akko Development Office, 1994.

18 The final results of the excavations have not yet been published, but see, provisionally, Eliezer Stern, 'La commanderie de l'Ordre des Hospitaliers à Acre', *Bulletin monumental* 164, 2006, 53–60.

19 The first significant contribution to this topic was presented in the small brochure by Gustav Dalman, *Das Grab Christi in Deutschland*, Studien über christliche Denkmäler 14, Leipzig: Dieterich, 1922. A paper dedicated to the idea of 'architectural copy' was the pioneering article by Richard Krautheimer in 1942 which can be read in a more recent edition that contains supplementary current epilogues: Richard Krautheimer, 'Einführung zu einer Ikonographie der mittelalterlichen Architektur', in Richard Krautheimer, *Ausgewählte Aufsätze zur europäischen Kunstgeschichte*, Köln: Dumont, 1988 [1942], 142–97. Regarding the Holy Sepulchre, see also the thorough, although not exhaustive, study by Martin Biddle, *Das Grab Christi. Neutestamentliche Quellen, historische und archäologische Forschungen, überraschende Erkenntnisse*, Biblische Archäologie und Zeitgeschichte 5, Gießen: Brunnen, 1998.

20 Regarding the Rhine Hessian turrets, see Hartmut Hofrichter, *Steinerne Kirchturmbekrönungen in der ehemaligen Diözese Worms*, Eltville: Aug, 1984. More recent results are presented by Hans-Jürgen Kotzur, *Das Rätsel der rheinhessischen 'Heidentürme'*, Mainz: Schmidt, 2003 [= *Lebendiges Rheinland-Pfalz* 40, 2003, fasc. III–IV].

21 For the history of research into the church of the Holy Sepulchre, see Krüger, *Die Grabeskirche zu Jerusalem*, pp. 13–23.

22 V.C. Corbo, *Il Santo Sepolcro di Gerusalemme. Aspetti archeologici dalle origini al periodo crociato (SBF Coll. Maior, 29)*, 2, Jerusalem: Franciscan Print. Press, 1982. See also the discussion by Renate Rosenthal-Heginbottom in *Jahrbuch fuer Antike und Christentum* 29, 1986, 213–18.

10

PEACEMAKING

Perceptions and practices in the medieval Latin East

Yvonne Friedman

The prevailing perception of the 1096 to 1291 era as one of Holy War, with peace far removed from the adversaries' thoughts, is not entirely accurate. In fact, this epoch of Holy War was punctuated by interludes of peace, as indicated by the approximately 120 treaties mentioned in the historical sources. Although crusader society in the East and its diverse Muslim enemies never achieved a lasting peace, the intermittent ceasefires or treaties reached over this period enabled a fragile cohabitation that endured for two centuries. The entry into such agreements required bridging differing conceptions of peace and the lack of shared language and peacemaking mechanisms.

I begin by examining the disparate conceptions of peace in Muslim and crusader society. I then consider the factors that encouraged or discouraged the parties involved from engaging in negotiations for a ceasefire or peace treaty and the influence of the shifting balance of power on peace initiatives. Finally, I address issues of mutual acculturation in the stages of peacemaking: how the sides developed a shared verbal and nonverbal language of peacemaking contacts in the arena of the Latin East, as implemented through diplomacy, gesture and formal agreements.

Peace was an ideal goal in both medieval Islamic and Western Christian thought. The aspiration to world peace, however, did not contradict the concept or practice of using military force against antagonists. Conceived of in Islam as resulting from a definitive victory that would bring a just solution to current situations, peace was therefore based on just war. In Christianity, peace was an inherent part of an eschatological vision of the world. Yet, both Islam and Western Christianity founded institutions aimed at the destruction of their enemies – in Islam, the *jihad*; and in Christianity, the crusade – thus making war a religious imperative. Both medieval societies, however, displayed a dichotomy between ideology and practice with respect to war and peace. It was the loopholes between the two that allowed for peace processes.

Muslim law differentiates between intra-Muslim peace, *sulḥ*, which could only be contracted between Muslim factions, and *muhadana*, a temporary

ceasefire – peace with the infidel entered into only for reasons of expediency. Although *jihad* is obligatory, its status as a collective, not a personal, obligation allows for many exceptions and facilitates utilization of loopholes to make peace. In Islam, war against the infidel needed no justification, whereas peace or even truce-making required both pretext and explanation. In his chapter on *jihad*, al-Tabari outlined the basic terms:

> Al-Awza'i said: If Muslims conclude a peace treaty with the enemy [*darb al-ḥarb*] in which they agree to pay Muslims a designated amount [of money] every year so that the Muslims will not enter their country, there is no harm in concluding such a treaty with them.
>
> Al-Shafi'i said: I would like for the Imam, if a great misfortune were to happen to the Muslims, and I hope God will not allow this [to happen] to them, to consider a peace treaty with the enemy, whoever they are, and he should conduct a peace [treaty] with [the enemy] only up to a certain time . . . And if the Muslims have power, he should fight the polytheists after the peace expires. If the Imam does not have the power, there is no harm to renew [the agreement] for the same duration or less, but he should not exceed the [time limit for the first one].[1]

Later medieval Islamic legal thought was preoccupied with the circumstances and conditions under which it was permissible to contract a truce. Ibn Rushd (Averroes), for example, submitted:

> The conclusion of truce is considered by some to be permitted from the very outset and without an immediate occasion, provided that the Imam deems it in the interest of the Muslims. Others maintain that it is only allowed when the Muslims are pressed by sheer necessity, such as civil war and the like. As a condition for truce, it may be stipulated that the enemy pay a certain amount of money to the Muslims . . . Such a stipulation (paying of tribute) however, is not obligatory.[2]

Thus, whereas peace treaties were seen as a necessary evil and had to be temporary, they were clearly permissible. Practical willingness to limit warfare and enter into treaties emerged from centuries of Muslim warfare and diplomatic relations with the Byzantines, leading to the development of an intricate web of means of coexistence, which included institutions like *aman*,[3] captive exchanges[4] and formal diplomacy.[5] Although still idealizing war as the normative relationship with the infidel, medieval Islam had in fact honed the tools with which to make peace. Michael Bonner describes the relations on the *tughur* (frontier) as fostering centres for embattled scholars, but at the same time depicts the abode of those embattled scholars – the *ribats* on the Eastern frontiers – as centres 'that became devoted to the arts of peace'.[6] The encounter with the crusaders led to an intensification of the ideal of *jihad*, as for example in the writing of al-Sulami. But

even in his treatise on *jihad*, he did not change the basic rules and thus treaties remained a practical possibility.[7]

The conditions of treaty-making encompassed almost all possible scenarios: (1) from a position of strength either to avoid further bloodshed or, occasionally, to buy time to acquire reinforcements and supplies; (2) from a position of parity in order to settle differences when combat was not desirable; and (3) from a position of weakness in order to make the best of an adverse situation and perhaps gain time for readjustment.[8] During the eighth to tenth century, the Byzantine and Abbasid empires often used captive exchanges as an opening and pretext for truce-making. Nor were these endeavours limited to relations with Eastern Christendom alone. In the twelfth century there were other Muslim–Christian encounters besides the crusades, many of which ended or were regulated by treaty. These ranged from military settlements, including a tributary status in Spain, to commercial treaties with Mediterranean powers.[9] Although all the Muslim legalists emphasized the temporary nature of these agreements, they still spelled out the conditions and tools of peacemaking.

Western Christianity also demonstrated a dichotomy between ideology and practice with respect to war and peace, but its starting point was diametrically opposed to that of Islam. As noted, peace was a religious goal, part of an eschatological programme for the world. It belonged to Christian ritual and, in Augustine's eyes, was one of the aims of the City of God.[10] Medieval Christian ideological adherence to peace, and limitation of warfare, was exemplified by the 'Peace of God' movement, organized and hailed by the Church. The medieval Western notion of peace encompassed Christians alone, viewing war against the infidel – the crusade – as another facet of peace, if not a prerequisite for it.[11] The Church's peace councils gave it the authority to decide who could deploy arms, for what purpose, at whose command, against whom, and when. But at the same time this development suggested that, under certain conditions, the Church now regarded violence as licit.[12] Seeing crusade as the logical outcome of the Peace of God movement, Thomaz Mastnak concluded that Urban II was a peacemaking pope, a lukewarm Gregorian reformer who waged a holy war.[13] Thus, crusade could be seen as an act of love in Christian eyes,[14] and the preaching of this act of love included the rallying of forces to a war of extermination against the infidel enemy, employing concepts like purging and cleansing the holy places.[15] Although the Church preached peace, the practical outcome was war.

In principle, the Holy War against the infidel allowed for no mercy for the vanquished enemy. The preachers described a situation of victory or death.[16] As they did not expect any mercy from their enemy, the crusaders saw no reason to show them mercy. Christian chroniclers described with proud relish bloody victories that included butchering and looting the defeated.[17]

On the other hand, Western Christianity had a long tradition of internal peacemaking by treaties and of conflict resolution accompanied by ceremonial gestures, such as *satisfactio* and *deditio*.[18] Therefore, in facing actual problems of peacemaking – accepting the capitulation of a besieged city, signing a ceasefire

with a city willing to pay tribute to be left in peace, and so on – the crusaders did not encounter a totally unknown situation. Although, ideologically, they saw no need to make peace with the enemy, when they found it profitable to do so, they had in store an arsenal of rituals and usages that had developed in Europe for intra-Christian peace and conflict resolution. Thus, to some extent, like their Muslim foes, the peace-loving Christians felt there was no need to explain the Holy War called by the pope; it was peace that needed a pretext and rationalization. However, in contrast to the Muslim world, for Christianity, it was the idea of Holy War that was new and placed the crusaders in a position in which peacemaking with the infidel was not seen as an option, whereas the notions of peace and of the need for treaty-making were well known.

In addressing the question of treaty-making under such circumstances we must remember that the leaders of the First Crusade were not just charged with religious zeal to free the Holy Land from what they saw as its unlawful inhabitants; they were also down-to-earth military leaders governed by realistic strategic considerations. Therefore, when approached by an enemy willing to surrender under favourable conditions, or proposing a pact that might seem expedient or as forwarding their main goal, it seems that the crusaders' problem was not so much one of overcoming religious or ideological qualms but one of language – cultural language. The main difficulty was to find a mechanism acceptable to both cultures to ensure that both sides would trust and keep an agreement. Not just military, the Muslim–Christian encounter has been rightly defined as one of negotiating cultures.[19] It is the story of these negotiations, in sharp contrast to their hostile ideology, which I seek to tell here.

The starting point for consideration of the details of the peacemaking processes is naturally the agreements themselves, their number, dates and terms. Using mainly Arabic sources, Taeko Nakamura charted a list of seventy-two treaties between 1097 and 1145, a period in which the Franks were dominant, ending with their first serious territorial loss, the fall of Edessa.[20] More recently, my student Shmuel Nussbaum examined the Latin and French sources in addition and arrived at a table of 109 treaties in the 1097 to 1291 period.[21] Although there is a large degree of overlap, by combining both tables and consulting the sources, I arrived at an approximate total of 120 treaties over the two-century period, but with negotiations failing in 11 cases, the final total is 109. The calculation is problematic, because treaties were often renewed and thus the same treaty is counted twice; on the other hand, sometimes negotiations failed and did not in fact end in agreement, although the sources may describe the stages as if they were part of a treaty. But even if the number of treaties is not sufficiently exact for statistical analysis, it suffices for a general impression of the balance of power and to prove that, notwithstanding ideologies of crusade and *jihad*, treaties were a regular phenomenon in the Latin East. Figure 10.1 shows the balance of power that emerges from comparison of the percentage of initiatives for peace as described in the literary sources, based on Nussbaum's findings.



Figure 10.1 The pattern of initiative-taking in peace treaties between Muslims and Christians, 1098–1290

Note: Treaties where the sources do not specify who asked for peace are not included.

1098–1124

During the first two decades of the principality of Antioch's history (1098–1128) the Muslim powers were forced to cultivate a generally submissive and conciliatory relationship with the Franks. The treaties reached included clauses setting tribute payments to the Christians and were, according to Thomas Asbridge, built on the eleventh-century Iberian precedent of the so-called *Taifa* states and their tributary status, known to at least some of the crusaders.[22] For the Muslim side, this situation was familiar from its relations with the Byzantine Empire. Asbridge sees the difference in willingness to make peace not just as one of political power, but of general outlook:

> It is worth noting that the Latins of Antioch did not share their neighbours' willingness to negotiate or purchase peace in times of crisis. When the principality faced disaster in 1105 or 1119, the Franks did not appear to have even tried to negotiate, relying instead upon military force, risking battle even when they lacked resources and manpower.[23]

But when the Muslim side showed willingness to submit to crusader rule, this was usually accepted, notwithstanding the ideal of total war. As the balance of power during the first decade of the Latin kingdom and the Syrian principalities was usually in favour of the Franks, treaties, both of tribute and condominium, were signed and implemented.

Thus, during this period of overwhelming crusader superiority over the Muslim principalities, we find a minority of Frankish requests for agreements with the Muslims, only 15 per cent of a total of 33 requests attested in the literature, as opposed to Muslim initiation of 46 per cent of the agreements.[24]

1127–92

With the unification of Syria under Zengi, Nur al-Din and Saladin, the religious slogan of *jihad* was used as a power-enhancing mechanism to forward their political aims. The gradual unification of Muslim territories, the fall of Edessa in 1144, and the ascendancy of *jihad* have been identified as points of decline on the Christian side.[25] This period saw a shift in the balance of power from crusader superiority until its great defeat at Hattin. The Franks now had to learn to accept that the shoe could be on the other foot. By then, though, a process of acculturation had taught them to accept elements of Eastern usage, and, when necessary, to ask for peace. It is, however, illuminating to note William of Tyre's negative reaction to the signing of a treaty placing them on an equal footing with their adversary, Saladin, in 1180, seven years before the great disaster at the Battle of Hattin: 'The conditions were somewhat humiliating to us, for the truce was concluded on equal terms, with no reservations of importance on our part, a thing which is said never to have happened before.'[26]

The Frankish historian and diplomat thought it permissible to make peace only when the Franks were the victors and found a status of equality humiliating. However, it seems inconceivable that the Franks had never been in a situation of equality, not to mention inferiority, before 1180. That such a shift in diplomatic balance is documented only at a rather late date may stem from the Muslim side's ideological preference for demonstrating its need for a truce even when it was in fact not the weaker party. At the time Saladin's propagandists depicted him as a leader who was pursuing *jihad* and was not making truces from a position of weakness; their explanation was that in this case he had economic motivations for agreeing to a truce. The historian and diplomat William of Tyre saw this shift in diplomatic protocol as a watershed, as marking a new period.

During this period, enhanced Muslim military strength, due to unification under the leadership of Zengi, Nur al-Din and Saladin, is reflected in a reduction of the number of Muslim-initiated requests for agreements from 46 per cent in the previous period to 35 per cent.[27] Note, however, that Saladin in fact fought more intra-Muslim wars to enhance his own rule in Egypt and Syria than *jihad* against the Franks, and it was his great victories at Hattin and Jerusalem that enabled his propagandists to paint him as the ideal Muslim ruler fighting only for the faith.[28]

1193–1250

For the third period, during which the Franks ruled the coastal region and the Muslims ruled the internal region of the Holy Land, the balance of power was largely determined by shifts in internal Ayyubid politics and crusader attempts at incursion on Ayyubid lands, strengthened by crusades from the West.[29] The tiny crusader kingdom did occasionally succeed in obtaining additional territory by treaty (especially from 1129 to 1144), but modern historians usually depict them as clearly inferior to the Ayyubids. The balanced number of peace-agreement-initiating requests seems to point to military parity,[30] or a balance of diplomatic power that enabled the Franks to appear stronger than they were in reality. In general, both this and the preceding period were characterized by a relatively even number of ceasefire initiatives.

1252–90

During the period of the Mamluk sultanate, when the Muslims achieved ascendancy, and before the final defeat of the Latin kingdom, we find cynical use of agreements to push the Franks out of the Latin East. The overriding consideration was what would bring greater benefit: war or peace? Note, however, that the religious definition of *muhadana* made designation of practical needs an integral part of treaty formulation. The Muslim leader, even when he was the stronger party, would explicitly state the necessity that permitted him to seek peace, a convention the triumphant Baybars included in his treaties. During Baybars' reign, when the Franks had to ask for peace time and again and were granted at most an unstable ceasefire, the diplomatic tone emphasized the inferior status of the Franks both in terms of territory and in terms of initiating and paying for the ceasefire. But even then it was necessary to mention the *fidah* – the return of captives by the Franks – because exchange or ransoming of captives was one of the legally accepted pretexts to end war.[31] This period saw the highest proportion of Frankish-initiated requests for ceasefires: 77 per cent of a total of 26 requests.[32]

This periodization of the two-century-long series of negotiations between Muslims and Franks is naturally arbitrary. In his book on crusader castles, which focuses on military encounters, Ronnie Ellenblum suggests a different scheme. Based on the frequency of hostilities, he divides the twelfth century into three stages: 1099–1115, 1116–67 and 1168–87.[33] He sees the second period as one of Frankish military superiority over their Muslim neighbours, and accordingly as a period of relative security for the Franks. His third period includes the unification of Muslim forces under Nur al-Din and Saladin and the subsequent deterioration in Frankish security and, following William of Tyre, 1180–7 is considered a sub-period, one of constant pressure by Saladin on the Franks until their defeat at Hattin.[34] Taking the treaties and peace negotiations as the criterion for periodization, one arrives at comparable but not similar results. As we have seen, William of Tyre, who was contemporary to the treaty of 1180 and well aware

of the military pressure Ellenblum sees as a watershed, still found equality in treaty negotiations to be novel and humiliating. He could not prophesy the fall at Hattin, but still ended his book on a gloomy note, expressing fear for the future.[35] He clearly did not see the 1167–80 period as one of inferior Frankish status.

But whatever scheme one adopts, the data clearly demonstrate a correlation between military–political shifts in the balance of power and requests for ceasefires with the underdog generally seeking cessation of hostilities. Whereas the first and last periods' results are as expected, the state of near equilibrium characterizing the two middle periods does not seem to fit the modern evaluation of the balance of power. With hindsight, the second period is usually seen as one of sharp decline on the Frankish side, and the third period as one of clear Muslim supremacy. Apparently, in contemporary eyes, the picture was different or perhaps was portrayed differently for religious or ideological reasons. Because Muslim ideology accepted a truce only when absolutely necessary,[36] the Muslims employed formal wording that placed them as the underdog long after they were in fact equal to, or even stronger than, the Franks. This might explain the discrepancy between the balance of power in the second half of the twelfth century as perceived by modern historians and as reflected by William of Tyre and statistical analysis.

The political significance of who initiates the request for peace negotiations is emphasized by Baha al-Din's description of the negotiations between Richard the Lionheart and Saladin's representatives in 1192. According to the chronicler, the Muslim mediator al-Adil made a point of noting: 'We did not make any request of you. It was you who asked us,'[37] thereby marking the inferiority of the Latin side.

Comparison of the treaties over the whole period points to some changes in the way agreements were reached over the course of the two-century period of coexistence. If initial contacts were characterized by oral agreements between the sides regarding surrender or lifting of a siege for monetary recompense, often emphasizing the gestures involved, towards the end of the period we find the sides drawing up formal written agreements, with fixed clauses defining the obligations assumed by each. As written treaties are sometimes mentioned during the earlier period too, they must have existed, even if they have not survived. But, more plausibly, the extant treaties from the thirteenth century prove that by then a mutual language had been agreed and a common diplomatic protocol had emerged.[38]

Analysis of the treaties mentioned in literary sources also enables elicitation of the underlying reasons for initiation of ceasefire agreements, revealing that military issues were most prevalent. Other factors promoting Muslim–Frankish agreements were: the need for military cooperation in the face of some common enemy;[39] renewal of expired agreements; economic or internal difficulties, such as lack of rainfall, the low level of the Nile, or the weakening of the regime by opposition forces; or, simply, the realization that no advantage would ensue from further conflict.[40] Not surprisingly, a greater number of treaties is attested both for periods in which one side showed marked superiority and for periods of intensive warfare, making the renewal or signing of treaties a necessity.

Muslim willingness to enter into agreements was largely conditioned by the pragmatic or political needs of the rulers. In the early period, individual leaders of the local principalities acted in their own best interests, as seen from what reportedly motivated Shams al-Khilafa, the governor of Ascalon, who made a truce with Baldwin I in 1111: his being 'more desirous of trading than of fighting and inclined to peaceful and friendly relations and the securing of the safety of travellers'.[41] But whereas in Muslim sources this was viewed as a valid and even honourable pretext, William of Tyre felt that ceasing fighting for economic reasons indicated greed, and he castigated Amalric for his readiness to negotiate a treaty after the conquest of Bilbeis in 1169 because of the large tribute the Egyptians offered.[42] However, this does not mean that the chronicler was unaware of the economic advantages of peace. In another famous diatribe William lamented the end of peace with Egypt:

> From a quiet state of peace [*quieto et tranquillo penitus status*] into what turbulent and anxious condition has an immoderate desire for possessions plunged us! All the resources of Egypt and its immense wealth served our needs; the frontiers of our realm were safe on that side; there was no enemy to be feared on the south. The sea afforded a safe and peaceful passage to those wishing to come to us. Our people could enter the territories of Egypt without fear and carry on commerce and trade under advantageous conditions. On their part, the Egyptians brought to the realm foreign riches and strange commodities unknown to us, were at once an advantage and an honour to us.[43]

Although William admitted that peace had its sunnier sides, for him war was the honourable task of a chivalrous, fighting society. Nonetheless, even these fighting societies engaged in peaceful contacts, as we have seen. Notwithstanding the use of *jihad* to forward political aims under Zengi, Nur al-Din and Saladin, the Ayyubid period (the third period in Figure 10.1) saw many peaceful contacts with the Franks.[44] During the Mamluk period, however, we witness almost cynical use of agreements to push the Franks out of the Latin East. Although we have charted the shifting balance of power and changed historical circumstances in the Latin East as underlying the conventions of treaty-making, note that initiating negotiations is not always a clear-cut sign of objective military inferiority on the local scene, and that the global political situation, the real reason behind a diplomatic move, sometimes receives no mention in the treaty itself.

Thus, for example, as Kedar has recently shown,[45] Ayyubid willingness to extend the treaty with the Latin kingdom in 1204 and to cede Kafr Kanna and Nazareth to the Franks did not stem from the balance of power in the Holy Land itself, but rather from the rumours that had reached the East about the preparations for the Fourth Crusade in the West. It may well have seemed expedient for the Muslim side to make concessions to the Franks in order to prolong the ceasefire; concessions which perhaps later proved unnecessary.[46] Thus the Fourth

Crusade impacted on the balance of power in the Holy Land even though most of its crusaders never landed in Acre.[47]

Similarly, Ibn Wasil's explanation that the Egyptian sultan al-Kamil had to cede Jerusalem to Christian rule in 1229 because he had promised it to Frederick II perhaps sounds like a shallow excuse for a move that seemed irrational to local Muslims in light of the imbalance between Frederick's small military presence (and dwindling local backing) and Ayyubid resources.[48] But to a Muslim leader, aware of the danger of Khwarizmian intervention in Syria and the Holy Land, as well as the still unstable division of the Ayyubid Empire between Saladin's heirs, a treaty with the greatest lay power in Christendom might not have seemed so outlandish.[49] The emperor's naval superiority, grounded in the backing of the Sicilian navy, was not apparent on the local scene, but it was evident to an Egypt-based sultan who well remembered the Latin conquest of Damietta a decade earlier.[50] The global balance of power may well have been the reason why the treaty, which was condemned by both Christian and Muslim contemporary chroniclers because of its religious connotations, was kept for its whole ten-year duration, despite the criticism voiced in both camps.

To this point, we have looked at peacemaking efforts through the prism of the shifting balance of power between the adversaries over the two-century period of Holy War in the Latin East and the impact of economic and political factors, both local and international. It remains to examine the verbal and nonverbal means the parties to the conflict employed to bridge their cultural differences and reach agreements.

Diplomacy

Note, at the outset, the differing conceptions in the Muslim and Christian camps. For the Muslims, negotiations were usually carried out by sending delegates to the enemy camp. For the Christians, the accepted mode of negotiating peace often took place at the highest levels, between the leaders themselves.[51] The need to overcome the cultural gap between the parties enhanced the culture-bridging role played by diplomats, and the emergence of a class of diplomats with special privileges and safeguards comprises an important aspect of peacemaking in the Latin East. From the first encounters between the enemies, and until their conclusion, emissaries played a prominent part in preventing hostilities and achieving agreements. The initiation of negotiations by sending delegates to the enemy camp presupposed a state of immunity, like the Muslim *aman*. This safe-conduct was essential, and although it could often be a risky business to bring tidings or offers to the other side, the envoys usually returned to their own camp unscathed. In the initial stages of drawing up an agreement, emissaries from each side engaged in preparatory talks, whose outcome often depended on their talents. In this case, too, there existed longstanding traditions of polyglot, skilled diplomats passing between the Muslim and Christian camps, some of them former captives, who learned the language and mores of the antagonist while in captivity; these

could be either Christians or Muslims, depending on the circumstances. In the East emissaries were usually chosen from among persons with connections to the ruling elite, at times even members of the royal family. Thus the mediator became a kind of hostage, protected by the safe-conduct granted by the enemy and the assumption that the monarch who dispatched him would consider any injury to him a great loss. Therefore, by its very nature, engaging in a diplomatic mission was indirectly a sign of trust in the enemy who was being approached.

Moreover, the emissary's rank also played a role in negotiations. Sending someone of high rank was a sign of honour; whereas sending somebody of lower rank could be seen as an insult. Perhaps the crusaders in Antioch thought Peter the Hermit a suitable envoy to Kerbogha of Mosul, who was laying siege to the city in 1098, along with the addition of Herluin as a translator. But a shabby hermit did not fit the other party's expectations. Notwithstanding Peter's report to the army that he had offered Kerbogha the option of converting to Christianity, which sounds very doubtful, his appearance alone was probably enough to persuade Kerbogha to refuse any offer.[52] Perhaps his real mission was to suggest a trial by battle with twenty soldiers instead of a total war, or to discuss possible surrender, but it seems in this case that the cultural, rather than the linguistic, gap was the problem.[53] Not surprisingly, the mission failed.

When Shirkuh, Saladin's uncle, wanted to use his captive, Hugh of Caesarea, as a diplomat to Amalric, he described the prerequisites for a mediator:

> You are a great prince of high rank [*nobilis*] and much influence [*clarissimus*] among your own people, nor is there any one of your barons to whom, if free choice were offered me, I would prefer to communicate this secret of mine and make my confidant . . . you are a man of high rank [*homo nobilis es*], as I have said, dear to the king and influential in both word and deed, be the mediator of peace between us.[54]

This flattering description was reported by Hugh himself, who was worried that as a former captive his own people might be suspicious that he 'was more interested in obtaining his own liberty than concerned for the public welfare'. He therefore preferred that another captive, Arnulf of Turbessel, take this task upon himself; however, Hugh joined him for the later stages of negotiations and 'put the final touches' to the treaty.[55]

As one function of the diplomat could also be to identify potential weaknesses in the opposing side during his mission, astuteness in spying out trends in the enemy camp played a role in his selection. Prominent diplomats like Saladin's brother al-Adil (Saphadin in Western sources) and the qadi Fahr-a-Din, who negotiated with Frederick II on behalf of al-Kamil, cultivated friendly relationships with the opposing side. A diplomat's political judgement was taken into account, and his influence certainly surpassed that of a simple message bearer. Polyglot abilities were an advantage, but not a prerequisite. The envoy's status and diplomatic skill and knowledge counted for more.

A well-known instance of the extent to which diplomats could influence the pact-making process is the part played by al-Adil, Hubert Walter, Bishop of Salisbury, and Henry of Champagne (Richard's relative) in the negotiations between Saladin and Richard I in August 1192. We may well disregard the tearful speech of love and admiration attributed to al-Adil by Richard of Devizes, as well as his chronology, but his description of the secret agreement reached without the sick king's knowledge rings true in having al-Adil promise, 'I shall arrange with my brother either for a perpetual peace for you, or at the least for a firm and lasting truce.'[56] The king's sudden recovery placed his ministers in a shaky position, as they had already arranged the treaty terms with al-Adil. Unaware of this agreement, Richard tried to organize an offensive while Hubert Walter and Count Henry did their best to sabotage mobilization of the army.[57] When failure made the king willing to negotiate, this provided the opening the negotiators needed. To their surprise, or so they claimed, they found that al-Adil, who was supposed to be in Jerusalem with Saladin, was in fact near by. Instructed by his colleagues on how to speak to Richard, al-Adil obtained a temporary truce ratified by the giving of hands and returned to his brother to arrange his part of the plot.

Baha al-Din's description of the same encounter proves that al-Adil's sudden appearance was no chance occurrence; he was in fact waiting to be summoned. The *Itinerarium peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi* knows nothing of the devious part played by the mediators but agrees that the truce initiative came from the crusader side and that the king was presented with a written document of a truce obtained by al-Adil: 'The terms were recorded in writing and read out to King Richard, who approved them', presented there as the best terms for which Richard could have hoped.[58]

The important role of the diplomats finds corroboration in Baha al-Din's detailed record of the same events. He noted that Richard was presented with a written draft of the truce as a *fait accompli* and referred the finishing touches, including some cardinal terms, to Henry and 'the others'.[59] Baha al-Din mentions that there was a delay in the oath-taking ceremony, attributed to the fact that the Christians 'do not take an oath after eating', and that they had already eaten that day. This too may have been the diplomats' invention and a way of gaining time to convince Richard. The mediators were apparently successful in setting international policy behind the backs of the rulers who had sent them to negotiate in their name. Thus the messengers who were only supposed to go between the camps grew in importance and became independent policy-makers, using the power bestowed by their connections with the other side.

According to Baha al-Din, Richard had suggested a personal meeting with Saladin to discuss peace terms back in November 1191. Saladin refused, making the counter-proposal that he and Richard should send envoys instead. Although his explanation that it was unseemly for kings to fight after having met, and that the terms ought to be settled by interpreters and messengers before such a meeting could take place, may have been a prevarication to gain time, it also exemplifies the above-mentioned difference in the diplomatic traditions of the two

sides.[60] Richard met Philip August for direct negotiations and treaty-making at Messina in March 1191,[61] and a similar meeting took place between Gaillon and Le Vaudreuil in January 1196.[62] Messengers were not unknown in the West but, apparently, relying on a long tradition of inter-religious diplomacy, the role of diplomats was more prominent in the East. In fact, Richard and Saladin never met except on the battlefield as commanders who did not really meet face-to-face, and it was their diplomats who finally made the treaty between them. Illustrations showing them fighting a duel belong to the realm of myth, not history.[63]

Gestures of conciliation

Another noteworthy aspect of the peacemaking encounters between enemies in the Latin East belongs to the nonverbal realm – gesture and ceremony. Some historians attribute the importance of gestures in the Middle Ages to the weakness of literacy in medieval societies. On the one hand, medieval culture greatly emphasized writing and reading because they were rare and used to spread Scripture; on the other, gestures publicly transmitted political and religious power and endowed legal actions with a living image. Gestures bound together human wills and bodies.[64] This was true for both societies, but the encounter between them emphasized the need for gestures that could be immediately understood and seen by all. In its stress on visual images through television and the internet, modern culture may be closer to the medieval perception of the importance of body language and political rituals than former generations.[65] Set conventions and conciliatory gestures were part of the cultural mechanisms that facilitated peacemaking, or prevented it in the cases where gestures were misunderstood by one of the sides. For effective, fruitful negotiations, a common cultural language had to be found. Some of these gestures of conciliation were learned by acculturation and became a common language; others remained specific to one of the sides and were never transmitted, whereas some were imposed on one side by the other, thus becoming part of the language of power.

Potentially, there could be several stages of peacemaking, each accompanied by its characteristic gestures. Thus, *the capitulation of a city* was signified by flying the conqueror's banner. This gesture occurred in the early encounters between the enemies and was presumably known to both sides. But how did the losing side obtain the banner? This presupposes the holding of some negotiations at an earlier time. These negotiations are usually not spelled out in the chroniclers' descriptions, perhaps because they were often carried out secretly, whereas the official submission had to be done publicly, for all to see. Nor did the problems end there. As each military leader had his own banner, it was important to know whose banner to fly in order to avoid becoming the victim of internal rifts in the victors' camp. Thus the anonymous *Gesta Francorum* claims that both Raymond of St Giles's and Bohemond's banners were flown at Antioch.[66] At Tarsus the rivalry between Tancred and Baldwin over the city's capitulation, which surrendered by flying Tancred's banner in 1097, ended in bloodshed.[67] And in August 1099

crusader rivalry at the siege of Ascalon saved the city from surrender. Richard the Lionheart's tactless behaviour in flying his banner at Acre after its surrender did not alter the city's fate, but marred his relations with his partners during and after the Third Crusade.[68] William of Tyre mentions signs given by the inhabitants of a conquered city spelling out their willingness to convert, but he does not explain what those signs were.[69]

Another self-explanatory gesture understood by both sides was *presenting the victor with the key to the city*. This is shown in illustrations such as that in the fourteenth-century *Grandes chroniques de France*, where the surrender of Acre to Philip Augustus and Richard I of England in 1191 is depicted by the offering of a disproportionately large key to the monarchs.[70] Muslim sources recognized a similar significance in the transfer of keys. The chronicler al-Yunini (1242–1326) described the capitulation of Crac des Chevaliers to Baybars in 1271: 'when Hisn al-Akrad [Crac des Chevaliers] was captured, the lord of Antartus (which belonged to the Templars) wrote to al-Malik al-Zahir [Baybars] to request the making of a truce and sent to him its keys'.[71] This was a symbolic gesture, as the lack of keys did not usually prevent the victorious army from entering the city. The letter to Baybars presumably included the request for a truce and its proposed terms, but the keys were the gesture of surrender.

The long list of cities that entered into treaties with the crusaders during the first years of their rule in the Levant, paying tribute and often retaining their former leaders as dependants of the new ruler, presupposes the holding of negotiations about which most chroniclers remain silent. It seems logical to assume that the vanquished side presented terms of capitulation, both because this was the usual practice in the East before the crusaders' arrival, and because it would be easier for the victorious crusaders just to accept the favourable terms that had been suggested than to negotiate in line with terms unknown in the East.[72] That perhaps explains the continuation of Eastern practices between the victor and the vanquished in the East, such as tribute, gifts and the like.

Just as we do not know exactly how the actual fighting on the battlefield ended, except in cases where the enemy was butchered to total extinction, it is not entirely clear what signalled *a ceasefire*. Elsewhere, I have shown that by 1150 there existed a gesture apparently known to both sides, namely the laying down of arms and clasping the hands, first on one side, then on the other. This is not the same as the modern gesture of capitulation by raising both hands, which signifies inferiority and even humiliation, albeit both gestures share the laying down of weapons as a first step. As opposed to the modern gesture, William of Tyre views the medieval gesture as showing reverence between military leaders and signalling a willingness to stop fighting, but not humiliation.[73] In 1150 the protagonists knew each other beforehand from earlier diplomatic missions and the gesture served as the sign to end fighting and start negotiating. Other Eastern gestures were ineffectual when dealing with a Western Christian army. Thus, at the Battle of Ascalon, the vanquished Egyptians 'threw themselves flat on the ground, not daring to stand against us, so our men slaughtered them as one slaughters beasts

in a shambles'.[74] Neither this gesture nor grasping the victor's leg to beg for mercy evoked any pity in crusader hearts, and the chroniclers make no apologies for killing the vanquished enemy.[75] At the Battle of Dorylaeum (July 1097) the Christian women employed a different gesture of surrender (women were not supposed to be on the battlefield but, during the First Crusade at least, the difference between soldiers and noncombatants was blurred):

> Stunned and terrified by the cruelty of the most hideous killings, girls who were delicate and very nobly born were hastening to get themselves dressed up, they were offering themselves to the Turks so that at least, roused and appeased by love of their beautiful appearance, the Turks might learn to pity their prisoners.[76]

In contrast, the crusaders prided themselves on killing, but not raping, enemy women: 'In regard to the women found in the tents of the foe [Antioch 1098], the Franks did them no evil but drove lances into their bellies.'[77] The Muslim chronicler Imad al-Din al-Isfahâni clearly saw the conquest of women as part of victory and did not spare the reader any descriptive details of their fate.[78] In this case, as in many others, the enemies had distinct cultural languages of war and peace; the vanquished had to learn the nuances of the other's nonverbal language quickly in order to save their lives.

The conclusion of the actual battle was followed by the stage of *initiating negotiations*. One gesture involved was that of *bowing*. Bowing before the ruler is a liminal gesture: a means of introduction that bridges the gap of the unknown at a first meeting between sides.[79] The lower the bow, the greater the humility shown. Koziol classifies bowing as a 'natural' gesture and therefore familiar to both sides:

> To place oneself beneath another person is clearly a sign of inferiority. Indeed this meaning is so widespread among social mammals that one wonders if it does not have some common source, perhaps in their perception of space or in the reinforcement of dependent, infantile behavior. Nevertheless, the kind of inferiority a prostration represents is not inherent in the physical act. Still less does the act convey any information about the world. They are explained in the cultural framework through their analogies with similar liturgical gestures (as one knelt before God or saints).[80]

The only exception to this ranking according to height was the seated ruler: by standing before him, the messengers or captives showed deference, and the ruler's immobility was a sign of his exalted position even though the standing petitioner was higher.

As Koziol has shown in detail for the West, there was a difference between a slight bow, kneeling on one knee or two, and the full-length prostration of a rebel

seeking pardon. We have already seen that, as a gesture of surrender asking for one's life to be spared, this gesture was not effective during the First Crusade. In the East, the usual procedures for initiating treaty-making included bowing, kneeling and the bringing of gifts, generally performed not by the ruler himself, but by proxy, via his messenger. A messenger sent to the Byzantine court or the court of the Abbasid caliph was expected to kiss the ground in front of the ruler and to bow and kneel.[81]

The bowing gestures in both Christianity and Islam originated in the religious sphere and were part of prayer ritual. This has been amply illustrated in the detailed prayer gestures in the West.[82] The religious connotations of prostration were problematic for the Muslims, as *sujud* – the full-fledged *proskynesis* before a person – is forbidden, as it is supposed to be restricted exclusively to the religious sphere. Bowing is therefore misused when performed before anyone other than God, even more so in this case of bowing not just before a human being, but an infidel.[83] Nevertheless, the Byzantine diplomatic protocol insisted on this gesture, so when the Franks and locals met in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, this gesture was well known and understood by both sides.

The above-mentioned difference in height could become part of a power play, as in the case of Muhyi al-Din Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir (1223–93), the head of the royal chancery under Baybars and Qalawun, and a court biographer, who described his part as a diplomat sent to ratify Baybars' treaty with the Latin kingdom in 1268:

> I was an ambassador together with the Amir Kamal al-Din b. Shith to take the king's oath . . . We entered Acre on 24 Shawwal [7 July 1268] and were received by a numerous gathering. The sultan had instructed us not to demean ourselves before [the king] in sitting or speech. When we entered to him, we saw him sitting enthroned together with the Masters [of the orders] and we would not take our seat until a throne was placed for us opposite him.[84]

To this point, many of the gestures of conciliation belong to the sphere of natural human behaviour and, as we have seen, some of its aspects, like gestures of humiliation and issues of height, have universal meaning. But other gestures were certainly culture-specific, and we must inquire how the parties to the conflict learned what they signified to the other side.

This is the case for *gifts*, which were part of the trust-building, deferential steps taken by the parties to negotiations. There was, however, a cultural difference between East and West. In the East bringing gifts was a primary gesture necessary to open negotiations. In one of the Old French manuscripts of William of Tyre's history there is an illustration showing the satraps of the northern principalities extending their gifts of gold, horses and expensive clothes to Baldwin I, who receives them sitting on his throne.[85] The incident depicted is typical of this kind of opening gesture. But even when the Muslim side had the upper hand, it still saw gift-giving as a preliminary stage of negotiations. Thus the messengers

Baybars sent to Acre, who were instructed to behave insultingly to the Frankish ruler, as we saw above,[86] were still dispatched with the gift of twenty of the prisoners of Antioch, priests and monks.[87] When Baybars laid siege to Safed in 1266 he sent the Templars gifts to initiate negotiations for their surrender 'after the custom of the Saracens'. When they refused the gifts and catapulted them back by mangonel, this infuriated Baybars. After conquering the castle he executed all the Templars even though he had previously promised them safe-conduct.[88]

In the West, on the other hand, gifts marked the culmination of the agreement-reaching process, and usually signified the hierarchical relationship between the parties: the more prominent side gave a gift to the lesser, thereby signifying its dependent status. Not to accept was tantamount to effrontery, if not a declaration of war.

Following Marcel Mauss, *Essai sur le don*,[89] anthropologists emphasize the need for reciprocity in gift-giving. As it creates some sort of obligation on the part of the recipient, it is sometimes a dubious blessing. In the words of Arnoud-Jan A. Bijsterveld:

> Gift exchange is defined as a transaction to create, maintain or restore relations between individuals or groups of people. The reciprocity is an essential element of this exchange. A gift has the capacity to create those relationships, because the initial gift obliges the recipient to return some other gift in the future. Because of the counter-gift, gift-giving is not restricted to one occasion: *do ut des*, it is an episode in a continuous social relationship. Gifts and counter-gifts, landed property, money, objects, brides and oblates act as a means of social integration.[90]

If we have seen that, in the encounter between enemies, gift-giving can work to initiate talks or to seal a mutual obligation, according to cultural background, Richard the Lionheart exemplifies what I see as a process of acculturation. When al-Adil initiated peace negotiations by sending Richard 'seven valuable camels and an excellent tent', Richard was severely criticized for accepting these gifts.[91] Later, when Richard wanted to initiate talks with Saladin, he sent him two falcons, specifying what he would like in return, although it is not clear if these were really meant as a gift or as a pretext to spy on the enemy.[92]

The falcon, a hunting bird, was in and of itself a symbol of peace, as hunting was the favourite pastime of non-belligerent warriors among both the Eastern and Western nobility. Hunting – the use of arms outside the battlefield – symbolized peaceful encounters, somewhat similar to modern sport. This is illustrated, for example, by the Bayeux tapestry, where a herald rides with a falcon on his shoulder to prove his peaceful intentions.[93] Usamah Ibn Munqidh's colourful description of the two rivals Amir Muin-al-Din and Fulk, King of Jerusalem, hunting together conveys the same meaning.[94] Thus, if in fact carried out, Richard's gesture, which is not mentioned by the Latin sources, had dual layers of meaning. It is interesting to note that Baha al-Din claims that the gift was accepted only on

the explicit condition that Richard accept a comparable present.[95] At the same time al-Adil made a point of emphasizing that the initiative had come from the English king; in other words, by Oriental standards, he was the weaker party. The gift of a falcon as part of a peace treaty is further illustrated by a Western illumination to William of Tyre's chronicle showing the Hungarian king returning the hostages to Godfrey of Bouillon. The two leaders clasp right hands and a falcon sits on the Hungarian king's arm, this hunting bird being a gift to seal the agreement.[96] The importance of gifts in the Eastern tradition of negotiations is further illuminated by the *Kitab al-Hadaya wa al-Tuhaf* (*The Book of Gifts and Rarities*), apparently compiled a generation before the First Crusade.[97] Gifts presented to Muslim rulers are carefully described, valued and detailed; there was evidently a special treasury where royal, diplomatic gifts were kept and registered.

Another example of mutual acculturation comes from the gesture of *giving the right hand*. Comparison of two treaties, one from 1098 – between the ruler of Azaz and Godfrey of Bouillon – and the other from 1167 – between the Caliph of Egypt and a Frankish emissary – shows a process of mutual acculturation, exemplified by the employment of the Western ceremony of extending the right hand and the Eastern use of gifts. Both cases reflect cultural mediation via outside intervention. In the earlier treaty, a captive Christian wife of the Muslim ruler teaches him Western mores. She instructs him to give Godfrey his right hand rather than to use his preferred Eastern method of messengers bearing gifts, a gesture that did not inspire trust on Godfrey's part. Later Western sources describe Godfrey, as the victorious party, giving gifts as a sign of lordship and supremacy. In the second treaty, the diplomat Hugh of Caesarea forces the caliph to extend his bare hand, contrary to his usage:

> 'Therefore, unless you offer your *bare hand* [my emphasis] we shall be obliged to think that, on your part, there is some reservation or lack of sincerity.' Finally, with extreme unwillingness, as if it detracted from his majesty, yet with a slight smile, which greatly aggrieved the Egyptians, he put his *uncovered hand* into that of Hugh. He repeated, almost syllable by syllable, the words of Hugh as he dictated the formula of the treaty and swore that he would keep the stipulations thereof in good faith, without fraud or evil intent.[98]

The treaty clauses were important, but for the chronicler, William of Tyre, imposing the gesture of giving his right hand was seen as a greater diplomatic victory.

In September 1192, during the protracted negotiations between Richard the Lionheart and Saladin, this basically Western usage for sealing a treaty is attributed to both sides. Thus Baha al-Din claims that Richard, who was too sick to read the draft of the treaty presented to him, said, 'I have no strength to read this, but I herewith make peace and here is my hand,' while Saladin said to the Christian envoys, 'These are the limits of the land that will remain in your hands. If you can

accept these terms, well and good. I give you my hand on it.'[99] Thus, according to the Muslim chronicler, this gesture had become part of the conventions of treaty-making on both sides. Notwithstanding this 'victory' of Western mores of peace gestures in the twelfth century, I think that careful comparison of the few surviving written treaties and earlier treaties in the West and in the East demonstrates the greater influence of Eastern usage in the Latin East. Such a comparison must, however, take into account the tendency of the victorious side to impose its norms on the text and terms of agreement. For the period for which *written* texts are extant, this was usually the Muslim party.[100]

A further source for the ceremonial aspects and nonverbal gestural language of peacemaking encounters is pictorial evidence. One such source is Matthew Paris' illustration of the treaty between Crac and Acre, in which both rulers meet, kneel, extend their hands, and remove their helmets while their forces look on from a distance.[101] The scene clearly represents a Western image of peacemaking, whereas Eastern illustrations of peacemaking emphasize gift-giving and a subservient gesture of bowing, as with the scene depicting Baldwin I from the Old French manuscript of William of Tyre's history, described above. Similarly, the Leningrad manuscript (1225–35) of the illustrated *Maqamat al-Hariri* has a characteristic miniature where the hero of the tales, Abu Zaid, approaches a city governor in a bent posture, arms raised in supplication.[102]

Another major mechanism of treaty-making that required familiarity with the enemy was *ratification by oath*. The use of oaths as a way of ensuring a treaty would be upheld necessitated some knowledge of the enemy's religious tenets and is thus in a way recognition of the other's belief at the supreme moment of distrust, when assurance was most needed. The texts of these oaths, extant for some of the Mamluk treaties, include a detailed list of the religious beliefs that the oath-taker is willing to abrogate should he fail to keep his promises, as well as a self-imposed penance of thirty pilgrimages. Clearly based on local usage, it was necessary to find a way to make an infidel's oath valid. Only one of the extant oaths cited requires swearing on the Gospels, which was the normal Western procedure in oath-taking and belonged to the legal procedures of the Latin kingdom. For the Christians, swearing by touching a relic or a holy book served as a surety, as it made the saint a guarantor of the oath-taker's good faith. But this gesture of touching a holy object had no meaning for the Muslims, for whom the verbal component of the oath was the main one. Even though Saladin and Richard signed a written document described in detail by Baha al-Din,[103] this was not considered sufficient to ensure its endurance. The taking of oaths was an important part of peacemaking, and probably more binding than the written contract. Because both societies were religious, an oath ensuring the involvement of what they saw as holy – be it their tenets of belief or their saints – was considered necessary.

But can we extrapolate from the detailed late thirteenth-century texts of oaths to the earlier oaths taken by crusaders and Muslims? No earlier evidence exists for the content of early twelfth-century oaths, but oath-taking on both sides is

mentioned in the late twelfth century, during the Third Crusade. Joinville (1250), however, describes the same kind of pre-formulated, written oaths as the late Mamluk ones in relating how Louis IX refused to swear because he would never agree to the clause inserted by renegades: 'He should be as dishonoured as a Christian who denies God and his law and in contempt of him, spits on his cross and tramples it underfoot,' and was only persuaded to change his mind by the Patriarch of Jerusalem, who was tortured by the Muslims to this end and promised to take the sin upon himself in addition.[104] The emirs' oath, which included the clause, 'they were to incur the same disgrace as a Saracen who has eaten pork', was checked by Nicole d'Acre, 'a priest who knew their language, and assured him that according to their law they could have devised no oaths that were stronger'.[105] When there was a diplomatic will to compromise, a neutral form could be used, as in the following example from a Latin document from Genoa, clearly translated from Arabic: 'In the name of God the Beneficent, the merciful. May God bless all the Prophets and Have Peace upon them.'[106] This general opening, clearly formulated by a Muslim, could fit any prophets and all three monotheistic religions. The formal language of the oaths, while being a tool to bridge the suspicion between the sides, also made it necessary to learn the other side's religious tenets.

Yet another realm of peacemaking involving gestures was the *concluding stage of negotiations*. In the Christian setting, conflict resolution was achieved not only by one side admitting the other's supremacy; the sign of peace was an act of friendly association – eating and drinking with the other party – and one consequence was the return of the letter of *diffidatio*. When war was over, it was over.[107] Gestures of emotion were part and parcel of treaty-making and expected of the protagonists. In the West public tears were taken as a sign of sincerity,[108] but they would probably have been misunderstood in the case of a religious adversary. In the thirteenth century King Alfonso el Sabio of Spain was able to provide a format for peacemaking that included not only the formal treaty but its accompanying gestures, especially the 'kiss of peace'.[109]

> Men sometimes agree to make peace with one another . . . know all persons who see this instrument, that . . . So and So . . ., and . . . So and So . . . have mutually agreed to keep peace with one another perpetually with regard to the disagreements, disputes, grudges, and insults, of which they have been guilty toward one another in word and in deed . . . And as a mark of the true love and concord which should be preserved between them, they kissed each other before me, notary public, and the witnesses whose names are subscribed to this instrument, and promised and agreed with one another that this peace and concord should forever remain secure, and that they would do nothing against it, or to contravene it, of themselves, or by anyone else either in word, deed or advice, under a penalty of a thousand marks of silver; and whether the penalty is paid or not, this peace and this agreement is to remain forever enduring and valid.[110]

Such a kiss had very little to do with emotions, but was an obligatory part of signing an agreement in the West. The kiss of peace was not part of Muslim cultural heritage, nor was it part of their gestural language. For the Muslims, any physical contact with a ruler was a special privilege. Usually not granted to an infidel mediator or envoy, the decision to grant it even to his co-religionists lay with the ruler.[111] Thus, it did not become part of the shared Muslim–Christian repertoire of gestures in the Latin East.

This was also the case for another significant gesture in the East, the *khil'a* – giving a garment or a horse invested with military meaning to a dependant to signify the transfer of authority and as a special sign of honour – which dates back to antiquity. This is illustrated by the biblical story of Esther, where Mordecai is endowed with a horse that the king has ridden and a garment he has worn, with a herald crying out before him: 'This is what is done for the man whom the king desires to honour!'[112] This may well be an example of ancient Persian usage. It was clearly used in the medieval Islamic world, but not in the Western lay community (although the investiture of clergy may retain something of this old gesture).[113] But it was not a gesture of peace in the medieval West. However, in one of the first treaties between the crusaders and the local northern principalities, Godfrey of Bouillon bestowed on Omar of Azaz a hauberk and a golden helmet. From his perspective, this gesture was part of the feudal gesture of submission, where the recipient proves his inferiority by giving an oath of fidelity and receiving a present. For his part, Omar of Azaz probably accepted this ceremony as the bestowing of authority through a military outfit. Thus, in this case, the misunderstanding of the gesture's meaning by the other side probably facilitated the treaty-making and its accompanying ceremony. Three generations later, after a long process of acculturation, Henry of Champagne asked Saladin to send him a garment that he would wear although it was against Western usage. At this stage, accepting the gift of a *khil'a* was understood by the Western side, but he was certainly cognizant of deviating from his own mores.[114]

The final stage of signing a treaty was its *public proclamation* by a herald. Witness Baha al-Din's description of the proclamation of the treaty of 1192: 'He ordered the herald to proclaim in the encampments and in the markets, "Listen all! Peace has been arranged. Any person from their lands who wishes to enter ours may do so and any person from our lands who wishes to enter theirs may also do so."'[115]

The connection between trade and proclamation of peace was also described by William of Tyre after the surrender of Alexandria and the agreement that both Saladin and Amalric would leave Egypt in 1167:

> Then the herald proclaimed to each cohort and to the public in general that the fighting was at an end; a legal edict was also issued forbidding further molestation of the Alexandrians. As soon as peace was concluded, the people worn down by the hardship of the long-continued siege issued forth rejoicing . . . There was now abundant food, and

> the resumption of trade was granted . . . The Christians, for their part, were no less eager to enter the city so long the object of their desires. Wandering freely about the streets . . . they collected material from which, on their return home, they might often weave stories for their friends and refresh the minds of their listeners with agreeable converse.[116]

The joyous reaction to the proclamation of peace was an important gesture in the West and part of the ceremony.[117] In this case Saladin was 'heralded by the blare of trumpets, the sounds of drums and of every kind of musical instruments, he advanced by bands of singing men . . . and crowds of shouting men at arms'. Noise and music were elements of warfare, as is revealed in both verbal descriptions and illustrations, but they were also part and parcel of the peace. The publicity was apparently supposed to show popular joy at victory and for the achievement of peace. It was indeed a performance, a staged arrangement of power.[118]

Thus, we have traced here the concepts of peace, the balance of power between the sides and how this influenced peacemaking, and the rich gestures and ceremony that accompanied Christian–Muslim negotiations for peace in the Latin East. Ultimately, despite the changes in practical peacemaking during the two centuries in the Latin East from oral agreements to more formal written ones, and mutual acculturation regarding the formal terms and the nonverbal gestures accompanying their implementation, peacemaking remained something that had to be explained and for which apology was necessary. In the Latin East the Christian side neither sought nor achieved its eschatological ideal of peace. From the Muslim perspective, its victory at the end of two centuries of struggle meant that peace had been attained.

Notes

1 *Al-Tabari's Book of Jihad*, Y.S. Ibrahim (tr.), Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 2007, p. 79.
2 Averroes, *Bidãyat al-Mudjtahid*, in Rudolph Peters (tr.), *Jihad in Medieval and Modern Islam*, Religious Texts in Translation Series NISABA 5, Leiden: Brill, 1977, pp. 9–25, at 21. The compulsory nature of the *jihad* is founded on Koran 2:216. *Jihad* can be carried out by a limited number of individuals and cancelled for the remaining Muslims (Koran 9:112, 4:95).
3 Peters (tr.), *Jihad in Medieval and Modern Islam*, p. 13: 'It is only allowed to slay the enemy on the condition that *aman* has not been granted. There is no dissension about this among Muslims. There is controversy, however, concerning the question who is entitled to grant *aman*. The majority of scholars are of the opinion that free Muslim males are also entitled to grant it, but Ibn Madjishun maintains that in this case, it is subject to authorization of the Imam.' See also Majid Khadduri (tr.), *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966.
4 See Yvonne Friedman, *Encounter between Enemies: Captivity and Ransom in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, Leiden: Brill, 2002, ch. 2.
5 For an example, see al-Tabari, *Ta'rikh al-rusul wa'l-muluk*, Joel Kraemer (tr.), [Volume 34 of *The History of Al-Tabari*], Albany: SUNY, 1989, pp. 168–9. For the Byzantine side, see John Haldon, '"Blood and Ink": Some Observations on Byzantine Attitudes towards Warfare and Diplomacy', in Jonathan Shepard and Simon Franklin

(eds), *Byzantine Diplomacy*, Aldershot: Variorum, 1992, pp. 281–94. For the later period, see P.M. Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy (1260–1290)*, Leiden: Brill, 1995, pp. 3–15.

6 M.D. Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 137.

7 For 'Ali ibn Tahir al-Sulami's *Kitab al-Jihad*, see Niall Christie, 'Jerusalem in the *Kitab Al-Jihad* of 'Ali ibn Tahir al-Sulami', *Medieval Encounters* 13, 2007, 209–21.

8 W.B. Bishai, 'Negotiations and Peace Agreements between Muslims and Non-Muslims in Islamic History', in S.A. Hanna (ed.), *Medieval and Middle Eastern Studies in Honor of Aziz Suryal Atiya*, Leiden: Brill, 1972, pp. 50–63, esp. p. 51.

9 Allaudin Samarrai, 'Arabs and Latins in the Middle Ages: Enemies, Partners and Scholars', in D.R. Blanks and Michael Frassetto (eds), *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999, pp. 137–45.

10 Augustine, *De civitate Dei contra paganos*, lib. 19, cap. 11–12.

11 Many historians have written about the connection between the Peace of God movement and the First Crusade. For a recent synthesis, see Tomaz Mastnak, *Crusading Peace: Christendom, the Muslim World, and Western Political Order*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

12 Mastnak, *Crusading Peace*, pp. 10–21. See also Jean Flori, 'De la paix de Dieu à la croisade? Un réexamen', *Crusades* 2, 2003, 1–23, who emphasizes the economic reasons the Church had for promoting a peace that would guard its interests.

13 Mastnak, *Crusading Peace*, p. 89.

14 Jonathan Riley-Smith, 'Crusading as an Act of Love', *History* 65, 1980, 177–92.

15 Penny Cole, '"O, God, the heathen have come into your inheritance" (Ps. 78.1): The Theme of Religious Pollution in Crusade Documents, 1095–1188', in Maya Shatzmiller (ed.), *Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth-Century Syria*, Leiden: Brill, 1993, pp. 84–111.

16 FC 411–12: 'Eia Christi milites, confortamini, nihil metuentes . . . qoud si hic interieritis, beati nimirum eritis. Iamiamque aperta est vobis ianua regni caelestis. Si vivi victores remanseritis, inter omnes Christianos gloriosi fulgebitis, si autem fugere volueritis, Francia equidem longe est a vobis.' Pope Gregory VIII put it simply, *PL* 202, Col. 1542: 'Sive autem supervixerint, sive mortui fuerint.'

17 For example, the descriptions of the slaughter at Ma'arat al-Numan (*GF* 79–80) and Jerusalem (*GF* 91–2). See B.Z. Kedar, 'The Jerusalem Massacre of July 1099 in the Western Historiography of the Crusades', *Crusades* 3, 2004, 15–75.

18 Gerd Althoff, 'Satisfaction: Peculiarities of the Amicable Settlement of Conflicts in the Middle Ages', in Bernhard Jussen (ed.), *Ordering Medieval Society: Perspectives on Intellectual and Practical Modes of Shaping Social Relations*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001, pp. 270–84. Geoffrey Koziol, *Begging Pardon and Favor: Ritual and Political Order in Early Medieval France*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992, p. 15, noted, however: 'If rituals like supplication and peacemaking formed a common language throughout northern France, then different regions spoke different dialects.'

19 R.I. Burns and P.E. Chevedden, *Negotiating Cultures: Bilingual Surrender Treaties in Muslim–Crusader Spain under James the Conqueror*, Leiden: Brill, 1999.

20 Taeko Nakamura, 'Territorial Disputes between Syrian Cities and the Early Crusades: The Struggle for Economic and Political Dominance', in *Beyond the Border: A New Framework for Understanding the Dynamism of Muslim Societies*, Proceedings of an International Symposium, Kyoto, 8–10 October 1999, pp. 126–41.

21 Shmuel Nussbaum, 'Peace Processes between Crusaders and Muslims in the Latin East', unpublished MA thesis, Bar-Ilan University, 2002 (in Hebrew).

22 T.S. Asbridge, *The Creation of the Principality of Antioch, 1098–1130*, Woodbridge: Boydell, 2000, pp. 48–9.
23 Asbridge, *The Creation of the Principality of Antioch*, pp. 49–50.
24 With respect to the remaining 39 per cent, it was impossible to determine which side initiated the agreement. Nakamura's statistics substantiate this finding. He counted 58 agreements: 29 Muslim initiatives (50 per cent), 15 crusader initiatives, and 11 so-called mutual ones. Nakamura, 'Territorial Disputes between Syrian Cities and the Early Crusades'.
25 Carole Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999, pp. 103–17; see also Emmanuel Sivan, *L'Islam et la croisade*, Paris: Maisonneuve, 1968, p. 44.
26 WT 1008: 'humilibus satis quantum ad nos conditionibus inducie, quodque nunquam antea dicitur contigisse, paribus legibus fedus initum est, nichil precipui nostris sibi in ea pactione reservantibus'. Translation by E.A. Babcock and A.C. Krey (trs), *A History of Deeds Done beyond the Sea*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, p. 447. This shows the shift not only in balance of power, but in outlook. Saladin was after *jihad* and was not making truces from a position of weakness; he had an economic motivation for agreeing to a truce.
27 Frankish-initiated requests rose from 15 to 41 per cent. A total of thirty-four agreements are attested for this period.
28 See, among others, Baha al-Din Ibn Shadad, *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, D.S. Richards (tr.), Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, pp. 28–32; *Fath*, *passim*.
29 For example, the treaties of 1192, 1198, 1204 and 1229.
30 Of the sixteen peace-agreement-initiating requests, 38 per cent were Muslim-initiated and 31 per cent Frankish-initiated.
31 Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 43, 59–62, 70.
32 As opposed to only 8 per cent of Muslim-initiated requests.
33 Ronnie Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles and Modern Histories*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 149–64.
34 Ellenblum, *Crusader Castles*, p. 277.
35 WT 1061–2.
36 Note, for example, Qalqashandi's remark when explaining the procedure of drafting a truce: 'So the clerk may draw on them for the terms of truces with which he is perhaps unacquainted – God Most High keep us from needing them.' *Subh al-a'sha fi sina'at al insha* 14, 71 cited in Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, p. 8. This implies that a truce was a necessary evil even when favourable to the Mamluks.
37 Baha al-Din, *The Rare and Excellent History*, p. 156.
38 It is a stroke of luck that al-Qalqashandi saved nine treaties in his book *Subh al-a'sha fi sina't al-insha* and that other members of the Mamluk chancery kept the texts of other treaties (Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, pp. 1–11). Written treaties are mentioned by earlier chroniclers on both sides, but although some of the writers were part of the royal chancery, such as William of Tyre and Imad al-Din al-Isfahâni, they did not cite the treaties verbatim, apparently finding the text less important than the oaths and other relevant gestures.
39 For example, the treaty between Godfrey and Omar of Azaz (1098) and between Amalric and Shawar (1167).
40 The economic incentive, such as dividing crops from conquered areas (1111), was probably prominent in the early period.
41 Abu Ya'la Hamza Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Dhayl ta'rikh dimashq*, H.F. Amedroz (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 1908, p. 172. Translation from H.A.R. Gibb (tr.), *The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades*, London: Luzac, 1932, pp. 109–10; Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, p. 396. For the economic background to treaties, see, for example, the

treaties between Baldwin I and Tughtigin of Damascus in 1108–9, 1111 and 1113, sharing the income from territories held as condominiums, in Ibn al-Qalanisi, 92, 113, 147.

42 WT 919–20, 923–5.

43 WT 924. Translation from Babcock and Krey, *A History of Deeds*, II.375–8.

44 M.A. Köhler, *Allianzen und Verträge zwischen fränkischen und islamischen Herrschern im Vorderen Orient: Eine Studie über das zwischenstaatliche Zusammenleben von 12. bis ins 13. Jahrhundert*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991.

45 B.Z. Kedar, 'The Fourth Crusade's Second Front', in A.E. Laiou (ed.), *Urbs capta: The Fourth Crusade and its Consequences*, Paris: Lethielleux, 2005, pp. 89–110.

46 R.S. Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193–1260*, Albany: SUNY, 1977, pp. 133–4.

47 For an extreme view, see Joshua Prawer, *Histoire du Royaume Latin de Jérusalem*, 2, Paris: Centre Nat. de la Recherche Scient., 1970, I.123. Witness the long debate over who was to blame for the diversion of the crusade in D.E. Queller and S.J. Stratton, 'A Century of Controversy on the Fourth Crusade', *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History* 6, 1969, 233–77. See also D.E. Queller and T.F. Madden, *The Fourth Crusade*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997, p. x: 'The overriding concern of the Latins was no longer making their way to the Holy Land, but consolidating and defending their newly born base in the Levant.'

48 Jamal al-Din Muhammad b. Salim Ibn Wasil (d. 1298), *Mufarrij al-kurub fi akhbar bani ayyub*, 3, Jamal al-Din al-Shyyal (ed.), Cairo: al-Idarat al-'Ammat li-Thiqafa, 1954 (Volumes 4 and 5 edited by S.A.F. Ashur and H.M. Rabi, Cairo: al-Idarat al-'Ammat li-Thiqafa, 1972–7); Francesco Gabrieli (tr.), *Arab Historians of the Crusades*, London: Routledge, 1969, pp. 269–71.

49 Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols*, pp. 195–204. Negotiations with Jalal al-Din Khwarizmshah against al-Kamil had begun already under al-Muazzam in 1226, and in 1228 the Khwarizmians threatened Armenia and al-Nasir Daud tried to make an alliance with them. See also David Abulafia, *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor* (3rd edn), London: Pimlico, 2002 [1998], pp. 182–90, who mainly follows Ibn Wasil's account.

50 J.H. Pryor, 'The Crusade of Emperor Frederick II, 1220–29: The Implication of the Maritime Evidence', *The American Neptune* 52, 1992, 113–32. I thank John Pryor for sending me his illuminating article.

51 See note 99 below for the negotiations between Saladin and Richard the Lionheart.

52 *GF* 66.

53 RA 79, 81; AA 4, 44. Albert describes Peter as 'small in size but great in worth', but Kerbogha apparently did not appreciate his greatness. See John France, *Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 280.

54 WT 905–6: 'Magnus princeps es, nobilis et apud tuos clarissimus, nec est de vestris principibus quispiam, si libera michi daretur optio, cui magis hoc meum communicare secretum cupiam et verbi huius participem constituere . . . Homo nobilis es, ut dixi, regi carus, sermone potens et opere: esto inter nos pacis mediator.' Translation from Babcock and Krey (trs), *A History of Deeds*, II.339–40.

55 WT 907: 'novissimam manum et finem placitum apposuit'.

56 Richard of Devizes, *The Chronicle of Richard of Devizes of the Time of King Richard the First*, J.T. Appleby (ed. and tr.), London: Nelson's Medieval Texts, 1963, p. 78: 'Vel pacem perpetuam cum fratre meo uobis adquiram, uel ad minus indutias bonas et diuturnas.' Translation by Appleby.

57 Richard of Devizes, pp. 82–3.

58 *Itinerarium peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, in *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I*, William Stubbs (ed.), Rolls Series 38, 2, London: Longman,

1864–5, I.429: 'Harum formam induciarum in scripturam redactam, sibi recitatam, rex Ricardus annuit observandam.' Translation from H.J. Nicholson (tr.), *Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997, pp. 371–2.
59 Baha al-Din, *The Rare and Excellent History*, pp. 230–2.
60 Baha al-Din, *The Rare and Excellent History*, p. 193.
61 Pierre Chaplais, *English Diplomatic Practice in the Middle Ages*, London: Continuum, 2003, p. 69.
62 Chaplais, *English Democratic Practice*, p. 74.
63 See, for example, the famous marginal illustration in the Lutrell Psalter showing them fighting face-to-face; and Debra Higgs, *Saracens, Demons and Jews: Making Monsters in Medieval Arts*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003, p. 167.
64 J.C. Schmitt, 'The Language of Gestures in the West: Third to Thirteenth Centuries', in J.N. Bremmer and Herman Roodenburg (eds), *A Cultural History of Gesture*, Ithaca: Polity Press, 1991, pp. 59–70, esp. p. 60.
65 Volker Kapp (ed.), *Die Sprache der Zeichen und Bilder: Rhetoric und nonverbale kommunikation in der frühen Neuzeit*, Marburg: Hitzeroth, 1990, pp. 7–11.
66 *GF* 71.
67 AA 150–8.
68 Richard of Devizes, pp. 46–7; Otto of St Blasien, *Chronicon*, A. Hofmeister (ed.), *MGH* Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum 46, Hanover: Hahn, 1912, p. 54. For the political consequences of hurling Leopold of Austria's banner into the ditch, see J.P. Huffman, *The Social Politics of Medieval Diplomacy: Anglo-German Relations (1066–1307)*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000, p. 138.
69 WT 675: 'occupant violenter, civibus qui ibi reperti sunt non parcentes, nisi forte qui ex eis verbo vel habitu vel quovis signo christiane professionis se esse sectatorem designaret'.
70 Surrender of Acre to Philip Augustus and Richard the Lionheart, king of England (BnF, FR 2813), fol. 238v. http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/91/Philippe_Auguste_et_Richard_Acre.jpg.
71 Al-Yunini, *Dhayl mir'at al-zaman*, 4, Hyderabad: Dar al-Maaref Osmania, 1955, II.669–70; Holt (tr.), *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, p. 48.
72 In her forthcoming book, Milka Rubin argues that the same happened during the Muslim conquest in the seventh century, when the capitulating Byzantine generals formulated the treaties of *aman*: that is, they knew how to formulate the treaties and presented the conquerors with ready-made documents. I thank Dr Rubin for sharing her thoughts with me before publication.
73 WT 784: 'repositis armis et iunctis alternatim ad latus manibus signum exhibens reverentie'. See Yvonne Friedman, 'Gestures of Conciliation: Peacemaking Endeavors in the Latin East', in Iris Shagrir, Ronnie Ellenblum and Jonathan Riley-Smith (eds), *In laudem Hierosolymitani: Studies for B.Z. Kedar*, *Crusades-Subsidia* 1, 2008, 31–48.
74 *GF* 96: 'iactabant se in terram, non audentes erigere se contra nos. Nostri igitur illos detruncabant, sicut aliquis detruncat animalia ad macellum'. Translation by Rosalind Hill.
75 B.Z. Kedar, 'The Jerusalem Massacre of July 1099 in the Western Historiography of the Crusades', *Crusades* 3, 2004, 15–75.
76 AA 130: 'Hac crudelitate atrocissime necis stupefacte et pauide tenere puelle et nobilissime, uestibus ornari festinabant, Turcis se offerebant, ut saltem amore honestarum formarum accensi et placati, discant captiuis misereri.' Translation by S.B. Edgington.
77 FC 257: 'Mulieribus in tentoriis eorum inventis, nihil aliud mali eis Franci fecerunt, excepto quod lanceas suas in ventres earum infixerunt.'
78 *Fath*, p. 34.

79 B.D. Palmer, 'Gestures of Greeting: Annunciations, Sacred and Secular', in Clifford Davidson (ed.), *Gesture in Medieval Drama and Art*, Early Drama, Art and Music Monograph Series 28, Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 2001, pp. 128–57.
80 Geoffrey Koziol, *Begging Pardon and Favor: Ritual and Political Order in Early Medieval France*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992, p. 301.
81 See also al-Tabari, *Tarikh al-rusul wa'l muluk*; David Waines (tr.), *The History of Al-Tabari: The Revolt of the Zanj* [Volume 36 of *The History of Al-Tabari*], Albany: SUNY, 1991, p. 101.
82 Peter the Chanter, *De penitentia*, in Richard Trexler (ed.), *The Christian at Prayer: An Illustrated Prayer Manual Attributed to Peter the Chanter (d. 1197)*, Binghamton: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1987, esp. pp. 54–5.
83 Roberto Tottoli, 'Bowing and Prostration', *Medieval Encounter* 5.1, 1999, 99–111.
84 Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, p. 70.
85 Armenian satraps offering gifts to negotiate a treaty, William of Tyre, *History of Outremer* [Old French translation], Paris: Bibliothèque nationale, MS fr. 9084, fol. 42r.
86 Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, p. 70.
87 Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, p. 70.
88 The Templar of Tyre, 'Chronique du Templier de Tyr', in *Les Gestes des Chîprois: Recueil de chroniques françaises écrites en orient aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles*, Gaston Raynaud (ed.), Geneva: Zeller 1887, #346.
89 Marcel Mauss, *Essai sur le don, forme archaique de l'exchange, in Sociologie et Anthropologie*, Ian Cunnison (tr.), as *The Gift*, London: Cohen and West, 1966 [1925].
90 A.-J.A. Bijsterveld, 'The Medieval Gift as Agent of a Social Bonding and Political Power: A Comparative Approach', in Esther Cohen and Mayke de Jong (eds), *Medieval Transformations*, Leiden: Brill, 2001, pp. 123–56.
91 *Itinerarium peregrinorum*, I.296: 'septem camelos pretiosos et tentorium optimum'. Nicholson (tr.), *Chronicle of the Third Crusade*, p. 273. See also Ambroise, *Estoire de la guerre sainte*, 2, Marianne Ailes and Malcolm Barber (eds), Marianne Ailes (tr.), Woodbridge: Boydell, 2003, lines 7410–11.
92 Baha al-Din, *The Rare and Excellent History*, pp. 155–6: According to Baha al-Din, the king said: 'It is the custom of princes when they camp close to another to exchange gifts. I have something suitable for the sultan and beg permission to convey it to him.' Al-Adil replied, 'You may do that on condition that you accept a comparable present.' The envoy then asked for fowls to feed the birds, and al-Adil joked, 'So the king needs chicken and fowls and wishes to get them from us on this pretext.' The conversation ended with al-Adil emphasizing that the initiative for talks came from the crusaders.
93 Wolfgang Grape, *The Bayeux Tapestry: Monument to a Norman Triumph*, Munich: Prestel, 1994, p. 92.
94 Usamah ibn Munqidh, *Kitāb al-i'tibār*; P.K. Hitti (tr.), *An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades: Memoirs of Usamah ibn-Munqidh*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1929, p. 226: 'When I was in the company of al-Amir Muin-al-Din to 'Akka to the king of Franks, Fulk, son of Fulk, we saw a Genoese . . . He brought with him a large molted falcon. Al-Amir Muin-al-Din asked the king to give him that falcon. The king took it with the bitch from the Genoese and gave them to al-Amir Muin-al-Din.'
95 Hitti (tr.), *An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades*, p. 226.
96 Paris: Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS fr. 9081, fol. 16v: Godfrey and King of Hungary.
97 *Kitab al-Hadaya wa al-Tuhaf*, Ghada al Hijjawi al-Qaddumi (tr.) as *Book of Gifts and*

Rarities, Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs 29, Cambridge, MA: Harvard CMES, 1996.

98 WT 889: '"Propterea aut nudam dabis, aut fictum aliquid et minus puritatis habens ex parte tua cogemur opinari." Tunc demum invitus plurimum et quasi maiestati detrahens, subridens tamen, quod multum egre tulerunt Egyptii dexteram suam in manum domini Hugonis nudam prebuit, eundem Hugonem, pactorem formam determinantem, eisdem pene sillabis sequens, tenorem conventorum bona fide, sine fraude et malo ingenio se observaturum contestans.'

99 Baha al-Din, *The Rare and Excellent History*, pp. 229, 230–1.

100 The opposite appears to have been true in Spain, where the Christians were the victors. As we have no extant written treaties from the period when the Franks clearly had the upper hand, it cannot be proved that such was the case in the East, although we have seen that in the sphere of nonverbal diplomatic language, the Latins did indeed impose their mores on the other side.

101 Cambridge: Corpus Christi College, MS 16, fol. 138v.

102 William of Tyre, *History of Outremer* [Old French translation], Bibliothèque nationale, MS fr. 9084, fol. 42r; Abu Zayd before the governor of Mevr, *Maqamat al-Hariri*: Thirty-eighth Maqama, Leningrad: Oriental Institute, Academy of Sciences, MS S23.

103 Baha al-Din, *The Rare and Excellent History*, p. 229: 'the draft treaty was drawn up, in which the conditions were recorded and peace for three years, from the date of the document, namely, Tuesday 21 Shaban 588'. (Imad al-Din, the secretary who actually drew up the treaty, has 21 Shaban (1 September 1192) for a period of three years and eight months. See *Fath*, p. 436.)

104 Jean de Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis: credo et lettre à Louis X*, N. de Wailly (ed. and tr.), Paris: Hachette, 1868, p. 160: 'il voulait être aussi honni que le chrétien qui renie Dieu et sa loi, et qui en mépris de Dieu crache sur la Croix et marche dessus'. Translation by M.R.B. Shaw, *Joinville and Villehardouin: Chronicles of the Crusades*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963, pp. 254–5.

105 Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, p. 160: 'il voulaient être aussi honnis que le Sarrasin qui mange de la chair de porc . . . Nicole d'Acre, qui savait le sarrasinois, dit qu'ils ne les pouvaient faire plus forts selon leur loi'.

106 Michele Amari, *Nuovi ricordi arabici su la storia di Genova*, Genova: Tipografica del R. Istituto sordo-muti, 1878, Doc. I, 1–5, pp. 45–75. See also Samarrai, 'Arabs and Latins in the Middle Ages', pp. 140–1.

107 Otto Brunner, *Land and Lordship*, Howard Kaminsky and James van Horn Melton (trs), Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992, pp. 63, 90.

108 Nicolas Offenstadt, 'The Rituals of Peace during the Civil War in France, 1409–19: Politics and the Public Sphere', in Tim Thornton (ed.), *Social Attitudes and Political Structures in the Fifteenth Century*, Thrupp: Sutton, 2000, pp. 88–100.

109 For the kiss of peace in Western European treaty-making, see Kiril Petkov, *The Kiss of Peace: Ritual, Self and Society in the High and Late Medieval West*, Leiden: Brill, 2003.

110 Alfonso X 'el sabio', *Las Siete Partidas del Rey Don Alfonso el sabio*, Madrid: La Imprenta Real, 1807; translation by S.P. Scott (tr.), *Las Siete Partidas*, Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, 1931, 3.13.82.

111 Baha al-Din saw Saladin's departure from this behaviour as a special sign of modesty: 'Whenever the sultan shook hands with someone he would not let go his hand until that person had taken the initiative to do so' (*The Rare and Excellent History*, p. 35).

112 Esther 6:9.

113 G.R.G Hambly, 'From Baghdad to Bukhara, from Ghazna to Delhi: The Khil'a Ceremony in the Transmission of Kingly Pomp and Circumstance', in Stewart Gordon (ed.), *Robes and Honor: The Medieval World of Investiture*, The New Middle Ages, Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 95–135.

114 'Izz al-Din 'Ali b. Abi al-Karm Muhammad Ibn al-Athir al-Jaziri (1160–1233), *al-Kamil fi al-ta'rikh*, 'Umar al-Tadmuri (ed.), Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabf, 2001; translated by D.S. Richards (tr.) as *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir for the Crusading Period*, Part 2, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, p. 397: 'You know that wearing a robe and a tall bonnet we hold to be shameful, but I shall wear them from you out of love for you.'

115 Baha al-Din, *The Rare and Excellent History*, p. 231. See also Nicolas Offenstadt, *Faire la paix au Moyen Age: discours et gestes de paix pendant la guerre de Cent Ans*, Paris: Odile Jacob, 2007, pp. 197–201, 240–5.

116 WT 907: 'Indicitur ergo voce preconia cohortibus singulis et omnibus generaliter preliandi finis et per legem edictalem ne Alexandrinis inferatur molestia interdicitur. Egrediuntur igitur concessa pace letantes qui diuturna fuerant obsidione macerati angustiasque . . . inventa etiam alimentorum copia et commerciorum libertate permissa . . . nostri quoque non segnius urbem ingrediuntur optatam et liberis discursibus vias . . . colligunt unde ad propria reversi suis aliquando texere possint historias et audientium animos gratis confabulationibus recreare.' Translation from Babcock and Krey (trs), *A History of Deeds*, II.341–2.

117 Offenstadt, 'Rituals of Peace', pp. 88–100.

118 Jacoba Van Leeuwen, *Symbolic Communication in Late Medieval Towns*, Mediaevalia Lovaniensia Series I, Studia 37, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2006, p. viii.

AFTERWORD

Bernard Hamilton

The states which were established in the Near East as a consequence of the First Crusade remained, in part at least, in Western control for almost 200 years, far longer than many of the colonies acquired by Western powers in the modern period. This collection of essays examines some of the ways in which the Frankish settlers and their Islamic and Eastern Christian subjects and neighbours influenced each other.

During much, possibly most, of the time that they were in the East, the Franks were not at war with the Islamic powers. Although both sides regarded peace with unbelievers to be ideologically unsound, practical considerations often made it necessary. Two of the essays in this book examine this paradox.

Yehoshu Frenkel demonstrates how slowly the Muslim rulers of Syria and Egypt reacted to the crusading conquests by reviving the concept of *jihad* and how, even after the Holy War had been promoted by Nur al-Din, it did not in any sense receive unqualified support from the other Islamic powers in the Near East. For much of the time political divisions within Islam took precedence over the prosecution of the *jihad*, but there was also a desire on the part of many Muslim rulers for peaceful coexistence with the Franks. This was perhaps inevitable because much of the prosperity of Egypt in particular depended on peaceful trade with Western Europe, conducted by the maritime cities of Italy, which had a strong financial interest in the preservation of the crusader states, where they enjoyed privileged status.

Similarly, on the Frankish side, ideology was often subordinated to practical considerations. The Franks were willing to form alliances with some Muslim powers from the early years of the twelfth century as part of their defence strategy. They also wished to promote peaceful trade contacts with the neighbouring Muslim powers, because this would ensure them the protection of the Italian communes, which was essential because they had no navy of their own. But above all the Frankish rulers wanted peace from incursions which damaged their agricultural economy and disrupted the pilgrimage routes which were their ideological *raison d'être*. Yvonne Friedman, in the final essay in this book, has explained that although it was ideologically difficult for either side to agree to a permanent peace, protocols were devised by which truces might be arranged

between Franks and Muslims for limited periods. About 120 truces of this kind were made between the Franks and Muslims between 1100 and 1291, roughly one every eighteen months.

Yet, although arguably more time was spent at peace than at war, this did not mean that either side could disarm. Truces were always fragile, so fortifications had to be built, and warriors trained and armed. John France, in the opening essay in this collection, which is a masterclass on warfare in the crusading period, demonstrates very clearly how the terrain of the Near East and the tactics of Islamic armies inevitably brought about important changes in Frankish military practice, which had long-term effects on the art of war in Western Europe as well as in the Near East. A particularly important development was the foundation of the military orders, which produced a class of full-time professional soldiers, hitherto virtually unknown in medieval Western Europe. He concludes his article with an important caveat: both Christians and Muslims were capable of committing atrocities, such as the Christian massacre of the Muslims of Jerusalem in 1099 and Zengi's massacre of the Latins of Edessa in 1144, but 'while war was savage it was never total'.

All these essays are concerned with the theme of interaction: what effect did Near Eastern societies have on Frankish settlers and what effect did those settlers have on the peoples among whom they lived and with whom they came in contact? Religious differences were important in the case of relations between Franks and Muslims. Sini Kangas examines some aspects of this conflict of faith. Christianity and Islam had a great deal in common: both were monotheistic and had almost identical traditions of early world history from Adam to Abraham. Because of this similarity of beliefs, neither confession could dismiss the other's faith as completely false. Nevertheless, Christians, who believed that Jesus was the incarnate Son of God, could not accept that God had given a different revelation to Muhammad, and therefore rejected those parts of his teaching which did not conform to that of Christ. Similarly, although Muslims taught that Jesus was a prophet sent by God, they could not accept that God had given him a message which differed significantly from that given to Muhammad. In the Islamic view, all prophets brought men the same divine message, though it was given in different languages and in different cultural contexts, and the message of Jesus had been identical with that of Muhammad. It therefore followed that when the Christian Scriptures gave a different account of the life and teachings of Jesus from that contained in the Quran, such passages must be rejected as a corruption of the truth introduced by Jesus' followers. Consequently, both Christians and Muslims tended to explain each other's faith as an heretical version of their own: that is, they regarded it as a corrupt version of a true religion, not as a completely false religion. Common ground was found in the respect with which some people on each side sometimes regarded each other's conduct. For example, Frankish and Islamic soldiers, at least among the officer class about whom we are best informed, often had great respect for each other. Emperor Frederick II, who was also King of Jerusalem, is said to have knighted Fakr al-Din, the envoy of Sultan al-Kamil,

c.1227. Knighthood was an integral part of the Christian ethic of chivalry, but no requirement was made of Fakr al-Din to change his faith: as a knight, he remained a Muslim and, indeed, became commander of the Egyptian army at the time of Louis IX's crusade to Damietta in 1249. We know about him from Joinville's account of that campaign.

Although some intermarriage did take place between Franks and Muslims, such relationships were lacking in parity: in the Frankish states a Muslim who married a Christian had to become a Christian, and conversely in the neighbouring Muslim states a Christian who married a Muslim had first to become a Muslim. This did not promote cultural assimilation. No parallel barriers existed between Western settlers, who were all Latin Christians, and indigenous Eastern Christians. In this regard the Franks made no distinction between Syrian and Greek Orthodox Christians who were in full communion with Rome, and members of the separated Eastern Churches – the Armenians, Jacobites and Maronites – whom the Western Church considered schismatic. This tolerance was, no doubt, partly a matter of necessity because the first groups of Western settlers were predominantly male. There must have been a high degree of intermarriage between the Franks and indigenous Christians of all confessions, but in the case of Frankish burgesses the evidence is largely inferential. The lives of the Frankish nobility are better documented and the sources show that the majority of those who married Eastern Christians chose Armenian wives and husbands. This was particularly true, of course, among those living in the northern states of Antioch and Edessa. The Armenians were the only Eastern Christians (apart from the Maronites of Lebanon) who had a landed aristocracy, so such marriages were not considered disparaging by the Frankish nobility. This phenomenon is examined by Natasha Hodgson, who shows that such alliances were not without problems. The Frankish lords wanted not only Armenian brides, but often their lands, and this could lead to conflict. But such marriages could also cause problems to the Franks, because the Armenian sons of mixed marriages could have claims to fiefs in Frankish territories and, in the case of Prince Raymond Rupen of Cilicia in 1201, to the principality of Antioch, a claim which led to the long War of the Antiochene Succession. But if intermarriage between Franks and Armenians did not always lead to political harmony, it did sometimes facilitate cultural assimilation. Thus Queen Melisende of Jerusalem, the daughter of Baldwin II and his Armenian wife Morfia, was sympathetic to her mother's Church, and it is surely not a coincidence that the Armenian cathedral of St James in Jerusalem was built by masons trained in the Western tradition very near to the royal palace.

The most important Christian power in the Eastern Mediterranean was the Byzantine Empire. Urban II had preached the crusade in 1095 in response to an appeal from Emperor Alexios I for Western mercenaries, and there seems little doubt that the pope considered that the Seljuk Turks, who had occupied much of Asia Minor after their victory at Manzikert in 1071, posed a potential threat to Christendom as a whole. The last Muslim strongholds in Sicily had only been taken by the pope's Norman vassals in 1091 and the pope was unable to feel

complacent about fresh Islamic advances in the Mediterranean world. Urban succeeded in this aim: it is too often forgotten both by Western historians and by Byzantinists that the victories of the First Crusade in Anatolia enabled the Comneni to recover Western Asia Minor, and that this in turn allowed Byzantium to remain an important power in the twelfth century.

Two of the essays in this volume deal with the crusading movement and Byzantium. Western opinion was very divided about the response of the Byzantines to the crusade: some observers considered that although the Byzantines had derived considerable benefits from the First Crusade, they had failed to give it the wholehearted support which, as fellow Christians, they should have done; others were favourably impressed by the high civilisation and the military capacity and organisation of the Byzantine world. These different reactions are considered by Léan Ní Chléirigh, who demonstrates that these attitudes did not grow up during the twelfth century, but were to be found among Western European crusade chroniclers from the start.

Chris Wright's essay covers the whole span of Western–Byzantine relations from 1095 to 1453. This is a very carefully nuanced piece of work, considering the impact of the crusades on the ideology of the Byzantine state. The emperors, who had ruled in Constantinople in unbroken succession from Constantine the Great, claimed to be the sole divinely sanctioned secular power in the world. In theory all men should acknowledge their rule as vice-gerents of God in temporal affairs: if non-Christians failed to do so, that was a consequence of original sin which prevented them from understanding God's design for the world; but Christians who failed to acknowledge the emperor's unique authority showed a deliberate disregard of God's will. Although the emperors never modified their claims, they were manifestly at variance with political reality after 1204, when Byzantine power gradually declined until the empire became a city-state with control over a few outposts, such as Mistra. But Chris Wright argues that the crusade movement caused Byzantium to be marginalised right from the start, by having as its goal the liberation of Jerusalem, an objective which the Byzantines did not share, and that the Fourth Crusade exacerbated but did not cause that marginalisation. This is an analysis that deserves very serious consideration.

Byzantium, the West and Islamic society all shared a common intellectual heritage, deriving from classical Greece. Although it is undoubtedly true that the Byzantine and Islamic civilisations had been far more advanced than that of Western Christendom in the centuries before 1100, that was no longer the case in the age of the crusades, which coincided with the complex movement that is often called the twelfth-century Renaissance. Western civilisation began to compete on equal terms with those of its Byzantine and Islamic neighbours and by the end of the thirteenth century it had become more dynamic than either of them. Some late nineteenth-century scholars who wrote about the age of the crusades, such as Stanley Lane-Poole, were so impressed by the civilisation of medieval Islam that they tended automatically to disparage Western intellectual achievements, and their legacy still underlies some common assumptions about

certain aspects of society in the crusader states. It is a widely held opinion, for example, that Islamic medicine was superior to Frankish medical knowledge in twelfth-century Syria. Susan B. Edgington, following in the pioneering footsteps of Piers Mitchell, has critically examined the evidence for this assumption in her essay. She rightly draws attention to the fact that the revival of medical studies in Western Europe antedates the crusades by almost a generation, through the work of Constantine the African at Monte Cassino from 1077, whose translations were used in the schools of Salerno. She also shows that from the earliest years of Frankish settlement in the Levant, Western doctors were not necessarily inferior in knowledge and clinical treatment to their Islamic colleagues. 'A study of the crusading armies suggests that they brought with them surgeons who were well up to the demands of battlefield surgery,' she comments.

One of the most complex and controversial areas of study in the society of the Latin East is that of ecclesiastical art and architecture. How far was the Gothic style which came to dominate Western ecclesiastical architecture in the central Middle Ages influenced by developments which originated in the crusader states? How far was Frankish architecture and sculpture in the Levant the work of indigenous craftsmen trained in the Western tradition? How far was it dependent on skilled masons and sculptors from Western Europe? Jürgen Krüger considers issues of this kind in his essay, with special reference to the church of the Holy Sepulchre, the spiritual focus of the crusading movement, which had a wide influence throughout the whole of Latin Christendom during the twelfth century.

The crusading movement was an expression of the unity of the Latin West, a unity which, *pace* the Western Empire of the Salians and the Hohenstaufen, had no political identity. Yet the crusading participants were unable to set aside their local cultural characteristics completely. This was particularly true of the linguistic divisions which existed in crusader armies. There is no doubt that this could give rise to practical problems, as the Provençal contingent found on the First Crusade. Alan V. Murray, in a very trenchant essay, shows that although divisions of this kind existed, they were not central to the conduct of the crusades, and that although they were mentioned by contemporary chroniclers, they did not attach any great significance to them. This changed when historians writing national histories used these sources and highlighted the contributions made to crusading by their fellow countrymen. This trend continued until comparatively recent times and, in a completely anachronistic way, rulers like Richard I of England, Louis IX of France and Frederick Barbarossa have been treated as national heroes because of their crusading activities.

This collection of essays might justly be subtitled 'Crusading Paradoxes'. The contributors have shown the complexity of the issues they discuss, and the reader is left with a vivid impression of the cultural diversity of the crusader states, where Christians and Muslims, Latins, Greeks and Armenians coexisted, not without tensions and violence, but for much of the time with a remarkable degree of cooperation and cultural interdependence.

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